風(fēng)投商阿施密特·辛達(dá)納認(rèn)為，一些頂尖硅谷公司的成功得益于他們的技術(shù)洞察力。

在2013年和Foundation Capital分道揚(yáng)鑣后，辛達(dá)納決定嘗試一種新的投資策略——支持敢于承擔(dān)技術(shù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)而非市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的創(chuàng)業(yè)者。

他的公司Engineering Capital為致力于解決軟件和核心IT基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施空間技術(shù)問(wèn)題的公司提供種子輪投資。他為首個(gè)基金籌集了3200萬(wàn)美元，第二個(gè)基金籌集了5000萬(wàn)美元，第二個(gè)基金已經(jīng)在2018年第二季度開(kāi)始投資。

“大部分投資公司關(guān)注的是市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。”辛達(dá)納說(shuō)?！耙簿褪钦f(shuō)，他們擅長(zhǎng)的是判斷公司什么時(shí)候有發(fā)展?jié)摿?，什么時(shí)候應(yīng)當(dāng)抓住機(jī)會(huì)進(jìn)行投資。而我現(xiàn)在的做法恰恰相反。我的思路是，‘如果我們認(rèn)為人們會(huì)樂(lè)于看到有人能夠解決這個(gè)技術(shù)問(wèn)題，而且僅僅在這種情況下我們才進(jìn)行投資。’”

Engineering Capital為公司提供的通常是首筆機(jī)構(gòu)投資資金，其投資對(duì)象包括Rubrik、Menlo Security、Prismo Systems、Palerra（被甲骨文公司收購(gòu)）和Netsil （被Nutanix收購(gòu)）。

辛達(dá)納告訴《財(cái)富》雜志什么是擁有技術(shù)洞察力、如何在種子投資市場(chǎng)中應(yīng)對(duì)不平衡的市場(chǎng)力量，以及他為什么覺(jué)得投資不再是生命周期型的行業(yè)。

《財(cái)富》：你在尋找投資對(duì)象時(shí)，希望公司及其創(chuàng)始人擁有哪些具體特征？

辛達(dá)納：我會(huì)著重考慮以下幾點(diǎn)。第一點(diǎn)是技術(shù)洞察力。每家公司都稱自己是技術(shù)公司，所以我指的是其中一小部分我認(rèn)為具有“技術(shù)洞察力”的公司。按照我的概念，谷歌是這樣的公司，F(xiàn)acebook不是。

第二，我希望投資對(duì)象能夠采用高資本效率的方式解決其問(wèn)題。我的投資對(duì)象都是軟件公司，一個(gè)五至七人的小團(tuán)隊(duì)可以做出一個(gè)產(chǎn)品并在種子輪創(chuàng)造營(yíng)收。這在企業(yè)領(lǐng)域并不常見(jiàn)。我相信一個(gè)技術(shù)水平高、商業(yè)能力強(qiáng)的小團(tuán)隊(duì)可以在種子輪融資中打造一個(gè)企業(yè)產(chǎn)品。從風(fēng)投戰(zhàn)略的角度考慮，我的主要投資就是公司資本效率比較高的這個(gè)階段。

公司創(chuàng)始人如何判斷自己是否具有有價(jià)值的技術(shù)洞察力？

辛達(dá)納：技術(shù)洞察力本身沒(méi)有價(jià)值。僅僅擁有技術(shù)洞察力，不足以建立一家公司。只有當(dāng)這種洞察力能夠使公司為顧客——最好是大批顧客——提供商業(yè)解決方案時(shí)，才能稱之為有價(jià)值。比如說(shuō)，一開(kāi)始開(kāi)發(fā)VMware只是為了給x86系統(tǒng)生產(chǎn)虛擬機(jī)。當(dāng)我運(yùn)行VMware ESX服務(wù)器時(shí)，我們注意到用戶想要在新硬件上繼續(xù)運(yùn)行他們?cè)瓉?lái)老的Windows NT系統(tǒng)。使用VMware ESX加固這些老服務(wù)器立刻帶來(lái)了投資回報(bào)，這是今天VMware大型業(yè)務(wù)的起源。技術(shù)洞察力之所以尤為重要，因?yàn)槿绻髽I(yè)提供的解決方案中含有這種洞察力，能夠賦予創(chuàng)業(yè)公司別人難以匹敵的優(yōu)勢(shì)。按照我對(duì)技術(shù)洞察力的定義，這意味著沒(méi)有其它公司可以提供這種解決方案。這不是實(shí)現(xiàn)成功的唯一方法，但許多大公司的發(fā)展基礎(chǔ)都是技術(shù)洞察力。

我們看到，目前一些進(jìn)行早期階段投資的基金關(guān)閉了，原因是擔(dān)心種子市場(chǎng)上資本過(guò)多、市場(chǎng)力量失衡。作為種子期投資者，你是否注意到了這些變化，準(zhǔn)備如何應(yīng)對(duì)？

辛達(dá)納：2015、2016年市場(chǎng)經(jīng)歷了快速發(fā)展，我也親歷了當(dāng)時(shí)的發(fā)展。我想做個(gè)大膽的預(yù)測(cè)，已經(jīng)成立的種子基金中至少一半甚至四分之三將不會(huì)再建立第二或第三個(gè)基金。

現(xiàn)在流行做風(fēng)投，所以不可避免地，我們會(huì)看到因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)力量使然而出現(xiàn)市場(chǎng)清洗。也就是說(shuō)，做風(fēng)投挺難的。風(fēng)投簡(jiǎn)單卻并不容易，人們經(jīng)常把“簡(jiǎn)單”和“容易”的概念搞混?，F(xiàn)在很多人覺(jué)得風(fēng)投很容易，他們最后會(huì)不幸地發(fā)現(xiàn)自己搞錯(cuò)了。

同時(shí)，我們看到出現(xiàn)了巨型基金。軟銀1000億美元巨額基金愿景基金（Vision Fund）采用的戰(zhàn)略是尋找行業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，向其傾注上億美元的投資，解決公司因?yàn)橘Y金限制帶來(lái)的問(wèn)題。你怎么看這種戰(zhàn)略？

辛達(dá)納：我覺(jué)得這種想法非常好。他們想嘗試?yán)矛F(xiàn)有的市場(chǎng)空白。但是沒(méi)有第二個(gè)軟銀。市面上有大量基金可以取代我的基金，甚至能找到紅杉和格雷羅克（Greylock）的替代者。但沒(méi)有公司能像軟銀一樣開(kāi)出如此巨額的支票，甘于冒這么大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，試著推動(dòng)規(guī)則向有利于自己的方向調(diào)整。而且我覺(jué)得軟銀會(huì)成功。我看好他們。

投資界在宏觀層面出現(xiàn)了一些新趨勢(shì)，如風(fēng)投公司在建立巨型基金、風(fēng)投資助公司維持私有化的時(shí)間更長(zhǎng)了，你認(rèn)為這些趨勢(shì)會(huì)給早期創(chuàng)業(yè)公司帶來(lái)什么長(zhǎng)期影響？

辛達(dá)納：這個(gè)問(wèn)題問(wèn)到了點(diǎn)子上。風(fēng)投將會(huì)從一個(gè)生命周期型行業(yè)變成只專注于某一個(gè)階段的行業(yè)。這將會(huì)是其中一項(xiàng)根本性改變。將影響每一家公司的戰(zhàn)略，無(wú)論是像Engineering Capital一樣的種子輪投資公司，還是像紅杉或者基準(zhǔn)資本（Benchmark）等傳統(tǒng)投資公司。所謂“生命周期型行業(yè)”，我指的是，以前，創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的第一家機(jī)構(gòu)投資者目的是成為公司除創(chuàng)始人之外的頭號(hào)股東，并且充當(dāng)公司從創(chuàng)立到離場(chǎng)整個(gè)過(guò)程的主要投資者——無(wú)論是采用并購(gòu)還是IPO的方式。所謂“只專注某一階段”，我是指在離場(chǎng)前，企業(yè)的主要機(jī)構(gòu)投資者會(huì)隨著時(shí)間推移發(fā)生改變。

關(guān)于這個(gè)概念，一個(gè)很好的例子是基準(zhǔn)資本和（Uber前CEO）特拉維斯·卡蘭尼克之間的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，最終基準(zhǔn)資本賣(mài)出了Uber的股份，紅杉在同一交易中購(gòu)入。換句話說(shuō)，在公司實(shí)現(xiàn)IPO之前，一家頂級(jí)公司賣(mài)出投資，另一家頂級(jí)公司買(mǎi)入。這不是個(gè)意外。這樣的事情還會(huì)再次發(fā)生。

要知道，基準(zhǔn)資本享有創(chuàng)始人友好型投資公司的美譽(yù)，被稱為全球被適宜合作的公司之一。但它起訴了所投資的一個(gè)公司CEO后，這個(gè)好名聲蕩然無(wú)存。

【2017年8月10日，基準(zhǔn)資本起訴卡蘭尼克和Uber，稱卡蘭尼克隱瞞了“重大管理失誤和其它不端行為”，同時(shí)在公司董事會(huì)又買(mǎi)下了三個(gè)位置?！?

辛達(dá)納：無(wú)論哪種情況，現(xiàn)在我們知道了，最終特拉維斯放棄了原來(lái)與其股權(quán)不成比例的控制權(quán)，基準(zhǔn)資本打折出售了股權(quán)，軟銀成為最大股東，紅杉在今年早期的同步交易中個(gè)買(mǎi)入了股權(quán)。也就是說(shuō)，在公司實(shí)現(xiàn)IPO之前，一家頂級(jí)風(fēng)投公司以優(yōu)惠價(jià)格賣(mài)出了他們歷史上表現(xiàn)最出色的投資，同時(shí)另外一家頂級(jí)風(fēng)投公司買(mǎi)入。在以前風(fēng)投還是生命周期型行業(yè)時(shí)，很難想象會(huì)發(fā)生這種事。我相信，創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的第一家風(fēng)投成為公司的最大機(jī)構(gòu)所有者并且在IPO或者并購(gòu)前一直保持這一地位的時(shí)代已經(jīng)一去不復(fù)返了。

一些公司試圖通過(guò)成立價(jià)值幾十億美元的巨型基金或平行成長(zhǎng)基金來(lái)應(yīng)對(duì)這一變化。從創(chuàng)業(yè)者的角度看，他們只是想得到100萬(wàn)美元的種子投資，因而很難從一個(gè)10億美元的基金中得到關(guān)注，因此出現(xiàn)了專門(mén)的種子基金。

8月29日，Axios報(bào)道，風(fēng)投公司安德森·霍洛維茨基金（Andreessen Horowitz）正在改變其籌資戰(zhàn)略，試圖不再使用跨階段、跨行業(yè)的手段。這也印證了你所說(shuō)的風(fēng)投正在朝向更加專業(yè)化的資金方式發(fā)展。什么人將從這種戰(zhàn)略中獲益？

辛達(dá)納：能夠快速確定自己在這種新版圖中的獨(dú)特價(jià)值并利用它提升企業(yè)表現(xiàn)的人能夠獲益。比如說(shuō)，將業(yè)務(wù)重點(diǎn)放在某一個(gè)行業(yè)領(lǐng)域或者發(fā)展階段的風(fēng)投公司能夠獲益。這也是為什么我認(rèn)為紅杉擁有不同的團(tuán)隊(duì)負(fù)責(zé)早期投資和成長(zhǎng)階段的投資。以及Emergence為什么總是關(guān)注SaaS業(yè)務(wù)。

如果創(chuàng)業(yè)者也能意識(shí)到不是所有的錢(qián)都一樣，不同公司能帶來(lái)不同價(jià)值，并且在選擇投資伙伴時(shí)銘記這一點(diǎn)，他們就能獲益。而且，這些專業(yè)的公司和團(tuán)隊(duì)還會(huì)帶來(lái)除資金之外的更多價(jià)值，他們也能因此受惠。

風(fēng)投的市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)發(fā)展得足夠大了，創(chuàng)業(yè)公司現(xiàn)在實(shí)現(xiàn)IPO需要經(jīng)歷足夠長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間，需要大量資本，因此他們足以支撐獨(dú)立的基金甚至只專注于整個(gè)風(fēng)投市場(chǎng)某一特定細(xì)分領(lǐng)域的獨(dú)立公司實(shí)現(xiàn)發(fā)展。

你覺(jué)得其它公司會(huì)如何應(yīng)對(duì)？

辛達(dá)納：大公司會(huì)擴(kuò)張，以涵蓋不同的業(yè)務(wù)。他們會(huì)成為平臺(tái)型公司。在我看來(lái)，A16Z、紅杉、Lightspeed正在朝這個(gè)方向發(fā)展。擴(kuò)張不會(huì)給大公司帶來(lái)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，但對(duì)于其它公司而言，可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)過(guò)度擴(kuò)張，導(dǎo)致他們不得不重新尋找自己的信念價(jià)值、回歸根本。一些公司會(huì)認(rèn)識(shí)到自己的特長(zhǎng)所在，并專注于該領(lǐng)域的業(yè)務(wù)?；鶞?zhǔn)資本目前采取的戰(zhàn)略似乎是保持根基、不再擴(kuò)張。而且，風(fēng)投行業(yè)不是贏者通吃，也不是一刀切，所以我看到很多不同的商業(yè)模型都取得了成功。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Agatha?

Venture capitalist Ashmeet Sidana believes that some of the best Silicon Valley companies owe their success to a technical insight.

After parting ways with Foundation Capital in 2013, Sidana decided to try out a new investing strategy — back founders taking technical risk, not market risk.

His firm, Engineering Capital, leads seed rounds in companies solving technical problems in the software and core IT infrastructure space. He raised $32 million for his first fund, and $50 million for his second, which he just began investing out of in Q2 of 2018.

“Most venture firms focus on market risk,” Sidana said. “In other words, they’re good at sussing out when a company has traction, and when it makes sense to invest in that opportunity. Whereas what I’m doing now is the exact opposite of that. The thinking is, ‘We know that people would love this if, and only if, someone had a way of solving this problem technically.”

Engineering Capital typically provides the first institutional money in a company, and its investments include Rubrik, Menlo Security, Prismo Systems, Palerra (acquired by Oracle), and Netsil (acquired by Nutanix).

Sidana spoke with Term Sheet about what it means to have a technical insight, navigating the imbalanced market forces in the seed market, and why he believes venture is no longer a lifecycle business.

TERM SHEET: What are some of the specific characteristics you look for in a founder and company before investing?

SIDANA: I look for the following key elements. First, a technical insight. Every company claims to be a technology company, so I’m talking about a particular subset of that, which is what I define as a “technical insight.” By my definition, Google would fall into that category, but Facebook would not.

Second, I’m looking for a business problem which can be solved in a highly-capital efficient way. In my case, these are all software companies, where a team of five to seven people can build a product and bring it all the way to revenue within the seed stage itself. This is unusual in the enterprise space. I believe that a very small, technically-astute, business-savvy team can actually build an enterprise product with a seed round of financing. From a venture strategy perspective, I have bet heavily on this capital-efficient stage of the company.

How can a founder evaluate whether they have a valuable technical insight?

SIDANA: A technical insight by itself is not valuable. It is not sufficient to build a company. It becomes valuable if it enables a solution to a business problem for a customer, and ideally a lot of customers. For example, the original VMware technical insight was how to build a virtual machine for the x86. When I was running VMware ESX Server, we noticed that customers wanted to keep running their old, primarily Windows NT applications, but on new hardware. Using VMware ESX to consolidate these old servers created an immediate return on investment — which became the genesis of the massive business VMware has today. The reason technical insights are so important is that if a solution includes a technical insight, it gives an unfair advantage to a startup. By definition, no one else can do it. It is not the only way, but many massive companies have been built on the back of a technical insight.

We’re seeing early-stage funds shutting down, citing concerns of excessive capital supply & imbalanced market forces in the seed market. As a seed investor, are you seeing some of these dynamics and how are you navigating them?

SIDANA: We saw a tremendous run up in 2015 and 2016, and I was a part of that. I would go so far as to predict that at least half, and potentially three-fourths of the seed funds that have been raised, will not raise their second or third fund.

It’s fashionable to be a VC right now, and we will inevitably have to see a cleanup of this, which will happen because of market forces. That said, venture is a hard business. Venture is very simple but not easy, and people often confuse “simple” and “easy.” A lot of people right now think it’s easy, and they’ll be sadly mistaken.

Meanwhile, we’re seeing the emergence of mega-funds. The strategy behind Softbank’s mammoth $100 billion Vision Fund is to identify a market leader, pour hundreds of millions of dollars in it, and remove the constraint of capital. What is your view on that playbook?

SIDANA: I think it’s brilliant. It’s a thoughtful attempt at taking advantage of a gap in the market. I mean, there is no other Softbank. You can name many other alternatives to my fund, you can even name alternatives to Sequoia and Greylock, but there is no alternative to Softbank. There is no one else who can write checks of that size along with that type of risk appetite and willingness to bend the rules in their favor in a way that Softbank has. And I think it will succeed. I am not pessimistic on Softbank.

How will some of these macro-investing trends, such as VC firms raising mega-funds and venture-backed companies staying private longer, affect early-stage startups in the long-run?

SIDANA: That is the golden question. Venture will change from being a lifecycle business to a stage-specific business. That is one of the fundamental changes that will happen. This will affect the strategy of every firm — whether they’re focused just on seed like Engineering Capital or whether they are traditional investors like Sequoia or Benchmark. By “l(fā)ifecycle business,” I mean the first institutional investor aims to be the largest non-founder owner and is the lead investor from inception through exit, whether by M&A or IPO. And by “stage-specific,” I mean that the lead institutional investor will change over time, prior to exit.

The great example of this is the battle that was fought between Benchmark and [former Uber CEO] Travis Kalanick with Benchmark subsequently selling and Sequoia buying Uber in simultaneous transactions. In other words, one top-tier firm sold and another one bought, prior to IPO. That was not an accident. It will happen again.

Remember, Benchmark is a firm that had a reputation for being founder friendly — for being one of the best firms on the planet to work with. It blew that entire reputation after it sued one of its CEOs.

[On Aug. 10, 2017 Benchmark sued Kalanick and Uber, alleging that Kalanick concealed “gross mismanagement and other misconduct” while procuring three additional seats on the board.]

SIDANA: In either case, as we now know, eventually Travis gave up disproportionate control, Benchmark sold at a discount, SoftBank became the largest shareholder, and Sequoia bought in simultaneous transactions earlier this year. In other words, a top-tier VC firm sold a portion of their all-time best performing investment at a discount, simultaneously while another top-tier VC firm bought, prior to IPO. This was hard to imagine when venture was a lifecycle business. I believe the days when your first VC became your largest institutional owner and stayed that way all the way through IPO or M&A are gone forever.

Some firms have tried to counter this change in the venture business by raising billion dollar mega-funds or parallel growth funds. From an entrepreneur’s perspective, it is difficult to get attention for a $1 million seed investment from a $1 billion fund — hence the emergence of specialized seed funds.

On Aug. 29, Axios reported that VC firm Andreessen Horowitz is changing its fundraising strategy by moving away from multi-stage, multi-sector flagship vehicles. This supports your point that venture is trending toward a more specialized fund approach. Who stands to benefit from this strategy?

SIDANA: The benefit will accrue to whoever can quickly identify their own unique value in this new landscape, and leverage that to enhance their business. So, for example, a VC firm could build a practice with a focus on a particular sector or stage will be served well. This is why I believe Sequoia has separate early stage and growth teams. Or, why Emergence has always had a SaaS focus.

Founders who recognize that all money is not equal — different firms bring different value — will benefit if they choose their investor partners keeping this in mind. They will also benefit because such focused firms and teams will bring more value than just money to them.

Venture has evolved into a big enough market, startups now take long enough, and need so much capital to IPO, that it supports standalone funds, and even standalone firms focused on sub-parts of the overall venture market.

How do you foresee other firms responding?

SIDANA: Great firms will expand and grow to include different offerings. They will become platforms. From my vantage point, it looks like A16Z, Sequoia and Lightspeed are following this strategy. Not a risk to these great firms, but the danger for other firms may be to over-expand and then they will have to find their religion again in order to get back to basics. Some firms will recognize their specialty and stay focused on that. It seems like Benchmark is staying true to its roots and not expanding. Venture is also not a winner-take-all, nor is it a one-size-fits-all market, so I can see many different models being successful.