別怪亞馬遜,零售巨頭西爾斯轟然倒下只能怪自己
據(jù)《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》報(bào)道,西爾斯控股已經(jīng)聘請(qǐng)顧問(wèn),可能按照美國(guó)破產(chǎn)法第11章遞交破產(chǎn)申請(qǐng)。即使是不了解零售業(yè)的人,聽(tīng)到消息也會(huì)感到吃驚。 如今的西爾斯控股是兩大美國(guó)零售業(yè)巨頭西爾斯和Kmart合并的產(chǎn)物,已然負(fù)債累累。2004年,前對(duì)沖基金大王艾迪·萊姆伯特撮合兩家公司合并,卻顯然欠考慮。合并后的西爾斯業(yè)績(jī)連年萎靡,既未能在零售業(yè)的新領(lǐng)域立足,也沒(méi)能通過(guò)投資實(shí)體店和商品提振經(jīng)營(yíng)。 上周,西爾斯有高達(dá)1.34億美元債務(wù)到期。公司一度股價(jià)跌至0.44美元,僅僅12年前股價(jià)還曾觸及145美元高點(diǎn)。西爾斯未對(duì)破產(chǎn)保護(hù)申請(qǐng)的可能性置評(píng)。但上周該公司董事會(huì)的確增加了一名擁有企業(yè)重組經(jīng)驗(yàn)的董事。 2013年,西爾斯的首席執(zhí)行官走馬燈一般更迭后,終于確定由萊姆伯特接任。過(guò)去幾年,他為了還債出售公司很多優(yōu)質(zhì)業(yè)務(wù),包括業(yè)績(jī)最好的一些門店、Lands’ End和Craftsman之類知名品牌、(去年清算的)遍布加拿大的龐大百貨公司網(wǎng)。事實(shí)證明,不管是大甩賣,還是萊姆伯特旗下對(duì)沖基金提供的大筆貸款,都很難阻止西爾斯走向末路。而且出售業(yè)務(wù)無(wú)異于飲鴆止渴,西爾斯還失去了有機(jī)會(huì)在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中脫穎而出的特色。畢竟,零售商玩資本運(yùn)作幾時(shí)有過(guò)好結(jié)果? 盡管十年里關(guān)閉了幾百家門店,西爾斯和Kmart仍然每況愈下,近年來(lái)同店銷售持續(xù)下滑。事實(shí)上,從2005年開(kāi)始,希爾斯控股已經(jīng)不再公布單一年份的銷售和同店(剔除新開(kāi)張或關(guān)閉門店影響)銷售增長(zhǎng)數(shù)據(jù)。2011年年初以來(lái),該公司累計(jì)凈虧損112億美元。隨著西爾斯的業(yè)務(wù)越變?cè)缴伲瑯I(yè)績(jī)也日漸慘淡,重拾昔日榮光的機(jī)會(huì)也逐漸渺茫。2015年,公司年?duì)I業(yè)收入還有540億美元,而到了2018年,華爾街預(yù)計(jì)其年收入僅有124億美元。 |
The Wall Street Journal report published late Tuesday saying Sears Holdings (shld, -23.19%) has hired advisers ahead of a potential Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing this week came as a surprise to no one following the retail industry even remotely closely. The company, a debt-laden retail Frankenstein begat from the ill-advised merger of Kmart and Sears engineered in 2004 by former hedge fund king Eddie Lampert, has been withering for years, unable to find a place for itself in retail’s new world or help itself by investing in its stores and merchandise. Sears, which has $134 million in debt coming due last week, saw shares plummet to $0.44; shares were at $145 at the company’s peak only 12 years ago. The company did not respond to a request for comment on the prospect of a bankruptcy protection filing, but last week the company did add a board member with corporate restructuring experience. To keep Sears solvent in the last few years, Lampert, who became CEO in 2013 after endless turnover in the corner office, has sold off many of Sears’ crown jewels, including its best stores, brands like Lands’ End and Craftsman, and its once-large Canadian unit (which liquidated last year). Those, along with quite a few loans Lampert has made via his hedge fund, have proven to be temporary salves to keep Sears from going under. But ultimately, they hurt the retailer by depriving it of the very features that helped it stand out from rivals. After all, since when has financial engineering ever made a retailer more attractive? Despite closing hundreds of stores this decade, Sears and Kmart both continued to deteriorate, with same-store declines worsening in the last few years. In fact since 2005, Sears Holdings has not reported a single year of sales or comparable sales (which strip out the impact of newly closed or opened stores) growth. The company has rung up $11.2 billion in cumulative net losses since the start of 2011. So much for a leaner and meaner Sears getting its mojo back. In 2015, Sears Holdings had annual revenue of $54 billion. For 2018, Wall Street expects it to come in at $12.4 billion. |
慢性惡化的根源在哪里?首先,西爾斯沒(méi)能吸引購(gòu)物者不斷上門,Kmart也沒(méi)有。誰(shuí)能想到,就在三十年前,Kmart曾是比沃爾瑪更大的零售商。西爾斯旗下太多的門店非常陳舊,與此同時(shí),塔吉特、沃爾瑪和(奪走西爾斯眾多家電業(yè)務(wù)份額的)家得寶都在門店和技術(shù)方面投入巨資。西爾斯當(dāng)年在商品目錄銷售領(lǐng)域稱霸一時(shí),本可以在電子商務(wù)的戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上取勝,卻拋棄了優(yōu)勢(shì)。在開(kāi)拓商品業(yè)務(wù)方面,西爾斯遠(yuǎn)沒(méi)有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手積極主動(dòng):除了幾年前因銷售不佳而撤柜的金·卡戴珊自創(chuàng)時(shí)裝品牌Kardashian Kollection,誰(shuí)還記得西爾斯出售過(guò)哪些牌子的服裝? 萊姆伯特承諾的改進(jìn)遲遲未落實(shí),他堅(jiān)持將西爾斯改造成會(huì)員制零售商,努力打造會(huì)員項(xiàng)目ShopYourWay。按照這種路線,西爾斯需要的門店越來(lái)越少,規(guī)模也越來(lái)越小。但西爾斯至今也未出現(xiàn)銷售業(yè)績(jī)和利潤(rùn)強(qiáng)勁增長(zhǎng),誰(shuí)會(huì)相信申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)后,西爾斯能靠這種方式打翻身仗?雖然也曾有一些不錯(cuò)的嘗試,比如為具體家電開(kāi)設(shè)小門店,以及和亞馬遜合作,但顯然無(wú)力扭轉(zhuǎn)命運(yùn)。 多年來(lái),萊姆伯特還不斷為業(yè)績(jī)不佳找借口(2005年和去年都?xì)w咎于媒體),最近怪起零售業(yè)大環(huán)境艱難??山衲陞s是消費(fèi)者支出最為強(qiáng)勁的年份,強(qiáng)詞奪理的借口實(shí)在沒(méi)法讓人信服。 萊姆伯特在2006年的致股東信中暗示,希望通過(guò)收縮業(yè)務(wù)規(guī)?;謴?fù)西爾斯的經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況:“如果門店的財(cái)務(wù)狀況良好且保持盈利,降低銷售并無(wú)裨益,但如果盈利不是主要目標(biāo),銷售主要來(lái)自分發(fā)產(chǎn)品而非直接向客戶提供價(jià)值,縮減銷售就有望實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)營(yíng)成功?!?/p> 但是,問(wèn)題就在這里:自從進(jìn)入新時(shí)代,百年零售品牌西爾斯就未真正實(shí)現(xiàn)向客戶提供價(jià)值。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)) 譯者:Pessy 審校:夏林 |
What’s behind this chronic deterioration? Sears never gave shoppers a reason to keep going there, nor did Kmart, which incredibly was a larger retailer than Walmart only 30 years ago. The company also let too many stores fall into disrepair even as companies like Target, Walmart, and Home Depot (to which Sears has lost a lot of its appliance business) have invested heavily in their stores and the technology they use in them. With its once dominant catalog business, Sears had what it needed to win the e-commerce wars. Talk about throwing away a big lead. On the merchandise side, Sears has not been nearly as active as its rivals have: Other than the ill-fated Kardashian Kollection a few years ago, who remembers any Sears apparel? Lampert, who has long been promising improvements that have failed to materialize, has stuck to the line that Sears was reinventing itself as a membership-based retailer focused on its ShopYourWay loyalty program, therefore needing fewer and smaller locations. But those haven’t led to stronger sales or earnings results yet, so what’s the case for believing they’d help a post-bankruptcy Sears? The company has made some good moves, including launching some smaller-format appliance-specific stores as well as teaming up with Amazon. But those are clearly not moving the needle. Indeed, Lampert has trotted out countless excuses (including blaming the media last year and also in 2005) for years, most recently naming a difficult retail environment, a my-dog-ate-my-homework-caliber excuse that doesn’t wash in the most robust consumer spending environment in years. He hinted at shrinking Sears back to health in a 2006 letter to shareholders: “While reducing sales is not a prescription for success on a base of healthy, profitable stores, it can be a prescription for success where profit was not the primary objective and where sales came from ‘giving product away’ rather than from providing value to the customer.” But therein lies the rub: Sears in the modern era has never truly found a way to provide value to its customers in a competitive way. |