威斯康星州格拉夫頓的科爾士百貨商店，一位穿著Ugg靴子、瑜伽褲和連帽衫的年輕女子走進店里。她推著一輛嬰兒車，看起來二十多歲，幾乎是科爾士顧客平均年齡的一半。當(dāng)時科爾士的首席執(zhí)行官米歇爾·加斯正在向記者介紹這家店，看到這位年輕女士后立刻停下認真觀察。 “這就是我們希望科爾士將來吸引的典型顧客?！彼f。

這位顧客推的嬰兒車上放著可愛的寶寶，商場工作人員逗著他玩。嬰兒車下部堆滿了亞馬遜的快遞盒，堪稱實體商店的克星。

雖然在百貨商店首席執(zhí)行官眼里，最不想看到的就是熱愛在亞馬遜購物的顧客，但對加斯來說，年輕媽媽出現(xiàn)在科爾士算是個小小的勝利。一年前科爾士大膽開啟實驗，旗下的1158家商店有100家處理亞馬遜在線訂單退貨服務(wù)。（還有約30家門店銷售亞馬遜的智能家居產(chǎn)品。）科爾士已將首要任務(wù)定為吸引更多購物者走進商店，尤其是更年輕也更富裕，往往更喜歡在亞馬遜購物的顧客?？茽柺窟@么做的考慮是，如果在亞馬遜購物的顧客可以在科爾士退貨，比如沒考慮清楚就下單買了件成人連體衣，去科爾士時會看到需要的東西，如耐克跑步短褲或華夫餅干，然后在科爾士購買。

無數(shù)人告訴加斯，將捕食者亞馬遜進入科爾士無異于引狼入室。但她表示，正因為很多零售商死守過時的想法，才會陷入困境，她認為科爾士會證明自己才是瘋狂的狐貍。亞馬遜沖擊整個零售行業(yè)已是既成現(xiàn)實，她說：“最重要的教訓(xùn)是，要改變思考方式?！?/p>

其實科爾士轉(zhuǎn)變思考方式的時間并不長。在過去五年里，由于客戶忠誠，商場常見問題也沒怎么出現(xiàn)，歷史悠久的科爾士避開了電商對零售業(yè)的大屠殺，還因技術(shù)和存貨管理高超贏得同業(yè)最佳的聲譽。但科爾士無法吸引年輕一代購物者，自2012年以來收入基本持平。

不過在過去一年半里，沉睡的巨人開始蠢蠢欲動。加斯曾在星巴克工作，在科爾士不同職位工作近五年之后，于今年5月升任首席執(zhí)行官，當(dāng)中就有很重要的原因。2017年，科爾士迎來多年里最成功的假期購物季之一，銷售額同比增長7%；現(xiàn)在已連續(xù)五個季度實現(xiàn)“全面”增長。增長的因素很多，有一些實打?qū)嵉呐e措，包括改造電子商務(wù)板塊，引入安德瑪?shù)日T人的品牌等，也有一些反常舉動，例如與亞馬遜合作，以及縮減近一半的門店規(guī)模，卻沒有關(guān)店。結(jié)果是：科爾士股價接近歷史高位，因為市場認為其增長勢頭并非意外。

The young woman walked into the Kohl’s store in Grafton, Wis., dressed to run errands, in Ugg boots, yoga pants, and a hoodie. She was pushing a stroller and looked to be in her twenties—barely half the age of the chain’s average customer. Kohl’s CEO, Michelle Gass, who was showing a reporter around the store, interrupted the tour to watch the younger woman intently. “This is the quintessential Kohl’s shopper we want to see in the future,” she said.

The top compartment of the woman’s stroller held a cute baby, who was duly cooed over by store workers. The lower compartment, on the other hand, was overflowing with Amazon boxes—brick-and-mortar retail kryptonite.

But while an Amazon super-shopper might seem to be the last person a department store CEO would want to see, the young mom’s presence was a small victory for Gass. As part of a daring experiment begun a year ago, Kohl’s handles returns of Amazon online orders at 100 of its 1,158 stores. (It also sells Amazon’s smart-home products at branded kiosks in about 30 stores.) Kohl’s has made it a ?mission-critical priority to get more shoppers to its stores, particularly the younger, more affluent customers Amazon tends to draw. The idea is that, when an Amazon shopper comes into a Kohl’s to return, say, an ill-advised adult onesie, she’ll see items she needs, like Nike running shorts or a waffle iron, and make a purchase at Kohl’s.

Gass has heard a million times that bringing apex predator Amazon into her stores is akin to bringing a fox into the henhouse. But that, she says, is the kind of antiquated thinking that got many retailers into trouble, and she’s betting Kohl’s will prove to be crazy like a fox. The Amazon gambit is meant to be a shock to the system, she says: “The big idea is that this is teaching us to think differently.”

Thinking differently has only recently become a priority at Kohl’s. Over the past five years, the venerable retailer has steered clear of the retail carnage that accompanied the rise of e-commerce, helped by customer loyalty and its low exposure to malls’ problems, and developed a best-in-class reputation for its tech and inventory management. But it also failed to win over many new shoppers, and its revenue has essentially flatlined since 2012.

Over the past 18 months, though, the slumber-inducing giant has started to stir, and Gass, a Starbucks alum who became CEO in May after almost five years in different roles at Kohl’s, is a big reason why. In 2017, Kohl’s enjoyed one of its most successful holiday seasons in years, with comparable sales up 7%; it has now clocked five straight quarters of “comp” growth. The growth has been driven by factors ranging from bread-and-butter moves, like overhauling its e-?commerce and bringing in coveted brands such as Under Armour, to counterintuitive ones, like inviting Amazon in—or deciding to shrink nearly half its stores while closing none. The upshot: Kohl’s stock trades near all-time highs on the assumption that its recent momentum is no fluke.

當(dāng)然，能否保持勢頭主要看加斯?？茽柺康那叭问紫瘓?zhí)行官凱文·曼塞爾從星巴克挖走加斯，希望她能為科爾士帶來超越傳統(tǒng)零售業(yè)的創(chuàng)新思想。（此前加斯最著名的創(chuàng)新是推出星冰樂。）她認為科爾士可以從逐漸衰弱的競爭對手手里搶奪市場份額，比如彭尼公司、梅西百貨和西爾斯百貨等，還有最近倒閉的Bon-Ton Stores和玩具反斗城之類對手。加斯還在推動科爾士持續(xù)追趕網(wǎng)絡(luò)上的競爭對手。她的工作核心是爭取年輕人，因為年輕人一直覺得科爾士是媽媽一輩購物的地方。

“我們就是中部，”加斯談起科爾士時表示，科爾士總部位于威斯康辛州密爾沃基郊外的梅諾莫尼瀑布?！拔覀冊诿绹胁?，也希望掌控中部人群?！?/p>

Sustaining that momentum, of course, is up to Gass. She was recruited from Starbucks by her predecessor, Kevin Mansell, who hoped she would infuse Kohl’s with radical ideas from outside traditional retail. (The radical idea she’s best known for: the frappuccino.) Now she’s betting that Kohl’s is perfectly positioned to steal market share from weakened rivals, like J.C. Penney, Macy’s, and Sears—not to mention recently shuttered ones, like Bon-Ton Stores and Toys “R” Us. She’s driving Kohl’s to continue catching up with rivals online. And her retail holy grail is winning over young adults who’ve long seen Kohl’s as the Place Where Your Mom Shops.

“We are the middle,” Gass says of Kohl’s, which is headquartered in Menomonee Falls, outside Milwaukee. “We’re Middle America. We want to own the middle.”

美國大眾零售業(yè)最輝煌的年份當(dāng)屬1962年。那年第一家塔吉特，第一家沃爾瑪，還有第一家凱馬特開業(yè)。那年科爾士也在威斯康星州布魯克菲爾德開設(shè)了第一家百貨商店，之前科爾士是連鎖雜貨店，上世紀(jì)20年代由波蘭移民馬克思·科爾士創(chuàng)立。

科爾士很快找到了成功秘訣：銷售百貨公司常見的全國性品牌，還有一些價格實惠的自有品牌，不強迫顧客去購物中心。（1983年科爾士退出了食品行業(yè)。）科爾士的門店往往比競爭對手?。阂话阏嫉?0,000平方英尺，而梅西百貨通常面積130,000平方英尺。選址經(jīng)常在“狹長地帶”中間，更靠近顧客的家，停車更方便。現(xiàn)在只有7%的科爾士開在商場里。店里采取簡潔的“賽道”式布局，后來證明是非常棒的設(shè)計。店里往往有一條明顯的主干道繞全店一圈，購物者沿主干道走完之后正好面前就是收銀臺。如此可以盡可能全面地展示商品，又可提升速度和便利性，非常貼合郊區(qū)媽媽的需求。

科爾士1992年上市時有76家店，大部分位于威斯康星州和伊利諾伊州，銷售額達10億美元。在接下來的20年里穩(wěn)步擴張到49個州的1150家店，2012年銷售額達到193億美元。但隨著消費者口味不斷變化，競爭對手不斷涌現(xiàn)，增長趨于平穩(wěn)。

不過，科爾士的銷售額也不像競爭對手彭尼公司和梅西百貨一樣急劇下滑。主要因為科爾士通過信用獎勵計劃——科爾士現(xiàn)金商店培養(yǎng)了超級忠誠的客戶群。多虧這項計劃，科爾士約60%的銷售額都通過商店充值卡完成，遠遠超過同行。但在電子商務(wù)大戰(zhàn)里，科爾士還是遠遠落后于亞馬遜，也比不上梅西百貨等競爭對手。其銷售額有約一半是通過自有品牌的服裝銷售，比如索諾瑪，但跟李維斯之類的全國性品牌相比幾乎沒有影響力。

American mass retail never had a more prolific year than 1962. That year marked the opening of the first Target, Walmart, and Kmart stores. It was also the year that Kohl’s, a grocery chain founded in the 1920s by Polish immigrant Max Kohl, opened its first general merchandise department store in Brookfield, Wis.

Kohl’s quickly found a winning formula: selling the national brands found at department stores, along with lower-price house brands, without forcing shoppers to go to the mall. (It got out of the food business in 1983.) Its stores tend to be smaller than those of its rivals: The typical Kohl’s occupies 90,000 square feet, compared with 130,000 for the average Macy’s. They’re usually found in “strip” centers, closer to where customers live, with easier parking. Today only 7% of Kohl’s stores are in malls. The chain’s no-frills “racetrack” store layout also proved to be genius. The typical store has one defined main aisle that loops around the store to whisk shoppers in a circle that ends at cash registers at the front. That maximizes the visibility of the merchandise and adds to speed and convenience, exactly what legions of suburban moms wanted.

In 1992, when Kohl’s went public, it had 76 stores, mostly in Wisconsin and Illinois, and sales of $1 billion. Over the next two decades, it grew in a steady march to 1,150 locations in 49 states, and in 2012, its sales peaked at $19.3 billion. But then growth leveled off, stalled by consumers’ changing tastes and the rise of new rivals.

Kohl’s sales never plummeted like those at rivals J.C. Penney or Macy’s. It helped that the chain had cultivated a hyper-loyal clientele with its Kohl’s Cash store-credit rewards program. Thanks in large part to that program, about 60% of its sales go through its store-branded charge cards—far more than at its peers. Still, Kohl’s was well behind not only Amazon but also rivals like Macy’s in the e-commerce wars. It was also deriving about half its sales from house brands in apparel, like Sonoma—few of which had much cachet compared with national brands like Levi’s.

曼塞爾從2008年開始擔(dān)任科爾士的首席執(zhí)行官，面臨增長乏力的局面，他開始為挑選繼任者制定戰(zhàn)略計劃。他和董事會一致認為，科爾士需要的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者一方面要有左腦思維，繼續(xù)維持科爾士在定價和庫存管理等方面的優(yōu)良傳統(tǒng)，也要充分利用右腦，具備大膽開創(chuàng)的一面。加斯曾在星巴克工作17年，也曾擔(dān)任時裝零售商安·泰勒（后來被Ascena Retail收購）的董事，她的思考方式可能剛好符合要求。

加斯缺乏管理百貨商店的經(jīng)驗，但她很懂如何將新產(chǎn)品推向市場。50歲的加斯出生在緬因州雷文頓，在馬薩諸塞州的伍斯特理工學(xué)院獲得化學(xué)工程學(xué)位，在華盛頓大學(xué)獲得MBA學(xué)位。她的職業(yè)生涯成長階段在寶潔公司度過，曾協(xié)助開發(fā)廣受歡迎的兒童佳潔士牙膏品牌。

1996年她加入星巴克，進一步發(fā)揮了開創(chuàng)性，在她的推動下，星冰樂增長為價值十億美元的新業(yè)務(wù)，還將星巴克忠誠顧客計劃做到行業(yè)最佳。2008年星巴克銷售額全面下滑，創(chuàng)始人霍華德·舒爾茨重新?lián)问紫瘓?zhí)行官，加斯擔(dān)任高級助手。她的任務(wù)包括改善星巴克食品業(yè)務(wù)，現(xiàn)在成了很多店的重要銷售來源，還協(xié)助改善歐洲業(yè)務(wù)。她將每項新任務(wù)視為挑戰(zhàn)，在舊傳統(tǒng)基礎(chǔ)上推動新舉措。她曾說：“如何才能進步？如何守住核心咖啡業(yè)務(wù)的同時努力創(chuàng)新？”

科爾士邀請加斯時，她已準(zhǔn)備好迎接新挑戰(zhàn)。選擇離開時，她沒有想著去科爾士可以比留在星巴克更快升上首席執(zhí)行官。更主要的原因是，她認為在科爾士工作30年的零售老手曼塞爾可以像之前的舒爾茨一樣指導(dǎo)自己?！拔蚁矚g時尚，”加斯補充說?！昂苡腥??！边€有一點很重要：參與另一種轉(zhuǎn)型很吸引她。

It was amid this meh climate that Mansell, who had been CEO since 2008, was sketching both new strategies and plans for his own succession. What Kohl’s needed, he and the board agreed, was someone who could sustain Kohl’s left-brain discipline on pricing and inventory management—but who could also tap into his or her right-brain, creative-daring side. Gass, a 17-year veteran of Starbucks who was also serving as a director of fashion company Ann Taylor (which has since been acquired by Ascena Retail), seemed to have all the right gray matter.

She lacked department store experience, but she knew plenty about getting new products to market. A native of Lewiston, Maine, Gass earned a chemical engineering degree at Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Massachusetts and an MBA at the University of Washington. But the 50-year-old exec spent her formative professional years at Procter & Gamble, where she helped develop its wildly popular Crest for Kids toothpaste brand.

She raised her game higher at Starbucks, which she joined in 1996, helping to build the frappuccino into a billion-dollar business and elevating the coffee chain’s loyalty program into an industry leader. And when a broader sales slump led founder Howard Schultz to return as CEO in 2008, Gass became a top lieutenant. Her mandates included helping Starbucks improve its food business—now a staple at most cafés—and turning around its European division. She approached every new task as a challenge to make sure new initiatives built on older traditions. As she puts it, “How do you evolve? How do you keep your core—your coffee credentials—but then innovate?”

By the time Kohl’s came calling, Gass was ready for a new challenge. She waves away the idea that she saw a quicker path to the CEO role than she’d have at Starbucks. But in Mansell, who had served at Kohl’s for 30 years by then, she saw a retail veteran who could mentor her much as Schultz had. “I love fashion,” Gass adds. “It’s fun.” Last but not least: She was drawn to the idea of being part of another transformation story.

加斯在科爾士第一項職責(zé)就是規(guī)劃轉(zhuǎn)型。曼塞爾聘請加斯后，專門為她設(shè)了首席客戶官的職位，負責(zé)設(shè)計零售商的轉(zhuǎn)型。她花了好幾個月制定計劃，內(nèi)部叫偉大議程，2013年年底向董事會提交，2014年初全面介紹給在科爾士銷售的全國性品牌。所有人都震驚了：“她深入挖掘了消費者數(shù)據(jù)，而且努力理解李維斯對科爾士的需求?！崩罹S斯的首席執(zhí)行官奇普·伯格回憶道。“她學(xué)得非?？??！?/p>

隨后加斯接手了更新科爾士忠誠顧客計劃的工作，涉及3000萬會員。加斯調(diào)整之后，即便顧客不用科爾士聯(lián)名信用卡購物也能獲得獎勵，這一舉措施行后獲得了大量新數(shù)據(jù)，協(xié)助各店庫存和銷售。（最近的一項創(chuàng)新是：消費達到一定金額后可獲得新獎勵和福利。）

曼塞爾還讓加斯將銷售重點轉(zhuǎn)移回全國性品牌，降低對自有品牌的依賴。她抓住了運動服裝市場飛速發(fā)展的機會，邁出了巨大一步，而且獲利豐厚?？茽柺肯騺沓鍪酆芏嗄涂说漠a(chǎn)品（有些人估計稱，每年耐克產(chǎn)品在科爾士的銷售額為8億美元）。但加斯認為，如果給運動品牌更好的展示空間，而不只是掛在擺滿低附加值商品的基礎(chǔ)貨架上，業(yè)務(wù)可以大大拓展。

她向頂級品牌承諾，提供科爾士商店前位置絕佳的地點，配備精美的布置和燈光，擺放抓人眼球的人體模特。首先她為科爾士最大的合作伙伴耐克提供承諾的服務(wù)，展示效果。后來吸引了Fitbit，（很快）蘋果手表也加入了。2017年，加斯成功吸引到安德瑪，見證了一波飛速增長。大約18個月后，安德瑪變成科爾士排名第二的暢銷品牌，僅次于耐克。每季度運動商品的整體銷售額至少增長10%。

Gass’s first role at Kohl’s, in fact, was to write that story. Right after hiring Gass—with a title, chief customer officer, created just for her—Mansell tasked her with designing the retailer’s transformation plan. She spent months developing what was known in house as the Greatness Agenda, presenting it to the board in late 2013 and to the national-brand vendors who sold through Kohl’s in early 2014. All around were impressed: “She had dug into consumer data insights and really tried to understand what Levi’s needed from Kohl’s,” recalls Levi Strauss & Co. CEO Chip Bergh. “She was a really quick study.”

She then took on the job of updating Kohl’s loyalty program, with its 30 million members. Gass tweaked it so customers could earn rewards even if they didn’t shop with a Kohl’s credit card—a move that opened up a mother lode of new data to help stores make decisions about what to stock and sell. (A more recent innovation: Customers who hit certain spending thresholds get new incentives and perks.)

Mansell also tasked Gass with shifting Kohl’s portfolio back toward national brands, with much less focus on its house brands. On that front, she made a big and profitable leap into the booming activewear market. Kohl’s had always had a good selection of Nike (it sells $800 million a year of Nike products, by some estimates). But Gass believed the chain could expand the business enormously if it gave activewear brands a better showcase than the basic shelf space in Kohl’s low-frills emporia.

She wooed top brands by promising them dedicated spaces with prominent placement at the front of Kohl’s stores, along with fancier fixtures and lighting and more eye-catching mannequins. She used Nike, Kohl’s biggest brand partner, to showcase the approach. The campaign lured Fitbit and (briefly) the Apple Watch. And in 2017, it helped Gass land Under Armour, then riding a wave of enormous growth. Some 18 months later, Under Armour is the second-bestselling national brand at Kohl’s, after Nike. And overall sales in activewear are growing by at least 10% each quarter.

科爾士的偉大議程引發(fā)很多人興趣，但對整體業(yè)績幫助不大。2017年公司計劃完成210億美元的收入，當(dāng)年實際收入?yún)s低于190億美元。付出了巨大努力卻還是達不到目標(biāo)，加斯和團隊嘗試看似更瘋狂的舉動：跟亞馬遜合作。

根據(jù)兩家公司于2017年9月宣布的計劃，科爾士將處理亞馬遜退貨業(yè)務(wù)，通過自家運輸渠道送回亞馬遜的倉庫。亞馬遜將在科爾士經(jīng)營商店，但僅出售智能家居產(chǎn)品，如語音助手Amazon Echo，科爾士不得銷售亞馬遜競爭對手產(chǎn)品。

這一消息引發(fā)了零售分析師懷疑，其中許多人擔(dān)心亞馬遜會奪走科爾士的電子商務(wù)客戶，影響其在線銷售增長。也有一些人看懂了加斯的思路。“不管怎么做，亞馬遜都會變成競爭對手?！盙lobalData Retail的尼爾·桑德斯說，他很贊賞科爾士的務(wù)實精神。為何不趁著亞馬遜流行，多吸引些人到店里呢？或許股價更明顯表現(xiàn)了市場的態(tài)度，華爾街很支持科爾士的大刀闊斧改革。公告發(fā)布后股價上漲，之后12個月里幾乎翻了一番。

科爾士和亞馬遜拒絕提供合作情況的數(shù)據(jù)。（加斯觀察到的推嬰兒車的媽媽很快便離開商店，看不出她有沒有留意過道邊的商品。）但如果購物者在科爾士網(wǎng)站使用類似自提服務(wù)，在官網(wǎng)下單然后去店面提貨，通常要收取網(wǎng)絡(luò)銷售價25%的費用，因為自提的顧客往往比較匆忙?！敦敻弧啡ジ窭蝾D的科爾士采訪那天早上，第一位進門的顧客是位很著急的女性，忙著退回在亞馬遜買的20多件萬圣節(jié)服裝。零售商怎么可能不想吸引喜歡大批采購的購物者？

Kohl’s Greatness Agenda was generating interest, but the overall top line wasn’t moving: The company, which aimed to bring in $21?billion in revenue in 2017, instead fell below $19 billion that year. The sting of falling short of that goal despite a big effort motivated Gass and her team to try something that seemed far crazier on the surface: the Amazon partnership.

Under the plan, which the two companies announced in September 2017, Kohl’s would process Amazon’s returns, sending them back to its rival’s warehouses with its own shipping infrastructure. And Amazon would operate its own stores-within-stores at Kohl’s, but only to sell smart-home tech like the voice-activated Amazon Echo—arenas in which Kohl’s doesn’t sell a competing product.

The news inspired skepticism from retail analysts, many of whom fretted that Amazon would steal Kohl’s own e-commerce customers and stunt its online sales growth. But others saw things Gass’s way. “Amazon is going to be a competitor come what may,” says Neil Saunders of GlobalData Retail, who gives Kohl’s kudos for its pragmatism; why not leverage its popularity to get a few more people in the door? Perhaps most tellingly, Wall Street rewarded Kohl’s for shaking things up. Shares rose on the announcement, and they have nearly doubled in the ensuing 12 months.

Kohl’s and Amazon decline to offer data on how the partnership has fared. (The stroller mom Gass observed scooted out of sight before it could be determined whether she browsed the aisles.) But a similar service, where shoppers can go in-store to pick up an order from Kohls.com, typically adds 25% to any given online transaction, as pickup customers buy things on the fly. On the morning Fortune visited the Kohl’s in Grafton, the first customer through the door was a harried woman returning 20 or so Halloween costumes to Amazon. And what retailer wouldn’t want to woo a shopper who buys in bulk?

如果說加斯不怕亞馬遜，可能是因為科爾斯在技術(shù)進步方面一直很自信。今年零售業(yè)最大的矛盾之一是，在網(wǎng)上表現(xiàn)最好的實體連鎖店都沒有關(guān)店。百思買、Ulta Beauty、家得寶、諾德斯特龍，當(dāng)然還有科爾士都是例子。這也是為什么加斯和團隊如此堅定地吸引人們進商店，因為當(dāng)前電商和實體零售正相互促進。根據(jù)eMarketer的數(shù)據(jù)，2013年以來電子商務(wù)已從占科爾士收入的9.1%增長到占比18.7%，每年銷售額達36億美元。在科爾士網(wǎng)站上可選的商品數(shù)量是實體店的四倍，而且今年的假日購物季里，近50%的在線訂單將在科爾士實體店自提。

為了弄清要點，做些實驗犯些錯誤也有必要。加斯剛到科爾士時測試了一些科幻手段，包括展示全息產(chǎn)品圖像，還有美容柜臺的增強現(xiàn)實鏡子。但最后發(fā)現(xiàn)普通的商品反而收益最高，也幫助科爾士“與時俱進”，這也是加斯最喜歡說的詞?！耙欢ㄒJ清自身，然后實現(xiàn)核心創(chuàng)新。”科爾士的總裁索娜·查拉說道。 查拉曾擔(dān)任連鎖藥店沃爾格林的數(shù)字業(yè)務(wù)負責(zé)人，2015年加入科爾士負責(zé)技術(shù)和電子商務(wù)業(yè)務(wù)。她也曾是接替曼塞爾的候選人，現(xiàn)在負責(zé)設(shè)計科爾士的技術(shù)戰(zhàn)略，過去三年里該戰(zhàn)略已耗資10億美元。

查拉表示，判斷創(chuàng)新方向時更傾向采用“外科手術(shù)方式”。這意味著不用全息圖像（只是目前），但會多做嘗試，例如今年假日購物季將多安排員工手持結(jié)賬設(shè)備，避免顧客結(jié)賬時長時間排隊。還有一塊影響很大：采用RFID（射頻識別）標(biāo)簽后，科爾士可實時掌握每件庫存，也更容易向客戶確保有貨?！斑@就為科爾士的忠實購物者解決了真正的問題，實用程度遠超魔鏡或虛擬現(xiàn)實?！睌?shù)字咨詢公司Publicis.Sapient的商務(wù)高級副總裁杰森·戈德伯格說。

存貨管理確實可能是科爾士的秘密武器。即便銷售額增加，同期商店庫存也能實現(xiàn)同比下降約8%。這意味著影響利潤的因素減少，也不必投入很多工人管理庫存，還能迅速改變銷售的產(chǎn)品。進一步利用該數(shù)據(jù)后，科爾士也可通過機器學(xué)習(xí)幫助商店經(jīng)理發(fā)現(xiàn)暢銷商品，意味著每家科爾士店面銷售商品的分類會各不相同。數(shù)據(jù)也是加斯將店面經(jīng)營權(quán)力下放的重要工具：“商店經(jīng)理就是首席執(zhí)行官?！彼f。

反過來，店面存貨減少后科爾士就能創(chuàng)造性地縮小規(guī)模。在主要零售商里，科爾士是唯一一家選擇縮減商店銷售空間，卻不關(guān)閉商店。目前約占一半的門店，500多家店存貨規(guī)模幾乎縮減了三分之一，通道之間留出更多空間。不少科爾士商場計劃將騰出的空間轉(zhuǎn)租給其他帶來穩(wěn)定客流的門店，如健身房或雜貨店，既能產(chǎn)生租金收入又能引來客流，也是雙贏。明年，科爾士將與幾家Aldi雜貨店共同測試，雜貨店將入駐科爾士收縮后留出的空間。

“降低庫存可為一些特別項目提供空間?！蔽诸D商學(xué)院教授芭芭拉·汗表示。留出的空間也可用于舉辦活動、臨時展覽、開咖啡館，或者其他比掛滿衣服的架子更有趣的東西。如此一來商場會變得更有吸引力。但這與傳統(tǒng)零售業(yè)“堆得越高，銷路越好”模式明顯不同。對科爾士來說，“再也不會回到老路了?！奔铀拐f。

If Gass isn’t afraid of Amazon, it may be because Kohl’s has been handling its own tech evolution with surprising aplomb. One of the great paradoxes of retail this year has been that the best performing brick-and-mortar chains online have also been the ones not closing stores wholesale. Think Best Buy, Ulta Beauty, Home Depot, Nordstrom, and, of course, Kohl’s. And that is why Gass and her team are so adamant about getting people into stores: E-commerce and physical retail feed each other in this day and age. Since 2013, e-commerce has gone from generating 9.1% of Kohl’s revenue to 18.7%, making it a $3.6-billion-a-year business, according to eMarketer. There are four times as many items available on the website as there are in Kohl’s stores—and this holiday season, nearly 50% of online orders will be filled by Kohl’s stores.

Figuring out where to focus took some trial and error. During Gass’s early years, Kohl’s experimented with sci-fi touches, including ?holograms for product displays and augmented-?reality mirrors at beauty counters. But ultimately, Kohl’s found that the unsexy stuff offers the biggest payoff and helps Kohl’s “contemporize” itself, to use a favorite verb of Gass’s. “You have to know who you are and then innovate to your core,” says Kohl’s president Sona Chawla. Chawla was the head of digital at Walgreens before joining Kohl’s in 2015 to overhaul its tech and e-commerce. She was also a candidate to succeed Mansell; now she’s the architect of the chain’s tech strategy, on which it has spent $1 billion in the past three years.

Chawla says she favors a “surgical approach” in deciding where to innovate. That means no holograms (yet) but more testing of things like line-busting handheld check-out devices, which Kohl’s will trot out during the holiday season. Also making an impact: RFID (radio-frequency identification) tags that let Kohl’s know where virtually any piece of inventory is in real time, making it easier to assure customers that the products they want are in stock. “That’s solving a real problem for the core Kohl’s shopper, much more so than magic mirrors or virtual reality,” says Jason Goldberg, a senior vice president of commerce at digital consultancy Publicis.Sapient.

Indeed, inventory tech may be Kohl’s secret weapon. Even as sales tick up, store inventory these days is down about 8% year over year. That has meant fewer profit-devouring markdowns, less need for store workers to devote time to stock management, and the ability to more quickly change up the products it sells. Leveraging that same data, Kohl’s is using machine learning to help managers at the store level see what is selling the best, meaning that no two Kohl’s locations sell the same product assortment. This is a key tool in Gass’s effort to decentralize how the chain is run:“The store manager is CEO,” she says.

Having less stuff in its stores, in turn, will enable Kohl’s to downsize in inventive ways. Kohl’s is the only major retailer working on shrinking selling space at stores en masse rather than close them: Some 500 stores, nearly half its fleet, already are stocked as if they were a third smaller, with more space between aisles. In many cases, Kohl’s plans to sublet the extra space to other businesses that generate frequent visits, like gyms or grocery stores—a double win that could generate both rental income and foot traffic. Next year, Kohl’s will test the idea with a few Aldi grocery stores that will move into next-door-neighbor spaces freed up by Kohl’s shrinkages.

“Lower inventory clears up floor space for special projects,” notes Wharton School professor Barbara Khan. Extra space could also be used for events, temporary exhibits, cafés, or just anything more interesting than yet another shelf full of clothes. And that makes the stores more inviting destinations. It’s a big departure from retail’s old “stack ’em high, watch ’em fly” model. For Kohl’s, “that’s over,” says Gass.

加斯和家人住在密爾沃基郊區(qū)，她很喜歡利用家人睡覺時的安靜氛圍。她通常凌晨4:30起床，制定策略，查看前一天的銷售，冥想，要么鍛煉?！斑@是我的思考時間。”她說。

最近，她一直在考慮代溝問題。根據(jù)咨詢機構(gòu)坎塔爾零售的數(shù)據(jù)，去科爾士購物者的平均年齡為50.3歲，跟加斯的年齡差不多，但比塔吉特購物者平均年齡（當(dāng)然還有亞馬遜）要大。所以科爾士最重要的任務(wù)是吸引年輕顧客，特別是組建家庭的年輕一代。最近在《女裝日報》零售首席執(zhí)行官論壇上，加斯談到千禧一代時表示，“我們的工作尚未完成。我個人的首要目標(biāo)是，徹底破解零售行業(yè)的密碼?！?/p>

她的策略里有個重要板塊，將科爾士打造為購買美妝產(chǎn)品可靠的選擇，也是購物者去逛零售商的主要動力。目前美妝領(lǐng)域銷售額僅占2%，遠低于科爾士5%的目標(biāo)。不過進展明顯，科爾士最近上架了拉爾夫·勞倫的Polo香水，以及古馳的竹韻香水等高端產(chǎn)品?？茽柺康囊恍╅T店里也在嘗試更寬闊的美妝區(qū)域，布置也更漂亮。

其他方面，加斯則大力推廣已經(jīng)驗證的經(jīng)驗?？茽柺吭诙砗ザ碇莸乃募疑痰昀?，正嘗試將運動服裝領(lǐng)域擴大40%?！叭绾文茉诒Ａ艨茽柺刻厣那疤嵯卤M可能應(yīng)用經(jīng)驗？”她沉思道。該計劃還包括動態(tài)調(diào)整價格。目前科爾士正測試客戶愿不愿意為阿迪達斯Boost之類高檔鞋支付120美元，經(jīng)典款價格一般為80美元。

科爾士爭奪年輕購物者還有個重要的戰(zhàn)場，就是自有品牌，涉及索諾瑪?shù)葦?shù)十億美元的商品，也包括與設(shè)計師王薇薇和歌手珍妮弗·洛佩茲合作的品牌。目前自有品牌占總銷售額的42%，仍是業(yè)務(wù)的重要組成部分。自有品牌比全國性品牌利潤更高，也可增強科爾士的獨家感。一些競爭對手已經(jīng)開了好頭：塔吉特和沃爾瑪各自升級了服裝系列，成果明顯。

一些品牌更新后，科爾士的自有品牌也迎來上升。加斯希望團隊更靈活，更迅速地創(chuàng)建品牌以滿足人們對新奇的需求，其實不管網(wǎng)購還是去H&M之類快時尚零售商無非是找新奇感?？茽柺恳褜脑O(shè)計到交付成衣的時間減少了40%，更容易跟上趨勢，也可避免失敗。明年春天科爾士將推出名為EVRI的大碼品牌，主要針對千禧一代女性，希望跟彭尼公司和塔吉特競爭。

科爾士的假日季銷售策略也格外關(guān)注年輕家庭。今年圣誕期間，所有店都會擺放圣誕老人，方便全家人跟圣誕老人合影，這次科爾士打破了逛店快進快出的傳統(tǒng)。 玩具反斗城倒閉后，科爾士也跟樂高和FAO Schwarz等品牌合作加強玩具銷售，搶占市場空間。

通過假日購物季的廣告也能看出，科爾士多么渴望變成全新的時尚品牌?？茽柺康碾娨晱V告主打西部冒險風(fēng)格，英雄是一位媽媽騎馬穿過邊境風(fēng)格的小鎮(zhèn)，一邊向家人拋時尚的禮物，電壓力鍋！耐克運動鞋！Xbox游戲機！家人一臉感激。她從馬背跳上裝滿科爾士現(xiàn)金積分的棚車后才能看清臉，非常年輕。

Gass likes to take advantage of the quiet in her house in suburban Milwaukee while her family sleeps. She typically rises at 4:30 a.m. to map out strategy, look at the previous day’s sales, meditate, or work out. “That’s my thinking time,” she says.

Lately, she’s been thinking about a generation gap. The average Kohl’s shopper is 50.3 years old, according to Kantar Retail data. That’s almost exactly Gass’s age, but it skews older than the average at Target (and certainly at Amazon). Much of Kohl’s heavy lifting is aimed at luring younger customers, particularly as they start to build families. When it comes to wooing millennials, Gass said at the recent WWD retail CEO conference, “we have not done our job. And I’m making it a personal priority to make sure that once and for all, we crack the code.”

One big plank in her strategy: making Kohl’s a credible destination for beauty products—a major driver of shopper visits for all kinds of retailers. Presently, beauty is stuck at 2% of sales, well short of Kohl’s 5% goal. But the chain is making progress, recently adding higher-end products like Ralph Lauren’s Polo fragrances and Gucci’s Bamboo perfume. And it is experimenting with much larger beauty areas with fancier fixtures in some stores.

Elsewhere, Gass is doubling down on what already works: At four stores in Ohio, Kohl’s is testing activewear areas that are 40% larger in size. “How far can we push this with it still being Kohl’s?” she muses. The initiative involves pushing things along the price spectrum: Kohl’s is testing to see whether customers will pay $120 for upscale shoe brands like Adidas Boost, up from the more typical $80.

A big front in Kohl’s battle for younger shoppers is its house brands, which include billion-dollar businesses like its Sonoma brand, as well as lines with Vera Wang and Jennifer Lopez. At 42% of sales, they remain a big part of the business; they’re more profitable than national brands and give Kohl’s something exclusive that sets it apart. Here, too, some rivals have a head start: Target and Walmart have each upgraded their clothing lines, with some notable successes.

After some brand refreshes, Kohl’s own labels are finally on the upswing again. Gass wants her team to be nimbler and faster in creating brands, to satisfy the urge for novelty that online shopping and fast-fashion retailers like H&M can slake. Already, Kohl’s has cut the time from design to delivery of some clothing by 40%, making it easier to jump on trends or drop flops. And Kohl’s will finally launch a brand for plus-size millennial women, called EVRI, in the spring, hoping to catch up with J.C. Penney and Target.

The focus on young families is also shaping Kohl’s holiday strategy. This Christmas season all stores will have a Santa Claus with whom families can pose—a big break from Kohl’s get-in-and-out-fast heritage. To take advantage of the demise of Toys “R” Us, Kohl’s has ramped up its toy sections with brands like Lego and FAO Schwarz.

Even the holiday-season ads show the new, hipper brand that Kohl’s aspires to be. Kohl’s centerpiece TV commercial features a Western-style adventure in which the hero is a mom on horseback riding through a frontier-style town and tossing trendy gifts—an Instant Pot! Nike sneakers! An Xbox!—to grateful family members. Only after she leaps from her horse onto a boxcar full of Kohl’s Cash do you get a close look at her face and see how young she is.

Back at the Grafton store, one of 58 around the country that Kohl’s uses as a laboratory for new ideas, Gass is pointing out another experiment. One of the first things shoppers see near the entrance is a display of Kohl’s LC Lauren Conrad fashion brand. It’s staged in a prominent area that Kohl’s plans to change every few weeks to showcase a different brand. This is standard operating procedure at Nordstrom, Macy’s, and Target, but it’s new at Kohl’s.

The goal is to show shoppers something new on each visit—and make sure they don’t stop visiting. But it’s also symbolic of Gass’s belief that Kohl’s will only escape the middle of the pack by continually trying new tricks. In retail, “nine out of 10 experiments aren’t going to work, so [retailers] need to have a pipeline of 30 experiments,” says Forrester analyst Sucharita Kodali. “Amazon lives and dies by this.” Gass wants to make sure Kohl’s lives.

In 2017, Kohl’s launched a fashion-forward clothing line called K Lab. It bombed badly. But during the development process, the Kohl’s team was introduced to PopSugar, a social media company popular with millennial women. The two companies collaborated on a clothing line that needed only a few months to get products on shelves—light speed, compared with Kohl’s past practices. “Our metabolic rate is increasing, and that feeds on itself,” says Gass. In other words,the flops are coming faster—but so are the successes.

A version of this article appears in the December 1, 2018 issue of Fortune with the headline “Michelle Gass Is Cracking The Kohl’s Code.”