誰能想像泰勒·斯威夫特也犯過錯(cuò)誤？這位鄉(xiāng)村流行音樂界的女王在2014年突然公開宣布與其知名的追求者Spotify分手，此舉讓粉絲震驚不已。就在10月新專輯《1989》發(fā)布數(shù)天之后，斯威夫特從這家領(lǐng)先的音樂流媒體服務(wù)下架了其所有歌單，并用有說服力的證據(jù)解釋了為什么Spotify會(huì)威脅音樂行業(yè)的發(fā)展。

斯威夫特當(dāng)時(shí)在抨擊Spotify所謂的免費(fèi)商業(yè)模式時(shí)說：“我個(gè)人覺得這個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)性項(xiàng)目沒有給詞作者、制作人、藝人以及作曲人支付公允的報(bào)酬，我不愿意把我畢生的心血交給它，而且它們宣傳的理念是：音樂沒有價(jià)值，應(yīng)該是免費(fèi)的，對(duì)此我真的無法贊同。”

斯威夫特的決絕贏得了全球唱片藝人的贊許，他們認(rèn)為流媒體音樂服務(wù)正在蠶食其已然微薄的收益。畢竟，由于CD銷量的斷崖式下跌，唱片行業(yè)的營收在近15年來一直處于下滑狀態(tài)。Spotify的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人兼首席執(zhí)行官丹尼爾·艾克發(fā)布了一篇長文來捍衛(wèi)其公司。（他寫道：“最近所有有關(guān)Spotify靠剝削藝人來賺錢的傳言讓我感到憤怒不已。”）但從銷量來看，斯威夫特的舉措被證明是一場(chǎng)勝利。在獲選成為公告牌（Billboard）年度收入最高的音樂藝人之后，盡管沒有Spotify服務(wù)器的幫助，但斯威夫特的專輯連續(xù)三周的周銷量都達(dá)到了100萬張。尼爾森音樂稱，這是歷史上首位獲此成就的唱片藝人。

斯威夫特對(duì)Spotify：1比0。

然而，盡管泰勒一時(shí)之間風(fēng)光無限，但Spotify從長期來看并沒有遭受多少損失。事實(shí)上，2014年是音樂銷售的低谷，也是Spotify引領(lǐng)的音樂流媒體崛起的開端。

自斯威夫特脫離Spotify的那一年起，全球唱片業(yè)的整體銷量逐年遞增，從2014年的143億美元增至2018年的181億美元。國際唱片業(yè)聯(lián)合會(huì)（IFPI）稱，這主要?dú)w功于付費(fèi)流媒體服務(wù)。如今，付費(fèi)和植入廣告的流服務(wù)共計(jì)貢獻(xiàn)了半數(shù)的全球唱片業(yè)營收。（實(shí)物CD和唱片的銷售量依然貢獻(xiàn)著25%的營收；其余的則來自于其他營收，例如演出權(quán)。）英國市場(chǎng)研究公司Midia估計(jì)，Spotify在流媒體服務(wù)行業(yè)處于領(lǐng)先地位，占據(jù)著三分之一強(qiáng)的流媒體市場(chǎng)，其月用戶達(dá)到了2.32億，全球付費(fèi)注冊(cè)會(huì)員為1.08億。

即便是斯威夫特也在為Spotify帶來收益的同時(shí)收獲了聽眾的贊譽(yù)。如今，斯威夫特《Shake It Off》整張專輯的曲目均可以通過該應(yīng)用程序收聽，包括專輯《1989》和最新專輯《Lover》。

Spotify和艾克從其平臺(tái)的崛起獲益良多。艾克與馬丁·洛倫宗于2006年在斯德哥爾摩共同創(chuàng)建了Spotify，并于2018年4月通過直接掛牌（而不是傳統(tǒng)的首次公開募股）的形式讓公司上市。如今，Spotify的市值約為210億美元，而艾克自己的凈財(cái)富值接近20億美元。分析師估計(jì)，公司2019年的銷售額將達(dá)到70億美元。波士頓咨詢公司（BCG）稱，Spotify的整體前景異常強(qiáng)勁，它在今年的《財(cái)富》全球未來50強(qiáng)榜單中名列第五位，上榜者均為在實(shí)現(xiàn)長期增長方面有著最佳優(yōu)勢(shì)的公司。

但沒有人可以保證Spotify能夠一直在該榜單中名列前茅。受音頻流業(yè)務(wù)增長的激勵(lì)，科技巨頭蘋果和亞馬遜也殺入了這一市場(chǎng)，而且這兩家都是財(cái)大氣粗的主，更何況它們都有著各自的優(yōu)勢(shì)——iPhone和Echo音箱，眾多聽眾都通過這兩款設(shè)備來收聽音樂。與此同時(shí)，美國、英國等國主流音樂流媒體市場(chǎng)的成熟也在迫使Spotify和其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手在巴西、墨西哥、印度以及德國和日本等“后來者”市場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)奪新興機(jī)遇。

Spotify早已發(fā)現(xiàn)，盈利實(shí)非易事。在2018年第三和第四季度首次出現(xiàn)季度盈利之后，公司在今年上半年再次出現(xiàn)虧損，也讓一些投資者對(duì)其股票失去了信心。自Spotify上市以來，其股價(jià)下跌了30%，而納斯達(dá)克則上漲了15%。Spotify費(fèi)盡唇舌與主流唱片公司（該服務(wù)提供的大部分流媒體音樂都來自于環(huán)球、索尼和華納，以及獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)Merlin的授權(quán)）達(dá)成的協(xié)議也沒有給自身利潤率的提升預(yù)留多大的空間。

Spotify是音樂行業(yè)的救星。如今，該公司需要證明自己并非只是曇花一現(xiàn)。

Imagine, for a moment, that Taylor Swift was wrong. The reigning queen of country-tinged pop shocked fans in 2014 by abruptly and publicly breaking up with a prominent suitor: Spotify. Mere days after the October release of her album 1989, Swift yanked her entire back catalog from the leading music-streaming service—and made a compelling case why Spotify was a threat to her industry.

“I’m not willing to contribute my life’s work to an experiment that I don’t feel fairly compensates the writers, producers, artists, and creators of this music,” Swift said at the time, taking a swipe at Spotify’s so-called freemium business model. “And I just don’t agree with perpetuating the perception that music has no value and should be free.”

Swift’s bold move won her acclaim from recording artists around the world who believed that streaming music services were cutting into their already meager bottom lines. After all, revenues for recorded music had been falling for a decade and a half thanks to plummeting CD sales. Spotify cofounder and CEO Daniel Ek countered by publishing a lengthy essay defending his company. (“All the talk swirling around lately about how Spotify is making money on the backs of artists upsets me big-time,” he wrote.) And Swift’s scheme proved to be a triumph once the receipts rolled in. Named America’s highest-earning musician that year by Billboard, Swift went on to sell a million copies a week of her album for three weeks straight—the first such recording artist to do so, according to Nielsen SoundScan—without the work ever landing on Spotify servers.

Swift 1, Spotify 0.

But while Taylor may have won the day, Spotify hardly suffered in the long run. In fact, 2014 was the low point for music sales—and the start of a resurgence for the business, led by Spotify.

Since the year of Swift’s Spotify defection, the global recorded music industry has seen overall sales grow every year—from $14.3 billion in 2014 to $18.1 billion in 2018. That’s predominantly thanks to paid streaming, according to the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, or IFPI. Today, paid and ad-supported streaming together represent almost half of all global recorded music revenue. (Physical sales of CDs and records still account for 25%; the rest comes from other avenues, like performance rights.) And Spotify—with 232 million monthly users and 108 million paying subscribers globally—leads the pack with more than a third of the streaming market, estimates U.K. market researcher Midia.

Even Swift has gained an appreciation for the benefits of Spotify. Today, the entirety of the “Shake It Off” singer’s catalog is available to stream on the app, including 1989 and her latest album, Lover.

Spotify and Ek have reaped the benefits of his platform’s rise. Ek took the company—which he cofounded with Martin Lorentzon in 2006 in Stockholm—public via a direct listing (rather than a traditional IPO) in April 2018. Today, Spotify has a market value of about $21 billion, and Ek himself has an estimated net worth of nearly $2 billion. Analysts estimate that the company will reach $7 billion in sales for 2019. Spotify’s overall prospects are so robust, according to BCG, that it ranks No. 5 on this year’s Fortune Future 50 list of the companies best positioned to generate long-term growth.

But there’s no guarantee that Spotify will hold its position at the top of the charts. Encouraged by streaming audio’s growth, tech giants Apple and Amazon have entered the fray. Each has extraordinarily deep pockets—not to mention a home court advantage as the makers of the iPhones and Echo devices on which so many listeners access their music. Meanwhile, the maturation of major streaming music markets such as the U.S. and the U.K. has Spotify and its rivals chasing emerging opportunities in Brazil, Mexico, India, and “l(fā)ate adopter” nations like Germany and Japan.

Already, Spotify has found profits hard to come by. After reporting its first-ever quarterly profits in the third and fourth quarters of 2018, the company returned to losses in the first half of this year, leading some investors to sour on the stock. Since Spotify’s listing, its shares are down 30% versus a 15% gain for the Nasdaq. And the painstakingly negotiated agreements that Spotify has with the major labels—the majority of the music streamed on the service is licensed from Universal, Sony, and Warner plus indie agency Merlin—don’t leave the company much room to boost its profit margins.

Spotify has been a savior for the music business. Now it needs to prove that it’s not a one-hit wonder.

Spotify對(duì)唱片行業(yè)的影響到底有多大？不妨先看看這個(gè)行業(yè)在世紀(jì)之交的情況。1999年，全球唱片行業(yè)的營收達(dá)到了創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的252億美元，均來自于實(shí)體媒介的銷售，例如黑膠唱片、磁帶，以及最為重要的CD。（作為對(duì)比，星巴克去年的銷售額不到250億美元。）

隨后，Napster橫空出世。同一年推出的臭名昭著的文件分享平臺(tái)讓本土盜版現(xiàn)象泛濫成災(zāi)，不過這個(gè)現(xiàn)象在音樂行業(yè)倒是從未消失過。翻過這一頁之后：國際唱片業(yè)聯(lián)合會(huì)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，在蘋果于2003年推出其 iTunes Music Store之際，音樂行業(yè)的年?duì)I收額下降了40億美元。

在2006年Spotify面世之際，唱片業(yè)銷售額又下滑了10億美元。然而，唱片公司依然對(duì)流媒體服務(wù)充滿了顧慮，艾克則將這一服務(wù)描繪為打擊盜版的解決方案。該行業(yè)于2008年在美國本土之外與Spotify達(dá)成了音樂授權(quán)協(xié)議，但直到2011年Spotify才通過談判拿到了美國市場(chǎng)的授權(quán)。受其業(yè)務(wù)被突然侵蝕的警報(bào)，所有大型唱片公司終于與Spotify簽署了授權(quán)協(xié)議，并低調(diào)地聯(lián)合購買了該公司14%的股份。（環(huán)球、華納和索尼拒絕對(duì)本文置評(píng)。）

Just how hard has Spotify rocked the record industry? Consider where the business was at the turn of the millennium. In 1999, still riding a multi-decade wave of growth, the global recorded music industry logged a record $25.2 billion in revenues, all of it via sales of physical media like vinyl records, cassette tapes, and above all, compact discs. (For perspective, Starbucks had just under $25 billion in sales last year.)

Then Napster came along. The launch of the notorious file-sharing platform that very same year took the homegrown piracy that has always been part of the music industry and put it on steroids. Cue the slide: By the time Apple launched its iTunes Music Store in 2003, annual music industry revenues had dropped by some $4 billion, according to the IFPI.

By the time Spotify launched in 2006, music sales had fallen another $1 billion. But the record companies were still wary of the streaming service, which Ek was pitching as a solution to piracy. The industry cut a deal with Spotify for music rights outside the U.S. in 2008, but it took until 2011 for Spotify to negotiate its way into the U.S. market. Alarmed by the sudden erosion of their business, all of the major record labels finally signed licensing deals with Spotify and quietly took an estimated 14% combined stake in the company. (Universal, Warner, and Sony declined to comment for this story.)

唱片品牌Astralwerks前負(fù)責(zé)人、紐約大學(xué)克萊夫·戴維斯唱片學(xué)院教授埃羅爾·克洛斯尼說：“主流唱片公司對(duì)于流媒體的出現(xiàn)持觀望態(tài)度。唱片行業(yè)曾幾何時(shí)對(duì)這一行業(yè)并不是很看好，因?yàn)樗鼈儗?duì)流媒體的生命力存在質(zhì)疑。然而，這個(gè)行業(yè)如今已經(jīng)站穩(wěn)了腳跟?！?/p>

唱片行業(yè)掌握的部分事實(shí)依據(jù)在于，它們意識(shí)到Spotify可以提供卓越的用戶體驗(yàn)，而且是客戶如今所渴求的體驗(yàn)，尤其是在這個(gè)智能手機(jī)和高速Wi-Fi無處不在的時(shí)代。紐約音樂工作室音樂人、制作人和音樂老師杰夫·培瑞茨說：“它為聽眾提供的服務(wù)簡(jiǎn)直棒極了，而且可以獲取各種各樣的音樂?！迸嗳鸫拇饲肮彩逻^的藝人包括馬克·隆森和拉娜·德雷。

但給予聽眾如此多的自主權(quán)意味著必須徹底重新構(gòu)建藝人和唱片公司的盈利模式。培瑞茨表示：“普通聽眾并不關(guān)心資金在行業(yè)如何流動(dòng)以及最終的去向。”

Spotify通過兩種方式盈利。第一種是在免費(fèi)收聽服務(wù)中插播廣告，聽眾可以獲取有限的曲庫點(diǎn)播權(quán)限。這一方式在今年上半年創(chuàng)造了2.91億美元的收入，占其總收入的比例不到10%。剩余大部分的營收，也就是今年上半年91%的營收——28.9億美元，則來自于付費(fèi)訂閱服務(wù)收入，該服務(wù)可以為聽眾提供點(diǎn)播任何音頻的權(quán)限。公司一直認(rèn)為，其免費(fèi)服務(wù)是通往付費(fèi)服務(wù)的輸送通道，而且這一理論有數(shù)據(jù)作為支撐：Spotify超過60%的新付費(fèi)用戶都是由免費(fèi)用戶升級(jí)而來。公司大部分的業(yè)績?cè)鲩L都源于公司在這兩個(gè)領(lǐng)域的努力，也就是更有效地利用免費(fèi)客戶群來撈金，同時(shí)吸引更多用戶加入付費(fèi)行列。這兩個(gè)領(lǐng)域的年增速均超過了30%，而且公司還對(duì)固定成本進(jìn)行嚴(yán)格的管控，為的是不讓其超過營收增速。

然而，行業(yè)觀察家本·湯普森去年在他的新聞稿《Stratechery》中指出，Spotify的優(yōu)勢(shì)受到了其邊際成本的限制，也就是公司向唱片公司支付的版權(quán)費(fèi)（公司借此獲得其海量音樂內(nèi)容的授權(quán)）。湯普森寫道，盡管其用戶和營收都出現(xiàn)了大幅增長，但Spotify的利潤率卻“掌握在唱片公司的手中”，而且按絕對(duì)價(jià)值計(jì)算，其虧損正在擴(kuò)大。

華爾街對(duì)此也是越來越擔(dān)心，不止一名分析師認(rèn)為公司需要降低其版權(quán)費(fèi)來支撐其市值。德意志銀行的分析師勞埃德·沃爾姆斯里說：“我們都覺得Spotify某一天可能會(huì)在其業(yè)務(wù)中推出高更利潤率的產(chǎn)品，但我們一直都沒有看到有任何現(xiàn)實(shí)跡象表明公司做到了這一點(diǎn)?！盨potify和各大唱片公司正在探討其今后兩年的交易，而且這些對(duì)話必然是火藥味十足。盡管Spotify的規(guī)模比以往任何時(shí)候都要大，但來自于亞馬遜、蘋果和其他對(duì)手的日趨激烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)也給唱片公司提供了新的議價(jià)籌碼。

正如一名與Spotify依然有關(guān)聯(lián)的音樂行業(yè)高管說的那樣：“只要出現(xiàn)一次失敗，Spotify就會(huì)與市場(chǎng)脫節(jié)?！?/p>

“The major labels kind of sat on their hands at the advent of streaming,” says Errol Kolosine, former head of the record label Astralwerks and a professor at New York University’s Clive Davis Institute of Recorded Music. “The music industry went through a period of relative uncertainty, driven by not understanding the permanence of streaming. That reality has set in now.”

Part of the industry’s reality check was to realize that Spotify, especially in the era of smartphones and speedy Wi-Fi, offered a superior experience—one that customers would now demand. “What it provides for the listener is amazing,” says Jeff Peretz, a studio musician, producer, and music teacher in New York who has worked with acts such as Mark Ronson and Lana Del Rey. “They have access to everything.”

But giving listeners so much control meant that the way artists and labels made money had to be completely rethought. Adds Peretz: “The average listener doesn’t care about how money moves through the industry and where it winds up.”

Spotify makes its money in just two ways. It generates less than a tenth of its revenue, or $291 million in the first half of this year, by selling advertising against its free listening service, which offers limited, on-demand access to its audio catalog. It generates the vast remainder—91% in the first half of the year, or $2.89 billion—from fees for its paid subscription service, which offers unlimited access to the catalog, online and off. The company has long held that its free service serves as a funnel to its paid counterpart, and it has the data to back up the claim: More than 60% of new paid subscribers to Spotify upgraded from its free tier. Most of the company’s growth has been the result of working within these two categories: more effectively monetizing its free customers, and attracting more paid subscribers. Annual growth in both categories tops 30%, and the company keeps a tight enough lid on fixed costs so as not to outpace revenue growth.

But, as industry observer Ben Thompson pointed out last year in his Stratechery newsletter, Spotify’s upside is limited by its marginal costs—that is, the royalties it pays the record labels from which it licenses the vast majority of its music catalog. Despite its impressive continued growth in terms of users and revenue, Spotify’s margins are “at the mercy of the record labels,” Thompson wrote, and its losses are growing in absolute terms.

Wall Street has grown concerned as well, with more than one analyst arguing that the company needs to lower royalty rates to justify its market value. “We can all contemplate ways that Spotify could one day add in higher margin products to their business,” says Deutsche Bank analyst Lloyd Walmsley. “We just haven’t seen any real signs of that coming to fruition.” Spotify and the labels are in the middle of negotiating their next two-year deal, and the talks promise to be intense. While Spotify is bigger than ever, the increasingly fierce competition it faces from Amazon, Apple, and others gives the labels new leverage

As one music industry executive with continued ties to the company puts it: “Spotify is one fail away from becoming less relevant.”

西西里亞·科維斯特從未來打來的這個(gè)電話似乎很是應(yīng)景。擔(dān)任Spotify全球市場(chǎng)負(fù)責(zé)人的科維斯特在日本通過視頻與我進(jìn)行了對(duì)話。日本是全球第二大音樂市場(chǎng)，但在流媒體領(lǐng)域卻是一個(gè)后來者。當(dāng)時(shí)她在東京，早上6:30，朝陽的光芒灑在她像素化的肩上?？凭S斯特解釋了為什么日本對(duì)于Spotify來說是一個(gè)巨大的機(jī)遇。

她說：“日本一直是一個(gè)非常依賴于實(shí)體的市場(chǎng)。我們有能力和機(jī)會(huì)向這里的人們展示他們以前從未見過的事物?！?/p>

這個(gè)日出國度并非是Spotify認(rèn)為自己可以俘獲新用戶芳心的唯一市場(chǎng)。音樂界認(rèn)為，在全球十大頂級(jí)音樂市場(chǎng)之中，至少有三分之一在流媒體服務(wù)采用方面并不成熟，要么是因?yàn)槿藗円廊粚?duì)CD青睞有加（日本），要么是缺乏技術(shù)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施（巴西）。

這對(duì)于Spotify來說是個(gè)好消息，因?yàn)楣灸壳罢媾R著巨大壓力，而且迫不及待地希望向外界展示：公司如今已經(jīng)成為了這一領(lǐng)域的主導(dǎo)者，因此可以可靠地將聽眾轉(zhuǎn)化為利潤?？凭S斯特受命開展的工作包括國際擴(kuò)張和產(chǎn)品本土化，他認(rèn)為增長之路取決于如何平衡地開展“三位一體”策略。

她說：“要實(shí)現(xiàn)增長，擺在我們面前的有這樣幾條道路：在現(xiàn)有市場(chǎng)內(nèi)實(shí)現(xiàn)增長；開拓新領(lǐng)域；提升我們的產(chǎn)品服務(wù)。這并不只是一件事情，你必須有足夠多的雞蛋，并把它們放在足夠多的籃子中?！?/p>

到目前為止，Spotify將雞蛋放在了79個(gè)籃子中，比亞馬遜音樂的30多個(gè)國家要多得多，但比蘋果的110多個(gè)國家則遜色不少。為了拓展其覆蓋范圍，Spotify在7月宣布了其所為的Spotify Lite，這是其標(biāo)志性流媒體服務(wù)的“袖珍快速精簡(jiǎn)版”，它針對(duì)老舊型號(hào)電腦硬件和較慢的手機(jī)網(wǎng)絡(luò)進(jìn)行了優(yōu)化，并覆蓋了36個(gè)新興市場(chǎng)，包括阿根廷、巴西、加拿大、印度和墨西哥。

科維斯特說：“全球共有近50億部智能手機(jī)。由此可見，現(xiàn)有的潛力是巨大的?！?/p>

是不是明顯漏掉了誰？中國。Spotify還未正式登陸這個(gè)全球人口數(shù)量最多的國家，不過它在2017年年底與騰訊音樂交換了少數(shù)股權(quán)，也讓其獲得了間接的立足之處。市場(chǎng)研究公司Midia估計(jì)，騰訊音樂于12月在紐交所上市，其市值達(dá)到了220億美元，該公司占據(jù)著全球8%的流媒體音樂市場(chǎng)，落后于Spotify、蘋果和亞馬遜。在全球音樂流媒體市場(chǎng)，Spotify和騰訊共計(jì)擁有接近多數(shù)的市場(chǎng)份額，也為其應(yīng)對(duì)科技巨頭對(duì)手的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)提供了堅(jiān)實(shí)的壁壘。（蘋果和亞馬遜均未回復(fù)《財(cái)富》雜志有關(guān)本文的置評(píng)請(qǐng)求。）

這并不是在說科維斯特對(duì)這個(gè)問題感到寢食難安。這位Spotify高管以蔑視的口吻說：“相信人們會(huì)感到驚訝的是，我們基本沒有花時(shí)間去研究如何競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，而是專注于獨(dú)立完成我們能夠做的事情。我們是一家全球性的服務(wù)公司，到目前為止是這一領(lǐng)域的老大。我們僅關(guān)注音頻，這里的區(qū)別還是很大的?！?/p>

It seems appropriate that Cecilia Qvist is calling from the future. Qvist, who serves as Spotify’s global head of markets, is speaking to me via videochat from Japan, the world’s second-largest music market but a late bloomer when it comes to streaming adoption. It’s 6:30 a.m. in Tokyo; fledgling rays of sunlight peek over her pixelated shoulders. Qvist explains why Japan represents such a big opportunity for Spotify.

“Japan has been a very physical market,” she says. “We have the ability and opportunity to show them things they haven’t seen before.”

The land of the rising sun isn’t the only place where Spotify believes it can dazzle new users. The music industry considers at least a third of the top 10 global music markets to be immature when it comes to streaming adoption, either because of a lingering love of CDs (Japan) or lagging technical infrastructure (Brazil).

That’s good news for Spotify, which is under great pressure to show that, category dominance now achieved, it can reliably turn listeners into profits. Qvist, whose mandate includes international expansion and product localization, believes the path to growth lies in balancing a trio of strategies.

“There are a few ways for us to grow,” she says. “Growth within existing markets. Expanding into new territories. Enhancing our product offering. It’s not just one thing. You have to have enough bets in enough buckets.”

To date, Spotify has bets in 79 buckets—far more than Amazon Music, which is available in about three dozen countries, but well behind Apple Music, which operates in more than 110. To broaden its reach, Spotify announced in July what it dubs Spotify Lite, “a small, fast, and simplified version” of its signature streaming service that’s optimized for older computer hardware and slower cellular networks. It launched Lite in three dozen emerging markets, including Argentina, Brazil, Canada, India, and Mexico.

“There are almost 5 billion smartphones around the globe,” Qvist says. “Just look at the potential that exists.”

One notable omission? China. Spotify doesn’t officially operate in the most populous country in the world, though in late 2017 it swapped minority stakes with Tencent Music, giving it an indirect foothold. Midia, the market research firm, estimates that Tencent Music—which went public on the New York Stock Exchange in December and carries a market capitalization of $22 billion—claims about 8% of the global streaming music market, behind Spotify, Apple, and Amazon. Together, Spotify and Tencent control a near-majority of the world’s music streaming business, providing a bulwark against competition from its Big Tech rivals. (Neither Apple nor Amazon responded to Fortune’s inquiries for this story.)

Not that Qvist is terribly concerned about it. “You would be surprised how little time we spend looking at competition versus what we can do on our own,” the Spotify executive says with an air of defiance. “We are a global service, by far the biggest. We are solely focused on audio, and that’s a big difference.”

這為我們帶來了播客。如果Spotify通過其他形式的音頻內(nèi)容來進(jìn)行擴(kuò)張，我們可能并不會(huì)感到驚訝。這完全是另外一回事，而且Spotify心甘情愿地為兩家播客內(nèi)容制作商支付了溢價(jià)。

2月，Spotify宣布，公司以2.3億美元收購了紐約Gimlet Media，后者因其播客系列《回復(fù)所有人》（Reply All）和《犯罪之城》（Crimetown）知名。一個(gè)月后，Spotify又斥資5600萬美元收購了Parcast，該公司因其真實(shí)犯罪作品而聞名，包括《懸而未決的謀殺案》（Unsolved Murders）。這些舉措背后的事實(shí)在于，Spotify已經(jīng)成為了坐上了播客行業(yè)的第二把交椅（僅次于位于加州庫比蒂諾的已知的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手）。這些舉措還凸顯了Spotify通過打破音樂合約限制來改善業(yè)績?cè)鲩L的必要性。

第二位要求匿名的音樂行業(yè)高管在評(píng)論其雇主與Spotify的商業(yè)關(guān)系時(shí)表示：“向播客轉(zhuǎn)變——我們對(duì)這一領(lǐng)域的現(xiàn)狀十分了解。”

盡管播客越來越受歡迎，但播客的業(yè)務(wù)規(guī)模與音樂相比依然要小得多。此外，這位音樂高管還表示，播客的盈利模式與音樂不同。版權(quán)費(fèi)規(guī)模不同，受眾本身也不一樣。這位高管說：“精于播客之道并不能解決與[Spotify]音樂業(yè)務(wù)地位相關(guān)的所有問題。這是一個(gè)十分有趣的機(jī)會(huì)，我能理解Spotify為什么會(huì)選擇這條道路。但它并不能力挽狂瀾，還是個(gè)未知數(shù)。”

Spotify的首席內(nèi)容官多恩·奧斯特洛夫?qū)Υ顺钟胁煌庖?。這位在電視行業(yè)摸爬滾打了多年的高管（曾經(jīng)擔(dān)任CW和UPN電視網(wǎng)總裁多年）從位于世貿(mào)中心4號(hào)樓的Spotify新美國總部給我打來電話，解釋了播客對(duì)于公司的重要性。Spotify充滿樂趣的紐約總部共有十幾層樓，面積達(dá)56.4萬平方英尺，它更像是一個(gè)垂直園區(qū)，而不是辦公室。這里的各種待遇，包括免費(fèi)餐飲以及如海般的站立式辦公桌，彰顯了公司的增長速度。

奧斯特洛夫表示，播客業(yè)務(wù)的格局類似于Spotify在00年代音樂行業(yè)的際遇。對(duì)于Spotify來說，播客這個(gè)十分誘人的機(jī)遇也是吸引新一代消費(fèi)者Z一代的另一把利器，他們收聽播客的熱情在不斷攀升。奧斯特洛夫說，2017年，27%的Z一代至少每個(gè)月收聽播客一次，今年這個(gè)數(shù)字已經(jīng)達(dá)到了40%。

她說：“播客已經(jīng)面世多年，但它們?cè)谀承┓矫嬉廊惶幱诎l(fā)展初期，這塊業(yè)務(wù)異常碎片化。我們看到，播客聽眾正在呈爆炸式增長，因此它為Spotify打造和統(tǒng)一這個(gè)行業(yè)提供了一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)。”

這也為Spotify將其內(nèi)容收入麾下節(jié)目單提供了機(jī)會(huì)，這樣就不用再去購買版權(quán)。播客并非是公司在這一方面的唯一嘗試。去年，Spotify試推行了一項(xiàng)服務(wù)，允許獨(dú)立藝人將其作品直接上載至平臺(tái)，類似于流媒體同行SoundCloud的做法，以越過中間人，也就是唱片公司。可以預(yù)見的是，音樂行業(yè)對(duì)這一舉措頗有微詞。7月，Spotify關(guān)閉了這個(gè)項(xiàng)目，稱公司希望專注于為藝人和唱片公司提供服務(wù)。第二名行業(yè)高管說：“我依然認(rèn)為[直接上載]可能是其長遠(yuǎn)規(guī)劃的一部分，但難以改變現(xiàn)狀。”

所有這一切都十分重要，因?yàn)镾potify沒有抵御蘋果和亞馬遜的殺手锏：硬件。蘋果自身的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，公司在全球擁有超過14億iPhones、iPads、TVs和 Macs活躍用戶，而這些用戶亦是Apple Music可以開發(fā)的對(duì)象。亞馬遜已經(jīng)售出1億臺(tái)配備Alexa個(gè)人助理的設(shè)備，而且擁有1億多Prime會(huì)員，這兩類人群均可以訪問其音樂內(nèi)容。作為對(duì)比，Spotify必須通過別人家的設(shè)備盡可能多地吸引用戶的眼球，然而其財(cái)大氣粗的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手在一夜間便能組建一支用戶大軍。Spotify的繼續(xù)增長證明了其強(qiáng)大的用戶數(shù)量，但其未來前景面臨的威脅依然存在。

Which brings us to podcasts. It was perhaps unsurprising that Spotify might look to other kinds of audio as a way to expand; it was another matter entirely that it was willing to pay a premium for a pair of podcast producers.

In February, Spotify announced that it had acquired New York–based Gimlet Media, known for its podcast series Reply All and Crimetown, for $230 million; the following month the company shelled out $56 million for Parcast, known for true-crime shows like Unsolved Murders. The moves capitalized on the fact that Spotify has become the second-largest player in podcasting (behind a certain competitor in Cupertino, Calif.). They also underscored Spotify’s need to break free from the constraints of its music contracts to see improved growth.

“The shift to podcasting—we understand what’s going on there,” says a second music industry executive, who requested anonymity, citing his employer’s business relationship with Spotify.

Despite its booming popularity, however, podcasting is still a much smaller business than music. In addition, the music executive adds, podcast economics aren’t the same as those for music. The royalty pool is different, and the audience itself is different. “Being really great at podcasting does not solve all the issues with respect to [Spotify’s] position in the music business,” the executive says. “It’s an interesting opportunity; I understand why they’re going after it. But it’s not a game-changer. The jury’s out.”

Dawn Ostroff, Spotify’s chief content officer, begs to differ. The longtime television industry executive (she was for years president of the CW and UPN networks) calls me from Spotify’s new U.S. headquarters at 4 World Trade Center to explain why podcasts hold promise for the company. At 564,000 square feet across more than a dozen floors, Spotify’s playful NYC digs are more of a vertical campus than an office, and the perks within—including free meals and an ocean of standing desks—signal the company’s rapid ascent.

Ostroff says the landscape for podcasts mirrors the one that Spotify encountered in music in the 2000s. They’re also an attractive opportunity for Spotify to gain additional leverage over the next generation of consumers: Generation Z, which is listening with increasing enthusiasm. In 2017, 27% of the cohort listened to a podcast at least once per month, Ostroff says; this year, 40% tuned in.

“Podcasts have been around for years, but they’re still nascent in other ways—the business has been incredibly fragmented,” she says. “It’s an opportunity for Spotify to build and unify the industry at a time when we’re seeing listenership explode.”

It’s also a chance for Spotify to own the content in its catalog, rather than license it. Podcasts haven’t been the company’s only attempt at this. Last year, Spotify experimented with a service that would allow independent artists to upload their work directly to its platform, à la streaming peer SoundCloud, and cut out the middlemen—that is, record labels. Predictably, the initiative was met with some complaints from the music industry. In July, Spotify shuttered the program, saying it wanted to focus on serving artists and labels. “I still think [direct uploads] might be part of their long-term perspective,” says the second industry executive. “But it wasn’t moving the needle.”

All of this is important because Spotify lacks a key tool to fend off Apple and Amazon: hardware. According to its own count, Apple has more than 1.4 billion active iPhones, iPads, TVs, and Macs around the globe to leverage for Apple Music; Amazon has sold more than 100 million devices with its Alexa personal assistant and counts more than 100 million members of Prime, both of which allow for access to its music catalog. Whereas Spotify must fight for every eyeball on someone else’s device, its well-heeled rivals can activate a customer base overnight. That Spotify continues to grow is a testament to its strong engagement figures, but the threat to its future prospects remains.

丹尼爾·艾克不安地環(huán)顧著四周。哥倫比亞廣播公司《This Morning》節(jié)目的主持人蓋勒·金剛剛在直播現(xiàn)場(chǎng)向他問道，在經(jīng)歷了三年冰凍期之后，他如何成功地修復(fù)了Spotify與泰勒·斯威夫特已然破裂的關(guān)系。金笑著說：“泰勒有首歌《Love Story》，里面唱道‘寶貝，答應(yīng)我吧?！闶遣皇蔷褪沁@樣說的？”

這位首席執(zhí)行官笑著說：“比這個(gè)稍微復(fù)雜點(diǎn)。”他還說自己去了很多次納什維爾，才說服這位流行明星流媒體重新考慮這個(gè)已經(jīng)頗具規(guī)模的流媒體行業(yè)。

事實(shí)上，艾克一直都是優(yōu)勢(shì)在握。對(duì)于已經(jīng)與大型唱片公司簽約的藝人來說，包括已經(jīng)與環(huán)球簽訂了全球合約的斯威夫特，進(jìn)駐所有擁有其聽眾的平臺(tái)符合其個(gè)人利益。Spotify自與斯威夫特分手之后一直都在致力于培養(yǎng)聽眾群體。在這期間，實(shí)物唱片專輯的銷量一落千丈。經(jīng)濟(jì)壓力會(huì)迫使斯威夫特重回Spotify的懷抱，這只是遲早的問題。

這并非是說Spotify已經(jīng)解決了長期以來一直困擾它的問題：藝人薪酬。根據(jù)公司自己的計(jì)算，其總營收的三分之二還多流向了藝人、唱片公司、出版商和發(fā)行商的腰包中。然而，流媒體收入中各單項(xiàng)收益實(shí)在是低的令人沮喪。

Spotify一直對(duì)具體的數(shù)字和付費(fèi)比率避而不談，而這些都取決于與唱片公司的協(xié)議。但有報(bào)告指出，單次播放量的付費(fèi)比率在十分之三到十分之八之間，也就是100萬次播放量可能高達(dá)8000美元。其中大部分進(jìn)入了歌曲總版權(quán)方的腰包。詞曲作家自己拿到的要少一些。（美國版稅委員會(huì)去年做出的一項(xiàng)決定意欲將詞曲作家的收入提升近一半；目前該動(dòng)議徘徊于申訴中。）

這些費(fèi)率并非只針對(duì)Spotify。行業(yè)消息人士稱，蘋果和亞馬遜的付費(fèi)比率與Spotify相當(dāng)。由多名知名藝人和Sprint共同持有的Tidal當(dāng)前的日子并不好過，但其付費(fèi)比率更高。SiriusXM旗下先驅(qū)電臺(tái)服務(wù)Pandora的付費(fèi)比率則要少得多。

然而如果將它們看作一個(gè)整體，流媒體服務(wù)事實(shí)上是聽眾發(fā)現(xiàn)藝人的強(qiáng)大引擎，也是唱片公司正在直茁壯成長的搖錢樹。正如一名音樂公司高管說的那樣：“我們是亦敵亦友的關(guān)系。我們都需要對(duì)方。從我們的利益角度來說，他們對(duì)我們的依賴度越高越好。同時(shí)，我們的藝人則需要盡可能多地接觸更多的聽眾。”

為了保住其行業(yè)領(lǐng)先地位，Spotify必須繼續(xù)平衡好與唱片行業(yè)之間這種既合作又競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的關(guān)系。當(dāng)然為了安全起見，Spotify最好還是避免再次交惡泰勒·斯威夫特。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

本文登載于《財(cái)富》雜志2019年11月刊。

譯者：馮豐

審校：夏林

Daniel Ek glances around nervously. Gayle King, the CBS This Morning anchor, has just asked him live on the air how, after three icy years, he managed to mend Spotify’s broken relationship with Taylor Swift. “She’s got a song, ‘Love Story,’ that says, ‘Baby, just say yes,’?” King offers with a smile. “Is that what you did?”

“It was slightly more complicated than that,” the CEO says with a chuckle, adding that it took several trips to Nashville to convince the pop star that streaming had come around enough for her to reconsider.

In truth, Ek always had the upper hand. It’s in the interest of artists signed to major labels—including Swift, who has a worldwide deal with Universal Music Group—to be on every platform where they have listeners. Spotify has done nothing but build that base since its spat with Swift; in the interim, physical album sales have fallen off a cliff. It was only a matter of time before economic pressures would push Swift into Spotify’s open arms.

That’s not to say that Spotify has solved the one bugaboo that continues to dog it: artist payouts. By the company’s own calculations, more than two-thirds of its total revenues are funneled back to artists, record labels, publishers, and distributors. And yet, the itemized numbers for streaming revenue feel distressingly low.

Spotify is cagey about revealing specific figures and payout rates, which depend on label agreements. But reports have pegged rates between three-tenths and eight-tenths of a cent per stream—or up to $8,000 for a million streams. Most of that goes to the master holder of the song rights. The songwriters themselves get less. (A ruling last year by the U.S. Copyright Royalty Board aimed to hike songwriters’ share by almost half; it’s stuck in appeals.)

Those figures aren’t unique to Spotify. Apple and Amazon pay similar rates, industry sources say. Tidal, the troubled streaming service co-owned by a roster of famous artists and Sprint, pays a little more; Pandora, the pioneering radio service owned by SiriusXM, pays a lot less.

Taken as a group, though, the streaming services have proved to be a powerful engine for listeners to discover artists and a growing revenue generator for labels. As one music executive puts it: “We’re frenemies. We need each other. It’s in our interest for them to be as dependent on us as possible. And our artists need to reach as many customers as possible.”

To stay on top, Spotify must keep that balance between partner and adversary with the record industry. And just to be safe, it should probably avoid starting any new fights with Taylor Swift.

This article appears in the November 2019 issue of Fortune.