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貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端時(shí)代,中國(guó)芯片行業(yè)能否迎頭趕上?

貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端時(shí)代,中國(guó)芯片行業(yè)能否迎頭趕上?

Grady McGregor 2019年12月01日
越來(lái)越多的證據(jù)表明,中國(guó)的芯片制造正在進(jìn)入一個(gè)新時(shí)代。

眾所周知,中國(guó)進(jìn)口半導(dǎo)體芯片的支出比進(jìn)口石油還高,這說(shuō)明了中國(guó)對(duì)外國(guó)芯片的嚴(yán)重依賴。即使是現(xiàn)在,雖然已經(jīng)耕耘多年,但中國(guó)在微型芯片制造方面仍然遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落后于美國(guó),而這些芯片是iPhone、三星Galaxy或華為Mate等手機(jī)的動(dòng)力來(lái)源。但隨著中國(guó)與美國(guó)的緊張關(guān)系不斷升級(jí),由于英特爾和高通等芯片巨頭都是美國(guó)公司,可能會(huì)刺激中國(guó)企業(yè)和供應(yīng)鏈最終迎頭趕上。

半導(dǎo)體硅芯片已經(jīng)成為技術(shù)革命的支柱,為移動(dòng)電話、電腦、無(wú)人駕駛汽車(chē)和“智能”設(shè)備提供動(dòng)力。它們的計(jì)算能力每?jī)赡昃蜁?huì)翻一番(這種工業(yè)原理被稱(chēng)為摩爾定律),推動(dòng)人類(lèi)進(jìn)入前所未有的技術(shù)大發(fā)展時(shí)代。

20世紀(jì)50年代以來(lái),中國(guó)就開(kāi)始投入到關(guān)鍵零部件的開(kāi)發(fā)。但事實(shí)證明,芯片的制造尤其困難,因?yàn)閯?chuàng)新成本高、發(fā)展快,很難趕上。例如,2017年,僅英特爾就在半導(dǎo)體研發(fā)上投入了130多億美元。

在中國(guó),國(guó)家主導(dǎo)的半導(dǎo)體計(jì)劃甚至連國(guó)內(nèi)需求都難以滿足。20世紀(jì)90年代,一個(gè)知名的大規(guī)模政府項(xiàng)目盡管資金充足卻收效甚微。然而,隨著中國(guó)在20世紀(jì)90年代和本世紀(jì)頭十年的對(duì)外開(kāi)放,科技水平又不斷提高,國(guó)內(nèi)對(duì)先進(jìn)芯片的需求有增無(wú)減。21世紀(jì)初,中國(guó)再次試圖通過(guò)行業(yè)改造來(lái)刺激創(chuàng)新:大規(guī)模私營(yíng)化、引入稅收優(yōu)惠、提供新的資金。但這些努力基本上也徒勞無(wú)功。

麥肯錫研究半導(dǎo)體業(yè)務(wù)的管理合伙人克里斯托弗·托馬斯表示,事實(shí)證明,中國(guó)的半導(dǎo)體投資規(guī)模太小,而且過(guò)于分散,無(wú)法對(duì)全球市場(chǎng)產(chǎn)生重大影響。

尋求自給自足

2015年,中國(guó)政府推出了另一項(xiàng)計(jì)劃,發(fā)布了一系列以科技為重點(diǎn)的政策目標(biāo),名為“中國(guó)制造2025”,目標(biāo)包括2020年實(shí)現(xiàn)半導(dǎo)體自給率達(dá)到40%,2025年達(dá)到70%。隨之而來(lái)的是大量針對(duì)該技術(shù)的投資承諾,例如10月宣布的300億美元半導(dǎo)體基金。

China famously spends more on importing semiconductor chips than it does on importing oil. This bit of trivia illustrates China’s deep dependency on foreign chips and is especially notable given China’s outsize efforts to break the habit. Even now, after years of investments, China still lags far behind the U.S. in manufacturing the tiny chips that power your iPhone, Samsung Galaxy, or Huawei Mate. But the nation’s escalating tensions with the U.S.—home of giant chipmakers like Intel and Qualcomm—may be spurring China’s firms and supply chains to finally catch up.

Semiconductor silicon chips have formed the backbone of the technological revolution, helping to power mobile phones, computers, driverless cars, and “smart” devices. And they’ve doubled in computing power every two years—an industry principle known as Moore’s Law—spurring the unprecedented era of technological growth.

China has devoted resources to developing the crucial components since the 1950s. But chips have proven particularly difficult to manufacture since innovation is costly, and their rapid advancement is difficult to catch up with. In 2017, for example, Intel alone spent over $13 billion on research and development for semiconductors.

In China, state-led semiconductor initiatives have proved inadequate to meet even domestic demand. A large, well-funded state push in the 1990s famously yielded few results. Yet the need for advanced chips only grew as the country opened up in the 1990s and 2000s and became more technologically advanced. In the 2000s, the country again attempted to spur innovation by transforming the industry; it privatized much of the sector, introduced tax benefits, and created new funds. That effort too was largely fruitless.

According to Christopher Thomas, a managing partner at McKinsey focused on semiconductors, China’s semiconductor investments have often proved too small and dispersed to make any significant dent in the global marketplace.

Seeking self-sufficiency

In 2015, the Chinese government introduced yet another initiative, releasing a set of tech-focused policy goals called “Made in China 2025,” which aimed for 40% self-sufficiency in semiconductors by 2020, and 70% by 2025. This policy came with massive investment pledges into the technology, such as the $30 billion semiconductor fund announced in October.

2018年11月29日,上海舉行的制造業(yè)博覽會(huì)上,一名男子走過(guò)“中國(guó)制造2025”的標(biāo)志牌。圖片來(lái)源:Visual China Group via Getty Images

《日經(jīng)亞洲評(píng)論》(Nikkei Asian Review)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,雖然中國(guó)在芯片行業(yè)取得了一些進(jìn)展,但截至去年自給率僅為15%左右?!斑^(guò)去五年,這個(gè)行業(yè)的生產(chǎn)制造沒(méi)有產(chǎn)生任何結(jié)構(gòu)性的變化?!蓖旭R斯說(shuō)。

但越來(lái)越多的證據(jù)表明,中國(guó)的芯片制造正在進(jìn)入一個(gè)新時(shí)代。與美國(guó)的爭(zhēng)端似乎刺激了中國(guó)的創(chuàng)新。

貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端的涓滴效應(yīng)

16個(gè)月的中美貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端還沒(méi)有直接影響到芯片行業(yè),但該行業(yè)已經(jīng)受到了貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端涓滴效應(yīng)的影響。2018年7月起,美中兩國(guó)連續(xù)幾輪關(guān)稅戰(zhàn)給兩國(guó)依賴半導(dǎo)體的科技公司帶來(lái)了不小壓力,因?yàn)獒槍?duì)相關(guān)設(shè)備的斗爭(zhēng)已經(jīng)陷入了針?shù)h相對(duì)的局面。價(jià)格因此上漲;像英特爾這樣的公司甚至已經(jīng)開(kāi)始將供應(yīng)鏈移出中國(guó)。

該行業(yè)的行業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)近期表示希望中美通過(guò)協(xié)商達(dá)成貿(mào)易協(xié)議,呼吁雙方“取消有害關(guān)稅”。

黑名單是另一個(gè)問(wèn)題,這是美國(guó)使出的阻礙中國(guó)科技的另外一個(gè)機(jī)制。去年5月,美國(guó)將華為和超過(guò)70家附屬公司加入政府實(shí)體清單(實(shí)際上就是一個(gè)黑名單),因?yàn)槊绹?guó)認(rèn)為它們會(huì)對(duì)國(guó)家安全造成威脅。最近幾周,隨著美國(guó)在名單上加入了許多頂尖的人工智能公司,這個(gè)名單還在增加。新上榜的這些公司依賴于先進(jìn)的芯片,但列入實(shí)體清單導(dǎo)致美國(guó)公司幾乎不可能向它們提供所需的零部件。

While the country has made some progress, as of last year it had reached only about 15% self-sufficiency, according to the Nikkei Asian Review. “In manufacturing there’s been no structural changes in the industry in the last five years,” said Thomas.

But there’s a growing body of evidence that suggests a new era in China’s chipmaking is underway. In this case, it seems, conflict with the U.S. is incentivizing China to innovate.

A trade war trickles down

The 16-month U.S.-China trade war hasn’t hit chips directly, but the industry has endured its trickle-down effects. Starting in July 2018, successive rounds of tariffs levied from the U.S. and China put a strain on technology companies in both countries that rely on semiconductors as related equipment got caught in the tit-for-tat. That led to higher prices; firms like Intel have even begun shifting supply chains away from China.

The industry’s trade association recently championed discussion of a U.S.-China trade deal, and called for the two sides to “remove harmful tariffs.”

Then there’s the matter of blacklisting, another mechanism employed by the U.S. that’s had a stymying effect on Chinese tech. Last May, the U.S. added Huawei and over 70 affiliated companies to the government’s entity list—essentially a blacklist—because the U.S. viewed it as a national security threat. In recent weeks, the list has grown, with the U.S. adding a number of top A.I. firms to it. The new entries depend on advanced chips, but the classification makes it nearly impossible for U.S. firms to supply them with the parts they need.

今年5月,美國(guó)阻擊華為,將其列入“實(shí)體清單”,這種做法實(shí)際上是禁止華為在美國(guó)開(kāi)展任何業(yè)務(wù)。圖片來(lái)源:Henrique Casinhas—SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images

英國(guó)的《金融時(shí)報(bào)》報(bào)道,美國(guó)甚至出于安全考慮敦促一家企業(yè)——全球最大的芯片制造商臺(tái)積電——停止向華為供應(yīng)芯片。與臺(tái)積電關(guān)系密切的臺(tái)灣地區(qū)當(dāng)局否認(rèn)了這一報(bào)道,稱(chēng)將繼續(xù)與華為合作。

中國(guó)的本土芯片

面臨這樣的緊張局勢(shì),中國(guó)的科技巨頭加快了自己的芯片生產(chǎn)。華為自己在8月也推出了一款由人工智能驅(qū)動(dòng)的新款芯片,以協(xié)助處理大量數(shù)據(jù)。同樣,中國(guó)的科技和電子商務(wù)巨頭阿里巴巴在去年9月宣布,已經(jīng)自主開(kāi)發(fā)了人工智能芯片用于該公司的云計(jì)算服務(wù)。這些芯片代表著巨大進(jìn)步,但這些公司仍然在很大程度上依賴從中國(guó)大陸境外進(jìn)口芯片。就在幾天前,華為高管還訪問(wèn)了臺(tái)灣地區(qū),確保臺(tái)積電能夠繼續(xù)向他們提供最先進(jìn)的芯片。

美國(guó)MSA Captial駐北京的管理合伙人、投資人本·哈伯格說(shuō),美國(guó)利用其在芯片行業(yè)的主導(dǎo)地位做出的種種決定短期內(nèi)似乎損害了中國(guó)的利益。但在未來(lái),他說(shuō),“輸家是美國(guó)?!?/p>

“如今投資的方向和資本的流向,是(中國(guó)的)替代產(chǎn)業(yè),是中國(guó)自給自足的產(chǎn)業(yè),(比如)芯片?!彼?1月初在廣州舉辦的《財(cái)富》全球科技論壇上表示,“將供應(yīng)鏈、資本市場(chǎng)和人才的規(guī)模擴(kuò)大一倍,最終會(huì)在中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)形成一個(gè)自給自足的體系?!?/p>

長(zhǎng)江商學(xué)院的金融學(xué)教授甘潔也持類(lèi)似看法:“未來(lái)10年,中國(guó)將在技術(shù)戰(zhàn)中扮演更勢(shì)均力敵的角色?!庇捎诿绹?guó)目前在半導(dǎo)體領(lǐng)域擁有優(yōu)勢(shì),它通過(guò)威脅不向中國(guó)供貨讓中國(guó)為難。但隨著中國(guó)在芯片制造和總體技術(shù)領(lǐng)域?qū)嵙υ鲩L(zhǎng),“(美國(guó))將被迫更加合作?!彼硎?。

哈伯格稱(chēng),他認(rèn)為芯片領(lǐng)域?qū)⒆兂梢粋€(gè)日益“分裂的世界”,美國(guó)和中國(guó)將各自經(jīng)營(yíng)自己的生產(chǎn)鏈,第三方最終可能不得不在這兩者之間做出選擇。

如果供應(yīng)鏈完全分裂,將是大型芯片制造商不愿意看到的結(jié)果,因?yàn)樵谌蚍秶鷥?nèi)整合供應(yīng)鏈對(duì)降低成本、轉(zhuǎn)移技術(shù)、促進(jìn)創(chuàng)新至關(guān)重要。

隨著中國(guó)尋求增強(qiáng)其芯片制造實(shí)力,一個(gè)長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)的問(wèn)題是這種努力是會(huì)導(dǎo)致出現(xiàn)兩個(gè)獨(dú)立的市場(chǎng)(一個(gè)在美國(guó),另一個(gè)在中國(guó)),還是中國(guó)會(huì)在全球芯片制造領(lǐng)域成為更勢(shì)均力敵的對(duì)手。然而,一個(gè)更直接的問(wèn)題是,中國(guó)當(dāng)前的創(chuàng)新熱潮是否會(huì)比過(guò)去結(jié)出更多的果實(shí)。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:Agatha

The U.S. reportedly even urged a foreign chipmaker Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s largest, to stop selling chips to Huawei over security fears, according to the Financial Times. The government of Taiwan, which is closely tied to TSMC, denied the report and vowed to continue its relationship with Huawei.

China’s homemade chips

Amid all this tension, Chinese tech giants have ramped up their own chip production. Huawei itself introduced a new A.I.-powered chip to the market in August to help process large data. Likewise, Alibaba, the Chinese tech and e-commerce giant, announced in September it had developed its own A.I.-chip for use in its cloud computing services. These chips represent significant strides, but the firms still remain largely dependent on importing chips from outside mainland China’s borders. Just a few days ago, Huawei’s top executives made a trip to Taiwan to ensure that TSMC could continue supplying them with the most advanced chips.

The U.S.’s decisions to leverage its chipmaking dominance seems to be hurting China in the short-term, said investor Ben Harburg, a managing partner at MSA Captial in Beijing. But farther down the road, he said, "the loser is the United States.”

“Where the investment is going today, and where the capital is flowing today, is in (China’s) replacement, self-sufficiency industries (like) chips," he said at Fortune’s Global Tech Forum in Guangzhou last week. “[D]ecoupling supply chains, capital markets, [and] talent ultimately breeds a system internally of self-sufficiency for China.”

Gan Jie, professor of finance at Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business takes a similar long view: “Ten years down the road, China will be more of an equal partner in terms of the technology war,” she said. Because the U.S. has such an advantage now in semiconductors, its threats to withhold the technology from China sting. But as China gains in chipmaking and general technological prowess, “[the U.S.] will be forced to be more collaborative,” she said.

Harburg said he sees an increasingly “balkanized and bifurcated world” emerging in the chip space, with the U.S. and China operating their own distinct production chains that third parties may ultimate have to choose between.

Should supply chains fully split, it’d be an undesirable outcome for major chipmakers, since integrating supply chains globally is critical to keeping costs down, transferring technology, and fostering innovation.

As China seeks to grow its chipmaking prowess, one longterm question is whether the effort will spur the emergence of two separate markets—one in the U.S. and another in China—or if China will simply become a more equal player in the global chipmaking landscape. A more immediate question, however, is whether China’s current innovation spurt will bear more fruit than those of the past.

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