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????11日晚些時候，我在舊金山由SecondMarket組織的Capitalyze會議上主持一場小組討論。這場討論距離SharesPost在門洛帕克組織的類似討論還不到24個小時。繼10日發(fā)問后，我為11日的討論準(zhǔn)備了四問： ????1. 可能鼓勵辭職：10日圍繞創(chuàng)始人股票的流動性預(yù)設(shè)有很多討論。比如，一旦公司的財務(wù)指標(biāo)滿足某種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，如現(xiàn)金流為正，就允許創(chuàng)始人在二級市場出售約2%的股份。頻率可以是一年一次。這聽起來很不錯——創(chuàng)業(yè)者和投資者的大多數(shù)利益仍保持一致——但有個很大的擔(dān)憂是：二級市場這樣會不會“鼓勵”一些級別相對低的雇員辭職？畢竟，一旦辭職，很多股票限售規(guī)定都會失效——而且，也很少有公司希望被外界視為優(yōu)先購股權(quán)恪守者 (這會讓其難以招到新的人才)。 ????2. 有限合伙人壓力：如果我是風(fēng)險投資基金的有限合伙人，我會就創(chuàng)始人股票的流動性提出下述問題：“為什么我們不也賣一點？”一個大學(xué)捐贈基金與一個希望在硅谷購房的26歲負債者之間顯然有很大差別，但當(dāng)創(chuàng)業(yè)者到了30歲，已不止一次出售持股后，兩者差別已有所縮小。這里我要說的是風(fēng)險資本——特別是種子/早期風(fēng)險投資——可能很快就會面臨有限合伙人壓力，要求和創(chuàng)始人一起賣出一些股票。 ????3. 訴訟紛爭: 到一定時候，二級市場會產(chǎn)生大量訴訟，可能包括集體訴訟。設(shè)想如果一家二級市場交易活躍的公司IPO價格比二級市場交易價低30%，會怎樣？設(shè)想二級市場賣家是內(nèi)部人士會怎樣？買家很可能提起訴訟，指控賣家應(yīng)早已知曉股票被高估 (須知，買家對公司財務(wù)狀況可能毫不知情)。我不認為這樣的訴訟會贏或者應(yīng)該贏(買入者都應(yīng)該知道，無數(shù)據(jù)支持的買入就是在閉著眼向前沖)，但律師們會爭著接這些訴訟案。標(biāo)的非?？捎^，外加一些有錢的原告…… ????4. 設(shè)立標(biāo)桿：當(dāng)幾家投行在為一家二線市場交易公司的IPO項目爭得不可開交時，他們會把二級市場的交易價格作為IPO價格基準(zhǔn)嗎？我說不好，但可以設(shè)想他們可能不得不這樣做。投行人士在定價方面蒙蔽非上市公司首席執(zhí)行官的情況并不少見，但很難設(shè)想他們會說，“我知道你在非公開市場上值200億美元，但在公開市場上我們只能做到150億美元?！?/p> |
????Later today I'll be moderating a panel at the Capitalyze conference in San Francisco, which is being organized by SecondMarket. This comes less than 24 hours after rival SharesPost held an its own event in Menlo Park. Some questions after yesterday, and in preparation for today: ????1. Incentive to leave: There was lots of talk yesterday about preemptively structuring founder liquidity. For example, letting founders sell 2% or so of their shares on a secondary market once the company hits some sort of financial milestone like cash-flow positive. Maybe make it an annual event. That's all well and good – most interests between entrepreneurs and investors remain aligned – but there is a much larger concern: Are the secondary markets incentivizing lower-level employees to leave? After all, many share restrictions are removed once no longer on a company's payroll – and few companies want to be known as ROFR sticklers (makes it hard to recruit new talent). ????2. LP pressure: If I'm a limited partner in VC funds, here would be my question about founder liquidity: "Hey, why don't we get a little too?" Now there obviously are huge differences between a university endowment and a debt-laden 26 year-old hoping to afford a house in the Valley, but that difference is minimized a bit when the entrepreneur is now 30 and has tapped the founder liquidity well more than once. What I'm getting at is the notion that VCs – particularly seed/early-stage VCs – could soon face LP pressure to also liquidate some shares alongside founders. ????3. Downside litigation: At some point, the secondary markets are going to produce a large number of lawsuits, possibly class-action ones. Imagine one of the heavily-traded companies goes public at 30% lower than where it traded on the secondary market. And imagine the secondary market sellers were insiders. The buyers may well sue, arguing that the sellers should have known the shares were overvalued (remember, buyers almost never know the actual company financials). I don't think these suits will – or should be – successful (anyone buying without the data should know they're flying blind), but lawyers will line up to bring them. Very rich target, plus some wealthy plaintiffs (by definition)… ????4. Setting the bar: When investment banks compete in a bake-off to lead the IPO of a secondary-traded company, are they using the secondary trading values as baselines for what they're promising on the public markets? I can't say, but would imagine they almost have to be. I-bankers are known for blowing smoke on pricing to private company CEOs, and it would be hard to imagine them saying, "I know you're getting $20 billion on the private markets, but I think we can only bring you out at $15 billion." |
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