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如果一切都按計(jì)劃進(jìn)行，打車應(yīng)用服務(wù)公司Uber今年應(yīng)該可以籌集逾50億美元的“風(fēng)投資金”。盡管有數(shù)十億美元的收入、飛速提升的增長率和一個(gè)經(jīng)久不衰的牛市，這個(gè)創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的融資額仍然表明Uber現(xiàn)在非常不想上市。 很難因?yàn)椴簧鲜卸?zé)怪Uber。谷歌（Google）上市也情非自愿。Facebook也是如此。但所謂的“500名股東”規(guī)定（即股東人數(shù)達(dá)到500名的非上市公司要在美國證監(jiān)會(huì)（SEC）注冊(cè)）迫使它們必須這樣做。這種局面直到2012年《創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)扶助法》（Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act）出臺(tái)才徹底改變。上市不可避免地會(huì)帶來業(yè)績壓力，還得跟來自格林威治（康涅狄格州小鎮(zhèn)，美國對(duì)沖基金之都）的對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理進(jìn)行無休止的會(huì)談，而且這些人會(huì)覺得他們比你還了解你的公司——對(duì)Uber來說，沒有理由這樣做。 另外，有理由相信Uber不會(huì)是一家好的上市公司。它的CEO十分好斗，就算按硅谷的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)衡量也是如此。幾乎可以肯定，這位仁兄會(huì)以不恰當(dāng)?shù)姆绞接|怒華爾街的分析師們。此外，Uber和地方政府的監(jiān)管糾紛（或者其他更糟糕的問題）可能對(duì)其股價(jià)產(chǎn)生巨大的不利影響。只有心理最強(qiáng)大的投資者才敢去買它的股票。 唯一的問題是Uber最終必須為股東（包括外部投資者和持股員工）提供變現(xiàn)途徑。他們和別人一樣喜歡看到自己的投資價(jià)值飛漲，但最終也會(huì)希望落袋為安。可能正是出于這個(gè)原因，這家設(shè)在舊金山的公司已經(jīng)開始默默地為首發(fā)上市做規(guī)劃，它向高盛（Goldman Sachs）客戶定向發(fā)行可轉(zhuǎn)債的安排就是證據(jù)。 不過，還有另外一條路可走，即Uber可以把控股權(quán)賣給沃倫?巴菲特，從而永遠(yuǎn)不用上市。 巴菲特當(dāng)然買得起這些股份。伯克希爾-哈撒韋公司（Berkshire Hathaway）目前的市值為3700億美元，其中包括近600億美元現(xiàn)金。Uber目前的估值只有400億美元，而且應(yīng)該沒有任何債務(wù)。如果以輕微溢價(jià)收購Uber51%的股份，再動(dòng)用一些杠桿，巴菲特需要的現(xiàn)金將遠(yuǎn)少于他目前在富國銀行（Wells Fargo）的投資。 還必須說明的一點(diǎn)是，無論多么讓人驚訝，400億美元這個(gè)數(shù)字體現(xiàn)了Uber的價(jià)值標(biāo)的。要知道，許多有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的投資者按這種估值水平向Uber投資時(shí)，都預(yù)計(jì)這家輕資產(chǎn)的公司的IPO價(jià)值將到達(dá)至少1000億美元。就在六個(gè)月前，富達(dá)國際投資（Fidelity）按170億美元的估值向Uber投資時(shí)，許多評(píng)論人士還說富達(dá)國際投資瘋了（2013年夏天德州太平洋集團(tuán)（TPG）和谷歌創(chuàng)投（Google Ventures）將20多億美元投入U(xiǎn)ber時(shí)也得到了類似的評(píng)價(jià)）。 此外，巴菲特會(huì)堅(jiān)持一些特殊要求，從而使伯克希爾-哈撒韋在Uber不斷成熟和克服監(jiān)管障礙的過程中加強(qiáng)其在公司中的地位。 更重要的是，我認(rèn)為Uber非常符合巴菲特的投資策略。原因有以下四條： 1.巴菲特可以理解Uber的業(yè)務(wù)。雖然具有科技公司的種種特點(diǎn)，Uber實(shí)際上是一家運(yùn)輸服務(wù)公司，其最終目標(biāo)是發(fā)展成為本地化按需物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)商。實(shí)際上，漢堡王（Burger King）等公司的數(shù)據(jù)密集度可能都比Uber高。此外，如果大家還糾結(jié)于Uber的科技特性，請(qǐng)記住，巴菲特持有IBM公司 7.12%股份，是其最大的外部股東。 2.現(xiàn)金流充裕：Uber不是那種收入及其不確定的“軟件即服務(wù)”公司。Uber的利潤來源很廣，每一筆生意都能帶來收入。 3.護(hù)城河：當(dāng)然，Uber處于一個(gè)高度競爭的市場。但它的資金充裕程度遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過任何競爭對(duì)手，在大多數(shù)市場中都具有先發(fā)優(yōu)勢，而且已經(jīng)開始和其他公司簽訂各種各樣的“優(yōu)先使用”協(xié)議。此外，如果大家相信長期計(jì)劃，目前Uber是唯一一家業(yè)務(wù)規(guī)模（按地理覆蓋范圍和數(shù)據(jù)衡量）足以成功進(jìn)行大批量本地遞送的按需運(yùn)輸服務(wù)公司。 4.管理層的理性：鑒于Uber首席執(zhí)行官特拉維斯?卡蘭尼克的好斗傾向，以及由此在監(jiān)管和公關(guān)方面惹出的麻煩，證明這一點(diǎn)有點(diǎn)兒困難。但說到底，卡蘭尼克似乎已經(jīng)有意識(shí)地做出了選擇，那就是Uber這樣的公司取得成功的唯一途徑就是要大膽，就算這樣做有時(shí)意味著不夠體面。雖然帶來了各種各樣讓人不快的新聞，公司業(yè)務(wù)似乎并未受到不利影響，而且巴菲特也能很輕松地?cái)[脫媒體的攻擊（請(qǐng)參見《Burger King to Canada》或《horribleness at Heinz》這兩篇文章）。對(duì)巴菲特而言，只要能達(dá)到要求，沒有人情味地計(jì)算得失似乎沒什么關(guān)系。 但對(duì)巴菲特來說，我可以想到的唯一問題就是透明度。各種各樣的UberUber投資者私下都抱怨過自己不了解這家公司的財(cái)務(wù)情況和策略，而且有消息稱，在向華爾街投行（高盛并非Uber接觸的唯一投行）推介自己的可轉(zhuǎn)債時(shí)，Uber甚至都不愿意提供相關(guān)信息。 不過，現(xiàn)有股東都沒有獲得Uber的控制權(quán)，使得他們可以唄排除在公司核心之外。這種情況不可能出現(xiàn)在巴菲特身上，這既是因?yàn)樗麚碛泻戏?quán)力，也因?yàn)樗兄白娓敢粯拥摹睔鈭?。同時(shí)，Uber不愿分享信息可能是出于對(duì)信息泄露的擔(dān)憂，而這種情況在僅有一位外部股東的情況下不容易發(fā)生。此外，Uber還可以通過114a終身規(guī)則來處理所有債務(wù)（請(qǐng)參見文章《Rule 144a for life》），進(jìn)而實(shí)現(xiàn)信息保密。 要知道，Uber有足夠的動(dòng)力向巴菲特敞開胸懷，因?yàn)楹笳咭苍S能幫助它免于上市。當(dāng)然，理論上還存在其他買家，比如在本地遞送業(yè)務(wù)方面抱有夢(mèng)想的亞馬遜和谷歌。但二者都不太可能給卡蘭尼克太多幫助。 如今，成功的初創(chuàng)型企業(yè)幾乎都已經(jīng)上市，而且也都不再獨(dú)立運(yùn)營。但Uber在很多方面都一直是個(gè)例外，再破個(gè)例有何不可呢？聯(lián)系巴菲特吧。盡管乍看上去這樣做顯得很可笑。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)） 譯者：Charlie 審稿：Vera Han |
If all goes according to plan, Uber should raise more than $5 billion in “venture capital” funding this year. It’s a record haul that reflects the ride-sharing company’s antipathy toward going public right now, despite billions of dollars in revenue, an exponential growth rate and a bull market that refuses to bear down. And it’s hard to blame Uber for staying private. Google GOOG 0.43% didn’t want to go public when it did. Neither did Facebook FB 2.03% . But both had their hands forced by something called the 500-shareholder rule, which was subsequently eviscerated by the 2012 JOBS Act. Uber, on the other hand, has virtually no reason to make a move that inevitably leads to short-term earnings pressures and endless meetings with Greenwich hedge fund managers who think they know more about your business than you do. Moreover, there is a good case to be made that Uber wouldn’t be a good public company. Its CEO is combative even by Silicon Valley standards, and is almost certain to rub some Wall Street analysts the wrong way. Plus, Uber’s endemic regulatory (or worse) controversies could play havoc with its stock price. Only traders with the strongest stomachs need apply. Only trouble is that Uber must eventually provide liquidity for its shareholders (both outside investors and vested employees). These folks love a good rocket-ship ride as much as anyone, but eventually want their moon rocks. That’s probably why the San Francisco-based company has begun tacitly planning for an IPO, as evidenced by the way in which it structured its ongoing private placement of convertible notes with wealthy Goldman Sachs GS 0.80% clients. But there is another way. Uber could remain private indefinitely by selling a control stake to Warren Buffett. To be sure, Buffett could afford it. Berkshire Hathaway BRK.A 0.51% has a current market cap of $370 billion, including nearly $60 billion in cash. Uber currently is valued at only $40 billion, and isn’t believed to have any debt on its books. Buffett could pay a slight premium, use some leverage and walk away with a 51% stake for much less cash than he currently has tied up in Wells Fargo WFC 0.31% . There also is a compelling case to be made that $40 billion is a “value” price, no matter how wide our collective eyes bulged when we first read it. Remember, plenty of other experienced investors are buying in at this valuation expecting asset-light Uber to be worth at least $100 billion at IPO — and many pundits called Fidelity nuts to invest at a $17 billion pre-money just six months ago (similar accusations were hurled at TPG and Google Ventures for giving it a $2 billion+ mark in the summer of 2013). Plus, Buffett could always insist on some special warrants that allow him to increase Berkshire’s position as Uber matures and overcomes various regulatory hurdles. More importantly, I think that Uber is a decent fit within Buffett’s investment strategy. Here are four reasons why: 1.It’s a business Buffett could understand. For all of its tech trappings, Uber is essentially a transportation company that eventually wants to expand into a localized, on-demand logistics company. In fact, a company like Burger King is probably more data-intensive. Plus, just in case the tech thing still trips you up, remember that Buffett is the largest outside shareholder in IBM IBM 0.35% , with a 7.12% stake. 2.Cash-flow rich: Uber is not some sort of SaaS business whose income statement is full of asterisks about future bookings. It’s a wildly-profitable company that generates revenue with each and every ride. 3.Moat: To be sure, Uber is in a highly-competitive market. But it is by far the best capitalized of any competitor, has first-mover advantage in most of its markets and has begun to sign all sorts of “preferred use” corporate partnerships. Plus, if you believe the long-term plan, it is the only on-demand ride company out there that currently has a large enough footprint (in terms of both geography and data) to pull off local delivery on a mass scale. 4. Management rationality: This is a tricky one, given Kalanick’s antagonistic stance and its consequences in terms of both regulation and PR. Ultimately, however, it seems that Kalanick has made a conscious choice that the only way for a company like Uber to succeed is by being brash, even if that means sometimes crossing the line of decency. While it has generated all sorts of unpleasant headlines, the business itself hasn’t seemed to suffer, and Buffett can easily shake off some media darts (see Burger King to Canada or the horribleness at Heinz). Coldly-calculating seems to be fine in Omaha, so long as the math checks out. The one area where I could see Buffett having a real problem, however, is transparency. All sorts of existing Uber investors privately gripe about their lack of visibility into company financials and strategy, and word is that Uber wasn’t even too forthcoming when pitching its convertible note deal to Wall Street banks (Goldman wasn’t the only one approached). But no current shareholder has company control, which can allow them to be easily excluded from the inner circle. Highly unlikely that happens with Buffett, both because of his legal rights and his grandfatherly gravitas. Moreover, one possible reason for Uber’s reticence to share information is concern over leaks — something which is much less likely when dealing with a single outside shareholder. Plus, any debt could be structured as Rule 144a for life, thus keeping underlying information private. Remember, Uber would have all sorts of incentive to open the kimono to Buffett, because he’d be the one “saving” them from having to go public. Yes there are other theoretical buyers — Amazon AMZN 0.50% and existing Uber shareholder Google GOOG 0.43% come to kind, given their local delivery aspirations — but neither one of them is likely to give Kalanick much rope. Today’s successful startups almost never remain private and operationally independent. But Uber has been the exception to so many other rules, why not one more? Make the call Warren. Even if it sounds ridiculous at first blush. |
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