????他們回來(lái)了。

????在第一次網(wǎng)絡(luò)泡沫破裂后棄硅谷而去的華爾街投行家們已全體回到這個(gè)科技業(yè)的圣地，尋找的當(dāng)然是幫助初創(chuàng)企業(yè)上市的賺錢(qián)機(jī)會(huì)。不然還能是什么？

????然而，華爾街投資銀行界——美國(guó)銀行美林(Bank of America Merrill Lynch)、花旗集團(tuán)(Citigroup)、高盛(Goldman Sachs)、JP摩根(JP Morgan)、摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)和瑞銀(UBS)——的銀行家們這次可能會(huì)受到冷遇。這種敵意有點(diǎn)類(lèi)似翰?休斯的電影里描繪的情形：勤奮的孩子們就是不想讓有錢(qián)人從他們的發(fā)明中賺錢(qián)。此外，投行們是否對(duì)IPO交易進(jìn)行低定價(jià)，以便能以低廉的價(jià)格賣(mài)給機(jī)構(gòu)客戶(hù)——損失初創(chuàng)企業(yè)內(nèi)部人士和創(chuàng)始人的利益，硅谷對(duì)此也心存疑問(wèn)。前瑞銀媒體研究全球策略師、現(xiàn)任Minyanville Media副董事長(zhǎng)克里斯托弗?迪克森直言，“硅谷對(duì)華爾街一直是愛(ài)恨交加?！?/p>

????迪克森和其他長(zhǎng)期關(guān)注這一現(xiàn)象的人士表示，現(xiàn)在業(yè)界對(duì)投行兩頭吃的做法日益反感：IPO前購(gòu)入看好企業(yè)的股份，當(dāng)這些企業(yè)上市時(shí)，收取承銷(xiāo)和其他客戶(hù)費(fèi)用。

????例證A：高盛最近與Facebook的交易。1月份，高盛對(duì)這家社交網(wǎng)站投資了4.50億美元，并代表其再籌資15億美元，為高盛在美國(guó)以外地區(qū)的高凈值客戶(hù)提供了一個(gè)投資Facebook的機(jī)會(huì)。因此，高盛似乎有近水樓臺(tái)的優(yōu)勢(shì)來(lái)承銷(xiāo)Facebook的IPO發(fā)行。

????有人說(shuō)，這種層層關(guān)系存在的問(wèn)題是投行總是能穩(wěn)賺不賠，即便初創(chuàng)企業(yè)和個(gè)人投資者虧了。同時(shí)扮演投資者和承銷(xiāo)商角色的投行往往有能力決定一家公司應(yīng)何時(shí)發(fā)行股票——通常是在他們擁有公開(kāi)上市的財(cái)務(wù)實(shí)力前——收取費(fèi)用，獲得高額回報(bào)，但無(wú)需用太多自身資金承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

????“當(dāng)泡沫破滅時(shí)，受傷的是他們的客戶(hù)，因?yàn)樯骐U(xiǎn)資金主要是投資者的錢(qián)，”肯?馬林表示。馬林在建立自己的咨詢(xún)公司為中間市場(chǎng)科技業(yè)服務(wù)前，曾擔(dān)任眾多科技公司的首席執(zhí)行官。

????迄今為止，承銷(xiāo)市場(chǎng)的大贏家看來(lái)是擔(dān)任5月份社交網(wǎng)站LinkedIn和6月中旬音樂(lè)網(wǎng)站Pandora IPO主承銷(xiāo)商的JP摩根和摩根士丹利，其中摩根士丹利有望從LinkedIn一單IPO中收取700-1，000萬(wàn)美元的費(fèi)用(JP摩根和高盛同為Zipcar 4月份的IPO承銷(xiāo)商。)

????租車(chē)網(wǎng)站ZipCar、LinkedIn和Pandora首日上市均大幅超越發(fā)行價(jià)，雖然Pandora現(xiàn)已比發(fā)行價(jià)16美元低了幾美元。

????為何發(fā)行價(jià)和二級(jí)市場(chǎng)價(jià)之間存在差距？許多硅谷風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資人和融資家表示，這是因?yàn)橥缎屑沂峭鈦?lái)投機(jī)分子，他們沒(méi)有在硅谷以及他們幫助上市的公司中花費(fèi)足夠的時(shí)間來(lái)準(zhǔn)確評(píng)估公司潛力。

????不幸的是這些初創(chuàng)公司不能像Hambrecht & Quist投資銀行和其他專(zhuān)業(yè)小型銀行時(shí)代那樣，繞過(guò)這些大投行。一些新成立的公司計(jì)劃募集的資金達(dá)到50-100億美元，數(shù)目龐大，只有高盛、摩根士丹利或者JP摩根有辦法完成。而且，正如迪克森所說(shuō)，“事情不僅僅是公開(kāi)上市這么簡(jiǎn)單；它還涉及到上市后如何為公司提供支持等，這使得大券商有能力把大科技公司玩弄于鼓掌之間?！?/p>

????但像Facebook這樣的熱門(mén)公司確實(shí)有討價(jià)還價(jià)的砝碼，至少在向承銷(xiāo)商支付費(fèi)用時(shí)是這樣：消息人士預(yù)測(cè)Facebook將就標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的7%費(fèi)率進(jìn)行討價(jià)還價(jià)，自從谷歌(Google) IPO以來(lái)這一標(biāo)準(zhǔn)費(fèi)率已略降至5%或更低。如果一家投行不愿接受，肯定會(huì)有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手愿意為一項(xiàng)大規(guī)模發(fā)行交易做出讓步。(美國(guó)CNBC電視臺(tái)最近報(bào)道，F(xiàn)acebook正在籌劃估值1,000億美元的IPO發(fā)行。) 專(zhuān)業(yè)小型銀行MESA的管理合伙人馬克?帕提考夫表示：“由于表現(xiàn)出色或品牌認(rèn)可度高而處于優(yōu)勢(shì)地位的科技公司顯然已在市場(chǎng)中比投行擁有更高的議價(jià)力。資金已經(jīng)商品化；對(duì)這些公司而言，投行只是獲取資金的渠道之一?！?/p>

????They're back.

????After all but abandoning Silicon Valley in the wake of the first dotcom implosion, Wall Street bankers have returned to the tech Mecca en masse, in search of -- what else? -- riches to be made taking startups public.

????But the moneymen of the bulge-bracket -- Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BAC), Citigroup (C), Goldman Sachs (GS), JP Morgan (JPM), Morgan Stanley (MS) and UBS (UBS)—can expect a chilly reception. Some of the ill will feels a bit like something out of a John Hughes movie: The studious kids simply don't like the richies making money off their inventions. And there are questions about whether banks are underpricing the public offering deals they covet, allowing them to sell stock to institutional clients cheaply—at the expense of startup insiders and founders. "Silicon Valley has always had a love-hate relationship with Wall Street," says Christopher Dixon, the former global strategist for media research at UBS and current vice-chairman of Minyanville Media.

????Dixon and other longtime observers of the scene say there's now growing resentment over the banks' practice of double dipping: taking pre-IPO positions in promising startups then collecting underwriting and other client fees when those companies go public.

????Exhibit A: Goldman Sachs' recent deal with Facebook. In January, Goldman invested $450 million in the social networking site and presented its non-U.S.-based high net worth clients with an opportunity to invest in Facebook as part of an effort to raise an additional $1.5 billion on the company's behalf. As a result, Goldman would seem to have an inside track to underwriting Facebook's public offering.

????The problem with these kinds of multilayered relationships, some say, is that the bank always wins, even if the startup and individual investors lose. By being both an investor and an underwriter, the banks are often in a position to dictate when a company should do a stock offering -- often before they have the financial strength to be traded publicly -- collecting fees and seeing big returns without putting much of the banks' own money at risk.

????"When the bubble bursts it is their clients who will get harmed because the money at risk is largely investor money," says Ken Marlin, who served as the CEO of numerous tech companies before founding his own advisory shop serving the middle market tech industry.

????Thus far the big winners in the underwriting game appear to be JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley, which served as lead underwriters for LinkedIn's May IPO and Pandora's IPO in mid-June, with Morgan Stanley looking collect $7 to $10 million in fees from the LinkedIn IPO alone. (JP Morgan was an underwriter, along with Goldman Sachs, of Zipcar's April IPO.)

????On the day of their initial offerings shares of ZipCar (ZIP), LinkedIn (LNKD) and Pandora (P) all soared past their offer prices, though Pandora has settled a few bucks below its $16 initial price.

????Why the mismatch between the offering prices and the market values? Many Silicon Valley venture capitalists and financiers say that's because bankers are carpetbaggers who don't spend enough time in the Valley and with the companies they represent to accurately assess their potential.

????Unfortunately for the upstarts, they can't bypass the big banks the way they might have in the days of Hambrecht & Quist and other boutique banks. The sums some new companies are raising -- $5 billion to $10 billion -- are so great that only a Goldman, Morgan Stanely or JP Morgan has the wherewithal to do it. Moreover, as Dixon notes, "it isn't just about getting into the public markets; it's also about being able to support the company in the aftermarket, and that puts these big tech companies right in the hands of the large brokerage firms."

????But hot companies like Facebook do have leverage, at least when it comes to the fees they pay their underwriters: Sources predict Facebook will try to negotiate the standard 7% fee, which has already inched downward since Google's (GOOG) IPO, down to 5% or less. If one bank doesn't like it, there's sure to be a rival that would be willing to take a haircut to be part of what's sure to be a huge offering. (CNBC recently reported that Facebook is planning an IPO that would value the company at $100 billion.) Says Mark Patricof, managing partner at boutique bank MESA: "Technology companies that are in a privileged position through performance or brand acceptance have significantly more leverage than banks in the marketplace. Money is commoditized; the banks are just one source of capital for them."