希臘違約左右歐元命運
????在投資者看來,希臘違約行為已經(jīng)發(fā)生,盡管從技術上來說尚未出現(xiàn)?,F(xiàn)在市場正迫使歐洲領導人當機立斷,就如何收拾主權債務危機殘局做出決定。雖然希臘要達到技術上違約——違約是必然的——還需要18個月的時間,但是歐元區(qū)外圍成員國發(fā)生類似違約現(xiàn)象的時間將可能要早于希臘。 ????如果以德國為首的歐元區(qū)核心成員國不發(fā)揮領導作用,很有可能會讓歐洲共同貨幣馬上壽終正寢,從而引爆難以想象的經(jīng)濟衰退。歐洲眼下正面臨選擇,要么同心同德,要么分道揚鑣。 ????明天就是希臘的債權人同意免除一定到期債務,將債務延后數(shù)年償還的最后期限。該計劃至少需要90%的債權人簽名才能生效。但是交易者稱,到目前僅有50%到70%的債權人已經(jīng)簽字,希臘試圖擺脫違約命運的努力面臨的形勢更加復雜。 ????最后限期到來之前仍有希望重組希臘債務,但市場似乎已經(jīng)厭倦了隔靴搔癢。就算希臘能說服債權人減免大筆債務,2020年前該國仍終將償還或再融資1,350億歐元。希臘需要開源節(jié)流才能實現(xiàn)這個目標,那將意味著一大筆錢。 ????如此一來就會出現(xiàn)問題,現(xiàn)在政府被迫緊縮開支已經(jīng)使虛弱的希臘經(jīng)濟傷筋動骨。今年第二季度該國的GDP縮水了7.3%,遠比原先的預期要糟糕。隨之而來的稅收收入下降造成國家預算赤字擴大到占整個GDP的10%。據(jù)花旗集團(Citigroup)測算,希臘必須讓基本盈余保持在GDP的5%,到2014年才能將其債務負擔穩(wěn)定在占全部GDP的180%;而要在2031年前將債務減少到占全部GDP的90%,則可能需要保持年均9%的基本盈余。 ????鑒于希臘的經(jīng)濟形勢,該國幾乎不可能達到上述基本盈余。故而,市場與其坐等希臘未來幾年還不起債務,倒不如這幾天把主導權拿在手中。周三早上,希臘五年期債券的信用違約掉期的交易速率表明希臘政府幾乎100%會違約。持有希臘債務的法國銀行這幾天市值蒸發(fā),意味著他們所持有的希臘債務完全虧損。 恐慌性拋售 ????市場首當其沖。不幸的是,市場慣于反應過度。恐慌情緒在交易臺之間的蔓延,速度之快自2008年股市遭遇黑暗時刻以來還從未出現(xiàn)。歐洲危機的慢動作已經(jīng)調(diào)到快進,威脅到銀行、企業(yè)、國家以及歐洲共同貨幣。媒體幾個月以前就警告過的恐慌現(xiàn)在開始肆虐了。 ????雖然希臘技術上違約不會像雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)在2008年崩潰那樣引起大軒然大波,但是其影響力正在累積。要知道,這場危機決不僅僅是希臘當前債務困局。希臘欠下的債務不足以撼動大局,僅占歐元區(qū)所有債務的3%。真正的大麻煩是在違約之后,希臘會選擇留在歐元區(qū)還是回歸本國貨幣德拉克馬。 ????回歸本國貨幣能夠讓希臘在出口上與鄰國相比占據(jù)競爭優(yōu)勢,特別是在吸引游客方面。與希臘隔愛琴海相望的土耳其,今年第二季度GDP增長達到了8.8%。如果重新啟用廉價的本國貨幣,希臘沒有理由不搶下部分旅游市場。 ????可是脫離共同貨幣也會導致惡劣的后果。此舉將迫使希臘籌措資金以填補預算不足,還有可能要支付比德國國債高25%的收益,看上去不太現(xiàn)實。這將使希臘削減更多政府開支,進一步加劇經(jīng)濟形勢惡化。擺脫歐元之后,希臘的銀行系統(tǒng)幾乎將全面崩潰,因為歐洲中央銀行(ECB)會停止墊付款額以維持銀行運轉(zhuǎn)?;ㄆ旒瘓F估算,如果沒有歐洲中央銀行的資金注入,希臘銀行將留下一個巨大的融資缺口,約合1,000億歐元,占所有銀行資產(chǎn)的20%左右。 ????希臘銀行業(yè)倒閉將導致該國經(jīng)濟活動戛然而止。進口產(chǎn)品短缺,造成波及全國的嚴重政治和社會動蕩。希臘銀行系統(tǒng)的崩潰將在整個歐洲范圍內(nèi)產(chǎn)生巨大的沖擊波。高盛集團(Goldman Sachs)估計歐元區(qū)外圍成員國銀行受到的沖擊將最為嚴重,其結(jié)果是38家銀行需要300億到920億歐元的注資?;ㄆ旒瘓F測算希臘、愛爾蘭、葡萄牙和西班牙的直接和間接經(jīng)濟損失將達到4,800億美元。 ????屆時,歐洲中央銀行不得不作出艱難的決定。到底是繼續(xù)等待歐洲各國政府的集體行動,還是自己擔當整個歐洲的最終貸款人?最近一次歐元債務危機爆發(fā)是在今年夏初,威脅到意大利1.9萬億歐元的債務市場,歐洲中央銀行出手干預,開始購買意大利和西班牙債券。截止目前購買額度較小,不足以把意大利債券收益率降低到上一次危機爆發(fā)前的水平。接下來的亂局將迫使歐洲中央銀行購買巨額債券以穩(wěn)定市場,將外圍國家與較富裕的核心國的命運綁在一起。 ????歐盟核心國自然一直都不愿看到這種情況。但歐元要挺過這場危機,顯然需要更一致的經(jīng)濟政策。歐盟進一步強化聯(lián)系的成本大部分要落在德國頭上,但是德國現(xiàn)任政府并不太情愿出手??墒侨绻聡胍o這久拖不決的主權債務危機作個了結(jié),推動歐盟繼續(xù)向前發(fā)展的話,就必須改變立場。 ????譯者:winter |
????A Greek default has already occurred in the eyes of investors, even though it technically hasn't happened yet. The market is now forcing European leaders to quickly decide how they want the rest of the sovereign debt crisis to play out. While the technical default of Greece -- inevitable as it is -- took around 18 months, similar defaults in other peripheral eurozone members will probably come much faster. ????A lack of leadership on the part of the core members of the eurozone, namely Germany, could very well bring a swift end to the common currency, setting off an economic meltdown that few would want to imagine. The time has now come for Europeans to either move much closer or break apart. ????Tomorrow is the deadline for owners of Greek debt to agree to a haircut on their debt by extending the repayment schedule out a few years. The plan required 90% of existing bondholders to sign on to the plan. But traders say that only 50% to 70% have signed on, complicating Greece's attempts to head off a default. ????The restructuring of Greek debt may still occur by the deadline, but the market seems to be fed up with all the dancing around. Even if Greece is able to convince debt holders to effectively take a large haircut on their debt, the country would still ultimately have to pay back, or refinance, 135 billion euro by 2020. To do that, Greece needs to take in more money than it spends – a lot more money. ????That will be a problem, considering that all the austerity cuts the government has been forced to make have decimated Greece's fragile economy. The country's GDP contracted 7.3% in the second quarter of the year, far worse than expected. The resulting decrease in tax revenue caused the country's budget deficit to widen to around 10% of GDP. Greece would need to run a primary surplus of around 5% of GDP to stabilize its debt burden at 180% of GDP by 2014 and would have to run almost a 9% primary surplus to reduce its debt to 90% by 2031, according to Citigroup. ????Running those kinds of surpluses is almost impossible for Greece given its economic outlook. So instead of waiting for Greece to miss a payment in the coming years, the market took matters into its own hands over the last few days. Credit default swaps on five-year Greek bonds this morning were trading at rates implying a nearly 100% chance of default by the government. French banks that hold Greek debt have seen their market values fall in the last few days, which imply a total loss on all their Greek debt holdings. Panic selling ????Score one for the market. Unfortunately, the market has a habit of going overboard. Panic is spreading across trading desks at speeds not seen since the dark days of 2008. The European slow motion crisis has now moved into overdrive, threatening to take down banks, businesses, nations and the European common currency. This is the contagion the media has warned about for months – it is already here. ????While the technical Greek default isn't causing fireworks like the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the flames are growing. To be sure, this crisis was never really all about Greece's current debt woes anyway. The amount it owed was always too small to move the needle, accounting for just 3% of eurozone's total debt load. The real trouble comes after the default, when Greece has to make a choice about whether it stays in the euro or it takes its chances and moves back to the drachma. ????Moving back to its former currency would allow Greek exports to be competitive again with its neighbors, especially those that cater to tourists. Across the Aegean in Turkey, GDP grew by 8.8% in the second quarter. There is no reason why Greece couldn't capture some of that tourist market if it returns to a cheap currency. ????But leaving the common currency would also lead to some nasty results. It would force Greece to raise cash to plug its budget shortfall and potentially pay yields that could run as high as 25% over German bonds, something that would probably be impossible. That would force Greece to make even larger cuts in government spending, further exacerbating its economic woes. The Greek banking system would almost certainly collapse in the changeover as the ECB would stop payments currently keeping them afloat. Without that cash infusion from the ECB, the Greek banks would be left with a massive funding gap equal to around 20% of their assets or 100 billion euros, according to an analysis by Citigroup. ????A run on the Greek banking sector would result bringing economic activity in the country to a grinding halt. Imported products would be in short supply, creating serious political and social unrest throughout the country. The ensuing collapse in the Greek banking system would send shockwaves throughout Europe. Goldman Sachs (GS) estimates that banks in the peripheral eurozone would be hit the hardest, resulting in 38 banks requiring between 30 billion and 92 billion euros. Citigroup (C) estimates that losses in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain would trigger direct and indirect losses of $480 billion. ????By then, the ECB would need to make a hard decision. Would it wait for the politicians to get their act together or would it be the lender of last resort to all of Europe? The last time the euro debt crisis flared up earlier in the summer, threatening Italy's 1.9 trillion euro debt market, the ECB stepped in and started buying Italian and Spanish bonds. So far the purchases have been moderate, not enough to bring Italian bond yields down to where they were before the latest crisis. The ensuing melee will force the ECB to buy a massive amount of bonds to stabilize the market, tying the fate of the peripheral countries with that of the richer core members. ????This is, of course, what the core members were hoping to avoid all along. But if the euro is to survive it is clear that it needs to have a more unified economic policy. Much of the cost of this closer union will be borne by Germany, where the current government seems reluctant to take charge. That will need to change if it hopes to finally put a lid on this long-running sovereign debt crisis and move forward. |