????當(dāng)今發(fā)達(dá)世界面臨著一個(gè)左右為難的尷尬境地：寬松信貸可以解決金融問題，但同時(shí)也會(huì)導(dǎo)致金融問題。歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人峰會(huì)周三商討如何應(yīng)對希臘（以及意大利和西班牙）財(cái)政危機(jī)時(shí)就將面臨這個(gè)兩難的選擇。的確需要投入更多的資金才能讓市場相信，一切都會(huì)好起來。但這能解決問題嗎？還是只是權(quán)宜之計(jì)？

????野村資本（Nomura Capital）上周發(fā)布的研究報(bào)告稱，預(yù)計(jì)歐盟領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人將加快推出歐洲穩(wěn)定機(jī)制（European Stabilization Mechanism，ESM）來取代現(xiàn)有的歐洲金融穩(wěn)定基金（European Financial Stability Facility，EFSF）。這些拗口的名詞主要涉及歐盟如何管理其賬目。而實(shí)際結(jié)果將是處于金融困境的歐盟成員國將獲得1.3萬億美元（9,400億歐元）的巨額放貸能力，遠(yuǎn)高于歐洲金融穩(wěn)定基金尚未確定的4,000億美元（額外的2,000億美元早已分發(fā)，在愛爾蘭和葡萄牙取得了良好成效，但希臘的效果并不如人意）。新舉措或許能讓市場相信，歐盟仍然有充足的資本，歐元區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)疲弱的國家盡管深陷困境，但問題仍能得到控制；但長遠(yuǎn)看它只會(huì)加深當(dāng)前所有西方經(jīng)濟(jì)體都面臨的一個(gè)更重大的問題：債務(wù)超級周期。

????債務(wù)超級周期一詞近年來流行于政府決策層。這一概念最早是2007年由BCA Research首先提出，這家銀行業(yè)獨(dú)立研究機(jī)構(gòu)的名字時(shí)常出現(xiàn)在各國央行行長收件箱的首列。債務(wù)超級周期的概念很簡單：有效的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策需要赤字支出和刺激性措施來阻止金融危機(jī)、恢復(fù)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長；但如果這么做，就會(huì)為未來更大的泡沫破滅埋下伏筆。

????最典型的例子是上世紀(jì)90年代初，當(dāng)時(shí)用低利率來應(yīng)對儲貸危機(jī)。寬松的流動(dòng)性助長了互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫的膨脹。后來為應(yīng)對互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫破滅，政府運(yùn)用了更為寬松的貨幣政策，但這也為樓市及相關(guān)衍生品泡沫的膨脹和破滅埋下了禍根。問題是被迫日漸升級的應(yīng)對方案意味著，終有一天這個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體將再也無力發(fā)行足夠的債務(wù)來刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，因?yàn)樗驯池?fù)了過多的債務(wù)。

????擺在我們面前的一個(gè)重大問題是：情況要發(fā)展到什么水平，債務(wù)超級周期將不得不宣告終結(jié)？大多數(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和政策制定者們認(rèn)為，債務(wù)/GDP比率達(dá)到100%后經(jīng)濟(jì)將變得不可持續(xù)：從歷史上看，超過這一水平會(huì)被視為將進(jìn)入長期、緩慢的經(jīng)濟(jì)下滑和政治倒退（大英帝國，我可看著你呢。）。

????更近一點(diǎn)的例子是債務(wù)/GDP比率高達(dá)226%、數(shù)十年來經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯的日本。一些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，日本的大部分債務(wù)都由國人持有，在某種程度上緩和了高負(fù)債帶來的壓力（就像右手欠左手錢——?dú)w根結(jié)底，錢還是在你的手里。）希臘和意大利的債務(wù)/GDP比率雖然比日本低約100個(gè)百分點(diǎn)，但大部分債務(wù)都不是由本國持有。根據(jù)最新統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)，當(dāng)前歐元區(qū)整體的債務(wù)/GDP比率為85%，增加1萬億美元的救助資金將使該比率立即上升至94%。

????毫無疑問，如果我們想避免全球金融市場災(zāi)難重演，歐盟必須采取行動(dòng)，使希臘債務(wù)更加可控。也許這次還能成功。但下一次泡沫危機(jī)來襲時(shí)，我們還會(huì)有轉(zhuǎn)圜的余地嗎？

????Here's the paradox the developed world faces today: easy credit is the solution to financial problems, and easy credit is the source of financial problems. This is the dilemma European leaders face when aiming to manage the terrible fiscal problems of Greece (and Italy and Spain) at their summit Wednesday. More money is needed to assure the markets everything will be okay, but will that solve the problem or just push out the pain?

????In its research note last week, Nomura Capital said it expects EU leaders to accelerate the introduction of the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) to replace the current European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). This alphabet soup mainly had to do with how the EU manages its books. The practical result, though, will be a massive fund of $1.3 trillion (940 million euro) in lending power to throw at weak EU member financial troubles, far more than the $400 billion funds currently uncommitted in the EFSF (an additional $200 billion has already been doled out with decent results to Ireland and Portugal, and not so effectively to Greece). This likely will assure markets there is enough capital to contain the problems in the weaker euro countries, but it only adds to a greater problem all the Western economies are facing: the debt supercycle.

????The debt supercycle is an idea that has been knocking around policy circles for the a few years, since it was first elucidated in 2007 by BCA Research, an independent banking research firm that often finds itself at the top of central banker inboxes. The debt supercycle is a simple idea: Sound economic policy requires deficit spending and stimulus efforts to stop financial crises and restore economic growth. But in doing so, it lays the groundwork for even bigger bust later on.

????The prime example was seen in the early 1990s, when the S&L crisis was countered with low interest rates. The easy money from that helped spark the dot-com boom. Even looser monetary policy was used to counter the dot-com bust, but lay the groundwork for the housing and related-derivatives boom and bust. A problem is that increasingly larger responses mean at some point at an economy just can't issue enough debt reflate its economy because there is already too much debt.

????The big question: where is that level where the debt supercycle must end? Most economists and policymakers see the 100% level of debt-to-GDP as the line where economies become unsustainable: historically, rising above this level is seen as sparking a long, slow economic and political descent (I'm looking at you, British Empire).

????A more current example is Japan, with 226% of debt to GDP and its decades-long stagnation. Some economists argue that high level is mitigated somewhat by the fact most Japanese debt is owned by Japanese (think of it as your right hand owing your left hand money -- ultimately, you'll still have that money.) Greece and Italy are about 100 percentage points below Japan's level but much of that is owed outside the country. The euro zone as a whole is at 85% debt to GDP right now, and adding a trillion dollars in bailout funds immediately raises that to 94% judging by latest statistics.

????There's little doubt that if we want to avoid another world financial market apocalypse the EU has to do something to make Greek debt more manageable. And it may work now. But will there be wiggle room to tackle the next bubble?