????債務(wù)危機(jī)重創(chuàng)歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)，創(chuàng)口血如泉涌，歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人卻只能眼睜睜地看著之前貼在傷口上的創(chuàng)可貼開始慢慢脫落。由于無(wú)法擴(kuò)容至必需的規(guī)模，歐洲最大的救助基金、高達(dá)4,400億歐元的歐洲金融穩(wěn)定基金（European Financial Stability Facility）昨晚最終宣告無(wú)法為歐元區(qū)帶來(lái)穩(wěn)定，最大的一塊創(chuàng)可貼也正式失效。基金負(fù)責(zé)人號(hào)召歐洲央行（European Central Bank）出臺(tái)更多措施以穩(wěn)定形勢(shì)，不言而喻，這顯然是在推卸責(zé)任。

????在美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)（US Federal Reserve）的牽頭下，歐洲六大央行聯(lián)手出招，將現(xiàn)有臨時(shí)美元流動(dòng)性互換安排的定價(jià)下調(diào)50個(gè)基點(diǎn)。然而，這一聯(lián)合行動(dòng)看起來(lái)不過(guò)是另外一張創(chuàng)可貼。雖然此番聯(lián)合救市會(huì)降低歐洲銀行的美元融資成本，也會(huì)令部分歐元區(qū)成員國(guó)不斷攀升的債券收益率有所下降，但卻解決不了根本問(wèn)題。救市效果不會(huì)長(zhǎng)久，也無(wú)法解決困擾歐元區(qū)的結(jié)構(gòu)性財(cái)政問(wèn)題。而且，這并不是各國(guó)央行第一次在金融危機(jī)中采取聯(lián)合行動(dòng)。根據(jù)以往的經(jīng)驗(yàn)來(lái)判斷，當(dāng)市場(chǎng)發(fā)現(xiàn)根本問(wèn)題并未解決之后，救市推動(dòng)的市場(chǎng)上漲通常都是曇花一現(xiàn)。

????現(xiàn)在，解決歐洲債務(wù)危機(jī)似乎只有兩種選擇：一是歐洲央行充當(dāng)整個(gè)歐元區(qū)的最后貸款人，二是將該地區(qū)成員國(guó)的債務(wù)集中起來(lái)，統(tǒng)一發(fā)行“歐洲債券”。

????從中短期來(lái)看，歐洲央行充當(dāng)最后貸款人顯然是解決債務(wù)危機(jī)最簡(jiǎn)單、最迅速的方法，但它不能解決歐元的核心問(wèn)題，即財(cái)政一體化的缺失。而發(fā)行統(tǒng)一的歐洲債券需要一體化的財(cái)政，只有這樣才可能解決核心問(wèn)題。然而，歐洲各國(guó)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人是否愿意、或者說(shuō)確實(shí)已經(jīng)走投無(wú)路，只能把財(cái)政大權(quán)拱手交給歐盟？要知道，財(cái)政大權(quán)可以說(shuō)是他們最重要的權(quán)力。

????關(guān)于如何發(fā)行歐洲債券，目前有幾種方案。歐洲部分國(guó)家希望歐洲債券完全取代歐洲大陸所有的主權(quán)債務(wù)，這樣一來(lái)融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就可以分散到歐元區(qū)全部17個(gè)成員國(guó)身上。但在這種情況下，意大利和希臘等高負(fù)債國(guó)家的借款利率會(huì)就從記錄高點(diǎn)下降，而德國(guó)和荷蘭等財(cái)政穩(wěn)健國(guó)家的融資成本則會(huì)上升。

????這種局面對(duì)德國(guó)人來(lái)說(shuō)有失公平，所以他們始終拒絕有關(guān)發(fā)行歐洲債券的任何對(duì)話。德國(guó)人認(rèn)為，迫使他們勒緊腰帶的唯一因素就是奢侈成員國(guó)（過(guò)度奢侈導(dǎo)致財(cái)政失衡，債臺(tái)高筑---譯注）的利率壓力。不過(guò)，如果這些國(guó)家愿意把財(cái)政權(quán)交給歐盟，同時(shí)實(shí)施類似德國(guó)的平衡預(yù)算方案，最終德國(guó)似乎也愿意承擔(dān)發(fā)行歐洲債券對(duì)融資成本造成的沖擊。

????歐元區(qū)有關(guān)統(tǒng)一財(cái)政和貨幣政策的想法似乎能夠最終縫合歐洲不斷惡化的債務(wù)危機(jī)創(chuàng)傷，同時(shí)增強(qiáng)該地區(qū)的團(tuán)結(jié)。但是，歐洲債券只不過(guò)體現(xiàn)這一想法的工具，而并非解決方案。即便如此，歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人仍對(duì)此猶豫不決。大量現(xiàn)有的歐洲債券構(gòu)成方案看起來(lái)更像是創(chuàng)可貼式的權(quán)宜之計(jì)，而不是手術(shù)式的最終縫合。

????European leaders are watching the Band-Aids they stuck on the eurozone's gushing wound of debt start to peel off. The largest attempted fix, the 440 billion euro European Financial Stability Facility, finally fell off last night, after the fund announced that it would not be able to lever up to a level that could actually bring stability to the eurozone. The head of the EFSF called on the European Central Bank to do more to stabilize the situation, ostensibly passing the buck.

????Today's coordinated action by the central banks of developed nations, led by the US Federal Reserve, to lower the pricing on existing temporary U.S. dollar liquidity swap arrangements by 50 basis points, looks like yet another Band-Aid. While this will make it cheaper for European banks to access critical dollar funding, and it will lower skyrocketing bond yields of some eurozone nations, it isn't a solution to the problem. The effects are temporary and do not address the structural fiscal problems plaguing the eurozone. And this isn't the first time there has been coordinated action between central banks during the financial crisis. The subsequent market rallies that accompany such moves usually fizzle out after it becomes clear that the root of the problem still exists.

????Solving the European crisis seems to have devolved into a binary choice whereby either the European Central Bank becomes the lender of last resort for the entire eurozone or the zone's nations pool their debt and issues joint "eurobonds."

????The ECB choice is clearly the easiest and fastest way to put an end to this crisis in the short to medium term, but it doesn't solve the common currency's core problem -- its lack of fiscal integration. The issuance of a common debt instrument would require such fiscal integration, ostensibly extinguishing the core problem. But are European politicians ready, or indeed desperate enough, to hand over the power of the purse, arguably their greatest power, to bureaucrats in Brussels?

????There are several proposals floating about as to how the eurobond could become a reality. There are constituents in Europe that want the eurobond to totally replace all sovereign debt in the continent, therefore spreading out the funding risk to all 17 members of the euro. This would see the borrowing rates of deeply indebted nations, like Italy and Greece, drop from their record highs, while countries with strong balance sheets, like Germany and the Netherlands, would see their rates rise.

????Such a scenario seems unfair to the Germans, which have repeatedly blocked any talk of issuing eurobonds. They believe that the interest rate pressure on profligate nations is the only thing that is forcing them to actually tighten their belts. But the Germans finally seem open to taking a hit in interest rates if those nations give up their fiscal authority to the EU and take on a German-like balanced budget solution.

????This idea of melding the eurozone's fiscal and monetary policies seems to be the stitch that will finally seal Europe's growing debt wound and bind the continent together. The eurobond is simply the vehicle by which this idea is manifested, it isn't the solution. But European leaders are still hesitant to give in. There are a number of eurobond structures floating about that seem to be more Band-Aid than stitch.