????華爾街的印鈔機(jī)可能終于沒(méi)了墨水。本月，美國(guó)的大銀行們陸續(xù)公布了慘淡的季度業(yè)績(jī)，給出的理由從歐債危機(jī)到法庭和解不一而足。

????糟糕的市場(chǎng)情況確實(shí)影響到了華爾街的年度業(yè)績(jī)，但絕對(duì)不是主要原因。隨著新的監(jiān)管規(guī)定強(qiáng)制銀行降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，傳統(tǒng)的投行和貸款業(yè)務(wù)已被掏空。這一季銀行業(yè)更安全的投資導(dǎo)致其權(quán)益回報(bào)率更接近乏味的管制型公用事業(yè)公司，而不是激進(jìn)的投資公司。

????那么，銀行投資者應(yīng)該習(xí)慣這樣差勁的資本回報(bào)率嗎？雖然不是每家銀行面臨的問(wèn)題都一樣，但它們的業(yè)績(jī)報(bào)表有一個(gè)共同特點(diǎn)。所有大銀行的交易收入都比信貸危機(jī)前的鼎盛時(shí)期有顯著下降。因此，這些銀行反映盈利效率的指標(biāo)——普通股東權(quán)益回報(bào)率都大幅下降。

????讓我們來(lái)看看這些數(shù)字。由于銀行的盈利數(shù)據(jù)有一定的波動(dòng)性，最好是看全年數(shù)據(jù)，而不是季度數(shù)據(jù)。高盛（Goldman Sachs）2011年股東權(quán)益回報(bào)率低至3.7%，較上一年的11.9%顯著下降。在金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)前的2007年和2006年，高盛的股東權(quán)益回報(bào)率是行業(yè)領(lǐng)先的32%。但熄火的不只是高盛。摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）2011年股東權(quán)益回報(bào)率為6%，也低于2010年的7%。摩根士丹利2007年的股東權(quán)益回報(bào)率為9%，2000-2006年的平均年股東權(quán)益回報(bào)率為20%。摩根大通（JP Morgan）略有改善，2011年股東權(quán)益回報(bào)率10.2%，高于2010年的9.7%，但仍低于危機(jī)前2007年約13%的水平。

????所有這些數(shù)字都不能孤立來(lái)看。考慮到它們承擔(dān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平和所持資本額，個(gè)位數(shù)權(quán)益回報(bào)率太差了——它們也知道這一點(diǎn)。2011年初時(shí)高盛曾承諾，全年股東權(quán)益回報(bào)率要達(dá)到20%。但到了5月份，高管們默默地放棄了這一目標(biāo)，因?yàn)榻灰讟I(yè)務(wù)顯然存在一些問(wèn)題。

????當(dāng)然，股東權(quán)益回報(bào)率絕非華爾街賴以生存的首要指標(biāo)。銀行高管們還關(guān)注很多銀行業(yè)務(wù)模式特有的指標(biāo)。不過(guò)，權(quán)益回報(bào)率雖然有不足之處，仍是投資者和分析師喜歡關(guān)注的一項(xiàng)指標(biāo)，因?yàn)樵撝笜?biāo)能抹平行業(yè)差異，便于與其他資產(chǎn)類別進(jìn)行比較。

????在信貸危機(jī)引發(fā)交易世界劇烈震蕩后，業(yè)內(nèi)發(fā)生了兩大結(jié)構(gòu)性變化。一是業(yè)內(nèi)有幾家大公司消亡。二是一系列的監(jiān)管改革強(qiáng)制銀行降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，增加資本緩沖。高盛和摩根士丹利變成了銀行控股公司，就像競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手摩根大通和美國(guó)銀行（Bank of America）一樣，由此必須縮減風(fēng)險(xiǎn)性業(yè)務(wù)。提高資本金要求，意味著可用于交易的資金減少。降低杠桿比率，意味著投資回報(bào)率下降。

????Wall Street's cash printing machine may be finally out of ink. One by one, the big U.S. banks reported dismal quarterly earnings this week, blaming the poor results on everything from the European debt crisis to court settlements.

????While tough market conditions did play a role in ruining Wall Street's annual money dance, it was hardly the main reason for its poor performance. The traditional investment banking and lending businesses have been gutted after new regulations forced the banks to decrease risk. Safer investing on behalf of the banks this quarter has translated into a return on shareholder's equity that's more akin to a sleepy regulated utility as opposed to an aggressive investment firm.

????So should bank investors get used to such lackluster and weak returns on their capital? While not every firm has the exact same problems, there is a common theme running throughout their earnings. Trading revenues at all major banks were down significantly from the heydays before the credit crisis. As a result, the firms' return on common shareholder equity, or ROE, which measures the efficiency of a company's earnings power, has collapsed.

????Let's look at some numbers. Given the lumpiness of bank earnings, it is best to look at full-year results as opposed to quarterly results. Goldman Sachs's (GS) annual ROE came in at a shockingly low 3.7% for 2011, down significantly from 11.9% the previous year. Before the financial crisis hit, Goldman's ROE was an industry-leading 32% in 2007 and 2006. But it wasn't just Goldman who sputtered. Morgan Stanley's (MS) ROE came in at 6% for the year, down from 7% in 2010. Morgan had a 9% ROE in 2007 and averaged an annual 20% ROE from 2000 to 2006. JP Morgan (JPM) fared a bit better with an ROE of 10.2% for the year, up slightly from the 9.7% it hit in 2010. But the firm is still below its pre-crisis ROE of around 13% in 2007.

????All this means nothing unless it is put in context. For the level of risk and amount of capital these firms hold, single digit returns on equity is pretty lousy -- and the banks know it. Goldman promised earlier in the year that it would hit a respectable 20% ROE in 2011. But its executives quietly dropped that goal in May after it became clear that its trading division was having some troubles.

????To be sure, ROE isn't the be-all-end-all metric that Wall Street lives by. There are dozens of other performance metrics that banking chieftains target, which are specific to the banking model. Nevertheless, ROE, while it has its flaws, is still a metric that investors and analysts like to see as it flattens out the sector, allowing them to compare it with other asset classes.

????There were two major structural changes that took place in the industry in the aftermath of the crisis that shook the trading world. The first was that several of the major players in the space ceased to exist. The second was the string of regulatory changes that forced the banks to cut risk and maintain larger capital buffers. Goldman and Morgan became bank holding companies like rivals JP Morgan and Bank of America (BAC) and were therefore forced to scale back on their risk taking. Higher capital requirements meant less money to use for trading. Lower leverage levels meant lower returns on investments.