????2010年和2011年間，在上市前階段的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司中，最被風(fēng)險投資家看好的是通常所謂的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)“四騎士”： Facebook、社交游戲公司Zynga、團購網(wǎng)站Groupon和Twitter。 這么說吧，他們無比熱衷于投資這些公司，甚至不惜做出了一些前所未有的瘋狂舉動：從二級市場購買普通股，接受數(shù)十億美元的超高估值，開出巨額支票。

????目前，F(xiàn)acebook 已經(jīng)成功上市，我們再來看看四騎士中另外兩個上市公司Zynga (ZNGA) 和Groupon (GRPN) 的股票表現(xiàn)。

????? Zynga: Zynga的生意火爆之前，前幾輪風(fēng)險投資募集的資金相當(dāng)有限。而隨著收入迅猛增長，股票的估值也直沖云霄。2010年，Zynga以每股6.44美元的價格募集了3億美元。到了2011年，Zynga募集另外5億美元時的價格就高達每股約14美元。這幾輪的投資者包括風(fēng)投基金、公共基金、投行和戰(zhàn)略投資者。目前Zynga股票價格略高于每股7美元。很明顯，2010和2011年的風(fēng)投投資者所期望的并不是這個價格。他們的8億美元投資基本上沒有獲得回報，甚至賠本。

????? Groupon: Groupon在2010年以接近每股2.7美元的價格募集了約1.35億美元。然后在2011年，Groupon募集了打破風(fēng)投紀錄的9.5億美元，股價約7.9美元。目前股價在每股11-12美元間震蕩，所以2010年投資者都獲得了可觀的回報，而2011年的投資者回報不足50%。此外，鎖定期還未結(jié)束。如果投資者爭相套利，導(dǎo)致股價下滑，2011年那個巨額輪次的回報還可能更加難看。

????很顯然Zynga 和Groupon都是了不起的公司：他們開拓新市場并占據(jù)了巨大的份額，收入以驚人的速度增長。然而，最后幾輪的風(fēng)險投資并沒有獲得預(yù)期的成功。原因何在？

????1. 看低成長。通常而言，風(fēng)投特別看重增長率，增長越快越好。風(fēng)投最大的回報都來自那些成長為大型企業(yè)的公司，而只有快速成長的公司才能迅速壯大。因此，只要看到創(chuàng)業(yè)公司快速成長的可能，風(fēng)投從來不會在乎價格。公眾投資者也喜歡成長型公司。但由于其接觸的公司通常已經(jīng)處于生命周期的后期，他們已經(jīng)習(xí)慣認為，由于大數(shù)定律的作用，即使是處于快速成長期的公司，其成長也會隨著時間推移而減弱。按照他們的經(jīng)驗法則，其它條件相當(dāng)時，相對于增長率50%的公司，公眾投資者并不會給予100%增長率的公司更高倍數(shù)的估值。他們預(yù)期兩個公司的增長率都會隨著時間推移而降低并最終相等，所以他們不愿為一時的極端成長額外掏錢。

????In 2010 and 2011, the four hottest pre-IPO Internet companies amongst venture capitalists were Facebook, Zynga, Groupon and Twitter – the "Four Horsemen" of the Internet, as they were commonly called. To wit, demand to get into the action on these four companies was so strong that venture capital firms starting doing things they hadn't done before – buying secondary stakes of common shares, paying multi-billion valuations and writing very large checks.

????With the successful IPO of Facebook (FB) now behind us, it's interesting to look at the performance of Zynga (ZNGA) and Groupon (GRPN), the other members of the Four Horsemen who are now public.

????? Zynga: After raising a fairly modest amount of cash in its first few venture rounds, Zynga's business caught fire. With tremendous revenue growth, its valuation soared and in 2010, Zynga raised approximately $300 million at approximately $6.44/share. In 2011, Zynga raised an additional $500 million at approximately $14/share. The investors in these rounds included venture capital funds, public funds, investment banks and strategic investors. Today, Zynga's public stock price sits at just over $7/share. This price clearly isn't what the investors in the '10 and '11 venture rounds were expecting. Basically $800 million has been invested with little or negative return.

????? Groupon: Groupon raised approximately $135 million in 2010 at approximately $2.70/share. Later, in 2011, Groupon raised the mother of all venture rounds - $950 million at just about $7.90/share. Today the stock is hovering between $11- 12/share, so the 2010 investors are sitting on a solid return but the investors in the 2011 round are below 1.5x. The lock up has yet to come off as well. If these investors look to rush for the exits and the share price softens, the returns on this huge round may end up even more paltry.

????Obviously Zynga and Groupon are amazing companies – they've invented markets, captured huge percentages of these markets and have grown revenues at phenomenal rates. Nonetheless, the last few rounds of venture investments haven't panned out as planned. Why not?

????1. Discounting Growth. VCs tend to get very focused on growth rates. The faster something is growing, the better. The really big venture returns have been made in companies that got very large, and unless a company is growing fast, it won't get large quickly. So, almost no price is too high for VCs when they see fast growth in a startup. Public investors love growth as well. But, because they see companies later in their lifecycles, they've been trained to expect growth rates of high fliers to taper over time as the law of large numbers kicks in. As a rule of thumb, public investors rarely pay higher multiples for a company growing 100% versus a company growing 50%, all else being equal. They expect growth to moderate and equal out over time, so they're just not willing to pay extra for extreme growth.