????在失業(yè)率如此高的情況下，西班牙的保守政府繼續(xù)推行合并政策，無(wú)異于蠻干。據(jù)加拿大皇家銀行資本市場(chǎng)（RBC Capital Markets）的數(shù)據(jù)，房地產(chǎn)泡沫帶來(lái)的銀行損失預(yù)計(jì)將在760-1,530億歐元之間。若采用這一估算值，加上銀行業(yè)每年成本約290億歐元，即便它們不知以何種方式將每年的成本削減40%（約120億歐元）達(dá)到30%的、一流的成本收入比，也需要7-14年的時(shí)間來(lái)消化所有壞賬的潛在損失。而且，鑒于當(dāng)初分析師們給出的Bankia貸款損失估算值過低，你可以相當(dāng)確信，最終的損失還會(huì)高很多。

????但更麻煩的是這些Caja的合并還給西班牙政府新增了一個(gè)“大得不能倒”的問題。讓Bankia以現(xiàn)有規(guī)模倒閉對(duì)西班牙經(jīng)濟(jì)的沖擊，就像在水里扔了一塊大石頭一樣，沖擊力將遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出7塊小石頭分不同時(shí)間落下。西班牙政府將一堆行將就木的小銀行拼湊成一個(gè)龐然大物后，卻發(fā)現(xiàn)不能承受讓其倒下的后果。

????有鑒于此，允許Ibercaja、Liberbank和Caja3實(shí)施合并是不負(fù)責(zé)任的，這會(huì)再增添一個(gè)任性的龐然大物。事實(shí)上，西班牙政府應(yīng)當(dāng)采取行動(dòng)，阻止更多合并，并承擔(dān)更為積極的角色向銀行注資，讓它們?cè)俅伍_始放貸。如果正如一家歐盟機(jī)構(gòu)上周建議的那樣，歐洲央行不愿為所有的西班牙銀行存款提供擔(dān)保，那么西班牙政府將需要私人資金來(lái)重振人們對(duì)銀行業(yè)的信心。

????西班牙銀行業(yè)需要私人投資者的注資，其資本金缺口多半已達(dá)西班牙GDP的25-30%。雖然西班牙的債務(wù)/GDP比率相對(duì)較低，約為68%，但即便以當(dāng)今的高利率，它也借不到足夠多的資金，既能向銀行注資，又能彌補(bǔ)潛在損失。

????一個(gè)可能的解決方案是結(jié)合私人和公共資金，借鑒20世紀(jì)90年代瑞典全國(guó)銀行業(yè)重組和當(dāng)今愛爾蘭正在進(jìn)行的銀行重組。西班牙政府需要首先全面評(píng)估其銀行業(yè)，估算潛在損失。其次，它應(yīng)當(dāng)讓一些資不抵債的中小銀行干脆倒閉。

????與此同時(shí)，償付能力較好的銀行和Caja就可以從資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中將大部分壞賬以當(dāng)前市值剝離，移入一個(gè)特殊用途投資基金中。然后，西班牙政府可以讓公眾投資這個(gè)基金，幫助抵消壞賬的已實(shí)現(xiàn)損失。西班牙政府可以吸引私人資本進(jìn)行投資，有可能的話，承擔(dān)它們前10%，甚至20%的損失。

????For the conservative government to continue this merger policy with its unemployment rate so high would be nothing less than foolhardy. Bank losses emanating from the property bubble are estimated to be anywhere between 76 billion euros on the low end to as much as 153 billion euros on the high end, according to RBC Capital Markets. Using that estimate and given that the banking sector's costs run at around 29 billion euros a year, even if they somehow achieved a top-notch cost-to-income ratio of 30% by reducing their costs by 40% a year, or 12 billion euros, it would take seven to 14 years to absorb all the potential losses from the bad loans. And given the low-ball loan loss estimates analysts ascribed to Bankia, you can pretty much be sure that it is going to be a much bigger loss at the end of the day.

????But even more troubling, the merging of the cajas has also created a "too big to fail" problem for the Spanish government. Like throwing a big stone in the water, allowing Bankia to collapse in its current form would create a much bigger splash to the Spanish economy than what would have been the case if seven smaller pebbles hit the water at various times. Cobbling a bunch of zombie banks together has in a way created a monster that the Spanish government cannot afford to kill.

????Given all this, it would be irresponsible to allow Ibercaja, Liberbank and Caja3 to actually go through with their merger as it would again create yet another unruly zombie. Instead, the government should move to block further mergers and take a more active role in recapitalizing its banks so they can start lending again. If the ECB is unwilling to guarantee all Spanish bank deposits, as what was recommended by an EU body this week, then the Spanish government will need private funding to restore confidence in its banking sector.

????Investor cash is needed because the capital shortfall at the banks is easily 25% to 30% of Spain's GDP. While the country has a relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio of around 68%, it cannot borrow enough money at today's current high interest rates to both recapitalize its banks as well as cover potential losses.

????One possible solution would involve a mix of both private and public funds, using features from Sweden's national banking reorganization in the 1990s and Ireland's banking reorganization that going on today. The government needs to first do a thorough assessment of its banking sector and make an estimate as to the potential losses. It should then let the smaller, insolvent cajas and banks to simply fail.

????Meanwhile, the more solvent banks and cajas would have the majority of their bad loans taken off their balance sheets at current market value and moved into a special purpose investment fund. It would then allow the public to invest in that fund, which would help offset the realized losses in the bad loans. The Spanish government can entice private capital to invest by possibly guaranteeing the first 10% or even 20% of their losses.