????其次，而且更重要的是，中國(guó)有政策工具，而且已經(jīng)開始使用——最近的降息（無疑標(biāo)志著經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)已取代通脹成為中國(guó)人民銀行的首要擔(dān)憂）最為明顯。高盛（Goldman Sachs）投資管理部首席投資策略師哈繼銘最近的研究報(bào)告指出，中國(guó)一些省級(jí)和地方政府已開始悄悄地試圖穩(wěn)定樓市。有些省份的銀行已開始向首次購房者提供低于現(xiàn)行基準(zhǔn)利率的購房貸款（過去，購房貸款利率往往較人民銀行的基準(zhǔn)利率上浮5%-10%）。而中央政府關(guān)注的是另一面，有跡象顯示樓市，特別是在北京、上海以外的二三線城市開始有反彈跡象。

????中國(guó)的消費(fèi)者仍然需要住房，也想買房——而且，關(guān)鍵是他們買得起。雖然宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩，實(shí)際工資增長(zhǎng)依然強(qiáng)勁，因此消費(fèi)態(tài)勢(shì)保持良好。這也是為何國(guó)際危機(jī)加深后，中國(guó)政府并不著急的原因之一。要知道2008-2009年，中國(guó)政府在全球金融危機(jī)第一階段后的的確確急了?？吹綌?shù)以萬計(jì)突然失業(yè)的農(nóng)民工擠滿了中國(guó)東部的火車站，準(zhǔn)備坐火車回到貧窮的內(nèi)陸省份，難免令人著急。中國(guó)政府瘋狂地向經(jīng)濟(jì)注資，只為穩(wěn)定經(jīng)濟(jì)，他們做到了，但后果是通脹上升，以及迄今為止仍然數(shù)量不明的壞賬。這次，除了放松樓市調(diào)控，中國(guó)政府迄今采取的措施都只是小打小鬧，提供節(jié)能家電銷售補(bǔ)貼，削減一些特定商業(yè)稅賦，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)加快審批投資計(jì)劃等等，從這類微調(diào)可看不出北京著急了。

????更重要的一點(diǎn)是如有需要，北京可以采取更多舉措。悲觀分析認(rèn)為，中國(guó)過去10年，特別是過去四年，所有政府推動(dòng)的資本投資都已結(jié)束；這造成經(jīng)濟(jì)過熱和過度投資重工業(yè)，令如今重工業(yè)深陷產(chǎn)能過剩。這造成了中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)的失衡，消費(fèi)/GDP比率僅為39%，即便對(duì)于發(fā)展中國(guó)家也處于歷史低點(diǎn)。簡(jiǎn)而言之，中國(guó)的增長(zhǎng)模式難以持續(xù)，如果不迅速轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橄衩绹?guó)那樣的消費(fèi)驅(qū)動(dòng)型國(guó)家，前面就是無底的深淵。看著辦吧。

????Second, and more important, China has policy options that it has begun to use -- the recent interest rate cut (signaling emphatically that growth has replaced inflation as the central bank's primary concern) being only the most obvious. Quietly, as a recent research note from Jiming Ha, chief investment strategist at Goldman Sachs' investment management division in China noted, provincial and local governments have begun to try to stabilize the housing sector. Banks in a variety of provinces are now offering mortgages to first time buyers that are available at a discount to the current benchmark rate (in the past they'd have to pay a 5%-10% premium over the PBOC's benchmark rate.) The central government is looking the other way, and there are signs that housing markets, particularly in second and third-tier cities outside Beijing and Shanghai, are now rebounding a bit.

????China's consumers still want and need housing -- and, critically, they can afford it. Real wage growth remains strong, despite the macro deceleration, and that in turn means consumption has held up pretty well. This is part of the reason the central government has not panicked in the wake of the growing global crisis. Believe me, in 2008 and 2009, the central government DID panic in the wake of the first phase of the global financial crisis. The site of tens of thousands of suddenly unemployed migrant workers clogging the trains stations in eastern China, headed home to much poorer interior provinces, tends to have that effect. Beijing dumped money furiously into the economy in order to stabilize it, succeeded in doing so, and then paid the consequences down the road in terms of higher inflation and a still unknown amount of bad loans. This time, the steps it is taking, in addition to loosening controls on housing sector, are so far all little tweaks -- subsidies for the sale of energy efficient appliances, some targeted business tax cuts, quicker approval of investment plans by regulators -- the small kind of stuff that doesn't bespeak panic.

????The more important point is that Beijing can do more if needed. Part of the bearish case on China is that all of the government driven capital investment that we saw in the last decade -- and in particular in the last four years -- is now over; it resulted in excessive growth overall and too much investment in heavy industries that are now plagued by over capacity. It's resulted in a disfigured economy, with consumption comprising only 39% of GDP, a historically low figure even for developing countries. Simply put, China's growth model is supposed to be dead, and if it doesn't shortly turn into a manic consumption driven clone of the United States, well, the abyss is right over there. Proceed accordingly.