????我們作出了三個(gè)預(yù)測(cè)：之所以作出第一個(gè)預(yù)測(cè)，是因?yàn)槲覀兞私饨鹑跈C(jī)構(gòu)的運(yùn)作，但我們沒(méi)有證據(jù)；至于第二個(gè)預(yù)測(cè)，我們肯定它會(huì)發(fā)生，因?yàn)樵缬邢壤?，而且最直接的受害者和最大的受益者近?lái)一直都對(duì)這種純粹的推測(cè)叫嚷得最為大聲；作出第三個(gè)預(yù)測(cè)的理由是，如果是我們掌權(quán)，我們肯定會(huì)考慮這么做。

????這三個(gè)預(yù)測(cè)要么被行業(yè)專(zhuān)家大打折扣，要么被自由企業(yè)當(dāng)作惡意攻擊而加以抨擊，要么被視為謬論而不予理睬。

1. 更多的洗錢(qián)活動(dòng)

????首先，我們預(yù)測(cè)美國(guó)各大銀行將因?yàn)榇罅康南村X(qián)活動(dòng)而備受指責(zé)。美國(guó)境內(nèi)的銀行和其他國(guó)家的銀行一樣，也蹚上了這灘渾水，洗錢(qián)已經(jīng)成為了銀行業(yè)的一部分。我們預(yù)測(cè)，不久后將出現(xiàn)針對(duì)美國(guó)大型金融機(jī)構(gòu)的嚴(yán)重洗錢(qián)指控。

????全球商業(yè)銀行處理的交易量非常巨大，難免有部分非法資金偷偷通過(guò)他們的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理網(wǎng)絡(luò)。國(guó)際銀行家的工作就是推銷(xiāo)資本，股票經(jīng)紀(jì)人的工作就是推銷(xiāo)股票，而進(jìn)行大規(guī)模洗錢(qián)的最好方法之一就是讓本地銀行提供信用額度，然后把它作為美國(guó)大型貨幣中心銀行的貸款擔(dān)保。

????銀行會(huì)聲稱(chēng)，錢(qián)是可以互換的，指望銀行找到每分錢(qián)的源頭不現(xiàn)實(shí)。但國(guó)會(huì)有權(quán)力要求金融機(jī)構(gòu)核實(shí)他們處理的每一分錢(qián)的合法性。噢，等等……他們已經(jīng)這么做了。就是《美國(guó)愛(ài)國(guó)者法案》（USA PATRIOT Act）。該法案要求金融機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行全面檢查，找出資產(chǎn)的最終擁有者，同時(shí)確保他們不會(huì)接收非法活動(dòng)資金。如果這些措施被切實(shí)執(zhí)行，我們一定會(huì)感到欣慰。對(duì)于金融機(jī)構(gòu)來(lái)說(shuō)，為了符合《美國(guó)愛(ài)國(guó)者法案》的規(guī)定，就必須證實(shí)自己流入、流出的每筆資金只來(lái)自或流向大型貨幣中心銀行。比如，大型國(guó)際銀行必須具備嚴(yán)密的防洗錢(qián)程序，經(jīng)紀(jì)公司有權(quán)利用這一點(diǎn)，在接收此類(lèi)銀行的電匯時(shí)不必再進(jìn)行反洗錢(qián)檢查。有資格獲得這種信任的銀行包括匯豐銀行（HSBC）和渣打銀行（Standard Chartered）。面對(duì)恐怖主義的國(guó)際觸角，你現(xiàn)在還覺(jué)得安全嗎？

????請(qǐng)注意，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理是要花錢(qián)的。企業(yè)最看重成本，他們關(guān)注的不是對(duì)錯(cuò)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，而是不參與洗錢(qián)活動(dòng)的金錢(qián)成本。洗錢(qián)與很多大型銀行的國(guó)際盈利活動(dòng)有關(guān)，比如貸款和項(xiàng)目融資。因此，部署反洗錢(qián)功能只是個(gè)算術(shù)問(wèn)題：組建、維持反洗錢(qián)部門(mén)的成本是多少？會(huì)有多少合法業(yè)務(wù)因?yàn)閮?nèi)部的反洗錢(qián)失察而受阻或喪失？洗錢(qián)活動(dòng)被監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)或執(zhí)法部門(mén)發(fā)現(xiàn)的可能性有多大？如果被發(fā)現(xiàn)，可能需要付出多大的代價(jià)才能與監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)或執(zhí)法部門(mén)達(dá)成和解？計(jì)算的結(jié)果是：洗錢(qián)是門(mén)非常好的生意，它的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)微不足道。

2. 銀行業(yè)崩潰

????我們的第二個(gè)預(yù)測(cè)是，銀行業(yè)將會(huì)崩潰，而不是被分割開(kāi)來(lái)。銀行將采取戰(zhàn)略措施，剝離、拆分和削減他們的業(yè)務(wù)。銀行早就該作出這種商業(yè)決定，高盛（Goldman Sachs）等公司已經(jīng)采取了這方面的措施。

????公眾對(duì)商業(yè)趨勢(shì)的認(rèn)識(shí)是最滯后的指標(biāo)之一。即使大難臨頭，大多數(shù)人也毫無(wú)察覺(jué)?？纯慈藗儗?duì)花旗集團(tuán)（Citi）前CEO斯坦福?韋爾所作評(píng)論的反應(yīng)就知道了。他說(shuō)，銀行應(yīng)該被分隔開(kāi)來(lái)。對(duì)此《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》（Wall Street Journal）——他們應(yīng)該更清楚些——寫(xiě)到，韋爾“現(xiàn)在認(rèn)為，廢除分隔商業(yè)銀行和投資銀行的《格拉斯-斯蒂格爾法案》（Glass-Steagall）是個(gè)錯(cuò)誤”。曲解韋爾的話可能有助于報(bào)紙的發(fā)行量，但完全無(wú)助于澄清這場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)論?！都~約時(shí)報(bào)》（New York Times）引用貝爾斯登（Bear Stearns）前著名CEO艾斯?格林伯格的話說(shuō)：“韋爾不是這個(gè)意思?！钡胁磺宄窳植袷欠裾娴目吹搅四嵌握勗?，或者就像其他那些純粹的讀者一樣，他看到的只是斷章取義的談話。

????韋爾當(dāng)然沒(méi)有說(shuō)他對(duì)廢除《格拉斯-斯蒂格爾法案》使花旗集團(tuán)得以誕生“感到遺憾”。恰恰相反，韋爾在回答消費(fèi)者新聞與商業(yè)頻道（CNBC）記者安德魯?羅斯?索爾金的提問(wèn)時(shí)說(shuō)，他認(rèn)為自己的方法符合當(dāng)時(shí)的情況，但現(xiàn)在情況已經(jīng)發(fā)生變化，因此應(yīng)該采取新的方法。

????Three predictions: The first because we know how the money business works – though we do not have proof to hand. The second we are certain will happen – because it has long been the obvious step, and because those most directly affected by it, and who stand to benefit most from it, have been howling loudest at the mere suggestion. The third, because we would certainly consider doing it if we were in charge.

????All three of our predictions, to the extent they ever come up for public discussion, are loudly discounted by industry pundits, or attacked as vicious assaults on free enterprise, or dismissed as preposterous.

1. More money laundering

????First, we predict that major U.S. banks will be accused of extensive money laundering activities. Banks on U.S. soil swim in the same polluted waters as their global counterparts, and money laundering is part of the environment. We predict there will soon be serious charges of money laundering brought against major U.S. financial institutions.

????Global commercial banks process such an immense flow of transactions that it is inescapable that some illicit funds should slip through their risk management nets. The job of a global banker is to sell money, no less than the job of the stockbroker is to push stocks, and one of the best ways to launder large sums of cash is to get your local bank to write you a line of credit against it, then take that line and post it as collateral for your loan from a major U.S. money center institution.

????The banks will argue that cash is fungible, and it is unrealistic to expect them to trace every dollar to its source. But Congress has the ability to require financial institutions to verify the bona fides of every cent they process. Oh, wait… they already did that. It's called the USA PATRIOT Act, and it requires financial institutions to undertake exhaustive checks to identify the ultimate owners of assets and ensure they do not take in funds that are the proceeds of illegal activities. You will be relieved to know that these steps have actually been implemented. In order for a financial institution to be in compliance with the PATRIOT Act, it must verify that all funds transferred in or out only come from or go to a major money center bank. Brokerage firms, for example, are entitled to rely on the fact that a major international bank is required to have iron-clad procedures to prevent money laundering, and may thus accept wires from such banks without further anti money laundering (AML) checks. Banks that qualify for such reliance would include HSBC and Standard Chartered. Do you now feel safe from the global reach of terror?

????Note too that risk management costs money. And businesses weigh cost centers, not versus standards of Right and Wrong, but versus the dollar cost of not engaging in the activity. Money laundering is associated with many major banks' international profit-making activities – from loan portfolios to project finance. Therefore the calculation to deploy an AML function is simple arithmetic: What does it cost to hire and support an AML department? What is the volume of legitimate business that will be impeded or lost as a result of internal AML oversight? What is the likelihood of money laundering activities actually being found out by a regulator or law enforcement? If found, what is the likely cost to settle with said regulator or law enforcement? The result of the calculation: money laundering is very good business, and the risks are inconsequential.

2. Bank break-ups

????Our second prediction is that the banks will break up. Not that they will be broken up. The banks will move strategically to divest, spin off and slice and dice their business – it is by now an overdue business decision, and firms such as Goldman Sachs (GS) have already made steps in that direction.

????Public awareness of trends in business is among the most lagging of lagging indicators. Even when they are hit over the head, most folks don't get it. Witness the reaction to comments made by former Citi CEO Sanford Weill that the banks should be broken up. The Wall Street Journal – folks who should know better – wrote Weill "now believes it was a mistake to scrap the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking." Mischaracterization of Weill's remarks may sell newspapers, but it fails utterly to clarify the debate. The New York Times quotes legendary former Bear Stearns CEO Ace Greenberg as saying "this was not Sandy," though it is not clear that Greenberg actually saw the conversation or if, like the rest of us mere readers, he was given out-of-context quotes.

????Weill certainly did not say he "regretted" scrapping Glass-Steagall to create Citigroup (C). Quite the opposite. Responding to CNBC's Andrew Ross Sorkin, Weill said he believed his formula was right for its time, but that times have changed and a new formula should prevail (Full disclosure: Hedgeye CEO, Keith McCullough, is a contributor and guest host on CNBC, and other Hedgeye analysts are featured guests from time to time.)