????如果歐洲弱國(guó)繼續(xù)留在歐元區(qū)內(nèi)，兩大問(wèn)題就不可能得到解決。一是政客和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)討論最多的巨額主權(quán)債務(wù)，像希臘和意大利等國(guó)的債務(wù)/GDP比率都已經(jīng)超過(guò)了100%。第二個(gè)問(wèn)題更嚴(yán)重，歐豬五國(guó)葡萄牙、愛(ài)爾蘭、意大利、希臘和西班牙由于生產(chǎn)成本過(guò)高（尤其是相對(duì)于德國(guó)），嚴(yán)重缺乏競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。西班牙和意大利的制造商們?cè)谂c進(jìn)口商品的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中紛紛敗下陣來(lái)，倒閉無(wú)數(shù)。

????這種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力差距是十年來(lái)逐漸形成的，主要源于歐洲“核心”國(guó)家和“外圍”國(guó)家間驚人的勞工成本差異。從1999年至2011年，西班牙單位勞動(dòng)成本——生產(chǎn)一輛汽車或一部電腦所需的工資和福利——每年增長(zhǎng)4.3%，意大利增長(zhǎng)3.4%，愛(ài)爾蘭增長(zhǎng)4.1%，而德國(guó)每年僅增長(zhǎng)0.9%。據(jù)布托估算，這使得外圍國(guó)家的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力落后于核心國(guó)家高達(dá)30-40%。由此，意大利出口占全球比重已從上世紀(jì)90年代末的5%下降到了去年的約2%。

????如果繼續(xù)留在歐元區(qū)，外圍國(guó)家要解決競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力問(wèn)題就只能通過(guò)緊縮政策——讓高失業(yè)率壓低工資，加稅以及縮減政府開(kāi)支?！斑@個(gè)過(guò)程可能需要10年，”布托表示。更糟的是，這些國(guó)家的債務(wù)和付息仍以歐元計(jì)價(jià)并保持增長(zhǎng)，但稅收卻在下降。這些國(guó)家出現(xiàn)債務(wù)違約后要留在歐元區(qū)，幾乎是不可能的?！皻W洲央行一直在向弱國(guó)的銀行業(yè)提供支持，”倫敦政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院（London School of Economics）的查爾斯?古德哈特稱。“抵押品主要是這些國(guó)家的主權(quán)債券。如果這些債券違約，向銀行提供的所有救助將中止，導(dǎo)致銀行倒閉。”

????盡早退出，可以一石二鳥地解決債務(wù)和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力這兩大問(wèn)題。布托認(rèn)為，有可能外圍國(guó)家會(huì)逐一退出。他在研究中總結(jié)稱，雖然退出的合法性尚不明確，但如果這對(duì)于一個(gè)國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)存亡至關(guān)重要，在國(guó)際法中是站得住腳的。退出前也不需要議會(huì)的批準(zhǔn)。這很重要，因?yàn)槭虑氨仨毐Ｃ堋?/p>

????譯者：早稻米

????The continent's weaker nations can't possibly solve their two big problems if they remain in the common currency. The first problem is the one the politicians and regulators talk about most: the huge overhang of sovereign debt, exceeding 100% of GDP in nations such as Greece and Italy. But the second is even more important. Europe's PIIGS -- Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain -- all suffer from a drastic loss of competitiveness because they face an excessive cost of production, especially compared with Germany. That disparity has decimated manufacturers in Spain and Italy struggling to compete with imports.

????The competitiveness gap was a decade in the making. Its main source is the shocking divergence in labor costs between Europe's two tiers, which we'll call the "core" and "peripheral" nations. From 1999 to 2011, unit labor costs -- the wages and benefits required to produce a car or computer -- rose 4.3% a year in Spain, 3.4% in Italy, and 4.1% in Ireland, compared with a 0.9% annual increase in Germany. That leaves the peripheral countries with a competitiveness gap of 30% to 40% vs. the core nations, by Bootle's estimate. As a result, Italy's exports as a share of the world total dropped from 5% in the late 1990s to about 2% last year.

????If they remain in the euro, peripheral countries must solve their competitiveness problem through austerity -- by letting high unemployment grind down wages, by raising taxes, and by slashing government spending. "That process could take 10 years," says Bootle. Worse, their debt and interest payments would remain in euros and keep rising, while tax receipts fall. It would be nearly impossible for those nations to default on their debt and stay in the eurozone. "The ECB has been supporting the banks in weak countries," says Charles Goodhart of the London School of Economics. "The collateral is largely their sovereign bonds. If they default, all aid to the banks would cease, causing their collapse."

????An immediate exit could solve both the debt and the competitiveness problems in a single stroke. Bootle believes it's likely that peripheral countries will begin to split off one by one. In his study, he concludes that although the legality of an exit is fuzzy, it can be justified under international law as essential to a country's economic survival. Nor would it require approval of Parliament prior to departure. That's important, given the need for secrecy.