????? 有時(shí)我們會(huì)為了表面上的好理由而貽誤時(shí)機(jī)（比如：“我們就要達(dá)成業(yè)務(wù)開(kāi)發(fā)協(xié)議，不想在這一過(guò)程中改變現(xiàn)狀”），而實(shí)際情況往往證明這些都不是什么好理由（比如：“這項(xiàng)協(xié)議一直都沒(méi)有付諸實(shí)施”）。迅速擺脫束縛幾乎也總是正確的選擇。

????? 招聘時(shí)別只看履歷，要聘用真正的人才。生物科技行業(yè)中許多人的履歷都很不錯(cuò)，要么是參與制造了了不起的藥物，要么是參與過(guò)漂亮的投資退出行動(dòng)，但這些實(shí)際上都不能決定他們到底是怎樣的人物（至少和他們自詡的人物相比相去甚遠(yuǎn)）。當(dāng)然，在我們聘用的履歷非凡的CEO中，有相當(dāng)一部分并沒(méi)有在我們的初創(chuàng)型企業(yè)中成為優(yōu)秀的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者和經(jīng)營(yíng)者。仔細(xì)核實(shí)以往他們做過(guò)的實(shí)際貢獻(xiàn)是背景調(diào)查和聘用的一個(gè)重要組成部分。有時(shí)，書面文字和實(shí)際工作出現(xiàn)落差是因?yàn)楸M管過(guò)去作用重大，但從大公司轉(zhuǎn)到小公司是個(gè)艱難的過(guò)程；另一個(gè)原因是他們以往的成功更多的是靠運(yùn)氣，而不是技能，而重復(fù)好運(yùn)的難度很大。

????2. 你不能選擇自己的出身，但能選擇自己的投資伙伴。最終實(shí)現(xiàn)退出的生物科技投資中，絕大多數(shù)都需要1,500萬(wàn)美元（9348.75萬(wàn)元人民幣）以上的風(fēng)投資金，而平均投資額則接近6,000萬(wàn)美元（3.7395億元人民幣）。這就是說(shuō)大多數(shù)投資都需要至少三方組成的風(fēng)投財(cái)團(tuán)，而且投資方往往超過(guò)三個(gè)。這為出現(xiàn)混亂局面埋下了很大的伏筆。我們觀察到的情況是：

????? 大型財(cái)團(tuán)往往運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)不良，我們會(huì)設(shè)法避開(kāi)這樣的財(cái)團(tuán)。財(cái)團(tuán)越大，參與議事的人就越多，對(duì)孰輕孰重的不同理解就越發(fā)分散注意力。投資人的退出傾向不同（長(zhǎng)期投資，還是盡早轉(zhuǎn)讓），資本偏好不同（節(jié)約資金，還是傾囊投入），對(duì)管理團(tuán)隊(duì)的看法不同（換還是不換），同一領(lǐng)域中利益不同（同一項(xiàng)投資讓有些人賺錢，讓有些人賠錢）。

????? 投資者目標(biāo)不一的害處可能和管理不善一樣大。這一點(diǎn)毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，而且基于上述原因，大型財(cái)團(tuán)中投資者目標(biāo)不一的可能性較大。最優(yōu)秀的管理團(tuán)隊(duì)會(huì)努力讓投資財(cái)團(tuán)中各位成員的目標(biāo)保持一致，并且會(huì)為了在戰(zhàn)略、愿景、財(cái)務(wù)和退出等問(wèn)題上保持一致而與董事會(huì)進(jìn)行開(kāi)放性的探討。

????? 風(fēng)投技能之外的經(jīng)驗(yàn)?zāi)茉诔跗谡嬲嵘聲?huì)的實(shí)際價(jià)值。我們深信，起步時(shí)引進(jìn)獨(dú)立董事會(huì)給初創(chuàng)型企業(yè)帶來(lái)極大幫助。比如，讓制藥公司Vertex前總裁兼研發(fā)業(yè)務(wù)主管維基?薩托進(jìn)入計(jì)算機(jī)輔助藥物探索公司Nimbus，盡管當(dāng)時(shí)董事會(huì)的規(guī)模超過(guò)公司本身，但這是一項(xiàng)正確選擇并大大提升了Nimbus的實(shí)力。

????3. 較為務(wù)實(shí)的預(yù)期有利于盡職調(diào)查。避免在生物科技行業(yè)蒙受損失的最佳途徑就是別向生物科技公司投資。這個(gè)行業(yè)比較復(fù)雜，針對(duì)科技、項(xiàng)目、團(tuán)隊(duì)、計(jì)劃、專利等方面的盡職調(diào)查至關(guān)重要。

????? Sometimes we've delayed for apparently good reasons (e.g., "we were close to a BD deal and didn't want to rock the boat during the process"), which more often than not turns out to be poor reasons (e.g., "the deal never got done"). Ripping the bandage off quickly is almost always the right answer.

????? Don't hire for the resume, hire for real talent. Lots of folks in biotech have good resumes, were part of stories with great drugs or great exits but didn't actually shape them (or at least no where near as much as they think they shaped them). We've certainly hired our fair share of great paper-resume CEOs that didn't translate into excellent leaders and operators in our startups. Diligencing the specifics of their actual contributions in the past is an important part of reference checking and recruiting. Some of the disconnect between paper and practice is that the transition from large to small companies is hard despite great past roles; others is that their past success was more luck than skill and repeating luck is a challenge.

????2. You can't pick your family, but you can pick your co-investors. The vast majority of biotech deals require >$15M in venture capital to get to an exit, and the average is close to $60 million. This means that most deals require syndicates of at least three VCs and often more. This creates a lot of potential for entropy. Our observations:

????? Big syndicates are often dysfunctional, and we try to avoid them. The bigger the syndicate, the more cooks in the kitchen, the more distracting the differing priorities become: Different exit preferences ("go long" vs "sell early"), different capital appetites (capital-sparing vs pushing money into a deal), different views of a management team (change vs no change) and different disease area interests (one made money on eye-deals, another lost money on eye-deals).

????? Misaligned investors can cause as much harm as weak management. This is undoubtedly true and, for the reasons stated above, big syndicates increase the odds of misalignment. The best management teams work hard to keep their investor syndicates aligned and maintain a continual open Board dialogue about that alignment on strategy, vision, financing, exit, etc…

????? Experience beyond the venture skill set can add real value on early stage boards. We are big believers that bringing great independent directors into deals early can be a huge help for startups. For example, getting former Vertex president and head of R&D Vicki Sato involved at Nimbus, even when the board was larger than the company, was the right thing to do and a great addition.

????3. Diligence would benefit from more realistic crystal balls. The best way to not lose money in biotech is to not invest in biotech. It's not a simple business, and deep due diligence around the science, programs, team, plan, patents, etc. is critically important.