????歐洲委員會(huì)（European Commission）上周五公布了冬季預(yù)測(cè)。根據(jù)預(yù)測(cè)，今年歐洲將面臨進(jìn)一步的經(jīng)濟(jì)萎縮以及債務(wù)狀況惡化的局面，到2014年（也可能是以后）將出現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇和金融穩(wěn)定。但結(jié)果真會(huì)是這樣嗎？

????我們首先來(lái)看看五個(gè)方面的官方數(shù)據(jù)：

????? 2012年收縮0.6%后，歐元區(qū)17個(gè)成員國(guó)的實(shí)際GDP預(yù)計(jì)將在2013年再度下降0.3%。因此，盡管預(yù)測(cè)的預(yù)算前景改善，歐元區(qū)成員國(guó)債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)將保持升勢(shì)，債務(wù)占GDP比值將再度上升2個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。與此同時(shí)，令人擔(dān)憂(yōu)的失業(yè)情況將進(jìn)一步惡化，整體失業(yè)率將從11.4%上升到12.2%。

????? 這些令人失望的預(yù)測(cè)不局限于陷入困境的外圍經(jīng)濟(jì)體。歐元區(qū)核心最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體預(yù)計(jì)會(huì)出現(xiàn)輕微擴(kuò)張（德國(guó)增長(zhǎng)0.5%）或增長(zhǎng)停滯（法國(guó)）。而在這個(gè)背景下，核心經(jīng)濟(jì)體的失業(yè)率也將小幅上升。

????? 而被視為歐元區(qū)穩(wěn)定關(guān)鍵的意大利和西班牙經(jīng)濟(jì)將分別萎縮1.0%和1.4%。它將導(dǎo)致意大利失業(yè)率上升到11.6%，而西班牙失業(yè)率更將達(dá)到驚人的26.9%。

????? 歐元區(qū)內(nèi)部將繼續(xù)面臨顯著的分化。愛(ài)沙尼亞預(yù)計(jì)將以3%的增速再次引領(lǐng)歐元區(qū)成員國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)，而希臘則將以4.4%的經(jīng)濟(jì)萎縮幅度再度成為經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)最差的成員國(guó)。

????? 最后，歐洲委員會(huì)預(yù)測(cè)2014年將出現(xiàn)顯著復(fù)蘇，盡管這個(gè)預(yù)測(cè)并沒(méi)有將財(cái)政政策立場(chǎng)可能發(fā)生的變化考慮在內(nèi)。（塞浦路斯除外）具體來(lái)說(shuō)，所有歐元區(qū)國(guó)家預(yù)計(jì)都將出現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)，推動(dòng)整個(gè)歐元區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率達(dá)到1.4%。這個(gè)預(yù)測(cè)令人鼓舞，但仍不足以顯著改變失業(yè)形勢(shì)。

????如果這些經(jīng)濟(jì)預(yù)測(cè)是可信的，那么2013年預(yù)計(jì)會(huì)出現(xiàn)更大的社會(huì)和政治脆弱性問(wèn)題。具體而言，席卷歐洲的普遍不滿(mǎn)情緒將會(huì)持續(xù)。街頭抗議仍將是反復(fù)出現(xiàn)的熱點(diǎn)問(wèn)題，尤其是在外圍經(jīng)濟(jì)體。而傳統(tǒng)的政治結(jié)構(gòu)也會(huì)承受更大的壓力，短期內(nèi)不大可能出現(xiàn)能持久的替代方案。

????這樣的低迷形勢(shì)持續(xù)得越久，歐洲央行（European Central Bank）尋求保持金融穩(wěn)定（到目前為止是成功的）所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)會(huì)越大。它強(qiáng)化了一種觀(guān)點(diǎn)，即歐洲央行可以為到達(dá)更好的目的地提供橋梁，但它本身并沒(méi)有辦法提供這個(gè)目的地。

????所有這一切都應(yīng)該為各成員國(guó)政府以及布魯塞爾的歐洲委員會(huì)總部和法蘭克福的歐洲央行敲響警鐘。

????The European Commission (EC) published its winter projections Friday. They point to further economic contraction and worsening debt dynamics this year giving way to recovery and financial stabilization in 2014 (and presumably beyond). But will they?

????Let us start with the official numbers, focusing on five items:

????? After contracting in real terms by 0.6% in 2012, the GDP of the 17-member eurozone is projected to decline by another 0.3% in 2013. Accordingly, and despite forecasting an improving budgetary outlook, the debt burden would maintain its upward trajectory, rising by another 2 percentage points of GDP. Meanwhile, the alarming unemployment situation would worsen, with the overall rate increasing from 11.4% to 12.2%.

????? These disappointing projections are not limited to the struggling peripheral economies. The largest economies at the core of the eurozone are expected to expand marginally (Germany at 0.5%) or stagnate (France). And with this, joblessness in the core would edge higher.

????? Italy and Spain, viewed correctly by many as central to the stability of the eurozone, would contract by 1.0% and 1.4%, respectively. This would push unemployment up to 11.6% in Italy and to a stunning 26.9% in Spain.

????? Intra-eurozone dispersion would remain significant. With a projected 3% growth rate, Estonia would again lead the pack while Greece, expected to contract by another 4.4% would come last once more.

????? Finally, the EC forecasts a notable recovery in 2014, though this does not incorporate likely changes in the fiscal policy stance. Specifically, every eurozone country (except Cyprus) is projected to grow, with the area's growth rate coming in at 1.4% -- encouraging, though not enough to dramatically change the unemployment picture.

????If these projections are to be believed, they point to greater socio-political fragility in 2013. Specifically, the wave of popular dissatisfaction sweeping across Europe would persist. Street protests would remain a recurrent theme, especially in the peripheral economies. And traditional political structures would come under greater pressure, without a durable alternative emerging any time soon.

????The longer such malaise persists, the greater the challenges facing the European Central Bank in its (so far successful) quest to maintain financial stability – reinforcing the view that the ECB can provide a bridge to a better destination but cannot, on its own, deliver this destination.

????All this should be ringing loud alarm bells in national capitals, as well as in the EC's headquarters in Brussels and the ECB's Frankfurt.