時下流行的“科技泡沫”觀點(diǎn)不值一信
????如今,私營高科技企業(yè)似乎輕輕松松就能獲得十億美元以上的估值,有些新上市科技公司的股價飆升,存在科技泡沫的說法又開始興起。金融市場分析師宣稱,科技公司的估值已經(jīng)高得離譜,硅谷需要制度化,否則將玩火自焚,還會殃及投資者。 ????存在科技泡沫這種論調(diào)確實很吸引眼球,但如果我們把眼光放到科技新創(chuàng)企業(yè)估值飆升之外,就會發(fā)現(xiàn)這種說法根本沒道理。要得出泡沫正在形成的論斷,我們得先考慮科技公司估值飆升的原因。我認(rèn)為有以下三個因素在驅(qū)動估值的飆升: ????驅(qū)動因素之一:上市準(zhǔn)備時間大幅延長 ????依靠風(fēng)險投資建立的科技公司如今的上市準(zhǔn)備時間要比早些年長得多。在2000年左右的那場真正的網(wǎng)絡(luò)泡沫時代,風(fēng)投型科技公司的平均上市時間為成立后的第四年。如今這個數(shù)字是九年。誠然,以前的IPO規(guī)模也不大(80%的募資額少于5000萬美元),那時的公司也遠(yuǎn)稱不上成熟(80%的公司年營收額低于5000萬美元)。 ????放眼當(dāng)下,形勢已經(jīng)完全不同。2013年,科技企業(yè)的平均IPO規(guī)模已超過2億美元,當(dāng)然,它們的平均年營收也已高達(dá)1.04億美元。這意味著我們可以預(yù)見,如今大部分“尚處于襁褓期的10億美元級私營企業(yè)”最終將走上公開上市之路。雖然十幾年前的網(wǎng)絡(luò)泡沫還歷歷在目,但如今時移勢易,我們的估值其實有理有據(jù),這些企業(yè)早已在私募市場完成了估值任務(wù)。所謂的上市也不過是一次財富轉(zhuǎn)移的過程,勞苦大眾們拿出血汗錢投資公開市場,而之前有能力投資私募市場的大財閥、私募資本、基金公司和公共養(yǎng)老基金則欣然笑納。 ????那么導(dǎo)致這種現(xiàn)象出現(xiàn)的原因是什么?一句話:百分位報價改革和美國證券交易委員會(the Securities and Exchange Commission)一系列的政策讓低價股票交易環(huán)境蕩然無存。低價股票在市場上被嚴(yán)重不看好。所以,沒有哪家私營公司敢冒低價上市的風(fēng)險,他們唯有一拖再拖,等待時機(jī)不斷成熟。 ????毫無疑問,這是一個重要的公共政策問題,而不是估值問題。 ????驅(qū)動因素之二:高速增長無法復(fù)制 ????暫且不說這兩年上市的科技公司,如今市值最高的一批科技企業(yè)——微軟(Microsoft)、SAP、甲骨文(Oracle)等,共計市值2.5萬億美元。不過,這些公司增長乏力,營收增速目前僅為6%。從公開市場來看,這批巨頭的市值與年營收之比為兩倍。 ????現(xiàn)在我們拿這些龐然大物與2011到2013年上市的25家科技公司做一番對比,后者的年營收增幅在30%以上,這是絕大多數(shù)投資者都認(rèn)定的“高速增長”。這些新生兒的總市值只有3000億美元,其中還有一半是Facebook。如果加上Twitter和商務(wù)社交網(wǎng)站LinkedIn,三家公司已占據(jù)總市值的三分之二之多。他們目前的市值與年營收之比為八倍。 ????我們靜下心來想一想。如果你是公開市場上尋找高增長科技公司的投資人——比如普信集團(tuán)(T Rowe Price)和富達(dá)投資(Fidelity),你有25家公司可以選擇,其中有三家公司獲得投資的幾率最大,遠(yuǎn)超其它公司。這就是最基本的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)供需關(guān)系在發(fā)揮作用:投資需求節(jié)節(jié)高漲,但公開市場的股票就那么幾支,所以市值攀升也就是意料之中的事情了。 ????這也恰恰解釋了為什么大量共同基金(和部分對沖基金)喜歡參與IPO之前的私募投資。公開市場科技企業(yè)的增長難以滿足他們的胃口。所以,大量逐利資金涌入后期私募市場,從而推高了各家公司的估值。 ????不過,并不是所有IPO科技企業(yè)都能搭上這班車。我們同樣可以列舉一系列失意者:Demand Media、Chegg以及Violin Memory。這些年營收增速不足20%的新上市公司市盈率只有高增長科技公司的四分之一。這是一件好事,至少說明投資者做足了功課,而不是在盲目地跟風(fēng)。這些認(rèn)真鉆研的投資者未來將獲得豐厚的回報。 |
????With private tech companies pulling down billion-dollar-plus valuations with seeming ease, and shares of some newly public tech outfits soaring, talk of a tech bubble is on the rise again. Financial market prognosticators have declared that technology valuations defy logic and that Silicon Valley needs to be institutionalized before it becomes a danger to itself and investors everywhere. ????All of this bubble-mongering encourages headlines, but it makes little sense if we look beyond the run-up in valuations of tech startups. Before we can say a bubble is brewing, we need to consider what's causing the value of tech companies to soar. Here's a look at three drivers: ????Driver No. 1: Going public today takes a long, long time ????For venture-funded technology companies, the time it takes to go public is inexorably longer today than in previous years. In the decades leading up to the "real" tech bubble of 1999-2000, the average venture-backed company went public soon after its fourth year in existence. Today it's nine years or more. Not surprisingly, IPO sizes used to be smaller (80% were less than $50 million), and the companies were less mature (80% had annual revenue less than $50 million). ????Today, these numbers have completely reversed. In 2013, the average tech IPO had annual revenues of $104 million and raised more than $200 million. What that means is that most of today's "private billion-dollar babies" would have been public in the markets of old. Rather than question the value of immature public companies as we eventually did in the last bubble, today we wring our hands because they now achieve these valuations in the private markets. In reality, this is nothing more than a wealth transfer from ordinary individuals who invest their retirement dollars in the public markets to wealthy individuals, endowments, foundations, and public pension funds who can invest in private equity. ????So how did we get here? The short answer is that decimalization and various other policies implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission have destroyed the trading environment for small cap stocks. As a result, the prospects of being a small cap public company are truly daunting; private companies go public only at a much later and more mature stage. ????No doubt this is an important public policy question, but it's not a valuation question. ????Driver No. 2: Growth is hard to find ????Putting aside the IPO class of 2011-2013, the largest tech companies -- Microsoft (MSFT), SAP (SAP), Oracle (ORCLE), etc. -- represent a combined $2.5 trillion in market cap. Yet, these companies are barely growing. The revenue growth rate for these companies is about 6%. At that pace the market values them at about two times their annual revenue. ????Now compare this to the 25 companies in the 2011-2013 IPO group with annual revenues growing at more than 30% -- what most investors would consider "high growth." This group has a combined market cap of only $300 billion, half of which is represented by Facebook (FB) alone. Add in Twitter (TWTR) and LinkedIn (LNKD), and these three companies make up roughly two-thirds of this total market cap. The market values these companies at eight times annual revenue. ????Think about that for a moment. If you are a public tech investor looking to buy growth -- e.g., T Rowe Price, Fidelity -- you have about 25 companies from which to choose, three of which account for the vast majority of the total investment opportunity. This is basic Economics 101 supply-and-demand at work: Investors demand growth, but there isn't a lot to satisfy this demand so the price rises. ????Interestingly, this also explains why you see many of these mutual funds (and some hedge funds) investing in the private financing rounds of pre-IPO companies. There simply is not enough growth in the public tech universe to satiate their appetite. They must buy growth via late-stage private financings; therefore, pushing valuations higher. ????So not all IPOs are on a rocket ride up -- to name a few, just look at companies like Demand Media, Chegg, Violin Memory. Such companies that recently went public with annual revenue growth of less than 20% trade at multiples fully 75% less than their high-growth peers. This is a good thing - investors are doing their homework, rather than putting money to a bubble. And they stand to do very well by their studiousness. |