????投資者到底應(yīng)該如何應(yīng)對新興市場最近的波動(dòng)？德高望重的專家們對這個(gè)問題的意見相當(dāng)不統(tǒng)一。一部分專家，比如著名新興市場股票基金經(jīng)理馬克?莫比烏斯預(yù)計(jì)，這種震蕩格局將繼續(xù)下去。他們還警告投資者，在增倉方面要小心謹(jǐn)慎。另一部分專家，比如高盛資產(chǎn)管理前董事長吉姆?奧尼爾則相信，這些人擔(dān)憂過度。奧尼爾等人認(rèn)為，投資者應(yīng)該利用眼下的機(jī)會(huì)大舉買進(jìn)。

????上述專家的意見出現(xiàn)這樣的反常分歧，我懷疑這不僅僅是因?yàn)樗麄儗ν慌?jīng)濟(jì)、金融和技術(shù)面數(shù)據(jù)的解讀不同。另一個(gè)原因可能是因?yàn)榛究蚣懿灰粯?。更仔?xì)地分析了相關(guān)問題后，我找到了第三條理由，那就是，他們意識到新興市場又犯了老毛病，但對這種表現(xiàn)的結(jié)果和影響觀點(diǎn)各異。

????新興市場資產(chǎn)的大幅震蕩已經(jīng)存在了一段時(shí)間，而且出現(xiàn)了幾次相當(dāng)嚴(yán)重的情況。這次大跌始于差不多一年前，原因是人們擔(dān)心美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)可能收緊貨幣政策（即削減債券購買規(guī)模）。結(jié)果，幾乎所有新興市場都受到了沉重打擊，不論是絕對值還是相對于其他資產(chǎn)類別的表現(xiàn)，而后者表現(xiàn)得尤其明顯。實(shí)際上，在2013年的數(shù)據(jù)中，很難看到哪一波行情的波動(dòng)幅度如此之大而且范圍如此之廣，因?yàn)樗缭搅斯墒?、匯市、主權(quán)和公司債券市場。

????具體到新興市場，有三個(gè)因素加重了全球金融環(huán)境相對緊張所產(chǎn)生的影響，包括部分新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體增長速度放慢，人們對某些新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體感到擔(dān)心，以及投資者失衡現(xiàn)象（特別是專門從事新興市場投資的小群體和跨界資金之間的不平衡，前者很了解這類資產(chǎn)，而且能夠更有準(zhǔn)備地迎接市場震蕩；后者則很敏感，市場急劇波動(dòng)初露端倪時(shí)他們就會(huì)逃離）造成的技術(shù)面缺陷。

????這些因素的共同影響讓許多人再次想起“新興市場的老毛病”。難怪傳導(dǎo)效應(yīng)（盡管基本面大相徑庭，但表現(xiàn)較差的新興市場出現(xiàn)的波動(dòng)仍會(huì)影響到表現(xiàn)較好的新興市場）已經(jīng)不再是20世紀(jì)80、90年代以及本世紀(jì)初才有的老傳統(tǒng)?？紤]到一系列下跌行情都高度相關(guān)，特別是和匯率的急劇波動(dòng)聯(lián)系緊密，現(xiàn)在人們更多地認(rèn)為這就是當(dāng)前的現(xiàn)狀。

????面對這樣的變化，許多人都措手不及，其中不僅包括無法忍受市場大幅震蕩的投資者，還包括一些慌忙處理自身外匯風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的公司。

????本輪新興市場滑坡的下一個(gè)階段對我這樣的老手來說似乎同樣不會(huì)讓人覺得陌生。具體來說，由于一部分國家和地區(qū)除了提高利率、削減財(cái)政赤字外別無選擇，經(jīng)濟(jì)增速將進(jìn)一步放慢，那些未能及時(shí)調(diào)整政策的國家和地區(qū)相互產(chǎn)生不利影響的內(nèi)部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就會(huì)凸顯出來。在這個(gè)過程中，原本就已經(jīng)很緊張的社會(huì)和政治局勢可能進(jìn)一步激化，結(jié)果進(jìn)一步提高了政府采取果斷措施的難度。

????Established and highly regarded experts are quite divided on how investors should react to the recent volatility in emerging markets (EM). Some, like the famous EM equity fund manager Mark Mobius, expect the instability to continue and warn investors to be cautious and measured in adding exposure. Others, such as Jim O'Neil, the respected former head of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, believe that such concerns are overdone. They think investors should be exploiting now a huge buying opportunity.

????I suspect that this unusually large divide among such experts reflects more than diverse interpretations of the same set of economic, financial, and technical data. It may also point to different underlying frameworks. By analyzing the contextual issues in greater detail, a third approach emerges -- one that recognizes the recurrence of bad old EM behaviors yet suggests a different mix of outcomes and implications.

????The heightened volatility in EM assets has been going on for a while now; and it has been quite severe at times. The major selloff was triggered almost a year ago by concerns that the U.S. Federal Reserve would tighten monetary policy ( called "taper"), bruising badly every segment of EM -- both in absolute terms and particularly when compared to what has been happening to other asset classes. Indeed, when you look at the 2013 numbers, it is hard to recall such a large and broad-based dispersion in performance across equities, currencies, sovereign, and corporate bonds.

????Three EM-specific factors aggravated the impact of relatively tighter global financial conditions: slowing growth in several emerging economies, concerns about policy incoherence in some of them, and technically vulnerable investor imbalances (particularly between the small group of "dedicated" investors who know the asset class relatively well and can withstand more readily volatility bouts, and "crossover" money susceptible to running out at the first sign of serious dislocations).

????It is this mix of drivers that reminds many of the "bad old EM." No wonder contagion (whereby disruptions in weaker EM names contaminate stronger ones despite very different fundamentals) is no longer as a relic of the bad old EM days of the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. It is now more appreciated as a current day reality given the series of highly correlated selloffs, with particularly sharp moves in currencies.

????Many were caught offside by the change -- and not only investors who were unable to stomach the heightened volatility but also some companies that have scrambled to deal with their foreign currency exposures.

????The next step of this EM dislocation will also seem very familiar to old-timers like me. Specifically, with some countries facing no choice but to hike interest rates and cut fiscal deficits, growth will slow even more, heightening the domestic risk of a negative feedback loop for those countries unable to reformulate promptly their policy mix. In the process, this may fuel preexisting social and political tensions, making it even harder for these governments to act decisively.