????弗拉基米爾?普京的支持率可能正在飆升，但不能說俄羅斯股市或盧布也會出現(xiàn)同樣的走勢。

????投資者不斷從俄羅斯撤回資金，因為他們擔(dān)心吞并克里米亞可能讓西方國家對俄羅斯施加嚴厲的經(jīng)濟制裁。不僅如此，還有一點也變得越來越明顯——俄羅斯的這個行動還將拖累它的經(jīng)濟。原因是除了海軍基地和相對溫暖的氣候，克里米亞地區(qū)并無所長。換句話說，克里米亞的離去對烏克蘭或西方來說并不是什么重大的損失。盡管奧巴馬總統(tǒng)和歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人放出了狠話，但我們要一位美國和歐洲方面真的會對俄羅斯實行經(jīng)濟制裁，嚴格限制貿(mào)易或資金的流動。除了前面提到的原因，這里還有幾個理由。另外三條理由如下：

????1. 俄羅斯吞并克里米亞后，西方實際上更容易鞏固對烏克蘭其他地區(qū)的影響。政治風(fēng)險咨詢機構(gòu)歐亞集團（Eurasia Group）分析師兼歐洲業(yè)務(wù)負責(zé)人穆杰塔巴?拉赫曼認為，對于俄羅斯的吞并行為，歐盟和烏克蘭新政府現(xiàn)在的反應(yīng)是向聯(lián)系國協(xié)定（Association Agreement）——也就是烏克蘭最終加入歐盟的路線圖——邁進，這比任何經(jīng)濟制裁都大膽和重要得多。

????拉赫曼指出，“退一步看，整個事件其實是關(guān)于烏克蘭是否會成為歐盟成員國，以及俄羅斯是否愿意讓烏克蘭倒向西方?，F(xiàn)在，歐洲方面已經(jīng)明確表示他們要采取這樣的行動。”再加上克里米亞現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)成為俄羅斯而不是歐盟的一部分，俄羅斯在烏克蘭的影響力已經(jīng)大為減弱。有近100萬克里米亞人投票支持俄羅斯，本來今后可以利用這些人來影響烏克蘭政局，但如今這股力量已經(jīng)不復(fù)存在?！艾F(xiàn)在，親西方的烏克蘭新政府要推選一位親西方的總統(tǒng)就會變得容易得多?！?/p>

????2. 嚴厲制裁最終會讓西方和俄羅斯兩敗俱傷。辦公室設(shè)在拉脫維亞的經(jīng)濟學(xué)家安德里斯?斯特拉茲德斯指出，俄羅斯經(jīng)濟高度依賴對歐洲的石油出口。雖然這一點可能讓大家認為歐洲可以牽制俄羅斯，但它其實對雙方都有影響。斯特拉茲德斯寫道：

????對俄羅斯石油的禁運會造成油價急劇上漲，至少短期內(nèi)會導(dǎo)致這樣的結(jié)果。此外，有幾個歐盟成員國非常依賴俄羅斯的天然氣。除了能源，德國以及其他許多歐盟國家的公司和俄羅斯都有著廣泛的貿(mào)易往來，制裁也會同時傷及這些歐洲企業(yè)。除了貿(mào)易，歐盟和俄羅斯之間的大量企業(yè)投資也會受到不利影響。

????美國和歐盟擁有對俄羅斯施加影響的政治杠桿，因此，它們會不會借助經(jīng)濟制裁這把雙刃劍來達到目的值得懷疑。

????3. 無論如何，制裁往往不起作用。通過協(xié)同行動來傷害自身經(jīng)濟會給西方帶來什么回報呢？很可能一無所獲。經(jīng)濟制裁往往不會達到預(yù)期效果，而且經(jīng)常事與愿違。芝加哥大學(xué)（University of Chicago）政治學(xué)家羅伯特?佩普研究了1914-1990年期間經(jīng)濟制裁的效果。他發(fā)現(xiàn)，在115次制裁行動中，達到目的的只有5次。實際上，在許多案例中，經(jīng)濟制裁反而讓受制裁國家的民眾團結(jié)在了他們的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人周圍，而且更加支持原先引發(fā)制裁的行動。

????當(dāng)然，如果俄羅斯決定進一步侵入烏克蘭，所有這些都可能發(fā)生改變。拉赫曼說：“沒有人希望因為克里米亞而真正開戰(zhàn)，無論是經(jīng)濟上的還是在其他領(lǐng)域?！比欢?，如果普京打算擴大俄羅斯在歐洲的軍事影響力，而且克里米亞只是這項計劃的第一步，西方就會考慮用真正的經(jīng)濟力量，甚至可能是軍事力量，予以回擊。(財富中文網(wǎng))

????譯者：Charlie

????

????Vladimir Putin's approval ratings may be soaring, but you can't say the same thing for the Russian stock market or the ruble.

????Investors have been pulling their money out of Russian investments, fearing that the country's annexation of Crimea could lead to harsh economic sanctions from western nations. Not only that, it's increasingly clear that Russia's move will be a drag on its own economy -- as the region has little to offer but a naval base and a relatively warm climate. In other words, the loss of Crimea isn't a huge one for the Ukraine or the West, and that's just one of several reasons why we shouldn't expect the U.S. and Europe to respond with economic sanctions that will significantly restrict trade or capital flows, despite tough talk from President Obama and European leaders. Here are three others:

????1. The annexation of Crimea actually puts the West in a stronger position to consolidate its influence over the rest of Ukraine. Western attempts to draw the Ukraine closer to the EU and the United States triggered this crisis. According to Mujtaba Rahman, an analyst and European Practice Head at the Eurasia Group, the fact that the European Union and the new Ukrainian government have now, in response to Russia's annexation, moved forward with an association agreement -- which serves as a road map for Ukraine's eventual joining of the European Union -- is a much bolder and consequential step than any economic sanctions would be.

????"When you take a step back, this whole drama was about whether or not Ukraine is going to become an E.U. member, and whether or not Moscow is willing to let it turn West, and Europe has now made it clear that it's going to allow this to happen." And with the Crimea region now a part of Russia rather than the E.U., Russia's influence over the Ukraine has been greatly weakened. Nearly one million pro-Russian votes in Crimea that could have been used to influence Ukrainian politics going forward are gone, argues Rahman. "It's now a lot easier for this Western-friendly government in Kiev to get a Western-friendly president in place."

????2. Strong sanctions would end up hurting the West as much as Russia. As the Latvian-based economist Andris Strazds has pointed out, the Russian economy is heavily dependent on oil exports to Europe. While this fact might lead you to believe that Europe has leverage over Russia, this road goes both ways. Strazds writes:

????An embargo on oil exports from Russia would result in a huge increase in oil prices, at least temporarily. In addition, several EU countries are heavily dependent on Russia for natural gas. Beyond energy, German and many other European Union businesses trade extensively with Russia, and they would be harmed by sanctions. In addition to trade, there are also extensive investments between EU and Russian firms that would be adversely affected.

????The U.S. and the E.U. have political levers to influence Russia, so it's doubtful they'll resort to mutually painful economic sanctions in order to achieve their goals.

????3. Sanctions tend to not work, anyway. What would the West get in return for a concerted effort to harm its own economy? Probably nothing. Economic sanctions don't usually deliver their intended effect, and they can often be counterproductive. University of Chicago political scientist Robert Pape studied the effects of economic sanctions from 1914-1990 and found only five examples in 115 attempts in which such sanctions achieved their goals. In fact, in many of these cases, sanctions led the populations of effected nations to rally around their leaders and further support the actions that paved the way to sanctions in the first place.

????Of course, all of this could change if Russia decides to make further incursions into Ukrainian territory. "Nobody wants to get into a serious fight, economic or otherwise, over Crimea," says Rahman. But if this is just the first step in Putin's plan to expand Russia's military influence in Europe, the West will consider responding with real economic -- and perhaps military -- force.