??? 私募-私募式退出

????全部私募公司退出交易中，企業(yè)收購所占百分比當(dāng)前處于10年來最低水平，而二次收購（即私募公司互售所持公司）則處于歷史高點(diǎn)。從2011年到2013年，在全部私募公司退出交易中有41%是二次收購；而在2005-2007年的好年份，只有36%的退出是從一家基金轉(zhuǎn)至另一家基金。2014年第一季度的初步數(shù)據(jù)顯示，在全部私募公司退出交易中有約45%來自二次收購。隨著私募所投資公司的IPO處于歷史低位（去年占全部IPO的25%，2005年為40%），二次收購可能會(huì)成為定例，而非例外。

????當(dāng)初私募行業(yè)建立的基本前提是，你可以購買一個(gè)家族企業(yè)，背上一些債務(wù)，然后將這家企業(yè)打理得更好、增長更快、估值更低，直到它對(duì)買家產(chǎn)生足夠的吸引力，甘愿為它付出一個(gè)好價(jià)錢。然后，私募基金就可以向投資者提供不錯(cuò)的回報(bào)。但最近，私募股權(quán)行業(yè)開始看起來更像風(fēng)投市場，即在新一輪融資中，新進(jìn)基金會(huì)標(biāo)高一家公司的估值，讓原始投資者受益。大家只要看看最近的Genstar交易就能明白。Genstar以9.30億美元向Thoma Bravo出售組合公司TravelClick，市盈率近16倍。我想像這是Genstar投資者的大勝利，但Thoma Bravo的有限合伙人一定會(huì)想在Genstar持有7年后，還會(huì)給他們留下些什么？而同時(shí)投資這兩只基金的有限合伙人們又會(huì)怎么想？

????過去一年，私募股權(quán)基金盡一切可能在債務(wù)派對(duì)結(jié)束前向投資者派發(fā)股息。一個(gè)例子就是BMC Software最近向投資者派息7.50億美元，也就是在原始收購?fù)瓿?個(gè)月后回報(bào)了50%的股本權(quán)益。很多基金都選擇資本重組，繼續(xù)持有投資組合公司，而不是以他們認(rèn)為過低的價(jià)格出售。雖然在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退后的幾年復(fù)蘇時(shí)間里，這樣的流動(dòng)性感覺尚可，但基金們持續(xù)地買新不賣舊行為已經(jīng)導(dǎo)致投資組合公司的數(shù)量越來越多。最終，它們必須賣出這些公司。

????過去六年多，私募股權(quán)公司持有的很多公司狀況并不好。這些公司沒有買家。為什么？或許是因?yàn)樗鼈兯幍男袠I(yè)不被看好?；蛟S是受到經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的沖擊，而借款人不愿重新協(xié)商?；蛟S是曾經(jīng)受到經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的沖擊，如今有所恢復(fù)，但尚不足以給股權(quán)持有人創(chuàng)造任何價(jià)值。在這種情況下，大家抱著的是一種虛假的希望，希望“明年會(huì)好”。我認(rèn)識(shí)的大多數(shù)私募股權(quán)經(jīng)理人都是天生樂觀的人，他們很難會(huì)放棄。

????那么，這些投資組合中的好公司呢？這些公司為什么不賣？哦，它們必須“補(bǔ)貼”那些差公司，直到私募股權(quán)基金能產(chǎn)生附帶利益。要知道，很多這些基金都必須先為有限合伙人實(shí)現(xiàn)8%的復(fù)合回報(bào)率，然后才能分享利潤（附帶利益）。因此，這些老基金需要將好公司持有稍微長一點(diǎn)的時(shí)間，彌補(bǔ)差公司的虧空。

????另外還有一點(diǎn)，出售一家公司，意味著收取的管理和監(jiān)督費(fèi)用將減少，這會(huì)縮減基金收入，增加成本壓力。因此，現(xiàn)有的僵尸基金除非不得已，出售意愿極低。

????有很多私募持有的公司必須在未來幾年內(nèi)出售，但即便退出量大幅增長，超過歷史水平，即便不算上每年幾千宗收購，當(dāng)前的投資組合公司可能也需要花上10年時(shí)間來消化。別指望IPO市場或企業(yè)買家會(huì)在這個(gè)過程中一馬當(dāng)先。隨著今年所有新資金涌回私募股權(quán)融資，同時(shí)基金募集的資金池規(guī)模越來越大，私募股權(quán)基金將加速資產(chǎn)互換速度，但這些資產(chǎn)的持有人依然是有限合伙人們。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????本文德文?馬修斯是Chicago Growth Partners的管理合伙人。

????譯者：早稻米

????The rise of PE-to-PE exits

????Corporate acquisitions as a percentage of all private equity-owned company exits are at the lowest levels in a decade, while secondary buyouts (in which private equity firms sell companies to each other) are at an all-time high. From 2011 through 2013, 41% of all PE company exits were secondary buyouts, while in the boom years of 2005 through 2007, just 36% were passed from one fund to the next. Preliminary data from the first quarter of 2014 show about 45% of all PE exits coming from secondary buyouts. And with PE-backed company IPOs at historically low levels -- they accounted for 25% of all IPOs last year, compared to 40% in 2005 -- secondary buyouts will likely become the rule rather than the exception.

????The PE industry was built on the premise that you could buy a family-owned business, sprinkle in a little debt, and then run it better, faster, and cheaper until it was attractive enough to a buyer, who would pay a nice price for it. The PE fund could then deliver a solid return to its investors. Lately, though, the PE industry is starting to look more like the venture capital market, where a new fund marks up a company's valuation to benefit the original investors in a new financing round. All you need to do is look at Genstar's recent sale of portfolio company TravelClick to Thoma Bravo for $930 million, at nearly 16 times its earnings. I imagine this is a great win for Genstar's investors, but Thoma Bravo's limited partners must be wondering what's left for them to do after seven years under Genstar's ownership. And what are the LPs who are invested in both funds thinking?

????In the last year, PE funds are recapitalizing everything that's not nailed down to pay dividends to their investors before the debt party stops. BMC Software's recent $750 million dividend to its investors, paying off 50% of the equity just seven months after the original acquisition closed, is a case in point. Lots of funds are choosing to recapitalize and hold instead of selling companies at a price they deem too low. While this liquidity feels really good after years of recession-era wound licking, funds are piling up the portfolio companies as they keep old ones and buy new ones. But they will eventually have to sell these companies.

????Many companies held by PE firms for more than six years aren't doing well. There are no buyers for them. Why? Maybe they are in an industry that is out of favor. Maybe the downturn hit them and the lenders won't renegotiate. Or maybe the downturn hit them and they have come back by some measure, but not enough to create any value to the equity holders. In this case, you're holding onto the false hope that "next year is going to be the year." Most PE executives that I know are naturally optimistic and it's really hard for them to capitulate.

????But what about the good companies in these portfolios? Why not sell those? Well, they have to "make up" for the losers before the PE fund can generate carried interest. And remember that many of these funds have to achieve a compounded 8% return to their LPs before they get to share in the profits (their carried interest). So the winners get held a little longer in these old funds to make up for the losers.

????And don't forget, when you sell a company, you lose the management and monitoring fees you were charging, so it hurts your fund's revenue and puts pressure on costs. So, at the zombie funds out there, the incentives to sell before you absolutely have to are low.

????There are a lot of PE-owned companies that must be sold in the next few years, but even if exit volumes increase dramatically beyond historical levels, it could take 10 years for the current crop of companies to liquidate, not even counting the thousands of buyouts that close each year. Don't expect the IPO market or corporate buyers to lead the parade. With all the new money pouring back into private equity fundraising this year and with funds raising increasingly larger pools of capital, PE funds will accelerate their pace of asset swapping and the LPs will be left holding the assets.

????Devin Mathews is a managing partner at Chicago Growth Partners.