????這是充滿希望的春天，也是令人絕望的寒冬……

????對(duì)專業(yè)投資者而言，2014年最令人沮喪的一點(diǎn)是，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇時(shí)斷時(shí)續(xù)。2014年1月，經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域捷報(bào)頻傳。然而，在短短幾周內(nèi)，一場(chǎng)暴風(fēng)雪席卷全美，各種經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)似乎也因此停擺。

????市場(chǎng)觀察人士被迫接受一季度美國(guó)GDP負(fù)增長(zhǎng)2.9％這一現(xiàn)實(shí)。突然間，同波詭云譎的現(xiàn)實(shí)相比，所有人的預(yù)測(cè)似乎都過(guò)于樂(lè)觀，至少是過(guò)于平穩(wěn)。這導(dǎo)致人們紛紛猜測(cè)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)最終退出其債券購(gòu)買計(jì)劃的時(shí)機(jī)。短短幾周內(nèi)，我們從信心滿滿變成了垂頭喪氣，同時(shí)，伴隨著不確定性的再次來(lái)襲，資產(chǎn)類別的交替以及市場(chǎng)調(diào)整也隨之而來(lái)。

????盡管每輪市場(chǎng)反彈最終都呈V形，每次連續(xù)的漲勢(shì)中，個(gè)股的參與越來(lái)越少。今年春夏兩季的絕大部分時(shí)間里，時(shí)事分析評(píng)論員們都專注于贏家與輸家、大盤股和小盤股之間的明顯差異。歐洲的通縮擔(dān)憂以及日本的技術(shù)性衰退，使得分析師們愈加困惑，盡管美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)正在好轉(zhuǎn)，美國(guó)國(guó)庫(kù)券收益率和通脹指標(biāo)卻雙雙下行。

????簡(jiǎn)言之，2014年種種相反的趨勢(shì)無(wú)法描述和解釋。我也不信，多年之后，人們憑借后見之明，能將今年發(fā)生的種種事情看得更清楚。

????我們的前路應(yīng)有盡有，我們的前路一無(wú)所有……

????在即將結(jié)束的2014年，標(biāo)普500指數(shù)再次實(shí)現(xiàn)亮眼增長(zhǎng)，而那些本欲跑贏該指數(shù)的基金經(jīng)理們，表現(xiàn)則沒那么出色。Lipper公司稱，截止11月底，85％的活躍股票型共同基金經(jīng)理業(yè)績(jī)低于標(biāo)普500指數(shù)。而在正常的年份里，跑贏該指數(shù)的基金經(jīng)理比例是今年的兩倍，也就是說(shuō)，通常只有約三分之二的基金表現(xiàn)不如標(biāo)普500指數(shù)。Lipper公司稱，這是30年來(lái)活躍基金經(jīng)理相對(duì)大盤表現(xiàn)最差的一年。

????今年選股遇到困難，部分原因在于市場(chǎng)頂部高度集中。蘋果、伯克希爾?哈撒韋、強(qiáng)生、微軟和英特爾這五只股票占去了市場(chǎng)漲幅的20％。如果你未持有上述股票，幾乎就沒有機(jī)會(huì)分享這場(chǎng)增長(zhǎng)盛宴，而正是這幾家公司的增長(zhǎng)推高了標(biāo)普500指數(shù)。市場(chǎng)上大部分股票的表現(xiàn)要遜色得多。研究公司路佛集團(tuán)稱，標(biāo)普1500綜合指數(shù)成分股中，僅有30％的個(gè)股跑贏了該指數(shù)。上次出現(xiàn)這樣的景象，那還是1999年的事。

????在令人失望的2014年里，基金投資者們沒有太多的動(dòng)作。總體而言，過(guò)去11個(gè)月中，主動(dòng)選股基金僅新增了350億美元資金，還不到2013年同期新增資金（1620億美元）的四分之一。2013年是該行業(yè)自2007年以來(lái)首次實(shí)現(xiàn)資金凈流入。不過(guò)，這并不是說(shuō)基金行業(yè)毫無(wú)作為。截止感恩節(jié)，交易所交易基金（ETFs）和被動(dòng)指數(shù)型基金吸納了2060多億美元凈存款，行業(yè)領(lǐng)先者先鋒集團(tuán)管理的基金規(guī)模在今年夏末突破了3萬(wàn)億美元大關(guān)。投資者們似乎已經(jīng)決定，與其把寶押在“騎手”身上，不如直接把賭注押在“賽馬”身上。

????我們都將直上天堂，我們都將直下地獄

????萎靡不振的不光是那些挑選個(gè)股的基金。截止12月1日，對(duì)沖基金整體回報(bào)嚴(yán)重落后于市場(chǎng)。彭博收集的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，對(duì)沖基金平均同比上漲了2％，其回報(bào)率也就勉強(qiáng)趕上無(wú)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)10年期美國(guó)國(guó)債的票面利率。2014年將有1000多只基金倒閉，是自2009年以來(lái)破產(chǎn)清算最多的一年。

????幾家大型對(duì)沖基金的資產(chǎn)規(guī)模，占據(jù)了該行業(yè)的大半江山。各家的回報(bào)率相差巨大。每個(gè)像威廉?阿克曼旗下潘興廣場(chǎng)那樣的大贏家，都對(duì)應(yīng)著一個(gè)像約翰?保爾森旗下優(yōu)勢(shì)基金那樣的大輸家。投資者選擇對(duì)沖基金，是沖著其“非相關(guān)收益”，意即與大盤走向背道而行的趨勢(shì)。今年，他們絕對(duì)是獲得了“逆市”的收益，可惜是在大盤表現(xiàn)出色的情況下“逆市”。

????那些原本希望今年憑借戰(zhàn)術(shù)策略獲得些利益的財(cái)務(wù)顧問(wèn)和資產(chǎn)配置人員，也在反復(fù)無(wú)常的市場(chǎng)中栽了跟頭。全美前三位的戰(zhàn)術(shù)策略產(chǎn)品中，有兩款產(chǎn)品幾乎因?yàn)楦哌_(dá)兩位數(shù)的虧損而崩盤，還有一款產(chǎn)品則因?yàn)橄蚬娬`報(bào)自身歷史回報(bào)率而受到美國(guó)證交會(huì)調(diào)查。另一家戰(zhàn)術(shù)產(chǎn)品巨頭嘉信理財(cái)旗下90億美元的Windhaven Diversified Growth產(chǎn)品，2014年的回報(bào)率幾乎為零。戰(zhàn)術(shù)策略原來(lái)不過(guò)如此。

????簡(jiǎn)言之，那個(gè)時(shí)代與當(dāng)今時(shí)代極為相似，一些最嘩眾取寵的權(quán)威人士，要么將其捧上天，要么把其貶得一文不值。

????狄更斯在《雙城記》中描寫法國(guó)大革命時(shí)，距離事件發(fā)生已有近一個(gè)世紀(jì)。而我則是在今年12月就回顧盤點(diǎn)這一年。因此，我在此描述的某些趨勢(shì)，可能將在可預(yù)見的未來(lái)繼續(xù)存在，而另一些趨勢(shì)則可能已經(jīng)開始減弱。作為當(dāng)今時(shí)代“最嘩眾取寵的權(quán)威人士”之一，我只要求各位在閱讀這篇評(píng)論文章時(shí)記住一點(diǎn)：過(guò)去的業(yè)績(jī)并不能保證將來(lái)的表現(xiàn)。

????各位，我們明年見。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????譯者：Hunter

????審稿：李翔

????It was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair…

????One of the most discouraging aspects of 2014 for professional investors has been the start-and-stop nature of the recovery. We coasted into January on a trend of strengthening economic reports. Within a few weeks, a nationwide snowstorm seemingly drove the economic data off the side of the road.

????Market watchers were forced to digest the reality of negative 2.9% GDP for the first quarter of the year. All of a sudden, everyone’s forecasts seemed too rosy—or at least too smooth—compared to the lumpy reality. This led to a raft of second-guessing on the timing of the Fed’s eventual exit from its bond-buying stimulus program. We went from confidence to WTF? in a space of a few weeks, with all the asset class rotations and market corrections that come along with a fresh bout of uncertainty.

????Despite the fact that each market rebound ended up as a V-shaped affair, each successive rally was carried out with less and less individual stock participation. Glaring divergences between winners and losers, large caps and small caps, preoccupied the commentariat for most of the spring and summer. Deflationary concerns from Europe and the Japanese technical recession further confounded analysts, as Treasury yields and inflation indicators in the U.S. were driven lower despite the improving domestic economy.

????Put succinctly, there was no way to describe or explain the crosscurrents of 2014. And I’m not convinced that the benefit of hindsight will make what happened this year any clearer years from now.

????We had everything before us, we had nothing before us…

????While the S&P 500 is on track to conclude another stellar year of gains, those who sought to beat the index are poised to finish with a more dubious distinction. According to Lipper, 85% of all active stock mutual fund managers had been trailing their benchmarks through the end of November. In a typical year, there are nearly twice as many managers outperforming, with only around two thirds of funds struggling to catch up. Lipper says this is the worst year for active managers relative to the market in three decades.

????Stock pickers encountered difficulty this year in part because of concentration at the top of the market. Just five stocks—Apple, Berkshire Hathaway, Johnson & Johnson, Microsoft, and Intel— accounted for 20% of the market’s gains. If you weren’t at least equally weighted toward them, you had virtually no shot at making up for missing their enormous, index-driving gains. A majority of the market’s stocks did not perform nearly as well. According to the Leuthold Group, only 30% of S&P 1500 stocks posted gains exceeding the index itself. You’d have to go back to 1999 to see anything like this.

????Fund shareholders weren’t wasting any time reacting to this year of disappointment. Collectively, they’ve added just $35 billion to active stock-picking funds in the last 11 months, less than a quarter of the $162 billion they added in 2013, which was the first year of positive flows for the industry since 2007. This is not to say that they were sitting still. ETFs and passive index funds took in over $206 billion in net deposits through Thanksgiving, and Vanguard surpassed the $3 trillion mark sometime in late summer. Investors seem to have decided that they’d rather bet on the horses than the jockeys, after all.

????We were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way

????The malaise was not confined to those picking individual stock winners. Through December 1, aggregate hedge fund returns trailed the market to the point of farce. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, hedge funds were up an average of 2% on the year, just barely offering the coupon rate of a risk-free 10-year Treasury note. Over 1,000 funds are on track to close down in 2014, the worst year for liquidations since 2009.

????Among the gargantuan hedge funds that make up a majority of the industry’s assets under management, dispersion of returns shot up to notable levels. And for every big winner, like William Ackman’s Pershing Square, there was a big loser to counterbalance it, like John Paulson’s Advantage Fund. Investors choose hedge funds for their “non-correlated returns,” meaning a tendency to move opposite from the general market’s direction. They certainly got such returns this year, unfortunately.

????Financial advisors and asset allocators who had been hoping to see some benefit this year from tactical strategies were also not spared the punishment of a capricious market. Of the top three tactical strategies in the country (Mainstay Marketfield, Good Harbor U.S. Tactical Core, F-Squared Premium AlphaSector Index), two had nearly imploded with double-digit losses while the third found itself under SEC investigation for misleading the public about its historical returns. The other giant tactical manager, Schwab’s $9 billion Windhaven Diversified Growth product, looks to end 2014 with a return close to zero. So much for tactics.

????In short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.

????When Dickens wrote about the French Revolution in A Tale of Two Cities, he did it with nearly a century of hindsight. Here, at the end of December, I don’t enjoy that luxury. As such, some of the trends I’ve written here are likely to remain in force for the foreseeable future, while others may have already begun to fade. As one of this period’s “noisiest authorities,” I insist only on your receiving this review with just one caveat in mind: Past performance does not guarantee future results.

????I’ll see you next year.