2012年，國際油價還盤桓在每桶100美元的高價，中國GDP增速還處在10%以上的高速上。那時，你很難會想到跟誰預測中國經(jīng)濟會出現(xiàn)滑坡，導致大宗商品價格崩潰的，最終令全球陷入衰退。

除非有人一直在看邁克爾·佩蒂斯寫的文章。佩蒂斯曾在華爾街做交易員，現(xiàn)任北京大學光華管理學院金融學教授。這些年，他一直在警告中國經(jīng)濟增長越來越失衡。早在2012年，他就預測大宗商品價格會崩盤。

佩蒂斯認為，中國經(jīng)濟正在重蹈許多國家的覆轍，比如二戰(zhàn)后的蘇聯(lián)、上世紀70年代的巴西和80年代的日本。在這些例子中，政府通過出臺一些人為促進投資、抑制消費的政策推動經(jīng)濟迅速增長，也累積了大規(guī)模的國際貿(mào)易順差，但最終經(jīng)濟發(fā)展失衡導致衰退，中國就正在面臨這個問題。

《財富》雜志最近采訪了佩蒂斯，請他暢想中國經(jīng)濟接下來何去何從，及其將怎樣影響美國、乃至全球經(jīng)濟。以下是此次采訪的主要內(nèi)容。

《財富》：你是在什么時候認識到中國經(jīng)濟增長模式不可持續(xù)的？

佩蒂斯：很早以前，到2006年就已經(jīng)很明顯了。

《財富》：你為什么認為，中國的增長模式會和巴西等國的試驗一樣？

佩蒂斯：經(jīng)濟學家亞歷山大·格申克龍曾提出，投資驅動的經(jīng)濟繁榮有兩大基石。首先必須強制推升儲蓄率，可以通過限制家庭消費實現(xiàn)；然后必須引導投資過程?？匆豢此型顿Y增長奇跡的案例，無不遵循這種規(guī)律。

真正讓我震驚的是，在創(chuàng)造增長奇跡期間，首先是增長率確實居高不下，高得令人震驚，然后在調(diào)整期增速迅速放緩，快得也讓人大吃一驚。沒有經(jīng)濟體能例外，始終如此。崛起之猛和隕落之快都令人大跌眼鏡。

企業(yè)同樣如此。以曾經(jīng)的天然氣與電力巨頭安然公司就是個非常典型的例子。安然破產(chǎn)以前經(jīng)歷了驚人的飛速增長。我認為，在宣告倒閉之前十年里，安然有八年都是美國最令人仰慕的企業(yè)。然而，當一家公司或者一個國家的資產(chǎn)負債表出現(xiàn)結構錯配時，比如，資產(chǎn)結構非但沒有對沖風險，反而增加了波動性，那么，就會像在穩(wěn)健的資產(chǎn)負債表上套一層投機性極強的資產(chǎn)負債表。這么做只會讓財務基礎惡化。

這就好比股市里賭上全部身家的股民。股市上揚時，這些股民比其他投資者斬獲的收益多，于是大家開始認為他們是投資天才。然而，當股市下挫時，他們會陪得一干二凈。在我看來，上述創(chuàng)造奇跡的經(jīng)濟體和這種投機者的做法極為相似。這些經(jīng)濟體的增速比我們預計的快得多，可在一夜之間，其經(jīng)濟增長又會以不可思議的速度急轉直下。

《財富》：這些年你一直預計大宗商品價格會崩潰，而大多數(shù)經(jīng)濟學家認為此類崩盤不會傷害美國這類大經(jīng)濟體。為什么他們錯了？

佩蒂斯：在中國和德國這樣的經(jīng)濟體中，存在著較大的貧富收入差距，家庭收入占全國GDP的比重很低。貧富差距對經(jīng)濟有同樣影響。貧富差距會推升儲蓄率，因為富人比普通民眾的儲蓄多。這對經(jīng)濟是好事還是壞事？供給學派經(jīng)濟學家認為，儲蓄率上升總是好的。凱恩斯主義經(jīng)濟學家則認為，必須增加需求。

事實上，這些經(jīng)濟學者都錯了，或者說，在非常特定的情況下，他們都是對的。

在英國，貧富差距是綿延19世紀的“大問題”，儲蓄率也一直太高。而在當時的美國，既可靠又亟需英國過剩的儲蓄促進生產(chǎn)性投資。后來，過剩儲蓄從英國流向美國，再后來英國人更富有，美國人也更有錢了。

如果一個國家有信用良好的生產(chǎn)性投資項目，卻受制于儲蓄不足，貧富差距對經(jīng)濟就有好處?？扇绻麤]有好項目，就會出現(xiàn)上世紀30年代的問題，儲蓄過剩通過強迫提高消費壓低了中產(chǎn)階級的儲蓄率，過剩的儲蓄就會流入投機市場，造成股市上漲、樓市上漲，大家都覺得自己更有錢了，類似房地產(chǎn)泡沫期間的感覺。一旦因為負債累累，投機游戲被迫終止，人們不得不不平衡儲蓄與投資。但是，因為無人投資，儲蓄率必然要降低。降低儲蓄率的方式就是解雇員工。

這就是當今世界的現(xiàn)狀，從大宗商品產(chǎn)業(yè)開始，各行業(yè)都在裁員。美國前財長拉里·薩默斯說過，現(xiàn)在全球最渴望的就是需求。我覺得他所言不虛。

《財富》：你認為，這說明全球開始步入漫長的緩慢增長期？

佩蒂斯：沒錯，我們處于全球增長疲弱期，貿(mào)易會惡化，會有一波主權債務違約事件。我真正擔心的是，歐洲人相當不負責任。德國的順差大問題首先導致一些歐洲國家破產(chǎn)，然后向歐洲以外地區(qū)蔓延。中國有巨大的貿(mào)易順差，日本也有順差，還需要擴大規(guī)模。誰來填補這些順差？過去幾年，金屬和能源生產(chǎn)國貿(mào)易逆差規(guī)模擴大，充當了“接盤俠”?？涩F(xiàn)在做不到了。巴西2016年將從上年的貿(mào)易逆差轉變?yōu)橘Q(mào)易順差。全球貿(mào)易格局必會發(fā)生變化。

用數(shù)學計算推測，只可能出現(xiàn)兩種結果：要么中國和歐洲的貿(mào)易順差縮減，要么其他國家地區(qū)的貿(mào)易逆差增加。順差增加的通常是最開放的經(jīng)濟體，一般是允許資本流入的，例如美國、加拿大、澳大利亞和英國。我最最擔心的是，如果美國貿(mào)易逆差飆升，可能讓國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟增長脫離正軌，而美國經(jīng)濟復蘇是全球經(jīng)濟中唯一的亮點。

《財富》：那么，如果美國決策者制定貿(mào)易保護主義政策，防止貿(mào)易逆差大增，是不是合理的做法？

佩蒂斯：眾所周知，經(jīng)濟學家大衛(wèi)·李嘉圖認為自由貿(mào)易促進國民福利，但上世紀20和30年代，有的國家并未創(chuàng)造國內(nèi)需求，又試圖擴大在全球需求中的比重，最后卻削減了整體需求。假如降低本國的薪資或者讓本幣貶值，全球總需求實際上會減少，該國在全球需求中所占比例相應升高。如果陷入這個怪圈，上世紀30年代的悲劇就會重演。

最好的情況是，世界各國聯(lián)合起來表示，不會讓假設中的糟糕局面發(fā)生。不過，這太愚蠢了，我也沒有多少把握他們會這樣做。

《財富》：中國政府試圖緩解經(jīng)濟著陸的影響，你怎么看這種嘗試？

佩蒂斯：從抽象的角度看，很容易判斷中國人的意圖。必須推動與兩大重要目標一致的改革，頭號目標是，尋找新需求而且不能由負債催生，第二大目標是，降低債務水平。

中國需要增加家庭收入占GDP的比例。這個比例已經(jīng)在緩慢上升，但還得加快。唯一的方法是將國有企業(yè)的財富轉移至家庭?？杀娝苤@方面政治阻力很大。

《財富》：你所說的將財富轉移給中國家庭，具體要怎么做？

佩蒂斯：理論上說可以降低窮人的賦稅，但窮人納稅本來就少，減稅起不到多大作用。中國可以取消現(xiàn)行戶籍制度，讓貧窮的農(nóng)民工迅速脫貧，因為取消城鄉(xiāng)戶籍差異以后，農(nóng)民工能把孩子帶到城里上學，找到收入更高的工作。不過，這在政治上很難實現(xiàn)。

中國也可以推行企業(yè)私有化，直接把股份轉向家庭轉移。此前，奧地利就成功實現(xiàn)過這種嘗試。

中國還可以將國有企業(yè)股份轉移到地方的社保系統(tǒng)。2015年3月山東省這樣做了。問題在于，社?；鸬男庞煤艿?。

回顧2013年中共中央第十八屆三中全會公布的改革措施，你會發(fā)現(xiàn)幾乎所有措施的目標都是促進消費。但要真正實現(xiàn)，就得減少某些方面的財富，猜猜看會影響誰的錢袋子吧？所以，改革面臨的反對聲浪很高。

經(jīng)濟學家顧問一直在提糟糕的建議，比如，要是能提高生產(chǎn)效率，經(jīng)濟狀況就能改善。實際上，中國的經(jīng)濟學家必須認識到，如果改革不能削減負債，也不能增加財富，那就毫無意義。道理就這么簡單。

即便中國的GDP增長速度比預期水平高出0.1個百分點，我們也不應該高興。因為，只要增加債務就可以把GDP增速拉高。

奧巴馬要是把芝加哥推倒重建，就能把美國經(jīng)濟增速提高到7%。但如此拉動增長愚不可及。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Pessy

校對：夏林

Back in 2012, when oil prices were above $100 per barrel and the Chinese economy was growing at over 10% per year you’d be hard pressed to convince anyone that a commodity price collapse, fueled by a sputtering China, would be the event that finally brought the world back into recession.

Unless, of course, that person followed the writings of Michael Pettis, a former Wall Street trader and professor of finance at Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management. For years, Pettis has been warning of the growing imbalances in the Chinese economy, and he called the commodity price collapse as early as 2012.

Pettis argues that the Chinese economy is following the example of many countries that came before, like the Soviet Union following World War II, the Brazilian economy in the 1970s, and Japan in the 1980s. In each of these cases, national governments put forward policies that artificially boosted investment and suppressed consumption, policies that led to a fast buildup of growth and large trade surpluses. But eventually these imbalances go into reverse, and that is what is happening now. Fortune reached out to Pettis to get his take on what will happen next in China, and how it will affect the U.S. economy. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Fortune: At what point did you recognize that China’s growth model was unsustainable?

Michael Pettis: Pretty early on—by 2006, it was obvious.

What made you realize that China’s growth model was like the failed experiments in places like Brazil?

[Economist] Alexander Gerschenkron argues that there are two fundamental parts to an investment-led boom. First, you have to force up the savings rate, which you do by constraining growth in household consumption. And next you have to direct the investment process. But if you look at all the investment growth miracles, they all did that.

One of the things that really struck me was that during the miracle periods, at first when growth rates are really high, everyone is shocked. And then during the adjustment period, it slows so quickly, we’re all shocked. There’s been no exceptions. It’s always like that. We’re shocked on the way up and shocked on the way down.

This happens to individual companies, too. Take a company like Enron, which is a very common story. Before Enron fell apart, it was just growing spectacularly. I think it was the most admired company in America eight out of 10 years before it went under. When a company or country has an inverted balance sheet [i.e. one with an asset structure that doesn’t hedge bets, but amplifies them] it’s really like you have your correct balance sheet with a very speculative overlay on top of it. All you’re doing is exacerbating underlying conditions.

It’s like if you invest in the stock market, but you margin write it to the hilt. If the market goes up, you make more money than anybody else, and you and everyone else start to think you’re a genius. And when the market goes down, you get wiped out. And it seemed to me that these economies were doing something very similar. They were growing much more quickly than we had any right to expect. And then suddenly they were slowing much more quickly than anyone believed possible.

For years, you have been predicting a collapse in commodity prices. Most economists don’t see the crash infecting large economies like the United States. Why are they wrong?

In places like China and Germany, we’re seeing high income inequality while the household share of GDP is quite low. The inequality has the same impact. It pushes up the savings rate because the rich save more than ordinary people. Is that good or bad? Supply siders tell us that it’s always good to increase the savings rate. Keynsians will tell us no, we have to increase demand.

The truth is they are wrong, or that they are both right only under very specific conditions.

For much of the 19th century, there was a huge “problem” of income inequality in England, and so the savings rate was too high. But you had … the United States, which was credible and urgently needed excess savings from England to fund productive investments. That’s where the excess savings went, and the English got richer, and we got richer.

If you have productive investment that’s credible and that’s being constrained by the lack of savings, then income inequality is actually good for the economy. But if you don’t, then you have the problems that you saw in the 1930s, where excess savings forced down the savings rate in the middle class by forcing up consumption. The savings go into speculative markets. Stock markets go up, real estate goes up, we all feel richer, just like during the real estate bubble. But once that game stops because of debt, then you still have to balance savings and investment. But because nobody is investing, then you’ve got to bring savings down. And the way you bring savings down is firing workers.

And that’s what we’re seeing around the globe, with job losses beginning in the commodity sector. I think Larry Summers is right in saying that the globe is starved for demand.

You see this as the beginning of a long period of slow global growth?

Yes, we’re in a period of weak global growth, in which trade is going to get worse. And we’re going to see a wave of sovereign defaults. What really worries me is that the Europeans have been incredibly irresponsible. The huge German problems, which first bankrupted Europe, were then forced abroad. And China also has a huge surplus, Japan has and needs a rising surplus. Who’s going to absorb it? In the last few years it has been the metal producers and the energy producers—their trade deficits grew. But they can’t do that anymore. In fact, Brazil will run a surplus this year from a deficit last year. So something’s gotta happen. And arithmetically, only two things can happen: either the surpluses of Europe and China go down, or somebody else’s deficit has to go up. And that country is always the most open economy that allows capital inflows: The United States, Canada, Australia, and the U.K. And my really big concern is that we’re going to see a soaring trade deficit in the U.S. which could derail the U.S. economy, which is the only bright spot right now.

Would it be rational for American policy makers to enact protectionist policies to prevent a soaring trade deficit?

We all know from [economist David] Ricardo that free trade is wealth enhancing, but in the 1920s and 1930s, when countries, rather than create domestic demand, tried to expand their share of global demand, they actually ended up reducing overall demand. If you lower wages or depreciate your currency, total global demand actually goes down but you get a bigger share of global demand. And when you get caught up in that spiral, you get yourself caught up in what happened in the 1930s.

The best thing would be for the world to get together and say we can’t allow this to happen, it would be incredibly stupid. But I’m not confident that this will happen.

How do you feel about the Chinese government’s attempt to soften the landing?

From an abstract point of view, it’s easy to tell the Chinese what to do. You must put forward reforms that are consistent with the two most important objectives. Objective No. 1 has to be to find a new source of demand that doesn’t come from debt, and objective No. 2 is to bring debt levels down.

They need to increase the household share of GDP. It’s rising slowly, but they need to speed it up, and the only way to do that is to transfer wealth from the state sector. But as you know, politically, that is really tough.

How do you practically transfer wealth to Chinese households?

In principle, you could cut taxes on the poor, but they don’t pay a lot of taxes so that’s not going to help much. You could eliminate the hukou system. That would make poor migrants immediately richer because now they can send their kids to school and find better paying jobs. That’s really politically tough to do.

You could privatize corporations and simply give the shares to households, as they did successfully in Austria.

You could transfer ownership shares to the local social safety net. Shandong province did that in March. The problem is that the pension fund has very low credibility.

If you look at the 3rd plenum reforms in 2013, almost all of them aim to [boost consumption] But to actually accomplish these goals, you have to reduce somebody’s wealth, and guess whose wealth it is? The government and the wealthy. So there’s a lot of opposition.

The economists keep giving the administration terrible advice, like if you improve the efficiency of, say the peanut business, that’s going to make a difference. They have to recognize that reforms that don’t reduce debt or increase household wealth are simply not going to matter. And that’s the end of the story.

If GDP growth is 1/10th of a point higher than expected, instead of applauding, we should be groaning. You can get any level of growth you want as long as you increase debt. Obama could get 7% growth if he wanted, if he tore Chicago to the ground and rebuilt it. It’s just a stupid way of getting growth.