和許多職業(yè)投資人一樣，我喜歡分紅型公司。分紅帶來(lái)有形和無(wú)形收益——在過(guò)去100年里，股票總回報(bào)的一半都來(lái)自分紅。

在當(dāng)今世界，業(yè)績(jī)往往是首席財(cái)務(wù)官想象力的創(chuàng)造性成果，分紅則源于現(xiàn)金流，因而是公司確實(shí)盈利的證據(jù)。

最后，大量分紅的公司在業(yè)務(wù)管理上必須要有遠(yuǎn)超旁人的紀(jì)律性，因?yàn)楦哳~分紅會(huì)產(chǎn)生又一項(xiàng)現(xiàn)金成本，這樣管理層在擴(kuò)張性收購(gòu)中可燒的現(xiàn)金就變少了。

但在過(guò)去10年中，人為制造的低利率讓分紅變成了一種“邪教”——如果你持股的公司分紅，那你就是“認(rèn)真的”投資者；如果你的投資策略核心不是分紅，那你就是“異教徒”，而且需要帶著歉意解釋你為何不在分紅的圣殿中祈禱。

我完全理解為什么會(huì)出現(xiàn)這樣的“邪教”，以前投資者通過(guò)債券來(lái)獲得持續(xù)收入，現(xiàn)在則不得不依賴分紅型公司。

問(wèn)題在于這種“邪教”對(duì)上市公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者產(chǎn)生了錯(cuò)誤的激勵(lì)。如果投資者想要紅利，那他們就會(huì)得到紅利。最近幾年，公司開始在這方面耍花招，他們會(huì)擠出紅利來(lái)，甚至被迫借錢來(lái)分紅。

分紅“邪教”的危害

以埃克森美孚為例。這是一家非常成熟的公司，其石油產(chǎn)量在過(guò)去十個(gè)季度中出現(xiàn)了九次滑坡。面對(duì)同樣下滑的油價(jià)，該公司毫無(wú)辦法。盡管有如此多的不利因素，但?？松梨诒憩F(xiàn)的很勇敢，每年都提高分紅水平。在過(guò)去四年中，它有兩年不得不借錢分紅，請(qǐng)不要擔(dān)心。

我很同情?？松梨诘墓芾韺?，他們覺得自己必須這樣做，因?yàn)椴粩嗌仙募t利讓他們進(jìn)入了“分紅貴族”獨(dú)家俱樂(lè)部，這里的成員都是在過(guò)去25年中一直提高分紅水平的公司。他們經(jīng)營(yíng)著一家成熟但已風(fēng)光不再的公司，業(yè)績(jī)飄忽不定，十年來(lái)一直未能提高利潤(rùn)。而且基于其增長(zhǎng)前景，?？松梨诘氖杏什粦?yīng)達(dá)到目前的15倍。能有這么高的估值只是因?yàn)樗欠旨t大戶。

人們會(huì)覺得已經(jīng)連續(xù)上升25年的紅利還會(huì)再增長(zhǎng)25年（或者至少能保持不變）。另一個(gè)分紅大戶通用電氣在提高分紅的道路上一直走到了盡頭，這才把紅利削減了一半，然后又降到了1美分。

在一個(gè)半理性的正常世界，分紅應(yīng)該是生意興隆的副產(chǎn)品，應(yīng)該是管理層理性分配資金的一部分。但低利率把分紅型公司變成了類似于債券的產(chǎn)品，而且現(xiàn)在他們必須制造出紅利來(lái)，代價(jià)則往往是他們的未來(lái)。

讓我們?cè)倏纯碅T&T。目前這家公司背負(fù)著1800億美元債務(wù)，它旗下的DirecTV業(yè)務(wù)正在滑坡，最重要的后付費(fèi)無(wú)線用戶也在被競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手奪走。把每年用于分紅的130億美元資金投向別處——用來(lái)還債，降低自身風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并延長(zhǎng)自己的“生命跑道”應(yīng)該是非常合理的選擇。然而，僅僅是降低或削減紅利的想法就會(huì)讓投資者立即“造反”。所以就像通用電氣那樣，AT&T從未下調(diào)過(guò)分紅水平，直到外部環(huán)境迫使它這樣做。

在把分紅型股票視為債券替代品的問(wèn)題上，投資者應(yīng)當(dāng)非常小心，因?yàn)橛幸粋€(gè)很充分的理由。債券是有法律約束力的合同，發(fā)行債券的公司保證還本付息。如果未能支付利息并且/或者在到期時(shí)償還本金，投資者就可以讓這家公司破產(chǎn)。就是這么簡(jiǎn)單。

如果把某只股票視為債券的替代品，那你就會(huì)在腦海中假設(shè)自己買進(jìn)這只股票的價(jià)格就是你跟它分手（也就是將其賣出）時(shí)的價(jià)格。這樣，你的注意力就會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)向持股期間你注定要享受的那個(gè)閃閃發(fā)光的東西，也就是紅利。你會(huì)逐漸忽略這個(gè)分紅大戶的股價(jià)可能會(huì)下跌的問(wèn)題，而且在你和其他分紅大戶愛好者爭(zhēng)相拋售這只股票的時(shí)候，其價(jià)格會(huì)變得低得多。

過(guò)去10年中，不光是美國(guó)，全世界的利率都在下降，對(duì)此大家不必?fù)?dān)心。2008年以來(lái)，高分紅股的表現(xiàn)一直好于標(biāo)普500指數(shù)。

然而，大多數(shù)高分紅個(gè)股的升值動(dòng)力都只有一個(gè)，那就是市盈率的增長(zhǎng)，它無(wú)法重復(fù)，而且很容易反轉(zhuǎn)。如果你斷定利率會(huì)下降，而且會(huì)比現(xiàn)在低得多，那你就不用再看這篇文章了。找?guī)字桓叻旨t股，買下來(lái)，然后就可以不管了。因?yàn)樗鼈儠?huì)一直表現(xiàn)的像超長(zhǎng)期債券那樣，而且還會(huì)帶來(lái)每年都提高幾美分的紅利。

如果利率上升，高分紅股票的價(jià)格就可能和長(zhǎng)期債券一樣。它們的市盈率就會(huì)朝著相反的方向發(fā)展，此前十年的增長(zhǎng)將被一掃而光。

分析管理，而不是分紅

投資者應(yīng)該怎么辦呢？不要把紅利當(dāng)成耀眼而又吸引人的東西，它只是一個(gè)多變量分析等式的一部分，而且絕不是該等式的唯一變量。評(píng)估一家公司的價(jià)值時(shí)要假設(shè)它不分紅——畢竟，紅利只是資金分配上的一個(gè)決定。

我知道，管理者在資金分配方面的失誤已經(jīng)讓數(shù)百億美元化為烏有，無(wú)論是回購(gòu)股票還是失敗的收購(gòu)。但隨著管理者繼續(xù)設(shè)法取悅于渴望分紅的投資者，在分紅超過(guò)公司承受能力時(shí)，其價(jià)值也將蕩然無(wú)存。

正是出于這個(gè)原因，分析公司管理才變得如此重要。許多管理團(tuán)隊(duì)都會(huì)告訴你正確的東西，他們聽上去聰明而細(xì)心，但他們的決定連一個(gè)非常簡(jiǎn)單的測(cè)驗(yàn)都通不過(guò)。這個(gè)測(cè)驗(yàn)的內(nèi)容是：如果管理層持有公司10%或20%的股份，他們還會(huì)做出同樣的決定嗎？

如果CEO持有10%或20%的股票，他們會(huì)用別的方式來(lái)經(jīng)營(yíng)通用電氣、?？松梨诨蛘逜T&T嗎？可以說(shuō)，他們會(huì)把數(shù)十億分紅資金用在截然不同而且利潤(rùn)更高的地方。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

維塔利·凱茨尼爾森是一位特許金融分析師（CFA），在投資公司Investment Management Associates, Inc擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官。他在個(gè)人網(wǎng)站ContrarianEdge.com上發(fā)表關(guān)于市場(chǎng)的文章，同時(shí)著有《The Little Book of Sideways Markets》（Wiley出版社）一書。

譯者：Charlie

審校：夏林

Like many professional investors, I love companies that pay dividends. Dividends bring tangible and intangible benefits: Over the last hundred years, half of total stock returns came from dividends.

In a world where earnings often represent the creative output of CFOs’ imaginations, dividends are paid out of cash flows, and thus are proof that a company’s earnings are real.

Finally, a company that pays out a significant dividend has to have much greater discipline in managing the business, because a significant dividend creates another cash cost, so management has less cash to burn in empire-building acquisitions.

Over the last decade, however, artificially low interest rates have turned dividends into a cult, where if you own companies that pay dividends then you are a “serious” investor, while if dividends are not a centerpiece of your investment strategy you are a heretic and need to apologetically explain why you don’t pray in the high temple of dividends.

I completely understand why this cult has formed: Investors that used to rely on bonds for a constant flow of income are now forced to resort to dividend-paying companies.

The problem is that this cult creates the wrong incentives for leaders of publicly traded companies. If it’s dividends investors want, then dividends they’ll get. In recent years, companies started to game the system, squeezing out dividends even if it meant they had to borrow to pay for them.

The cult of dividends takes its toll

Take ExxonMobil for example. It’s a very mature company whose oil production has declined nine out of the last ten quarters, and it is at the mercy of oil prices that have also been in decline. Despite all that, Exxon is putting on a brave face and raising its dividend every year. Never mind that it had to borrow money to pay the dividend in two out of the last four years.

I sympathize with ExxonMobil’s management, who feel they have to do that because their growing dividend puts them into the exclusive club of “dividend aristocrats” – companies that have consistently raised dividends over the last 25 years. They run a mature, over-the-hill company with very erratic earnings that have not grown in ten years and that, based on its growth prospects, should not trade at its current 15 times earnings. ExxonMobil trades solely on being a dividend aristocrat.

It is assumed that a dividend that was raised for 25 years will continue to be raised (or at least maintained) for the next 25 years. GE, also a dividend aristocrat, raised its dividend until the very end, when it cut it by half and then cut it to a penny.

In a normal, semi-rational world, dividends should be a byproduct of a thriving business; they should be a part of rational capital allocation by management. But low interest rates turned companies that pay dividends into a bond-like product, and now they must manufacture dividends, often at the expense of the future.

Let’s take AT&T. Today, the company is saddled with $180 billion of debt; its DirecTV business is declining; and it is also losing its bread and butter post-paid wireless subscribers to competitors. It would be very rational for the company to divert the $13 billion it spends annually on dividends, using it to pay down debt, to de-risk the company and to increase the runway of its longevity. But the mere thought of a lowered or axed dividend would create an instant investor revolt, so AT&T will never lower its dividend, until, like GE, its external environment forces it to do so.

There is a very good reason why investors should be very careful in treating dividend-paying stocks as bond substitutes. Bonds are legally binding contracts, where interest payments and principal repayment are guaranteed by the company. If a company fails to make interest payments and/or repay principal at maturity, investors will put the company into bankruptcy. It is that simple.

When you start treating a stock as a bond substitute, you are making the mental assumption that the price you pay is what the stock is going to be worth at the time when you are done with it (when you sell it). Thus, your focus shifts to the shiny object you are destined to enjoy in the interim – the dividend. You begin to ignore that the price of that fine aristocrat might be less, a lot less, when you and the stampede of other aristocrat lovers will be selling it.

For the last ten years as interest rates have declined not just in the US but globally, you didn’t have to worry about that. Dividend aristocrats have consistently outperformed the S&P 500 since 2008.

However, the bulk of the aristocrats’ appreciation came from a single, unrepeatable, and highly reversible source: price to earnings expansion. If you are certain that interest rates are going lower, much lower, then you can stop reading this, get yourself some aristocrats, buy and forget them, because they’ll continue to behave like super-long-duration bonds with the added bonus of dividends that grow by a few pennies a year.

If interest rates rise, the prices of dividend aristocrats are likely to act like those of long-term bonds. The price-to-earnings pendulum will swing in the opposite direction, wiping out a decade of gains.

Analyze management, not dividends

What should investors do? View dividends not as a magnetic, shiny object but as just one part in a multivariable analytical equation, and never the only variable in the equation. Value a company as if it did not pay a dividend – after all, a dividend is just a capital-allocation decision.

I know tens of billions of dollars have been destroyed by management’s misallocation of capital, be it through share buybacks or bad acquisitions. But as corporate management continues trying to please dividend-hungry investors, value will also be destroyed when companies pay out more in dividends than they can afford.

This is why analyzing corporate management is so important. A lot of management teams will tell you the right thing; they’ll sound smart and thoughtful; but their decisions will fail a very simple test. Here is the test: If this management owned 10% or 20% of the company, would they be making the same decisions?

Would GE, ExxonMobil, or AT&T have been run differently if they were run by CEOs who owned 10% or 20% of their respective stocks? It’s safe to say they would have put their billions in dividend payments to a very different, more profitable use.

Vitaliy Katsenelson, CFA, is the CEO at Investment Management Associates, Inc. He writes about the markets at ContrarianEdge.com, and is the author of The Little Book of Sideways Markets (Wiley).