這家共享辦公空間公司在上周的招股書中把“包容性文化”放在了核心位置。

不過在其普通股能否被“包容”進(jìn)重要指數(shù)這個問題上，公司發(fā)出了警告：“標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾道瓊斯（S&P Dow Jones）和富時羅素（FTSE Russell）已經(jīng)宣布調(diào)整公開上市公司股票被納入特定指數(shù)的合格標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，其中就包括標(biāo)普500指數(shù)。調(diào)整之后，擁有多層股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的公司無法被納入這些指數(shù)。”

翻譯過來就是：WeWork無法被納入指數(shù)，這意味著它無法享受熱門指數(shù)基金在股票購買上的優(yōu)勢。

WeWork計劃發(fā)行三類股票：A類股每股擁有一票投票權(quán)，而B類股和C類股是“高投票權(quán)股票”，每股擁有20票投票權(quán)。這會導(dǎo)致聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人和首席執(zhí)行官亞當(dāng)·諾依曼擁有公司控制權(quán)?！白鳛橛梢患覄?chuàng)始人主導(dǎo)的公司，我們相信這種投票結(jié)構(gòu)符合我們在創(chuàng)造股東價值方面的利益?！?/p>

不過，一些指數(shù)基金的提供者和股東權(quán)利組織不這么認(rèn)為。涵蓋養(yǎng)老基金、基金會和捐贈基金的非盈利股東權(quán)利組織機構(gòu)投資者理事會（Council of Institutional Investors）的副主任艾米·博勒斯表示：“按照原則，你的股權(quán)應(yīng)該和投票權(quán)一致。一份股票、一份投票權(quán)，這是優(yōu)秀的企業(yè)管理結(jié)構(gòu)秉持的基本原則，也是大部分長期股東關(guān)注的重點。”她表示，每股20票投票權(quán)不符合常理。一般來說，高投票權(quán)群體平均每股擁有10票投票權(quán)。根據(jù)機構(gòu)投資者理事會的數(shù)據(jù)，2019年上半年上市的公司中，有26%設(shè)有不平等的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。這些公司中只有20%會逐漸放棄這種政策。

“滴答作響的定時炸彈”

公司的創(chuàng)始人堅稱，掌控公司可以讓他們著手做好長期規(guī)劃，避免受到季度投資者預(yù)期的干涉。問題在于高投票權(quán)股票可以有效地鎖定對公司的控制。博勒斯表示：“長期來看，這個結(jié)構(gòu)就是滴答作響的定時炸彈。某些情況下，即使是最優(yōu)秀的首席執(zhí)行官也可能失誤，這時候，流通股股東沒有能力施加任何影響?！彼傅氖荈acebook的馬克·扎克伯格，盡管他近來連連犯錯，卻免于彈劾。機構(gòu)投資者理事會支持七年到期就取消高投票權(quán)股票的屆滿條款。而WeWork確實有屆滿條款，但該條款卻極不尋常：如果亞當(dāng)·諾依曼和妻子麗貝卡不能在上市十周年之內(nèi)捐贈10億美元，這些股票的投票權(quán)將會從20票削減為10票。

科技公司尤其熱衷于多層股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)[盡管值得一提的是，今年上市的非科技公司李維斯（Levi’s）也設(shè)置了兩類股票]。不過長期投資者對此并不樂意，隨著熱門IPO越來越多地采用這種策略，他們紛紛抱怨。臨界點是2017年Snap的公開上市，當(dāng)時公司沒有給公眾提供任何投票權(quán)。投資者爆發(fā)了。他們沒法讓美國證券交易委員會（SEC）或證券交易所做些什么，于是向指數(shù)基準(zhǔn)公司標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾道瓊斯、富時羅素和明晟（MSCI）施壓，要求對方采取行動。

2017年7月，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾道瓊斯指數(shù)宣布，標(biāo)普綜合1500指數(shù)以及其成分指數(shù)——標(biāo)普500指數(shù)、標(biāo)普中型股400指數(shù)和標(biāo)普小型股600指數(shù)——將不再納入擁有多層股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的公司。指數(shù)中已有的公司可以得到豁免，不受影響?？紤]到WeWork的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，它無法被納入標(biāo)普500指數(shù)。

同樣在2017年，富時羅素也要求其指數(shù)成份股至少有5%的股票為公眾所有，而已有指數(shù)成份股須在五年內(nèi)滿足這一規(guī)定。截至2019年6月，富時全球股票指數(shù)體系（FTSE Russell Global Equity Index Series）中還有20只股票尚未滿足5%的門檻，它們的豁免期將在2022年9月到期；36只股票尚未得到承認(rèn)，因為它們在規(guī)定頒布時并未滿足5%的投票權(quán)門檻。目前還不清楚WeWork是否滿足門檻，該公司尚未公布其投票比例。

在與投資者進(jìn)行了長達(dá)18個月的磋商之后，明晟在2018年10月宣布，明晟全球可投資市場指數(shù)（MSCI Global Investable Market Indexes）“將繼續(xù)向全球的機構(gòu)投資者反映完整的可投資資產(chǎn)局勢”。公司還表示，他們會編制新的指數(shù)，為希望避開投票權(quán)不平等企業(yè)的投資者提供新的選擇。

不過，利用指數(shù)構(gòu)成來推動治理改革是否合適？簡而言之，按照資金管理公司黑石（BlackRock）的說法，并非如此。在標(biāo)普和富時羅素決定剔除投票權(quán)不平等的企業(yè)之后，黑石發(fā)聲強烈支持所有股東獲得平等的投票權(quán)，卻反對以把企業(yè)剔除出指數(shù)基金作為改善治理的手段。他們當(dāng)時表示，這會“限制我們依托指數(shù)的客戶接觸可投資上市公司的渠道，剝奪他們獲得投資回報的機會” 。

佛羅里達(dá)大學(xué)法學(xué)院的安德魯·文登研究了多層股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的指數(shù)剔除情況，他表示，如果以最近的上市情況作為指標(biāo)，這種改革無法限制Pinterest和Lyft這樣的獨角獸發(fā)行這類股票。他說：“它們基本等于是在對標(biāo)普和富時羅素嗤之以鼻。創(chuàng)始人和首席執(zhí)行官愿意以較低的股價換取長期控制公司命運的能力?！?/p>

流動性降低

不過隨著指數(shù)投資日益發(fā)展，無法被納入重要的指數(shù)基金意味著購買股票的投資者會更少。需求減少意味著市場流動性降低，從長期來看這會拖累公司的估值。對于需要發(fā)行股票募集資金的公司而言，這是一大難題。明晟ESG的負(fù)責(zé)人雷米·布萊恩德表示：“如果你希望從最多的投資者那里獲得資金，不在投票權(quán)上做手腳會是加分項?！辈贿^他指出，主動的投資者也有很多，如果公司擁有引人注目的增長率和利潤率，依然可以吸引資本。

正因如此，熱門的科技公司依然能夠設(shè)立多層股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。

值得注意的是，一家公司最近調(diào)整了方針。Carlyle Group在7月底表示他們將成為一股一票制度的公司，旨在將“管理權(quán)授予所有股東”，“通過爭取被納入各大指數(shù)和基準(zhǔn)，從而提高Carlyle對廣大被動和主動投資者的吸引力”，以此改善“交易流動性”。

不過，即使WeWork調(diào)整股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，變成一股一票制，被動投資者也無法通過標(biāo)普500指數(shù)湊湊熱鬧，因為還有另一條麻煩的規(guī)定：想要被納入指數(shù)，公司的通用會計準(zhǔn)則凈盈利需要為正。而WeWork的招股書中顯示，公司2018年的收入為18億美元，凈虧損高達(dá)16億美元。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：嚴(yán)匡正

The co-working company put its “culture of inclusivity” front and center last week in its IPO filing.

But when it comes to “inclusion” of its common stock in important indices, the company issued a warning: “S&P Dow Jones and FTSE Russell have announced changes to their eligibility criteria for inclusion of shares of public companies on certain indices, including the S&P 500. These changes exclude companies with multiple classes of shares of common stock from being added to these indices,” the filing states in its risk factors.

Translation: WeWork won’t be included—meaning it also won't enjoy the advantage of popular index funds being required to buy shares.

WeWork is going public with three classes of stock. Class A shares will carry one vote each. Class B and Class C shares are “high-vote stock,” which carry 20 votes per share. As such, co-founder and CEO Adam Neumann will control the company. “As a founder-led company, we believe that this voting structure aligns our interests in creating shareholder value.”

Some index fund providers and shareholder rights groups believe otherwise. “On principle, you should have a vote consistent with your equity stake, says Amy Borrus, Deputy Director of the Council of Institutional Investors, a shareholder rights non-profit comprised of pension funds, foundations, and endowments. “One-share, one-vote is a bedrock tenet of good corporate governance as far as most long-term shareholders are concerned.” Twenty votes per share, she says, is out of the ordinary. Supervoting classes generally carry 10 votes per share. In the first half of 2019, according to CII statistics, 26 percent of IPOs had unequal class share structure. Only 20 percent of those companies will phase it out.

A “ticking time bomb”

Founders maintain that keeping control of the company liberates them to manage for the long term outside of quarterly investor expectations. The problem is that supervoting shares can effectively lock in control. “This structure is a ticking time bomb for the long term,” says Borrus. “At some point, even the best CEOs are going to stumble, and when that happens, public shareholders are powerless to have any influence.” She points to Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, who despite recent blunders, is immune to challenges. CII favors a sunset period for supervoting shares of seven years. In WeWork’s case, there is a sunset clause, but it's a highly unusual one: Such shares decrease from 20 votes per share to 10 votes per share if Adam Neumann and his wife Rebekah fail to give away $1 billion in 10 years.

Technology companies have been particularly keen on multi-class stock structures (although it should be noted that non-technology company Levi’s went public this year with a dual class structure as well). But long-term investors don’t like it and have complained as more and more hot IPOs employed the tactic. The tipping point came when Snap filed for a public offering in 2017, giving zero voting power to the public. That’s when investors, well, snapped. Unable to get the SEC or the stock exchanges to do anything about it, they pressured the index benchmarking companies—DowJones S&P, FTSE Russell, and MSCI—to take action.

In July of 2017, S&P Dow Jones Indices, announced that the S&P Composite 1500 and its component indices—S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600—would no longer add companies with multiple share class structures. Existing companies in the index were grandfathered and not affected. Considering WeWork’s stock structure, the company cannot be included in the S&P 500.

Also in 2017, FTSE Russell required that 5% of shareholder voting rights of a company must be in public hands for index inclusion, with a five-year grandfather period for constituents to comply. As of June 2019, 20 stocks in FTSE Russell Global Equity Index Series have not yet complied with the 5% voting rights threshold. Their grandfather period is set to expire in September 2022; 36 stocks have not been admitted because they did not meet the 5% voting rights hurdle since the rule was introduced. It is still unclear whether WeWork will meet the threshold. The company has not yet released its voting percentages.

After an 18-month long consultation with investors, MSCI announced in October 2018 that the MSCI Global Investable Market Indexes “will continue to reflect the complete investable equity universe for international institutional investors.” The company also said it would create a new index for investors who want options that account for unequal voting.

But is index composition the right forum to push governance reform? In short, according to money management firm BlackRock, no. In the wake of S&P’s and FTSE Russell’s decisions to exclude, the asset manager voiced strong support for equal voting rights for all shareholders, but opposed excluding companies from index funds as an approach to improve governance which “could limit our index-based clients’ access to the investable universe of public companies and deprive them of opportunities for returns,” they stated at the time.

If recent IPO history is any indicator, according to Andrew Winden, at the University of Florida’s Levin College of Law, who has studied multi-class index exclusion, the reforms aren’t exactly holding unicorns like Pinterest and Lyft back from issuing such stock. “They’re basically thumbing their nose at S&P and FTSE Russell,” he says. “Founders and CEOs are willing to accept lower stock prices in exchange for being able to control the destiny of the company for a longer period of time.”

Less liquidity

But as index investing continues to grow, exclusion from important funds means fewer people invest in your shares. Less demand translates into less market liquidity, and becomes a drag on valuation in the long term. For companies that need to raise money by selling shares, that’s a problem. “If you want to raise capital from the maximum number of investors, then having a clean profile in terms of voting rights is a plus,” says Remy Briand, head of ESG at MSCI. He notes, though, that there are still plenty of active investors, so companies with compelling growth and profitability profiles will still attract capital.

And as long as that’s the case, hot tech companies are able to continue to use multiclass voting structures.

Notably, one company has recently switched course though. At the end of July, Carlyle Group said it would become a one-share, one-vote corporation with the goal of delivering “governance rights to all shareholders” and improving “trading liquidity by increasing Carlyle’s appeal to a broader group of passive and active investors through potential inclusion into indices and benchmarks.”

But even if WeWork were to change its stock structure to one-share, one-vote, passive investors still wouldn’t get in on the action through the S&P 500 because of another pesky rule: for inclusion on the index companies are required to have positive GAAP earnings. WeWork’s S-1 filing revealed a loss of $1.6 billion on $1.8 billion of revenue in 2018.