埃拉德·吉爾并非在硅谷長(zhǎng)大。雖然出身護(hù)士和教育心理學(xué)學(xué)者家庭,但他的童年卻像軍人家庭的小孩那樣“居無定所”,先后在密歇根州、圣迭戈、以色列和亞利桑那州等地生活。
不過吉爾在挑選初創(chuàng)企業(yè)時(shí)似乎特別獨(dú)具慧眼。他所投資的公司中(通常在種子輪融資時(shí)就已投資)有約25家成長(zhǎng)為了所謂的“獨(dú)角獸”,其中包括Instacart、Stripe、Coinbase等。
不僅如此,他參與投資的PagerDuty、Square和Pinterest都已經(jīng)成功上市,愛彼迎(Airbnb)、Wish等更多公司預(yù)計(jì)也將在今年IPO。
吉爾曾經(jīng)負(fù)責(zé)創(chuàng)辦谷歌(Google)的移動(dòng)業(yè)務(wù),也曾經(jīng)幫助推特(Twitter)從一家只有90人的小公司成長(zhǎng)為1500人的行業(yè)巨頭。他還參與創(chuàng)辦了基因檢測(cè)初創(chuàng)公司Color Genomics。如今,吉爾已經(jīng)贏得了“創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)師”的美譽(yù),為許多剛剛起步或想要擴(kuò)大規(guī)模的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)提供咨詢建議。
作為獨(dú)立投資者,吉爾會(huì)在企業(yè)創(chuàng)業(yè)初期對(duì)其進(jìn)行少量投資、扮演天使投資人的角色,不過他同樣也是日益興起的所謂“個(gè)體資本家”(solo capitalists)中的一員,會(huì)在創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的發(fā)展后期投入大量資金,與傳統(tǒng)風(fēng)投機(jī)構(gòu)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)合意的投資標(biāo)的。
許多企業(yè)日后的成就與創(chuàng)業(yè)之初有著天壤之別,應(yīng)當(dāng)如何尋找和評(píng)估此類投資機(jī)會(huì)?為什么全球最大、最成功的公司初看之時(shí)會(huì)顯得既愚蠢又低端?近日,《財(cái)富》雜志就相關(guān)話題采訪了埃拉德·吉爾。
訪談內(nèi)容如下,為簡(jiǎn)明起見,內(nèi)容有刪改:
《財(cái)富》:介紹下自己吧,有這么多事情可以做,為什么選擇了做技術(shù)投資?
埃拉德·吉爾:我當(dāng)時(shí)正在攻讀生物學(xué)博士學(xué)位,主要研究病毒學(xué)、癌癥、衰老等人類疾病相關(guān)問題,讀到一半的時(shí)候,我意識(shí)到,成為一名學(xué)者并非我的志向所在,這部分是因?yàn)槲也幌矚g那種在實(shí)驗(yàn)室里待著的生活。于是我就開始思考,如何才能對(duì)人類產(chǎn)生最大的影響,做一些對(duì)人類有用的事情。
此外,我當(dāng)時(shí)對(duì)科技也很感興趣。現(xiàn)在大家可能已經(jīng)忘了以前做事情有多難。記得讀高中時(shí),我對(duì)數(shù)學(xué)家們的工作很感興趣,我會(huì)給他們寫信,他們也會(huì)把打印出來的論文用黃色信封裝著郵寄給我。而現(xiàn)在,突然之間,所有的小孩都可以根據(jù)自己的興趣隨意查閱世界上的每一篇數(shù)學(xué)論文了。
后來,我便搬到了舊金山的灣區(qū),在“互聯(lián)網(wǎng)繁榮”即將畫上句號(hào)的時(shí)候進(jìn)入了創(chuàng)投世界。時(shí)至今日,我依然牢記著硅谷的傳統(tǒng)精神——做對(duì)人類有用的事情,給世界帶來積極的影響。然而不幸的是,這種精神現(xiàn)已經(jīng)成為大眾媒體取樂的對(duì)象,就像電視劇《硅谷》(Silicon Valley)中演繹的那樣。
種子期企業(yè)的商業(yè)規(guī)劃可能還不明朗,而你通常會(huì)投資這一階段的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)。那么,你會(huì)關(guān)注創(chuàng)始人的哪些特質(zhì)?
我認(rèn)為,市場(chǎng)往往是決定(一家企業(yè))能否成功的最重要因素。我見過非常非常優(yōu)秀的團(tuán)隊(duì)因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)低迷而功敗垂成,也見過一塌糊涂的團(tuán)隊(duì)因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)行情不錯(cuò)而大獲成功。因此,首先我會(huì)關(guān)心創(chuàng)始人瞄準(zhǔn)的市場(chǎng)是否足夠大、產(chǎn)品是否有想象空間。
我很少投那些沒有想好做什么的團(tuán)隊(duì),我一般會(huì)等到創(chuàng)業(yè)團(tuán)隊(duì)有了實(shí)際動(dòng)作之后才會(huì)選擇投資,這樣更容易判斷他們瞄準(zhǔn)的市場(chǎng)是否可靠。比如像PagerDuty這樣的團(tuán)隊(duì),他們整個(gè)職業(yè)生涯就是在為不同公司開發(fā)相同的產(chǎn)品,然后有一天,他們決定把這種產(chǎn)品單獨(dú)建成數(shù)字基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施(這時(shí)候去投他們就穩(wěn)妥得多)。
至于創(chuàng)業(yè)者瞄準(zhǔn)的市場(chǎng)是否足夠大、產(chǎn)品是否有想象空間,這件事情其實(shí)很難講。原因很簡(jiǎn)單,顯而易見的機(jī)會(huì)和市場(chǎng)肯定會(huì)吸引很多競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者往里沖。所以那些做得比較好的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)幾乎肯定只能從那些不起眼的市場(chǎng)入手,往那些別人覺得可笑、愚蠢或者非常低端的市場(chǎng)發(fā)展,這也是為什么很多企業(yè)在創(chuàng)業(yè)時(shí)會(huì)讓人感覺很奇怪,投資者可能也搞不懂你做這件事情的原因。這時(shí)候就需要?jiǎng)?chuàng)業(yè)者拿出些東西來證明自己了。
你在愛彼迎的投資是否就是這種情況?我記得安德森·霍洛維茨的管理合伙人杰夫·喬丹曾經(jīng)說過,他在剛聽到這個(gè)想法時(shí)覺得非常瘋狂。
如果沒有記錯(cuò)的話,我投資愛彼迎的時(shí)候他們只有8個(gè)人,而且那時(shí)候他們還是在布萊恩·切斯基的公寓里辦公。我和他們?cè)缇驼J(rèn)識(shí),所以他們?cè)贏輪融資的時(shí)候就找到了我。那時(shí)我就覺得他們的想法非常好。
當(dāng)時(shí)看來,種種跡象都表明他們的想法應(yīng)該行得通。首先,他們的產(chǎn)品已經(jīng)開始運(yùn)作了。而且在那之前,我在讀本科和研究生時(shí)曾經(jīng)通過一家名為Servas的(旅行)公司旅行過,這家公司誕生于二次世界大戰(zhàn)時(shí)期的世界語社區(qū),其基本理念就是,如果人們能夠在其他國家跟其他國家的民眾生活一段時(shí)間,彼此建立直接的聯(lián)系,那么人類就更有可能實(shí)現(xiàn)世界和平。要想通過該公司旅行,首先你要完成注冊(cè),然后他們會(huì)對(duì)你進(jìn)行面試。最后就是出國旅行了,他們會(huì)給你提供一份名單,名單上的人會(huì)在旅行目的地為你提供免費(fèi)接待。當(dāng)然,你也得遵守一些規(guī)定,比如你得提前一周或一晚聯(lián)系名單上的東道主。也就是說,假如你要去羅馬,只要給名單上的任意東道主打個(gè)電話或者發(fā)個(gè)郵件,再帶上這本小冊(cè)子就行了。
所以當(dāng)我看到愛彼迎的時(shí)候,就立刻想到了Servas,只是這個(gè)項(xiàng)目還可以讓我獲益。
不過你也很看重創(chuàng)始人本身的特質(zhì)和性格,對(duì)嗎?
創(chuàng)始人確實(shí)很重要,除了毅力、勇氣和道德操守等特質(zhì)以外,我們還需要了解以下問題:他們是否具有快速學(xué)習(xí)的能力?是否擅長(zhǎng)營銷?這里的營銷不僅是指他們是否能夠把產(chǎn)品賣給新客戶,還包括他們是否可以說服他人加入自己的團(tuán)隊(duì),是否能夠籌集到資本。創(chuàng)始團(tuán)隊(duì)里至少要有部分成員擅長(zhǎng)營銷,也要有部分成員擅長(zhǎng)產(chǎn)品開發(fā),在公司逐漸走向成熟之后,還要有擅長(zhǎng)運(yùn)營的人才。
如果用蘋果公司來打比方的話,那就是史蒂夫·沃茲尼亞克能夠開發(fā)出任何產(chǎn)品,史蒂夫·喬布斯任何產(chǎn)品都可以銷售得出去,而蒂姆·庫克則是從后端做起,最后承擔(dān)起了運(yùn)營和擴(kuò)展供應(yīng)鏈的工作。
“個(gè)體資本家”(能夠比傳統(tǒng)風(fēng)投機(jī)構(gòu)更快做出投資決策的個(gè)人“風(fēng)投機(jī)構(gòu)”)近來蔚然成風(fēng),大家普遍認(rèn)為你也是其中一員,你覺得“個(gè)體資本家”出現(xiàn)的原因是什么?
現(xiàn)在大家所說的“個(gè)體資本家”其實(shí)由來已久。蘋果、英特爾等一批偉大公司的原始投資人亞瑟·洛克便是其中之一。洛克起初是“戴維斯與洛克”(Davis and Rock)兩人公司的成員,20世紀(jì)80年代,洛克自立門戶,此后便一直以我們現(xiàn)在所說的“個(gè)體資本家”的身份開展投資活動(dòng)。
但現(xiàn)在有一批獨(dú)立投資者不再僅僅將目光投向企業(yè)的種子輪或A輪融資,而是更加積極地參與A、B、C輪及后續(xù)投資機(jī)會(huì)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。
當(dāng)前,企業(yè)從創(chuàng)辦到上市通常需要8到12年,處于私有狀態(tài)的時(shí)間遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)長(zhǎng)于過往。企業(yè)規(guī)模擴(kuò)大、業(yè)務(wù)井噴式增長(zhǎng)時(shí)期往往也是企業(yè)最容易出現(xiàn)問題的時(shí)期,此時(shí),創(chuàng)業(yè)者可以向運(yùn)營型投資者尋求幫助,而許多個(gè)體資本家恰好能夠扮演這種角色。
由于創(chuàng)投網(wǎng)絡(luò)的重要性愈發(fā)突出,所以我也認(rèn)同這將成為一種趨勢(shì)。我感覺這種情況大概每五年會(huì)發(fā)生一次。有些以前很重要的網(wǎng)絡(luò)現(xiàn)在依然很重要,比如Y-Combinator和谷歌,但其他一些企業(yè)的重要性則大為降低,并且已經(jīng)被Stripe(一個(gè)很重要的創(chuàng)投網(wǎng)絡(luò))、Opendoor,Coinbase、Uber等公司所取代。越來越多的創(chuàng)始人(和投資者)從這一波企業(yè)中脫穎而出。
話雖如此,我還是覺得有些傳統(tǒng)的后期基金本質(zhì)上就是個(gè)人投資者,我沒有打算超越他們(笑),不過有些基金確實(shí)只有一位主要的合伙人,其他人不過就是做些很初級(jí)的工作。
對(duì)初創(chuàng)企業(yè)而言,哪些創(chuàng)投網(wǎng)絡(luò)不像以前那么重要了?
有些企業(yè)在創(chuàng)投領(lǐng)域確實(shí)被邊緣化了,很奇怪,它們擁有非常好的基礎(chǔ)條件,卻從未孵化出任何知名企業(yè),或者即便有,數(shù)量也非常少。
比如從亞馬遜、微軟或蘋果孵化出來的企業(yè)就很少,太奇怪了,不是么?這也是西雅圖坐擁大量?jī)?yōu)秀工程師卻在過去20年沒有誕生過多少創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的部分原因所在。這里也有一些很不錯(cuò)的企業(yè),但并沒有體現(xiàn)出亞馬遜、微軟作為錨定企業(yè)的作用。
有時(shí)有些小企業(yè)反而能夠孵化出許多非常值得關(guān)注的企業(yè)和動(dòng)能。以PayPal網(wǎng)絡(luò)為例:由PayPal前員工創(chuàng)辦并達(dá)到一定規(guī)模的企業(yè),創(chuàng)始人都是該公司的離職高管。不知為何,PayPal的高管團(tuán)隊(duì)似乎特別擅長(zhǎng)創(chuàng)辦具有影響力的大企業(yè),但普通員工在創(chuàng)業(yè)方面似乎就有些乏善可陳了(YouTube除外)。這是為什么呢?有可能是因?yàn)槠髽I(yè)文化、決策習(xí)慣或者吸引到的人才不同,我也不清楚。有些動(dòng)能讓我感覺很奇怪,也不太能理解,不過思考一下還是很有趣的。
你還投資了加密貨幣交易所Coinbase。該公司的首席執(zhí)行官布萊恩·阿姆斯特朗最近公開發(fā)表了一份頗具爭(zhēng)議的備忘錄,呼吁員工不要參與政治事務(wù)。在該公司尋求發(fā)展的當(dāng)下,你認(rèn)為這會(huì)產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響?
我覺得這個(gè)問題還是直接問Coinbase團(tuán)隊(duì)比較好。我沒有參與相關(guān)決策,對(duì)相關(guān)情況也不怎么了解。
所以從你的角度來看,這不是一個(gè)“應(yīng)不應(yīng)該做”的問題,而是他有權(quán)利這么做,對(duì)嗎?
我認(rèn)為,從根本上說,還是要由公司的創(chuàng)始人或首席執(zhí)行官來從使命驅(qū)動(dòng)的角度決定希望員工專注于哪些事務(wù),而且確定企業(yè)使命這件事應(yīng)該由創(chuàng)始人在創(chuàng)業(yè)初期完成。每家企業(yè)的首席執(zhí)行官都有權(quán)確定公司的重點(diǎn)與使命。如果創(chuàng)業(yè)者希望承擔(dān)宏大的使命,那當(dāng)然可以,不過如果他們想要更專注地履行一些特定的使命,也沒有什么問題。
你現(xiàn)在感興趣的投資領(lǐng)域有哪些?之前你曾經(jīng)說過要采取守勢(shì),不過你也認(rèn)為新興社交媒體企業(yè)還有投資空間,比如你就投了Clubhouse。
大約一年前,我讀到一篇關(guān)于社交媒體世界會(huì)發(fā)生哪些有趣變化的博客。首先是技術(shù)革新,瀏覽器中集成了WebRTC、WebGL技術(shù),而借助WebRTC可以傳輸高清影音,開發(fā)者能夠使用相關(guān)技術(shù)開發(fā)出非常優(yōu)秀的視頻應(yīng)用程序。
其二是代際轉(zhuǎn)換,年輕人不想使用與父輩相同的社交媒體網(wǎng)絡(luò)。我認(rèn)為,再過5到8年,某些社交媒體網(wǎng)絡(luò)也會(huì)出現(xiàn)“新老交替”,而且我覺得時(shí)機(jī)其實(shí)已經(jīng)成熟。加上現(xiàn)在受新冠疫情影響,大家都對(duì)社交非??释步o新平臺(tái)創(chuàng)造了實(shí)驗(yàn)和應(yīng)用的空間。
在看待這種事情時(shí),我會(huì)努力讓自己保持開放的心態(tài),因?yàn)槲覐臎]有預(yù)料到會(huì)出現(xiàn)Clubhouse這樣的產(chǎn)品。我以前也從沒有想過僅支持語音功能的格式(會(huì)成為下一個(gè)主要功能)。有些東西只有上手了才可以發(fā)現(xiàn)它的美。所以我一直在搜索網(wǎng)絡(luò)上那些不甚起眼的功能。我認(rèn)為,未來肯定會(huì)有爆款產(chǎn)品從這些不起眼的地方誕生,比如說瀏覽器內(nèi)置VR,不過我要再次強(qiáng)調(diào)的是,現(xiàn)在還處于非常早期的階段。
你是否曾經(jīng)錯(cuò)過重要的投資機(jī)會(huì)?
噢,那可多了。比如我就錯(cuò)過了Lyft。原因是我對(duì)它的估值及其與Uber的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)有點(diǎn)擔(dān)心。當(dāng)時(shí)人們普遍認(rèn)為,所有的強(qiáng)技術(shù)型市場(chǎng)都會(huì)是“贏家通吃”,但實(shí)際上許多市場(chǎng)后來都變成了寡頭市場(chǎng)。我當(dāng)時(shí)對(duì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)和估值做出了錯(cuò)誤的判斷。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:梁宇
審校:夏林
埃拉德·吉爾并非在硅谷長(zhǎng)大。雖然出身護(hù)士和教育心理學(xué)學(xué)者家庭,但他的童年卻像軍人家庭的小孩那樣“居無定所”,先后在密歇根州、圣迭戈、以色列和亞利桑那州等地生活。
不過吉爾在挑選初創(chuàng)企業(yè)時(shí)似乎特別獨(dú)具慧眼。他所投資的公司中(通常在種子輪融資時(shí)就已投資)有約25家成長(zhǎng)為了所謂的“獨(dú)角獸”,其中包括Instacart、Stripe、Coinbase等。
不僅如此,他參與投資的PagerDuty、Square和Pinterest都已經(jīng)成功上市,愛彼迎(Airbnb)、Wish等更多公司預(yù)計(jì)也將在今年IPO。
吉爾曾經(jīng)負(fù)責(zé)創(chuàng)辦谷歌(Google)的移動(dòng)業(yè)務(wù),也曾經(jīng)幫助推特(Twitter)從一家只有90人的小公司成長(zhǎng)為1500人的行業(yè)巨頭。他還參與創(chuàng)辦了基因檢測(cè)初創(chuàng)公司Color Genomics。如今,吉爾已經(jīng)贏得了“創(chuàng)業(yè)導(dǎo)師”的美譽(yù),為許多剛剛起步或想要擴(kuò)大規(guī)模的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)提供咨詢建議。
作為獨(dú)立投資者,吉爾會(huì)在企業(yè)創(chuàng)業(yè)初期對(duì)其進(jìn)行少量投資、扮演天使投資人的角色,不過他同樣也是日益興起的所謂“個(gè)體資本家”(solo capitalists)中的一員,會(huì)在創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的發(fā)展后期投入大量資金,與傳統(tǒng)風(fēng)投機(jī)構(gòu)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)合意的投資標(biāo)的。
許多企業(yè)日后的成就與創(chuàng)業(yè)之初有著天壤之別,應(yīng)當(dāng)如何尋找和評(píng)估此類投資機(jī)會(huì)?為什么全球最大、最成功的公司初看之時(shí)會(huì)顯得既愚蠢又低端?近日,《財(cái)富》雜志就相關(guān)話題采訪了埃拉德·吉爾。
訪談內(nèi)容如下,為簡(jiǎn)明起見,內(nèi)容有刪改:
《財(cái)富》:介紹下自己吧,有這么多事情可以做,為什么選擇了做技術(shù)投資?
埃拉德·吉爾:我當(dāng)時(shí)正在攻讀生物學(xué)博士學(xué)位,主要研究病毒學(xué)、癌癥、衰老等人類疾病相關(guān)問題,讀到一半的時(shí)候,我意識(shí)到,成為一名學(xué)者并非我的志向所在,這部分是因?yàn)槲也幌矚g那種在實(shí)驗(yàn)室里待著的生活。于是我就開始思考,如何才能對(duì)人類產(chǎn)生最大的影響,做一些對(duì)人類有用的事情。
此外,我當(dāng)時(shí)對(duì)科技也很感興趣?,F(xiàn)在大家可能已經(jīng)忘了以前做事情有多難。記得讀高中時(shí),我對(duì)數(shù)學(xué)家們的工作很感興趣,我會(huì)給他們寫信,他們也會(huì)把打印出來的論文用黃色信封裝著郵寄給我。而現(xiàn)在,突然之間,所有的小孩都可以根據(jù)自己的興趣隨意查閱世界上的每一篇數(shù)學(xué)論文了。
后來,我便搬到了舊金山的灣區(qū),在“互聯(lián)網(wǎng)繁榮”即將畫上句號(hào)的時(shí)候進(jìn)入了創(chuàng)投世界。時(shí)至今日,我依然牢記著硅谷的傳統(tǒng)精神——做對(duì)人類有用的事情,給世界帶來積極的影響。然而不幸的是,這種精神現(xiàn)已經(jīng)成為大眾媒體取樂的對(duì)象,就像電視劇《硅谷》(Silicon Valley)中演繹的那樣。
種子期企業(yè)的商業(yè)規(guī)劃可能還不明朗,而你通常會(huì)投資這一階段的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)。那么,你會(huì)關(guān)注創(chuàng)始人的哪些特質(zhì)?
我認(rèn)為,市場(chǎng)往往是決定(一家企業(yè))能否成功的最重要因素。我見過非常非常優(yōu)秀的團(tuán)隊(duì)因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)低迷而功敗垂成,也見過一塌糊涂的團(tuán)隊(duì)因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)行情不錯(cuò)而大獲成功。因此,首先我會(huì)關(guān)心創(chuàng)始人瞄準(zhǔn)的市場(chǎng)是否足夠大、產(chǎn)品是否有想象空間。
我很少投那些沒有想好做什么的團(tuán)隊(duì),我一般會(huì)等到創(chuàng)業(yè)團(tuán)隊(duì)有了實(shí)際動(dòng)作之后才會(huì)選擇投資,這樣更容易判斷他們瞄準(zhǔn)的市場(chǎng)是否可靠。比如像PagerDuty這樣的團(tuán)隊(duì),他們整個(gè)職業(yè)生涯就是在為不同公司開發(fā)相同的產(chǎn)品,然后有一天,他們決定把這種產(chǎn)品單獨(dú)建成數(shù)字基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施(這時(shí)候去投他們就穩(wěn)妥得多)。
至于創(chuàng)業(yè)者瞄準(zhǔn)的市場(chǎng)是否足夠大、產(chǎn)品是否有想象空間,這件事情其實(shí)很難講。原因很簡(jiǎn)單,顯而易見的機(jī)會(huì)和市場(chǎng)肯定會(huì)吸引很多競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者往里沖。所以那些做得比較好的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)幾乎肯定只能從那些不起眼的市場(chǎng)入手,往那些別人覺得可笑、愚蠢或者非常低端的市場(chǎng)發(fā)展,這也是為什么很多企業(yè)在創(chuàng)業(yè)時(shí)會(huì)讓人感覺很奇怪,投資者可能也搞不懂你做這件事情的原因。這時(shí)候就需要?jiǎng)?chuàng)業(yè)者拿出些東西來證明自己了。
你在愛彼迎的投資是否就是這種情況?我記得安德森·霍洛維茨的管理合伙人杰夫·喬丹曾經(jīng)說過,他在剛聽到這個(gè)想法時(shí)覺得非常瘋狂。
如果沒有記錯(cuò)的話,我投資愛彼迎的時(shí)候他們只有8個(gè)人,而且那時(shí)候他們還是在布萊恩·切斯基的公寓里辦公。我和他們?cè)缇驼J(rèn)識(shí),所以他們?cè)贏輪融資的時(shí)候就找到了我。那時(shí)我就覺得他們的想法非常好。
當(dāng)時(shí)看來,種種跡象都表明他們的想法應(yīng)該行得通。首先,他們的產(chǎn)品已經(jīng)開始運(yùn)作了。而且在那之前,我在讀本科和研究生時(shí)曾經(jīng)通過一家名為Servas的(旅行)公司旅行過,這家公司誕生于二次世界大戰(zhàn)時(shí)期的世界語社區(qū),其基本理念就是,如果人們能夠在其他國家跟其他國家的民眾生活一段時(shí)間,彼此建立直接的聯(lián)系,那么人類就更有可能實(shí)現(xiàn)世界和平。要想通過該公司旅行,首先你要完成注冊(cè),然后他們會(huì)對(duì)你進(jìn)行面試。最后就是出國旅行了,他們會(huì)給你提供一份名單,名單上的人會(huì)在旅行目的地為你提供免費(fèi)接待。當(dāng)然,你也得遵守一些規(guī)定,比如你得提前一周或一晚聯(lián)系名單上的東道主。也就是說,假如你要去羅馬,只要給名單上的任意東道主打個(gè)電話或者發(fā)個(gè)郵件,再帶上這本小冊(cè)子就行了。
所以當(dāng)我看到愛彼迎的時(shí)候,就立刻想到了Servas,只是這個(gè)項(xiàng)目還可以讓我獲益。
不過你也很看重創(chuàng)始人本身的特質(zhì)和性格,對(duì)嗎?
創(chuàng)始人確實(shí)很重要,除了毅力、勇氣和道德操守等特質(zhì)以外,我們還需要了解以下問題:他們是否具有快速學(xué)習(xí)的能力?是否擅長(zhǎng)營銷?這里的營銷不僅是指他們是否能夠把產(chǎn)品賣給新客戶,還包括他們是否可以說服他人加入自己的團(tuán)隊(duì),是否能夠籌集到資本。創(chuàng)始團(tuán)隊(duì)里至少要有部分成員擅長(zhǎng)營銷,也要有部分成員擅長(zhǎng)產(chǎn)品開發(fā),在公司逐漸走向成熟之后,還要有擅長(zhǎng)運(yùn)營的人才。
如果用蘋果公司來打比方的話,那就是史蒂夫·沃茲尼亞克能夠開發(fā)出任何產(chǎn)品,史蒂夫·喬布斯任何產(chǎn)品都可以銷售得出去,而蒂姆·庫克則是從后端做起,最后承擔(dān)起了運(yùn)營和擴(kuò)展供應(yīng)鏈的工作。
“個(gè)體資本家”(能夠比傳統(tǒng)風(fēng)投機(jī)構(gòu)更快做出投資決策的個(gè)人“風(fēng)投機(jī)構(gòu)”)近來蔚然成風(fēng),大家普遍認(rèn)為你也是其中一員,你覺得“個(gè)體資本家”出現(xiàn)的原因是什么?
現(xiàn)在大家所說的“個(gè)體資本家”其實(shí)由來已久。蘋果、英特爾等一批偉大公司的原始投資人亞瑟·洛克便是其中之一。洛克起初是“戴維斯與洛克”(Davis and Rock)兩人公司的成員,20世紀(jì)80年代,洛克自立門戶,此后便一直以我們現(xiàn)在所說的“個(gè)體資本家”的身份開展投資活動(dòng)。
但現(xiàn)在有一批獨(dú)立投資者不再僅僅將目光投向企業(yè)的種子輪或A輪融資,而是更加積極地參與A、B、C輪及后續(xù)投資機(jī)會(huì)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。
當(dāng)前,企業(yè)從創(chuàng)辦到上市通常需要8到12年,處于私有狀態(tài)的時(shí)間遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)長(zhǎng)于過往。企業(yè)規(guī)模擴(kuò)大、業(yè)務(wù)井噴式增長(zhǎng)時(shí)期往往也是企業(yè)最容易出現(xiàn)問題的時(shí)期,此時(shí),創(chuàng)業(yè)者可以向運(yùn)營型投資者尋求幫助,而許多個(gè)體資本家恰好能夠扮演這種角色。
由于創(chuàng)投網(wǎng)絡(luò)的重要性愈發(fā)突出,所以我也認(rèn)同這將成為一種趨勢(shì)。我感覺這種情況大概每五年會(huì)發(fā)生一次。有些以前很重要的網(wǎng)絡(luò)現(xiàn)在依然很重要,比如Y-Combinator和谷歌,但其他一些企業(yè)的重要性則大為降低,并且已經(jīng)被Stripe(一個(gè)很重要的創(chuàng)投網(wǎng)絡(luò))、Opendoor,Coinbase、Uber等公司所取代。越來越多的創(chuàng)始人(和投資者)從這一波企業(yè)中脫穎而出。
話雖如此,我還是覺得有些傳統(tǒng)的后期基金本質(zhì)上就是個(gè)人投資者,我沒有打算超越他們(笑),不過有些基金確實(shí)只有一位主要的合伙人,其他人不過就是做些很初級(jí)的工作。
對(duì)初創(chuàng)企業(yè)而言,哪些創(chuàng)投網(wǎng)絡(luò)不像以前那么重要了?
有些企業(yè)在創(chuàng)投領(lǐng)域確實(shí)被邊緣化了,很奇怪,它們擁有非常好的基礎(chǔ)條件,卻從未孵化出任何知名企業(yè),或者即便有,數(shù)量也非常少。
比如從亞馬遜、微軟或蘋果孵化出來的企業(yè)就很少,太奇怪了,不是么?這也是西雅圖坐擁大量?jī)?yōu)秀工程師卻在過去20年沒有誕生過多少創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的部分原因所在。這里也有一些很不錯(cuò)的企業(yè),但并沒有體現(xiàn)出亞馬遜、微軟作為錨定企業(yè)的作用。
有時(shí)有些小企業(yè)反而能夠孵化出許多非常值得關(guān)注的企業(yè)和動(dòng)能。以PayPal網(wǎng)絡(luò)為例:由PayPal前員工創(chuàng)辦并達(dá)到一定規(guī)模的企業(yè),創(chuàng)始人都是該公司的離職高管。不知為何,PayPal的高管團(tuán)隊(duì)似乎特別擅長(zhǎng)創(chuàng)辦具有影響力的大企業(yè),但普通員工在創(chuàng)業(yè)方面似乎就有些乏善可陳了(YouTube除外)。這是為什么呢?有可能是因?yàn)槠髽I(yè)文化、決策習(xí)慣或者吸引到的人才不同,我也不清楚。有些動(dòng)能讓我感覺很奇怪,也不太能理解,不過思考一下還是很有趣的。
你還投資了加密貨幣交易所Coinbase。該公司的首席執(zhí)行官布萊恩·阿姆斯特朗最近公開發(fā)表了一份頗具爭(zhēng)議的備忘錄,呼吁員工不要參與政治事務(wù)。在該公司尋求發(fā)展的當(dāng)下,你認(rèn)為這會(huì)產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響?
我覺得這個(gè)問題還是直接問Coinbase團(tuán)隊(duì)比較好。我沒有參與相關(guān)決策,對(duì)相關(guān)情況也不怎么了解。
所以從你的角度來看,這不是一個(gè)“應(yīng)不應(yīng)該做”的問題,而是他有權(quán)利這么做,對(duì)嗎?
我認(rèn)為,從根本上說,還是要由公司的創(chuàng)始人或首席執(zhí)行官來從使命驅(qū)動(dòng)的角度決定希望員工專注于哪些事務(wù),而且確定企業(yè)使命這件事應(yīng)該由創(chuàng)始人在創(chuàng)業(yè)初期完成。每家企業(yè)的首席執(zhí)行官都有權(quán)確定公司的重點(diǎn)與使命。如果創(chuàng)業(yè)者希望承擔(dān)宏大的使命,那當(dāng)然可以,不過如果他們想要更專注地履行一些特定的使命,也沒有什么問題。
你現(xiàn)在感興趣的投資領(lǐng)域有哪些?之前你曾經(jīng)說過要采取守勢(shì),不過你也認(rèn)為新興社交媒體企業(yè)還有投資空間,比如你就投了Clubhouse。
大約一年前,我讀到一篇關(guān)于社交媒體世界會(huì)發(fā)生哪些有趣變化的博客。首先是技術(shù)革新,瀏覽器中集成了WebRTC、WebGL技術(shù),而借助WebRTC可以傳輸高清影音,開發(fā)者能夠使用相關(guān)技術(shù)開發(fā)出非常優(yōu)秀的視頻應(yīng)用程序。
其二是代際轉(zhuǎn)換,年輕人不想使用與父輩相同的社交媒體網(wǎng)絡(luò)。我認(rèn)為,再過5到8年,某些社交媒體網(wǎng)絡(luò)也會(huì)出現(xiàn)“新老交替”,而且我覺得時(shí)機(jī)其實(shí)已經(jīng)成熟。加上現(xiàn)在受新冠疫情影響,大家都對(duì)社交非??释步o新平臺(tái)創(chuàng)造了實(shí)驗(yàn)和應(yīng)用的空間。
在看待這種事情時(shí),我會(huì)努力讓自己保持開放的心態(tài),因?yàn)槲覐臎]有預(yù)料到會(huì)出現(xiàn)Clubhouse這樣的產(chǎn)品。我以前也從沒有想過僅支持語音功能的格式(會(huì)成為下一個(gè)主要功能)。有些東西只有上手了才可以發(fā)現(xiàn)它的美。所以我一直在搜索網(wǎng)絡(luò)上那些不甚起眼的功能。我認(rèn)為,未來肯定會(huì)有爆款產(chǎn)品從這些不起眼的地方誕生,比如說瀏覽器內(nèi)置VR,不過我要再次強(qiáng)調(diào)的是,現(xiàn)在還處于非常早期的階段。
你是否曾經(jīng)錯(cuò)過重要的投資機(jī)會(huì)?
噢,那可多了。比如我就錯(cuò)過了Lyft。原因是我對(duì)它的估值及其與Uber的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)有點(diǎn)擔(dān)心。當(dāng)時(shí)人們普遍認(rèn)為,所有的強(qiáng)技術(shù)型市場(chǎng)都會(huì)是“贏家通吃”,但實(shí)際上許多市場(chǎng)后來都變成了寡頭市場(chǎng)。我當(dāng)時(shí)對(duì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)和估值做出了錯(cuò)誤的判斷。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:梁宇
審校:夏林
Elad Gil didn’t grow up in Silicon Valley. The son of a nurse and an academic studying education psychology, he grew up akin to a military brat, moving between Michigan, San Diego, Israel, and Arizona in his early years.
But he seems to have a golden touch when picking startups that turn into unicorns or decacorns. Gil, who typically makes bets in seed-stage companies, has cut checks to some 25 startups that have since reached the vaunted unicorn status, including Instacart, Stripe, and Coinbase.
And there's more: Other companies in his portfolio such as PagerDuty, Square, and Pinterest are already trading in public markets, while more, such as Airbnb and Wish, are expected to IPO this year.
Now billed as a "startup helper" who advises new companies as they seek to get off the ground or scale, Gil has worked to start Google's mobile efforts and help Twitter scale from 90 employees to 1,500. He also co-founded a genetic testing startup, Color Genomics.
While many individual investors are considered angels that put in small amounts of capital early on, Gil is also often cited as a part of trend dubbed "solo capitalists"—a class of investors who are putting in large checks even in later stages and compete with traditional venture capital shops for highly desirable investments.
Fortune caught up with the investor to discuss how he finds and evaluates investments at a stage when many companies look very different from their final form—and why by definition, the largest and most successful startups seem dumb or low-end at first glance.
Here's our conversation, edited for clarity:
Fortune: Tell me about yourself—how did you end up in tech investing, of all things?
Elad Gil: I was getting a Ph.D in biology—focused on human diseases-related areas, for example virology, cancer, aging—and I realized partway through that I didn’t want to become an academic, partly because you get thrown into a lab for a long time. I was thinking through what is the biggest way to have an impact and do something useful for people.
At the same time, I was interested in technology. I think we forget today how hard it was to do so many things: When I was in high school, I mailed random mathematicians because I was really interested what they were doing, and they would then send back those yellow envelopes with print outs of their papers. Now, oh my gosh, suddenly any kid can go online and read every single mathematics paper that is relevant in the world.
So I moved out to the San Francisco Bay area to join the startup world near the end of the dot-com boom. I still have an old Silicon Valley ethos of wanting to do useful things for people and to impact the world positively—unfortunately that’s become the type of thing that is made fun of in popular media, like Silicon Valley.
You generally invest at seed stage—when a company's business plan may still be unclear. So what do you look for in founders?
I think the biggest determinant of success tends to be the market. I’ve seen really, really good teams in terrible markets get completely crushed. I’ve also seen really bad teams in good markets do really well. So first and foremost, I care about if you’re building something interesting in a market that is large enough.
It’s pretty rare for me to invest in a team without an idea—usually I wait until people are working on something specific so it's easier to validate whether that market makes sense. Sometimes you see teams that have built the same thing over and over again in their career for different companies, and they decide to build it as a piece of infrastructure, like PagerDuty.
On whether you're building something interesting in a market large enough, though—that's really hard to tell a priori because, if a market is big and interesting and obvious, then everyone would already be doing it. So the startups that do best almost by definition have to be in non-obvious markets. People may think it's toyish, or dumb, or super low-end—so often things start off looking weird, and you [as an investor], may wonder, “Why would you really want to do that?” And you need a bit of convincing.
So was that the case for your investment in Airbnb? I remember that Andreessen Horowitz’s Managing Partner Jeff Jordan said he thought the idea was crazy when he first heard of it.
I invested in Airbnb, I think, when it was just eight people, and they were still working out of Brian Chesky’s apartment at the time. I knew them previously, and they pinged me while raising their Series A. It actually seemed like a really good concept and idea.
At the time, I think there were all sorts of signs that something like this should work. One: The product was beginning to work on their side. And before that, when I was in undergrad and a little during grad school, I had travelled through a [travel] service called Servas, a service born out of the Esperanto community in World War II. Their basic belief was that if you could stay with people in a foreign country and learn about them directly and vice versa, we would be more likely to have world peace. So you’d sign up for the service and they’d interview you and make sure you weren’t crazy or anything. Then you’d visit a country and they’d give you a printed booklet with the names of all the people that would host you for free in that country—with rules, of course, around needing to contact them a week or a night ahead. So you could literally show up in Rome with this booklet and just call or email anyone in it to stay with them.
So when I saw Airbnb, I thought: Wow, this is Servas but you can monetize it.
But you do also think the founders and their characteristics are important.
Founders are really important. Beyond signals like perseverance, grit, and ethics, you ask: Are people learning rapidly? Are they good at sales? Not only can they sell to new customers, but also can they convince people to join them and can they raise money? You need at least one part of the founding team to be good at selling, and one part to be good at building, and later in life of the company, you need someone who is good at tight operations.
If I were to use Apple as an analogy: Steve Wozniak could build anything. Steve Jobs could sell anything. Tim Cook really ended up running the operations from the back end and scaling the supply chains.
There seems to be a new trend around "solo capitalists"—single-person “venture firms” that are able to write checks faster than their traditional counterparts. You are considered one of those solo capitalists. Why do you think it is happening?
What people now call "solo capitalists" actually has a pretty long history. Arthur Rock was the original investor in Apple and in a bunch of other great companies including Intel. Originally, he was part of a two-person outfit called Davis and Rock, but he eventually went out on his own in the '80s and was just investing as what we would now call a solo capitalist.
But now there is a set of individuals who are investing and competing more aggressively for Series A, B, C, and beyond—competing later in the life of companies rather than just the seed or the A.
One shift is that companies have stayed private for much longer. Now companies take 8 to 12 years to go public, but founders could still use help from operator investors, which many solo capitalist are, as their companies are scaling and going into growth spurts—which is often when everything is starting to break at a company.
I also think this is a trend because there’s been a sudden shift in which networks are really important. I feel like this happens every five years or so. Some networks that were relevant before are still relevant today, like Y-Combinator or Google. But there are a bunch of companies that aren’t as relevant anymore and are being replaced by, say, Stripe—which is a really important founding network—or Opendoor, Coinbase, Uber, etc. There are more and more founders [and investors] emerging from these next waves of companies.
That said, I do think there are some traditional late-stage funds that are almost late-stage dressing for people acting as solo capitalists—I don’t want to out them (laughs)—but there really are some funds with just one main partner and a bunch of junior people.
What are the networks that are less relevant today for startup formation?
There are some companies that are less central now—and then there are some that have, oddly enough, never spawned anybody, or spawned very few companies.
There’s very few companies, for example, that have come out of Amazon, Microsoft, or Apple. It’s so weird, right? And it’s part of the reason why Seattle, while an interesting city with tons of great engineers, hasn’t created a whole lot of startups in the last twenty years. There are many interesting companies up there, but it’s not reflective of the fact that Amazon and Microsoft are anchor companies.
There are sometimes small companies that have spawned half a dozen interesting companies and other dynamics. Look at the PayPal network: Every single company founded by someone ex-PayPal that hit scale was founded by a former executive. For some reason, the executive team at PayPal was amazing at starting these massive, important companies, but the rank-and-file employees, with the big exception of YouTube, didn't start much. Why is that? It could be the culture, the decision-making, the people they attract—I have no idea why. There are really strange dynamics that I don’t really understand but I think are fascinating to think about.
You are also an investor in Coinbase, the crypto exchange. Its CEO Brian Armstrong recently came out publicly with a divisive memo calling employees to refrain from politics. What is your view on how that could impact the company as it seeks to grow?
I think that question's best directed at the Coinbase team. I wasn’t involved in the decisions around that post and I don’t have insights relevant to it.
So to you, it’s not a question of whether or not he should have posted it, but that he had the right to do so.
I think, fundamentally, it is up to the founder and/or CEO of the company to determine what they want the employees of their company to focus on from a mission-driven perspective. And it is really up to the founders, really early on in the life of the company, to define that mission, and to some extent you define that mission over time. Each CEO has it within their purview to define the focus and mission of the company. And if people want to have a broad mission for their company, they can define it that way. And if they want to have a very narrow mission for their company, they can define it that way too.
What are some of the areas you are interested in investing today? You've previously pointed to defense, but you also think there is space for new social media companies—for example, you invested in Clubhouse.
About a year ago, I read a blog post about interesting things that should happen in the social-media world. Number one, there was a technology shift—so WebRTC and WebGL were baked into the browser—and WebRTC allowed for really crisp audio and video that you can build really great video apps on.
Secondly, you have a generational shift. People don’t want to use their parents' social network, and I think in five to eight years, there will be turnover on certain networks and I think we are ripe for one. And now with COVID, people crave social interactions so you have more room for experimentation and adoption.
I’m trying to keep an open mind on it—because something like Clubhouse I would’ve never predicted. I never a priori would have said an audio-only format [is the next big feature]. Some things aren’t that compelling until you try it. So I’ve been scouring obscure parts of the webs and playing with them. I think there are finally things happening with, say, in-browser VR—but again, it’s very early.
Any big misses in terms of picking out investments?
Oh, a bunch. I missed Lyft. I was a little worried about the valuation at the time and competition with Uber. At the time there was a really strong perception that every strong technology market would be winner-takes-all when in reality, many markets are oligopoly markets. I just misunderstood the market structure and the valuation.