我和林君叡坐在紅杉資本位于舊金山的辦公室里,保持著合適的社交距離。辦公室里除了我們倆和這家風(fēng)投公司的通訊副總裁,別無(wú)旁人。
自從2010年起成為紅杉合伙人的林君叡并不健談,對(duì)我提出的每一個(gè)問(wèn)題,他都深思熟慮,言簡(jiǎn)意賅,說(shuō)完便停下來(lái)看著我,等待下一個(gè)問(wèn)題。氣氛因此而愈發(fā)沉悶。
在我15年的商業(yè)記者生涯中,從未遇到過(guò)這樣的采訪對(duì)象,他似乎覺(jué)得完全沒(méi)有必要做任何補(bǔ)充。
不過(guò),這種不露聲色的低調(diào)和空空蕩蕩的辦公室只是假象。林君叡和他所在的公司,這家硅谷最早、最聲名顯赫的風(fēng)投公司在過(guò)去一年里經(jīng)歷了大風(fēng)大浪,對(duì)科技界內(nèi)外產(chǎn)生了巨大影響。
回顧2020年,林君叡總結(jié)說(shuō):“回想起來(lái),我腦海中蹦出的詞匯是‘既興奮又疲憊’,經(jīng)歷過(guò)很多高潮,也走過(guò)不少低谷?!?/p>
他說(shuō)的高潮很容易理解。2020年,紅杉資本投資的7家公司首次公開(kāi)募股(第8家公司Clover Health采用SPAC的形式上市)。
其中愛(ài)彼迎和DoorDash是當(dāng)年最大的兩宗IPO,為投資公司帶來(lái)了目前市值總價(jià)超過(guò)230億美元的股份。退出的巨額回報(bào)讓2020年成為紅杉?xì)v史上回報(bào)率最高的一年。
這家成立于1972年、以加州巨大的紅杉樹命名的公司在過(guò)去幾十年里已經(jīng)成功投資谷歌、領(lǐng)英、甲骨文和其他眾多科技企業(yè),在2020年顯得格外輝煌。在紅杉呼風(fēng)喚雨的這一年里,林君叡更是站在了風(fēng)口浪尖,愛(ài)彼迎和DoorDash都是他的“寶貝兒”,他也擔(dān)任了這兩家公司的董事。(就此而言,紅杉更傾向于以公司主導(dǎo)的形式開(kāi)展投資,而非依賴于某位合伙人。)
至于低谷,就一言難盡了。這個(gè)方面更難量化,也更難言說(shuō),尤其是遇到沉默寡言的講述者時(shí)。
在加入紅杉成為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資人之前,林君叡曾經(jīng)與企業(yè)家謝家華共同經(jīng)營(yíng)過(guò)若干家公司,并于2009年將旗下最有名的鞋類電商平臺(tái)Zappos賣給了亞馬遜。當(dāng)時(shí),林君叡是公司的首席財(cái)務(wù)官,謝家華擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官。
有報(bào)道稱,謝家華近年來(lái)一直在嘗試戒毒戒酒。去年11月,他在康涅狄格州新倫敦因?yàn)榉课菔Щ鸲軅?,隨后去世。林君叡和謝家華是大學(xué)同學(xué),曾經(jīng)作為商業(yè)伙伴和密友一起工作了15年,用林君叡的話說(shuō):“在我人生相當(dāng)長(zhǎng)的一段時(shí)間里,每天都能夠見(jiàn)到他?!?/p>
悲劇發(fā)生在新冠疫情期間,傷痛尤難平復(fù)。謝家華去世幾天后,向來(lái)注重隱私的林君叡在《福布斯》上發(fā)表了致友人的“最后一封信”,回憶了老友對(duì)自己的鼓勵(lì),并利用這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)做最后的道別。
“想不到,在新冠病毒肆虐的世界里,這種哀悼、告別的方式竟然如此真實(shí)?!?/p>
疫情或許讓林君叡在哀悼友人之際顯得比平日里更公開(kāi),但他仍然刻意遠(yuǎn)離公眾的目光。
與硅谷的其他許多風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家不同,林君叡不常公開(kāi)講演。他在社交媒體上花的時(shí)間不多,在深受科技圈喜愛(ài)的音頻網(wǎng)絡(luò)應(yīng)用程序Clubhouse上也不活躍,只注冊(cè)賬號(hào)“嘗試”了一下。
“他沒(méi)有百萬(wàn)推特粉絲,我覺(jué)得這不是壞事?!睈?ài)彼迎的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人及首席執(zhí)行官布萊恩?切斯基說(shuō)。
在此之前,林君叡從來(lái)沒(méi)有接受過(guò)深度訪談。不過(guò),我們有幸打過(guò)兩次交道,一次是在紅杉的辦公室里,另一次是在Zoom上。他愿意公開(kāi)談?wù)勛罱鼛讉€(gè)月的瘋狂經(jīng)歷,也就是那些創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的經(jīng)濟(jì)收益和痛徹的個(gè)人損失;也同意聊聊謝家華的意外死亡對(duì)自己的影響,以及自己從已故合伙人兼朋友身上學(xué)到的東西。
對(duì)于自己在紅杉異常輝煌的2020年中所扮演的角色,他十分坦率,沒(méi)有絲毫自吹自擂。
事實(shí)上,林君叡與紅杉的關(guān)系可以追溯到他與謝家華合作之初。那是1997年,紅杉投資了他們的第一家公司LinkExchange,隨后又投資了兩人的第二家公司Zappos。2010年離開(kāi)Zappos后,林君叡以合伙人的身份加入了紅杉。
謝家華和紅杉或多或少地塑造了林君叡的職業(yè)生涯道路。不過(guò),這種影響絕非是單向的。聚光燈效應(yīng)讓外界往往忽視了林君叡對(duì)前合伙人和現(xiàn)就職公司的重要性,但林君叡以他特有的方式,不動(dòng)聲色地給二者留下了無(wú)法磨滅的印記。
“安息吧,好時(shí)光”
2008年秋天,紅杉資本的合伙人給所投資的各公司的創(chuàng)始人發(fā)了一份電子郵件,通知他們前來(lái)參加緊急全體會(huì)議,不得缺席。會(huì)議在沙丘路的Quadrus會(huì)議中心舉行,距離紅杉在加州門洛帕克的辦公室不遠(yuǎn)。
參會(huì)的創(chuàng)始人和創(chuàng)始團(tuán)隊(duì)成員總共只有一百多人,但會(huì)上傳遞的信息卻飛出了會(huì)議中心的四壁,在硅谷乃至更廣闊的創(chuàng)業(yè)界激起千層浪。
會(huì)議的目的在于向紅杉投資的公司發(fā)出嚴(yán)肅警告,讓創(chuàng)始人們意識(shí)到眼下的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退將對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)造成怎樣的打擊,并希望借此機(jī)會(huì)給他們提供一些生存建議。(一句話:凜冬將至。)
為了確保信息傳達(dá)到位,公司合伙人準(zhǔn)備了一份共計(jì)56頁(yè)的幻燈材料,題為“安息吧,好時(shí)光”。在這份籠罩著不祥氣息的演示材料里,每一張經(jīng)濟(jì)圖表數(shù)據(jù)都一落千丈,第三頁(yè)干脆不著一字,只有一把尖刀插在豬頭上。
結(jié)果可想而知,會(huì)議奏效了。
引起業(yè)界注意的不只是這些圖表和圖畫。紅杉是硅谷的王者,只要是被他們選上的公司,就一定會(huì)得到認(rèn)真對(duì)待。畢竟,從甲骨文到谷歌,不少最成功的科技公司背后都有紅杉的功勞。
因此,事情很簡(jiǎn)單:紅杉一呼,初創(chuàng)界百應(yīng)。那份不祥的幻燈片一經(jīng)發(fā)布上網(wǎng),傳播速度比最新的手機(jī)應(yīng)用程序測(cè)試邀請(qǐng)還快。硅谷新聞網(wǎng)站TechCrunch稱之為“末日陳述”。企業(yè)家們大驚失色。裁員隨之而來(lái),不僅是紅杉投資的那些公司,整個(gè)行業(yè)都在裁員。
彼時(shí),林君叡和謝家華就在沙丘路會(huì)議中心的這些企業(yè)家中。他們倆共同經(jīng)營(yíng)著Zappos,接到通知后即從Zappos總部所在地拉斯維加斯飛來(lái)。
雖然豬頭幻燈片觸目驚心,紅杉會(huì)議傳達(dá)出的悲觀信息卻并沒(méi)有讓他們驚訝。自2008年下半年起,兩人已經(jīng)注意到Zappos上的銷量開(kāi)始放緩。他們知道,此刻生死攸關(guān)。
“紅杉不會(huì)向創(chuàng)始人公布這一類內(nèi)容,除非真的非常重要、非常嚴(yán)肅?!绷志齾闭f(shuō)。
回到拉斯維加斯,他們迅速行動(dòng),裁掉了大約100名員工,占當(dāng)時(shí)Zappos總?cè)藬?shù)的8%。經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的結(jié)果正如紅杉資本所料。
“那段時(shí)間,我注意到其中有一天的銷售額同比下跌了30%?!绷志齾被貞浀?。“要知道,當(dāng)時(shí)我們的年增長(zhǎng)率是30%,因此可想而知,下跌30%是相當(dāng)驚人的。事先準(zhǔn)備好應(yīng)付這種情況實(shí)在太重要了。如果我們當(dāng)初沒(méi)有看到那個(gè)演示幻燈,就不可能如此認(rèn)真對(duì)待?!?/p>
最終,Zappos不僅熬過(guò)了凜冬,甚至愈發(fā)成功,并于2009年以12億美元的價(jià)格賣給了亞馬遜。林君叡和謝家華能夠度過(guò)那段艱難時(shí)期,固然要?dú)w功于紅杉資本的指導(dǎo),更要多虧了彼此的支持。
合作十五載
林君叡和謝家華是在哈佛大學(xué)的一次宿舍聚會(huì)上認(rèn)識(shí)的。當(dāng)時(shí)林君叡四年級(jí),謝家華三年級(jí),兩人有很多的共同點(diǎn)。
“我們都戴著大眼鏡,穿著卡其褲,寬寬大大的紐扣襯衫下擺散在褲腰外?!绷志齾庇浀茫麄z站在角落里,冷靜地看著其他人開(kāi)懷暢飲。別的學(xué)生都在狂歡,他們卻討論起了商業(yè)創(chuàng)意?!?/p>
雖然我覺(jué)得謝家華的想法很瘋狂,但和他海闊天空地即興討論很有趣?!绷志齾闭f(shuō)?!凹幢闼J(rèn)為我的想法太保守?!?/p>
林君叡一直有種滿腦子數(shù)學(xué)的書呆子傾向,確切地說(shuō),不只是傾向。在談到兒時(shí)的樂(lè)趣時(shí),他說(shuō):“我們經(jīng)常玩涉及算術(shù)內(nèi)容的紙牌游戲。”
現(xiàn)年48歲的林君叡出生在中國(guó)臺(tái)灣,6歲來(lái)到美國(guó)讀小學(xué)一年級(jí)。他的父親在一家國(guó)際銀行任職,當(dāng)時(shí)被派往紐約開(kāi)設(shè)分行。他的母親原本也在銀行工作,但為了孩子的教育,搬到美國(guó)后便辭了職,成為全職媽媽。林君叡有個(gè)弟弟,兄弟倆在小學(xué)期間轉(zhuǎn)過(guò)三次學(xué)。
“倒不是為了住進(jìn)更好的公寓,而是為了進(jìn)更好的學(xué)區(qū)?!?/p>
以學(xué)業(yè)為重心的緊張童年和志趣相投的書呆子氣讓謝家華與林君叡成了好友。林君叡有條不紊,善于分析,謝家華則富有創(chuàng)造力,甚至有時(shí)不切實(shí)際。不過(guò),他們都有一個(gè)大夢(mèng)想。這一切,始于比薩。
在他們兩人居住的哈佛大學(xué)學(xué)生宿舍的一樓有一家餐廳,名叫昆西燒烤,售賣漢堡和薯?xiàng)l。但謝家華覺(jué)得,學(xué)生們真正想要的是比薩,尤其是在深夜聚會(huì)之后。
這家餐廳每年都會(huì)通過(guò)競(jìng)標(biāo)的方式招募新管理者,于是謝家華投標(biāo)了,而且要求兩年的管理權(quán)。至于報(bào)價(jià),他填的是“最高價(jià)+1美元”。這一招奏效了。
改賣比薩的想法也同樣大獲成功。謝家華投資購(gòu)買了幾臺(tái)比薩烤爐,消息傳開(kāi),餐廳門口立刻排起了長(zhǎng)隊(duì)。
林君叡當(dāng)時(shí)還不是謝家華的商業(yè)伙伴,但他找到了參與比薩投資的門路。謝家華曾經(jīng)對(duì)這個(gè)故事津津樂(lè)道,甚至把它寫進(jìn)了2010年出版的《傳遞幸?!罚―elivering Happiness,這本書主要講述的是兩人創(chuàng)造Zappos文化的經(jīng)歷)。不過(guò),林君叡回憶的版本略有不同。
兩人的關(guān)系越來(lái)越親密,林君叡也成了昆西燒烤的最佳顧客。這倒不是因?yàn)樗约撼缘枚?,而是因?yàn)樗看味紩?huì)買一整張比薩,然后再一片一片分銷出去。
根據(jù)謝家華的說(shuō)法,為了盈利,林君叡會(huì)將每片比薩加價(jià)轉(zhuǎn)賣。(也正是這一點(diǎn),讓謝家華萌生了有朝一日請(qǐng)這位朋友做自己的首席財(cái)務(wù)官的想法。)
但林君叡說(shuō),那些利潤(rùn)完全是意外所得。他說(shuō)自己從謝家華的餐廳里買比薩時(shí)就談好了折扣。因?yàn)橘?gòu)買量大,餐廳里一片比薩通常賣2美元,但賣給他則是1.25或1.5美元。然后他再把比薩送上樓按片售賣。但加價(jià)并不是為了賺取利潤(rùn)。
“我并沒(méi)有抬高價(jià)格。但25美分的硬幣是稀缺物,要留著用于自助洗衣機(jī)投幣。”于是,學(xué)生們付給他2美元,而非1.25或1.5美元。
無(wú)論故事的真相如何,比薩連接起了二人的長(zhǎng)期友誼和商業(yè)伙伴關(guān)系。他們尊重彼此的商業(yè)頭腦,相互取長(zhǎng)補(bǔ)短,合作了15年。
畢業(yè)后,林君叡和謝家華去了西海岸。謝家華在甲骨文找了一份工作,但未能做長(zhǎng)久;林君叡進(jìn)入斯坦福大學(xué)攻讀博士學(xué)位,也未能堅(jiān)持下來(lái)。他們都一門心思想創(chuàng)業(yè)。
1996年,謝家華創(chuàng)辦了在線廣告平臺(tái)LinkExchange,林君叡隨即加入,成了公司的首席財(cái)務(wù)官。1998年,他們將LinkExchange賣給微軟,然后成立了一家風(fēng)投基金公司。
他們通過(guò)一宗小規(guī)模投資發(fā)現(xiàn)了一直在努力尋找增長(zhǎng)點(diǎn)的Zappos,決定收購(gòu)。謝家華擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官,林君叡任首席財(cái)務(wù)官。兩人停下其余的風(fēng)投基金項(xiàng)目,把所有資金都押在了鞋子上。
投資Zappos不僅是一項(xiàng)商業(yè)努力,它也給了兩人一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì),去定義和創(chuàng)造心目中的理想企業(yè)文化。(相比之下,LinkExchange則讓他們有機(jī)會(huì)意識(shí)到什么樣的企業(yè)文化是自己不認(rèn)同的。)他們的理念是要讓顧客和員工都滿意。這是一個(gè)革命性的想法。
Zappos呼叫中心的工作人員并不會(huì)因?yàn)榭焖俳Y(jié)束與問(wèn)題顧客的通話而受到獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。恰恰相反,他們與顧客溝通的時(shí)間越長(zhǎng),得到的認(rèn)可就越高(最長(zhǎng)的客服電話記錄為10小時(shí)51分鐘,至今仍然為公司稱道)。
他們?yōu)閆appos設(shè)立的使命包含一些非傳統(tǒng)的價(jià)值觀,比如“創(chuàng)造樂(lè)趣,與眾不同”和“敢于冒險(xiǎn),富于創(chuàng)造,思維開(kāi)闊”。憑借這種獨(dú)特的文化和創(chuàng)新的客服方式,公司成了行業(yè)分析的經(jīng)典案例。與此同時(shí),林君叡和謝家華也建起了價(jià)值數(shù)十億美元的網(wǎng)上鞋店。
Zappos被亞馬遜收購(gòu)后不久,林君叡離開(kāi)公司加入紅杉資本,謝家華則繼續(xù)留任首席執(zhí)行官直到2020年8月,也就是他去世前的幾個(gè)月。林君叡說(shuō),是謝家華幫助自己學(xué)會(huì)了如何與企業(yè)家共事,并且他的影響至今猶存。
“我覺(jué)得,我可以和謝家華愉快共事,與我擅長(zhǎng)同許多創(chuàng)始人合作,這背后的原因是一樣的。因?yàn)槲視?huì)試著分析他們的想法,并找出完善的途徑。我試著成為他們的搭檔和教練。這種嘗試,從我與謝家華共事時(shí)就開(kāi)始了?!?/p>
圍繞謝家華的死,仍然有不明朗之處,林君叡不愿意對(duì)細(xì)節(jié)發(fā)表評(píng)論。但謝家華去世后的一些文章提到了他濫用毒品和行為不穩(wěn)定的情況,以及他對(duì)火的迷戀。(謝家華嚴(yán)重受傷正是因?yàn)槲肓藵鉄?,他?dāng)時(shí)就住在康涅狄格州的那棟失火房屋內(nèi)。)
謝家華去世后,林君叡受邀參加了一場(chǎng)在Zoom上舉行的親友追思會(huì)。但他說(shuō),此舉并不能夠寄托他的哀思,也未能讓悲傷終結(jié)。于是,盡管向來(lái)行事低調(diào),他還是在網(wǎng)上發(fā)布了致謝家華的一封信。
“我想讓其他人讀到的,是我眼中的謝家華,是他身上的方方面面。有些人在謝家華一生的某個(gè)階段看到了他的某些部分。而我有幸看到他經(jīng)歷的不同階段,從一個(gè)對(duì)商業(yè)感興趣、想在宿舍樓里開(kāi)辦最佳餐廳的計(jì)算機(jī)專業(yè)的書呆子,到建立自己的第一個(gè)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)帝國(guó),再到愛(ài)上Zappos?!?/p>
林君叡見(jiàn)證了謝家華將瘋狂的想法從概念變?yōu)楝F(xiàn)實(shí),見(jiàn)證了他一次又一次籌措資金、一次又一次被拒絕。親身參與的經(jīng)歷促使林君叡成長(zhǎng)為一名企業(yè)家、一位投資者。
2020年的黑天鵝
2020年3月9日周一,紅杉資本的合伙人齊聚一堂,而這也是新冠疫情前合伙人的最后一次碰面。
早在1988年就加入紅杉資本的合伙人道格?萊昂內(nèi)表示:“我敢說(shuō)7月1日前復(fù)工無(wú)望,我賭20美元。但我希望自己不是贏家?!?/p>
2008年,萊昂內(nèi)與資深投資者邁克爾?莫里茨牽頭發(fā)起了《R.I.P. Good Times》報(bào)告。如今,主角換成了紅杉資本年輕一代的合伙人:以林君叡和羅洛夫?博塔為主要推手的《黑天鵝備忘錄》再一次引起了人們的注意。該電子郵件于3月5日發(fā)出,幾天后就是紅杉資本合伙人最后一次碰頭的日子。
只是這一次,信息并未遭到泄露。紅杉資本在Medium平臺(tái)上公開(kāi)發(fā)布了電子郵件的內(nèi)容。
備忘錄的開(kāi)篇第一句話就非常不吉利:“冠狀病毒是2020年的那只黑天鵝。你們(以及我們)當(dāng)中的某些人已經(jīng)受到了這種病毒的影響。我們了解你們所承受的壓力,我們?cè)敢鉃槟銈兲峁椭?。鑒于生命受到威脅,我們希望情況可以盡快好轉(zhuǎn)。在此期間,我們應(yīng)該做好應(yīng)對(duì)動(dòng)蕩的防范,并做好可能出現(xiàn)情況的思想準(zhǔn)備。”
備忘錄最后的署名是“紅杉團(tuán)隊(duì)”。但結(jié)尾部分被單獨(dú)拎出來(lái)的合伙人卻只有林君叡。
《黑天鵝備忘錄》引用了林君叡的一段話:“2008年金融危機(jī)之前,我被叫到紅杉辦公室聽(tīng)取那個(gè)臭名昭著的《R.I.P. Good Times》報(bào)告,那時(shí)候我正擔(dān)任Zappos的首席運(yùn)營(yíng)官/首席財(cái)務(wù)官。和現(xiàn)在一樣,那時(shí)我們不知道將要面對(duì)的衰退會(huì)持續(xù)多久,也不清楚是急劇衰退還是緩慢下行。我能夠確認(rèn)的是,那次報(bào)告讓我們的團(tuán)隊(duì)和企業(yè)變得更加強(qiáng)大了。競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手遭到重創(chuàng),而Zappos則挺過(guò)了金融危機(jī),已經(jīng)準(zhǔn)備好抓住他們留下的機(jī)遇?!?/p>
紅杉資本和林君叡的預(yù)測(cè)基本上是正確的。但他們肯定會(huì)因?yàn)檫@個(gè)標(biāo)題(以及其他幾個(gè)預(yù)言,我們將在后面進(jìn)行討論)而遭到詬病。
林君叡稱:“有人說(shuō)(疫情)是完全可以預(yù)見(jiàn)的,所以它不是一只黑天鵝?!彼€補(bǔ)充道,那么多人因?yàn)橐咔橥蝗粊?lái)襲而措手不及,這個(gè)事實(shí)就能夠用標(biāo)題來(lái)加以凸顯。
不僅如此,他還表示:“這個(gè)標(biāo)題可以吸引人眼球。”
紅杉資本對(duì)疫情給投資組合公司帶來(lái)直接沖擊的影響范圍或持續(xù)時(shí)間一無(wú)所知。但該公司認(rèn)為,這種病毒的影響至少會(huì)持續(xù)幾個(gè)季度,供應(yīng)鏈將受到極大影響。
和2008年一樣,紅杉資本再次建議其投資組合公司低調(diào)行事,重新評(píng)估員工數(shù)量和其他支出。
擔(dān)任愛(ài)彼迎、DoorDash等十多家公司董事會(huì)成員的林君叡與幾位企業(yè)家一起經(jīng)歷了數(shù)次重大危機(jī)。在2009年紅杉資本早期押注愛(ài)彼迎之際,林君叡還未加入紅杉資本。2012年,擔(dān)任愛(ài)彼迎董事的合伙人離開(kāi)了紅杉資本,留出了一個(gè)職位空缺。愛(ài)彼迎的首席執(zhí)行官及聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人切斯基請(qǐng)求莫里茨讓林君叡擔(dān)任公司董事。
切斯基說(shuō):“我是藝術(shù)學(xué)校出身,沒(méi)有公司運(yùn)營(yíng)經(jīng)驗(yàn)。(林君叡)懂運(yùn)營(yíng),具有非常出色的分析能力。我們之間有點(diǎn)類似陰和陽(yáng)的那種共生關(guān)系?!?/p>
林君叡還幫助Zappos打造了令愛(ài)彼迎創(chuàng)始人欽佩的企業(yè)文化。他和謝家華共同經(jīng)歷了兩次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退(除2008年金融危機(jī)外,“9?11”事件后Zappos的銷售額也受到了沖擊)。事實(shí)證明,對(duì)切斯基而言,這些經(jīng)驗(yàn)和知識(shí)都非常寶貴。
2013年左右,林君叡實(shí)際上每周都會(huì)有一天時(shí)間在愛(ài)彼迎辦公。當(dāng)時(shí)正值愛(ài)彼迎的高速增長(zhǎng)期,切斯基也在努力壯大與之相匹配的高管團(tuán)隊(duì)。除此之外,切斯基還需要應(yīng)付監(jiān)管訴訟和平臺(tái)上的歧視事件,急需一位幫助他處理日常管理事務(wù)的首席運(yùn)營(yíng)官。此時(shí),林君叡登場(chǎng)了,他至少能夠臨時(shí)性協(xié)助切斯基加強(qiáng)客戶服務(wù)和內(nèi)部運(yùn)營(yíng)。
切斯基稱:“我和他一起經(jīng)歷了很多?!钡舜涡鹿谝咔閷?huì)以一種全新的方式考驗(yàn)愛(ài)彼迎。
2020年3月,愛(ài)彼迎的業(yè)務(wù)量下降了80%。
切斯基說(shuō):“危機(jī)也是識(shí)人的機(jī)會(huì)。林君叡的身上具備了所有我期望的特質(zhì)。他樂(lè)觀而穩(wěn)重。他支持我們,并且實(shí)際上也以捍衛(wèi)者的身份挺身而出?!?/p>
為了應(yīng)對(duì)營(yíng)收大幅下降的困境,愛(ài)彼迎必須做出舉債或股本融資的決定。舉債風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更高,但成本相對(duì)較低。林君叡是舉債的堅(jiān)定支持者。他不想讓愛(ài)彼迎經(jīng)歷增發(fā)股票帶來(lái)的一輪“降價(jià)融資”:股本增加,但公司估值降低。他對(duì)公司后續(xù)反彈能力充滿信心。
切斯基在談到董事會(huì)和林君叡處理這一決定的方式時(shí)指出:“這有點(diǎn)像是羅夏測(cè)試,看你站在哪一方。”
愛(ài)彼迎最終選擇舉債20億美元。該公司推遲了原定于2020年早些時(shí)候的首次公開(kāi)募股,并最終在去年12月上市。紅杉資本共計(jì)向愛(ài)彼迎投資了3.75億美元。如今,紅杉資本持有的愛(ài)彼迎在短租市場(chǎng)的股份價(jià)值高達(dá)150億美元。IPO后,林君叡應(yīng)允了切斯基讓其繼續(xù)擔(dān)任董事會(huì)成員的邀約。
在新冠疫情最嚴(yán)重的時(shí)候,兩人每周會(huì)交談數(shù)次,有時(shí)是每天都交流,也有時(shí)一天交談好幾個(gè)小時(shí)。
切斯基稱:“我們的關(guān)系非常密切?!眱扇酥g也從最初的商業(yè)關(guān)系發(fā)展成了友誼。
切斯基說(shuō):“他總是一本正經(jīng),表情嚴(yán)肅。他說(shuō)話的時(shí)候聲音起伏不大。初次見(jiàn)面根本無(wú)法判斷他對(duì)你項(xiàng)目的喜好程度。但他非常有激情,而且他實(shí)際上是一個(gè)很感性的人。”
即便是面對(duì)面交流,一般人也很難在林君叡身上看到這些特點(diǎn),至少對(duì)那些沒(méi)有切斯基那么了解他的人來(lái)說(shuō)是這樣。
但為了證明林君叡更情緒化的一面,切斯基還提供了另一個(gè)證據(jù):“謝家華不會(huì)讓非人文主義者做他的合伙人。”
從最初的拒絕到后來(lái)的欣然同意
除了弄錯(cuò)《黑天鵝備忘錄》的標(biāo)題外,紅杉資本還誤判了疫情引發(fā)的一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)影響:它預(yù)測(cè)民間借貸會(huì)像2001年以及2008年到2009年那樣,出現(xiàn)“顯著疲軟”。最終,雖然眾多企業(yè)和生命因?yàn)橐咔槎馐苤貏?chuàng),但疫情也對(duì)其他方面起到了推動(dòng)作用。并且風(fēng)投資金非但沒(méi)有枯竭,其流動(dòng)性反而更勝以往。
在這場(chǎng)疫情風(fēng)暴中,除了愛(ài)彼迎很快挽回頹勢(shì)外,紅杉資本的另一項(xiàng)投資,以及林君叡的董事會(huì)職位,實(shí)際上最終從疫情中獲得了豐厚回報(bào),并因此誕生了年度第二大IPO:外賣應(yīng)用程序DoorDash。
在談到這款外賣應(yīng)用程序面對(duì)疫情的最初反應(yīng)時(shí),林君叡稱:“他們真的很害怕餐廳會(huì)難以存續(xù)。那段時(shí)期一切都充滿了不確定性?!?/p>
但林君叡從未動(dòng)搖過(guò)。他和DoorDash的首席執(zhí)行官及創(chuàng)始人徐訊已經(jīng)成了朋友;自2014年紅杉投資DoorDash以來(lái),林君叡一直是徐訊的董事會(huì)成員。林君叡花好幾個(gè)小時(shí)和徐訊一起研究數(shù)據(jù),尋找趨勢(shì),并對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)預(yù)測(cè)進(jìn)行建模。
DoorDash不僅沒(méi)有迎來(lái)末日,與去年同期相比,2020年前9個(gè)月DoorDash的營(yíng)收還翻了三番。究其原因,宅在家中的美國(guó)人訂購(gòu)的外賣比以往任何時(shí)候都多。
與愛(ài)彼迎一樣,DoorDash也于去年12月上市。上市首日,公司股價(jià)收于190美元,比102美元的IPO價(jià)格足足上漲了86%。
然而,當(dāng)林君叡第一次見(jiàn)到徐訊時(shí),他并未堅(jiān)定看好DoorDash這筆投資。當(dāng)時(shí),徐訊正在試圖籌集種子輪融資,并向林君叡提出了這筆交易。但林君叡認(rèn)為,外賣市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)非常擁擠,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)過(guò)于激烈,還有Postmates、Caviar、Grubhub等一大批老牌競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手。他打電話給徐訊,告知了自己準(zhǔn)備放棄這個(gè)投資機(jī)會(huì)的決定。
林君叡表示:“我真的感到很抱歉,因?yàn)槲也⒉恢喇?dāng)時(shí)他在參加婚禮?!彪m然那并不是徐訊的婚禮(兩周后徐訊也結(jié)婚了)。但當(dāng)徐訊接到電話時(shí),他正在給朋友做伴郎。
徐訊回憶道:“感覺(jué)就像是:‘好吧,對(duì)著鏡頭微笑?!邮鼙痪芙^的現(xiàn)實(shí)真的很難,特別是在你的公司急需資金的情況下?!?/p>
林君叡表示,雖然他已經(jīng)放棄了這筆投資,但徐訊給他留下了深刻的印象:“我始終對(duì)此耿耿于懷。”
徐訊在公司情況分析中極盡細(xì)致地分析了餐廳廚房的運(yùn)營(yíng)方式,以及如何優(yōu)化流程(從烹飪流水線到送貨上門)。這給林君叡留下了深刻的印象。而徐訊的堅(jiān)韌同樣也讓林君叡印象深刻。
林君叡說(shuō):“創(chuàng)始人在創(chuàng)辦公司的時(shí)候通常不會(huì)理會(huì)別人的建議。如果他們認(rèn)真聽(tīng)取所有反饋意見(jiàn),那么他們就辦不成公司。”
謝家華創(chuàng)辦Zappos就是如此,林君叡也多次見(jiàn)證過(guò)這一點(diǎn)。
林君叡稱:“在謝家華帶領(lǐng)紅杉資本投資LinkExchange前,LinkExchange被投資人和機(jī)構(gòu)拒絕了太多次。我想可能不下十幾次?!?/p>
距離與徐訊的初次碰面又過(guò)去了幾年,在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家艾琳?李舉辦的晚宴上,林君叡碰巧與這位企業(yè)家比鄰而坐。這一次,徐訊成功說(shuō)服了他。在拒絕種子輪融資后,紅杉資本參與了DoorDash的A輪融資。(艾琳?李說(shuō):“天哪,那天的晚宴我也在場(chǎng)。我為什么沒(méi)有投資DoorDash?”)
最終,紅杉資本共計(jì)向DoorDash投資了4.15億美元,持有該公司的股份價(jià)值超過(guò)85億美元。
風(fēng)投公司Cowboy Ventures的創(chuàng)始人艾琳?李也是林君叡的朋友。在被問(wèn)及林君叡業(yè)績(jī)記錄的時(shí)候,艾琳?李開(kāi)玩笑說(shuō):“我的理想就是把工作做得足夠出色,從而有機(jī)會(huì)可以和林君叡一起投資?!?/p>
把握當(dāng)下
林君叡擅于挑選贏家,并以此而聞名。但與他共事過(guò)的企業(yè)家表示,他不僅僅是一位擅長(zhǎng)數(shù)據(jù)處理的成功人士,在他的身上還有更多閃光的特質(zhì)。
徐訊表示:“私底下,說(shuō)到真正關(guān)心企業(yè)家的人,我首先想到的就是林君叡。順便說(shuō)一句,我認(rèn)為他在某種程度上必須這么做,因?yàn)槟銌渭冎豢磾?shù)字,那么當(dāng)這些數(shù)字不存在、當(dāng)你不得不懷著某種程度的堅(jiān)信去相信一些東西的時(shí)候,你就會(huì)面臨太多棘手的時(shí)刻?!?/p>
林君叡還是Houzz的董事會(huì)成員,這是一家由聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人阿迪?塔塔科運(yùn)營(yíng)的家居設(shè)計(jì)網(wǎng)站。
塔塔科說(shuō):“從外表上看,他是一個(gè)強(qiáng)硬的人,他非常擅長(zhǎng)分析、絕頂聰明。但我相信在內(nèi)心深處他還是一個(gè)善良的人。他會(huì)與你并肩奮斗。他會(huì)大力幫助和支持他投資的創(chuàng)始人,并以我們希望的方式給我們提供支持?!?/p>
與林君叡密切合作的紅杉合伙人杰斯?李表示,林君叡之所以能夠吸引企業(yè)家,在很大程度上歸功于他對(duì)人和文化的關(guān)注。
杰斯?李說(shuō):“Zappos堪稱范本地展示了如何打造成功的公司文化。而且,我認(rèn)為就這一點(diǎn)而言,林君叡可以與謝家華平分秋色?!?/p>
在《黑天鵝備忘錄》發(fā)布大約一年后,紅杉資本又向包括塔塔科、徐訊和切斯基在內(nèi)的創(chuàng)始人發(fā)出了另一條信息。
這條信息被貼上了《新冠疫情讓未來(lái)提前到來(lái):現(xiàn)在抓住這個(gè)機(jī)遇》的標(biāo)簽。這一特殊信息采取了更為樂(lè)觀的語(yǔ)氣,預(yù)計(jì)美國(guó)將在2021年下半年迎來(lái)幾十年來(lái)“更為強(qiáng)勁的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)”。
也許是因?yàn)閴南⒖偙群孟鞑サ每?,這份特別的宣言并沒(méi)有像之前的《R.I.P. Good Times》和《黑天鵝備忘錄》那樣掀起太大的波瀾。還有一個(gè)不同之處在于,紅杉資本對(duì)初創(chuàng)公司創(chuàng)始人的建議還有另一個(gè)要素:關(guān)注其團(tuán)隊(duì)的福祉。
《備忘錄》中寫道:“我們看到,業(yè)務(wù)指標(biāo)的表現(xiàn)與這些公司中敏感人員的數(shù)量各有不同。開(kāi)誠(chéng)布公地討論員工面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。以人為本的有力領(lǐng)導(dǎo)將繼續(xù)發(fā)揮關(guān)鍵作用?!?/p>
這種論調(diào)不無(wú)道理,不僅僅是因?yàn)橐咔閷?duì)許多人的心理和身體健康造成了明顯的損害,同時(shí)也因?yàn)椋貏e是對(duì)林君叡而言,這是喜憂參半的一年。史無(wú)前例的職業(yè)巔峰與前所未有的個(gè)人低谷并存。
紅杉資本的《黑天鵝備忘錄》簽署人一欄又是簡(jiǎn)簡(jiǎn)單單的“紅杉團(tuán)隊(duì)”。但就像愛(ài)彼迎和DoorDash,以及林君叡與已故合伙人謝家華運(yùn)營(yíng)的那些公司一樣,即使他的名字沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)在最醒目的位置,我們還是不難從中辨別出林君叡的風(fēng)格。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:胡萌琦、唐塵
我和林君叡坐在紅杉資本位于舊金山的辦公室里,保持著合適的社交距離。辦公室里除了我們倆和這家風(fēng)投公司的通訊副總裁,別無(wú)旁人。
自從2010年起成為紅杉合伙人的林君叡并不健談,對(duì)我提出的每一個(gè)問(wèn)題,他都深思熟慮,言簡(jiǎn)意賅,說(shuō)完便停下來(lái)看著我,等待下一個(gè)問(wèn)題。氣氛因此而愈發(fā)沉悶。
在我15年的商業(yè)記者生涯中,從未遇到過(guò)這樣的采訪對(duì)象,他似乎覺(jué)得完全沒(méi)有必要做任何補(bǔ)充。
不過(guò),這種不露聲色的低調(diào)和空空蕩蕩的辦公室只是假象。林君叡和他所在的公司,這家硅谷最早、最聲名顯赫的風(fēng)投公司在過(guò)去一年里經(jīng)歷了大風(fēng)大浪,對(duì)科技界內(nèi)外產(chǎn)生了巨大影響。
回顧2020年,林君叡總結(jié)說(shuō):“回想起來(lái),我腦海中蹦出的詞匯是‘既興奮又疲憊’,經(jīng)歷過(guò)很多高潮,也走過(guò)不少低谷。”
他說(shuō)的高潮很容易理解。2020年,紅杉資本投資的7家公司首次公開(kāi)募股(第8家公司Clover Health采用SPAC的形式上市)。
其中愛(ài)彼迎和DoorDash是當(dāng)年最大的兩宗IPO,為投資公司帶來(lái)了目前市值總價(jià)超過(guò)230億美元的股份。退出的巨額回報(bào)讓2020年成為紅杉?xì)v史上回報(bào)率最高的一年。
這家成立于1972年、以加州巨大的紅杉樹命名的公司在過(guò)去幾十年里已經(jīng)成功投資谷歌、領(lǐng)英、甲骨文和其他眾多科技企業(yè),在2020年顯得格外輝煌。在紅杉呼風(fēng)喚雨的這一年里,林君叡更是站在了風(fēng)口浪尖,愛(ài)彼迎和DoorDash都是他的“寶貝兒”,他也擔(dān)任了這兩家公司的董事。(就此而言,紅杉更傾向于以公司主導(dǎo)的形式開(kāi)展投資,而非依賴于某位合伙人。)
至于低谷,就一言難盡了。這個(gè)方面更難量化,也更難言說(shuō),尤其是遇到沉默寡言的講述者時(shí)。
在加入紅杉成為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資人之前,林君叡曾經(jīng)與企業(yè)家謝家華共同經(jīng)營(yíng)過(guò)若干家公司,并于2009年將旗下最有名的鞋類電商平臺(tái)Zappos賣給了亞馬遜。當(dāng)時(shí),林君叡是公司的首席財(cái)務(wù)官,謝家華擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官。
有報(bào)道稱,謝家華近年來(lái)一直在嘗試戒毒戒酒。去年11月,他在康涅狄格州新倫敦因?yàn)榉课菔Щ鸲軅?,隨后去世。林君叡和謝家華是大學(xué)同學(xué),曾經(jīng)作為商業(yè)伙伴和密友一起工作了15年,用林君叡的話說(shuō):“在我人生相當(dāng)長(zhǎng)的一段時(shí)間里,每天都能夠見(jiàn)到他?!?/p>
悲劇發(fā)生在新冠疫情期間,傷痛尤難平復(fù)。謝家華去世幾天后,向來(lái)注重隱私的林君叡在《福布斯》上發(fā)表了致友人的“最后一封信”,回憶了老友對(duì)自己的鼓勵(lì),并利用這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)做最后的道別。
“想不到,在新冠病毒肆虐的世界里,這種哀悼、告別的方式竟然如此真實(shí)。”
疫情或許讓林君叡在哀悼友人之際顯得比平日里更公開(kāi),但他仍然刻意遠(yuǎn)離公眾的目光。
與硅谷的其他許多風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家不同,林君叡不常公開(kāi)講演。他在社交媒體上花的時(shí)間不多,在深受科技圈喜愛(ài)的音頻網(wǎng)絡(luò)應(yīng)用程序Clubhouse上也不活躍,只注冊(cè)賬號(hào)“嘗試”了一下。
“他沒(méi)有百萬(wàn)推特粉絲,我覺(jué)得這不是壞事?!睈?ài)彼迎的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人及首席執(zhí)行官布萊恩?切斯基說(shuō)。
在此之前,林君叡從來(lái)沒(méi)有接受過(guò)深度訪談。不過(guò),我們有幸打過(guò)兩次交道,一次是在紅杉的辦公室里,另一次是在Zoom上。他愿意公開(kāi)談?wù)勛罱鼛讉€(gè)月的瘋狂經(jīng)歷,也就是那些創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的經(jīng)濟(jì)收益和痛徹的個(gè)人損失;也同意聊聊謝家華的意外死亡對(duì)自己的影響,以及自己從已故合伙人兼朋友身上學(xué)到的東西。
對(duì)于自己在紅杉異常輝煌的2020年中所扮演的角色,他十分坦率,沒(méi)有絲毫自吹自擂。
事實(shí)上,林君叡與紅杉的關(guān)系可以追溯到他與謝家華合作之初。那是1997年,紅杉投資了他們的第一家公司LinkExchange,隨后又投資了兩人的第二家公司Zappos。2010年離開(kāi)Zappos后,林君叡以合伙人的身份加入了紅杉。
謝家華和紅杉或多或少地塑造了林君叡的職業(yè)生涯道路。不過(guò),這種影響絕非是單向的。聚光燈效應(yīng)讓外界往往忽視了林君叡對(duì)前合伙人和現(xiàn)就職公司的重要性,但林君叡以他特有的方式,不動(dòng)聲色地給二者留下了無(wú)法磨滅的印記。
“安息吧,好時(shí)光”
2008年秋天,紅杉資本的合伙人給所投資的各公司的創(chuàng)始人發(fā)了一份電子郵件,通知他們前來(lái)參加緊急全體會(huì)議,不得缺席。會(huì)議在沙丘路的Quadrus會(huì)議中心舉行,距離紅杉在加州門洛帕克的辦公室不遠(yuǎn)。
參會(huì)的創(chuàng)始人和創(chuàng)始團(tuán)隊(duì)成員總共只有一百多人,但會(huì)上傳遞的信息卻飛出了會(huì)議中心的四壁,在硅谷乃至更廣闊的創(chuàng)業(yè)界激起千層浪。
會(huì)議的目的在于向紅杉投資的公司發(fā)出嚴(yán)肅警告,讓創(chuàng)始人們意識(shí)到眼下的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退將對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)造成怎樣的打擊,并希望借此機(jī)會(huì)給他們提供一些生存建議。(一句話:凜冬將至。)
為了確保信息傳達(dá)到位,公司合伙人準(zhǔn)備了一份共計(jì)56頁(yè)的幻燈材料,題為“安息吧,好時(shí)光”。在這份籠罩著不祥氣息的演示材料里,每一張經(jīng)濟(jì)圖表數(shù)據(jù)都一落千丈,第三頁(yè)干脆不著一字,只有一把尖刀插在豬頭上。
結(jié)果可想而知,會(huì)議奏效了。
引起業(yè)界注意的不只是這些圖表和圖畫。紅杉是硅谷的王者,只要是被他們選上的公司,就一定會(huì)得到認(rèn)真對(duì)待。畢竟,從甲骨文到谷歌,不少最成功的科技公司背后都有紅杉的功勞。
因此,事情很簡(jiǎn)單:紅杉一呼,初創(chuàng)界百應(yīng)。那份不祥的幻燈片一經(jīng)發(fā)布上網(wǎng),傳播速度比最新的手機(jī)應(yīng)用程序測(cè)試邀請(qǐng)還快。硅谷新聞網(wǎng)站TechCrunch稱之為“末日陳述”。企業(yè)家們大驚失色。裁員隨之而來(lái),不僅是紅杉投資的那些公司,整個(gè)行業(yè)都在裁員。
彼時(shí),林君叡和謝家華就在沙丘路會(huì)議中心的這些企業(yè)家中。他們倆共同經(jīng)營(yíng)著Zappos,接到通知后即從Zappos總部所在地拉斯維加斯飛來(lái)。
雖然豬頭幻燈片觸目驚心,紅杉會(huì)議傳達(dá)出的悲觀信息卻并沒(méi)有讓他們驚訝。自2008年下半年起,兩人已經(jīng)注意到Zappos上的銷量開(kāi)始放緩。他們知道,此刻生死攸關(guān)。
“紅杉不會(huì)向創(chuàng)始人公布這一類內(nèi)容,除非真的非常重要、非常嚴(yán)肅?!绷志齾闭f(shuō)。
回到拉斯維加斯,他們迅速行動(dòng),裁掉了大約100名員工,占當(dāng)時(shí)Zappos總?cè)藬?shù)的8%。經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的結(jié)果正如紅杉資本所料。
“那段時(shí)間,我注意到其中有一天的銷售額同比下跌了30%?!绷志齾被貞浀馈!耙溃?dāng)時(shí)我們的年增長(zhǎng)率是30%,因此可想而知,下跌30%是相當(dāng)驚人的。事先準(zhǔn)備好應(yīng)付這種情況實(shí)在太重要了。如果我們當(dāng)初沒(méi)有看到那個(gè)演示幻燈,就不可能如此認(rèn)真對(duì)待?!?/p>
最終,Zappos不僅熬過(guò)了凜冬,甚至愈發(fā)成功,并于2009年以12億美元的價(jià)格賣給了亞馬遜。林君叡和謝家華能夠度過(guò)那段艱難時(shí)期,固然要?dú)w功于紅杉資本的指導(dǎo),更要多虧了彼此的支持。
合作十五載
林君叡和謝家華是在哈佛大學(xué)的一次宿舍聚會(huì)上認(rèn)識(shí)的。當(dāng)時(shí)林君叡四年級(jí),謝家華三年級(jí),兩人有很多的共同點(diǎn)。
“我們都戴著大眼鏡,穿著卡其褲,寬寬大大的紐扣襯衫下擺散在褲腰外?!绷志齾庇浀?,他倆站在角落里,冷靜地看著其他人開(kāi)懷暢飲。別的學(xué)生都在狂歡,他們卻討論起了商業(yè)創(chuàng)意?!?/p>
雖然我覺(jué)得謝家華的想法很瘋狂,但和他海闊天空地即興討論很有趣?!绷志齾闭f(shuō)?!凹幢闼J(rèn)為我的想法太保守?!?/p>
林君叡一直有種滿腦子數(shù)學(xué)的書呆子傾向,確切地說(shuō),不只是傾向。在談到兒時(shí)的樂(lè)趣時(shí),他說(shuō):“我們經(jīng)常玩涉及算術(shù)內(nèi)容的紙牌游戲。”
現(xiàn)年48歲的林君叡出生在中國(guó)臺(tái)灣,6歲來(lái)到美國(guó)讀小學(xué)一年級(jí)。他的父親在一家國(guó)際銀行任職,當(dāng)時(shí)被派往紐約開(kāi)設(shè)分行。他的母親原本也在銀行工作,但為了孩子的教育,搬到美國(guó)后便辭了職,成為全職媽媽。林君叡有個(gè)弟弟,兄弟倆在小學(xué)期間轉(zhuǎn)過(guò)三次學(xué)。
“倒不是為了住進(jìn)更好的公寓,而是為了進(jìn)更好的學(xué)區(qū)。”
以學(xué)業(yè)為重心的緊張童年和志趣相投的書呆子氣讓謝家華與林君叡成了好友。林君叡有條不紊,善于分析,謝家華則富有創(chuàng)造力,甚至有時(shí)不切實(shí)際。不過(guò),他們都有一個(gè)大夢(mèng)想。這一切,始于比薩。
在他們兩人居住的哈佛大學(xué)學(xué)生宿舍的一樓有一家餐廳,名叫昆西燒烤,售賣漢堡和薯?xiàng)l。但謝家華覺(jué)得,學(xué)生們真正想要的是比薩,尤其是在深夜聚會(huì)之后。
這家餐廳每年都會(huì)通過(guò)競(jìng)標(biāo)的方式招募新管理者,于是謝家華投標(biāo)了,而且要求兩年的管理權(quán)。至于報(bào)價(jià),他填的是“最高價(jià)+1美元”。這一招奏效了。
改賣比薩的想法也同樣大獲成功。謝家華投資購(gòu)買了幾臺(tái)比薩烤爐,消息傳開(kāi),餐廳門口立刻排起了長(zhǎng)隊(duì)。
林君叡當(dāng)時(shí)還不是謝家華的商業(yè)伙伴,但他找到了參與比薩投資的門路。謝家華曾經(jīng)對(duì)這個(gè)故事津津樂(lè)道,甚至把它寫進(jìn)了2010年出版的《傳遞幸?!罚―elivering Happiness,這本書主要講述的是兩人創(chuàng)造Zappos文化的經(jīng)歷)。不過(guò),林君叡回憶的版本略有不同。
兩人的關(guān)系越來(lái)越親密,林君叡也成了昆西燒烤的最佳顧客。這倒不是因?yàn)樗约撼缘枚?,而是因?yàn)樗看味紩?huì)買一整張比薩,然后再一片一片分銷出去。
根據(jù)謝家華的說(shuō)法,為了盈利,林君叡會(huì)將每片比薩加價(jià)轉(zhuǎn)賣。(也正是這一點(diǎn),讓謝家華萌生了有朝一日請(qǐng)這位朋友做自己的首席財(cái)務(wù)官的想法。)
但林君叡說(shuō),那些利潤(rùn)完全是意外所得。他說(shuō)自己從謝家華的餐廳里買比薩時(shí)就談好了折扣。因?yàn)橘?gòu)買量大,餐廳里一片比薩通常賣2美元,但賣給他則是1.25或1.5美元。然后他再把比薩送上樓按片售賣。但加價(jià)并不是為了賺取利潤(rùn)。
“我并沒(méi)有抬高價(jià)格。但25美分的硬幣是稀缺物,要留著用于自助洗衣機(jī)投幣?!庇谑?,學(xué)生們付給他2美元,而非1.25或1.5美元。
無(wú)論故事的真相如何,比薩連接起了二人的長(zhǎng)期友誼和商業(yè)伙伴關(guān)系。他們尊重彼此的商業(yè)頭腦,相互取長(zhǎng)補(bǔ)短,合作了15年。
畢業(yè)后,林君叡和謝家華去了西海岸。謝家華在甲骨文找了一份工作,但未能做長(zhǎng)久;林君叡進(jìn)入斯坦福大學(xué)攻讀博士學(xué)位,也未能堅(jiān)持下來(lái)。他們都一門心思想創(chuàng)業(yè)。
1996年,謝家華創(chuàng)辦了在線廣告平臺(tái)LinkExchange,林君叡隨即加入,成了公司的首席財(cái)務(wù)官。1998年,他們將LinkExchange賣給微軟,然后成立了一家風(fēng)投基金公司。
他們通過(guò)一宗小規(guī)模投資發(fā)現(xiàn)了一直在努力尋找增長(zhǎng)點(diǎn)的Zappos,決定收購(gòu)。謝家華擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官,林君叡任首席財(cái)務(wù)官。兩人停下其余的風(fēng)投基金項(xiàng)目,把所有資金都押在了鞋子上。
投資Zappos不僅是一項(xiàng)商業(yè)努力,它也給了兩人一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì),去定義和創(chuàng)造心目中的理想企業(yè)文化。(相比之下,LinkExchange則讓他們有機(jī)會(huì)意識(shí)到什么樣的企業(yè)文化是自己不認(rèn)同的。)他們的理念是要讓顧客和員工都滿意。這是一個(gè)革命性的想法。
Zappos呼叫中心的工作人員并不會(huì)因?yàn)榭焖俳Y(jié)束與問(wèn)題顧客的通話而受到獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。恰恰相反,他們與顧客溝通的時(shí)間越長(zhǎng),得到的認(rèn)可就越高(最長(zhǎng)的客服電話記錄為10小時(shí)51分鐘,至今仍然為公司稱道)。
他們?yōu)閆appos設(shè)立的使命包含一些非傳統(tǒng)的價(jià)值觀,比如“創(chuàng)造樂(lè)趣,與眾不同”和“敢于冒險(xiǎn),富于創(chuàng)造,思維開(kāi)闊”。憑借這種獨(dú)特的文化和創(chuàng)新的客服方式,公司成了行業(yè)分析的經(jīng)典案例。與此同時(shí),林君叡和謝家華也建起了價(jià)值數(shù)十億美元的網(wǎng)上鞋店。
Zappos被亞馬遜收購(gòu)后不久,林君叡離開(kāi)公司加入紅杉資本,謝家華則繼續(xù)留任首席執(zhí)行官直到2020年8月,也就是他去世前的幾個(gè)月。林君叡說(shuō),是謝家華幫助自己學(xué)會(huì)了如何與企業(yè)家共事,并且他的影響至今猶存。
“我覺(jué)得,我可以和謝家華愉快共事,與我擅長(zhǎng)同許多創(chuàng)始人合作,這背后的原因是一樣的。因?yàn)槲視?huì)試著分析他們的想法,并找出完善的途徑。我試著成為他們的搭檔和教練。這種嘗試,從我與謝家華共事時(shí)就開(kāi)始了?!?/p>
圍繞謝家華的死,仍然有不明朗之處,林君叡不愿意對(duì)細(xì)節(jié)發(fā)表評(píng)論。但謝家華去世后的一些文章提到了他濫用毒品和行為不穩(wěn)定的情況,以及他對(duì)火的迷戀。(謝家華嚴(yán)重受傷正是因?yàn)槲肓藵鉄?,他?dāng)時(shí)就住在康涅狄格州的那棟失火房屋內(nèi)。)
謝家華去世后,林君叡受邀參加了一場(chǎng)在Zoom上舉行的親友追思會(huì)。但他說(shuō),此舉并不能夠寄托他的哀思,也未能讓悲傷終結(jié)。于是,盡管向來(lái)行事低調(diào),他還是在網(wǎng)上發(fā)布了致謝家華的一封信。
“我想讓其他人讀到的,是我眼中的謝家華,是他身上的方方面面。有些人在謝家華一生的某個(gè)階段看到了他的某些部分。而我有幸看到他經(jīng)歷的不同階段,從一個(gè)對(duì)商業(yè)感興趣、想在宿舍樓里開(kāi)辦最佳餐廳的計(jì)算機(jī)專業(yè)的書呆子,到建立自己的第一個(gè)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)帝國(guó),再到愛(ài)上Zappos?!?/p>
林君叡見(jiàn)證了謝家華將瘋狂的想法從概念變?yōu)楝F(xiàn)實(shí),見(jiàn)證了他一次又一次籌措資金、一次又一次被拒絕。親身參與的經(jīng)歷促使林君叡成長(zhǎng)為一名企業(yè)家、一位投資者。
2020年的黑天鵝
2020年3月9日周一,紅杉資本的合伙人齊聚一堂,而這也是新冠疫情前合伙人的最后一次碰面。
早在1988年就加入紅杉資本的合伙人道格?萊昂內(nèi)表示:“我敢說(shuō)7月1日前復(fù)工無(wú)望,我賭20美元。但我希望自己不是贏家?!?/p>
2008年,萊昂內(nèi)與資深投資者邁克爾?莫里茨牽頭發(fā)起了《R.I.P. Good Times》報(bào)告。如今,主角換成了紅杉資本年輕一代的合伙人:以林君叡和羅洛夫?博塔為主要推手的《黑天鵝備忘錄》再一次引起了人們的注意。該電子郵件于3月5日發(fā)出,幾天后就是紅杉資本合伙人最后一次碰頭的日子。
只是這一次,信息并未遭到泄露。紅杉資本在Medium平臺(tái)上公開(kāi)發(fā)布了電子郵件的內(nèi)容。
備忘錄的開(kāi)篇第一句話就非常不吉利:“冠狀病毒是2020年的那只黑天鵝。你們(以及我們)當(dāng)中的某些人已經(jīng)受到了這種病毒的影響。我們了解你們所承受的壓力,我們?cè)敢鉃槟銈兲峁椭?。鑒于生命受到威脅,我們希望情況可以盡快好轉(zhuǎn)。在此期間,我們應(yīng)該做好應(yīng)對(duì)動(dòng)蕩的防范,并做好可能出現(xiàn)情況的思想準(zhǔn)備?!?/p>
備忘錄最后的署名是“紅杉團(tuán)隊(duì)”。但結(jié)尾部分被單獨(dú)拎出來(lái)的合伙人卻只有林君叡。
《黑天鵝備忘錄》引用了林君叡的一段話:“2008年金融危機(jī)之前,我被叫到紅杉辦公室聽(tīng)取那個(gè)臭名昭著的《R.I.P. Good Times》報(bào)告,那時(shí)候我正擔(dān)任Zappos的首席運(yùn)營(yíng)官/首席財(cái)務(wù)官。和現(xiàn)在一樣,那時(shí)我們不知道將要面對(duì)的衰退會(huì)持續(xù)多久,也不清楚是急劇衰退還是緩慢下行。我能夠確認(rèn)的是,那次報(bào)告讓我們的團(tuán)隊(duì)和企業(yè)變得更加強(qiáng)大了。競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手遭到重創(chuàng),而Zappos則挺過(guò)了金融危機(jī),已經(jīng)準(zhǔn)備好抓住他們留下的機(jī)遇。”
紅杉資本和林君叡的預(yù)測(cè)基本上是正確的。但他們肯定會(huì)因?yàn)檫@個(gè)標(biāo)題(以及其他幾個(gè)預(yù)言,我們將在后面進(jìn)行討論)而遭到詬病。
林君叡稱:“有人說(shuō)(疫情)是完全可以預(yù)見(jiàn)的,所以它不是一只黑天鵝?!彼€補(bǔ)充道,那么多人因?yàn)橐咔橥蝗粊?lái)襲而措手不及,這個(gè)事實(shí)就能夠用標(biāo)題來(lái)加以凸顯。
不僅如此,他還表示:“這個(gè)標(biāo)題可以吸引人眼球?!?/p>
紅杉資本對(duì)疫情給投資組合公司帶來(lái)直接沖擊的影響范圍或持續(xù)時(shí)間一無(wú)所知。但該公司認(rèn)為,這種病毒的影響至少會(huì)持續(xù)幾個(gè)季度,供應(yīng)鏈將受到極大影響。
和2008年一樣,紅杉資本再次建議其投資組合公司低調(diào)行事,重新評(píng)估員工數(shù)量和其他支出。
擔(dān)任愛(ài)彼迎、DoorDash等十多家公司董事會(huì)成員的林君叡與幾位企業(yè)家一起經(jīng)歷了數(shù)次重大危機(jī)。在2009年紅杉資本早期押注愛(ài)彼迎之際,林君叡還未加入紅杉資本。2012年,擔(dān)任愛(ài)彼迎董事的合伙人離開(kāi)了紅杉資本,留出了一個(gè)職位空缺。愛(ài)彼迎的首席執(zhí)行官及聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人切斯基請(qǐng)求莫里茨讓林君叡擔(dān)任公司董事。
切斯基說(shuō):“我是藝術(shù)學(xué)校出身,沒(méi)有公司運(yùn)營(yíng)經(jīng)驗(yàn)。(林君叡)懂運(yùn)營(yíng),具有非常出色的分析能力。我們之間有點(diǎn)類似陰和陽(yáng)的那種共生關(guān)系?!?/p>
林君叡還幫助Zappos打造了令愛(ài)彼迎創(chuàng)始人欽佩的企業(yè)文化。他和謝家華共同經(jīng)歷了兩次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退(除2008年金融危機(jī)外,“9?11”事件后Zappos的銷售額也受到了沖擊)。事實(shí)證明,對(duì)切斯基而言,這些經(jīng)驗(yàn)和知識(shí)都非常寶貴。
2013年左右,林君叡實(shí)際上每周都會(huì)有一天時(shí)間在愛(ài)彼迎辦公。當(dāng)時(shí)正值愛(ài)彼迎的高速增長(zhǎng)期,切斯基也在努力壯大與之相匹配的高管團(tuán)隊(duì)。除此之外,切斯基還需要應(yīng)付監(jiān)管訴訟和平臺(tái)上的歧視事件,急需一位幫助他處理日常管理事務(wù)的首席運(yùn)營(yíng)官。此時(shí),林君叡登場(chǎng)了,他至少能夠臨時(shí)性協(xié)助切斯基加強(qiáng)客戶服務(wù)和內(nèi)部運(yùn)營(yíng)。
切斯基稱:“我和他一起經(jīng)歷了很多?!钡舜涡鹿谝咔閷?huì)以一種全新的方式考驗(yàn)愛(ài)彼迎。
2020年3月,愛(ài)彼迎的業(yè)務(wù)量下降了80%。
切斯基說(shuō):“危機(jī)也是識(shí)人的機(jī)會(huì)。林君叡的身上具備了所有我期望的特質(zhì)。他樂(lè)觀而穩(wěn)重。他支持我們,并且實(shí)際上也以捍衛(wèi)者的身份挺身而出?!?/p>
為了應(yīng)對(duì)營(yíng)收大幅下降的困境,愛(ài)彼迎必須做出舉債或股本融資的決定。舉債風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更高,但成本相對(duì)較低。林君叡是舉債的堅(jiān)定支持者。他不想讓愛(ài)彼迎經(jīng)歷增發(fā)股票帶來(lái)的一輪“降價(jià)融資”:股本增加,但公司估值降低。他對(duì)公司后續(xù)反彈能力充滿信心。
切斯基在談到董事會(huì)和林君叡處理這一決定的方式時(shí)指出:“這有點(diǎn)像是羅夏測(cè)試,看你站在哪一方?!?/p>
愛(ài)彼迎最終選擇舉債20億美元。該公司推遲了原定于2020年早些時(shí)候的首次公開(kāi)募股,并最終在去年12月上市。紅杉資本共計(jì)向愛(ài)彼迎投資了3.75億美元。如今,紅杉資本持有的愛(ài)彼迎在短租市場(chǎng)的股份價(jià)值高達(dá)150億美元。IPO后,林君叡應(yīng)允了切斯基讓其繼續(xù)擔(dān)任董事會(huì)成員的邀約。
在新冠疫情最嚴(yán)重的時(shí)候,兩人每周會(huì)交談數(shù)次,有時(shí)是每天都交流,也有時(shí)一天交談好幾個(gè)小時(shí)。
切斯基稱:“我們的關(guān)系非常密切?!眱扇酥g也從最初的商業(yè)關(guān)系發(fā)展成了友誼。
切斯基說(shuō):“他總是一本正經(jīng),表情嚴(yán)肅。他說(shuō)話的時(shí)候聲音起伏不大。初次見(jiàn)面根本無(wú)法判斷他對(duì)你項(xiàng)目的喜好程度。但他非常有激情,而且他實(shí)際上是一個(gè)很感性的人。”
即便是面對(duì)面交流,一般人也很難在林君叡身上看到這些特點(diǎn),至少對(duì)那些沒(méi)有切斯基那么了解他的人來(lái)說(shuō)是這樣。
但為了證明林君叡更情緒化的一面,切斯基還提供了另一個(gè)證據(jù):“謝家華不會(huì)讓非人文主義者做他的合伙人?!?/p>
從最初的拒絕到后來(lái)的欣然同意
除了弄錯(cuò)《黑天鵝備忘錄》的標(biāo)題外,紅杉資本還誤判了疫情引發(fā)的一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)影響:它預(yù)測(cè)民間借貸會(huì)像2001年以及2008年到2009年那樣,出現(xiàn)“顯著疲軟”。最終,雖然眾多企業(yè)和生命因?yàn)橐咔槎馐苤貏?chuàng),但疫情也對(duì)其他方面起到了推動(dòng)作用。并且風(fēng)投資金非但沒(méi)有枯竭,其流動(dòng)性反而更勝以往。
在這場(chǎng)疫情風(fēng)暴中,除了愛(ài)彼迎很快挽回頹勢(shì)外,紅杉資本的另一項(xiàng)投資,以及林君叡的董事會(huì)職位,實(shí)際上最終從疫情中獲得了豐厚回報(bào),并因此誕生了年度第二大IPO:外賣應(yīng)用程序DoorDash。
在談到這款外賣應(yīng)用程序面對(duì)疫情的最初反應(yīng)時(shí),林君叡稱:“他們真的很害怕餐廳會(huì)難以存續(xù)。那段時(shí)期一切都充滿了不確定性?!?/p>
但林君叡從未動(dòng)搖過(guò)。他和DoorDash的首席執(zhí)行官及創(chuàng)始人徐訊已經(jīng)成了朋友;自2014年紅杉投資DoorDash以來(lái),林君叡一直是徐訊的董事會(huì)成員。林君叡花好幾個(gè)小時(shí)和徐訊一起研究數(shù)據(jù),尋找趨勢(shì),并對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)預(yù)測(cè)進(jìn)行建模。
DoorDash不僅沒(méi)有迎來(lái)末日,與去年同期相比,2020年前9個(gè)月DoorDash的營(yíng)收還翻了三番。究其原因,宅在家中的美國(guó)人訂購(gòu)的外賣比以往任何時(shí)候都多。
與愛(ài)彼迎一樣,DoorDash也于去年12月上市。上市首日,公司股價(jià)收于190美元,比102美元的IPO價(jià)格足足上漲了86%。
然而,當(dāng)林君叡第一次見(jiàn)到徐訊時(shí),他并未堅(jiān)定看好DoorDash這筆投資。當(dāng)時(shí),徐訊正在試圖籌集種子輪融資,并向林君叡提出了這筆交易。但林君叡認(rèn)為,外賣市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)非常擁擠,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)過(guò)于激烈,還有Postmates、Caviar、Grubhub等一大批老牌競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手。他打電話給徐訊,告知了自己準(zhǔn)備放棄這個(gè)投資機(jī)會(huì)的決定。
林君叡表示:“我真的感到很抱歉,因?yàn)槲也⒉恢喇?dāng)時(shí)他在參加婚禮?!彪m然那并不是徐訊的婚禮(兩周后徐訊也結(jié)婚了)。但當(dāng)徐訊接到電話時(shí),他正在給朋友做伴郎。
徐訊回憶道:“感覺(jué)就像是:‘好吧,對(duì)著鏡頭微笑。’要接受被拒絕的現(xiàn)實(shí)真的很難,特別是在你的公司急需資金的情況下?!?/p>
林君叡表示,雖然他已經(jīng)放棄了這筆投資,但徐訊給他留下了深刻的印象:“我始終對(duì)此耿耿于懷?!?/p>
徐訊在公司情況分析中極盡細(xì)致地分析了餐廳廚房的運(yùn)營(yíng)方式,以及如何優(yōu)化流程(從烹飪流水線到送貨上門)。這給林君叡留下了深刻的印象。而徐訊的堅(jiān)韌同樣也讓林君叡印象深刻。
林君叡說(shuō):“創(chuàng)始人在創(chuàng)辦公司的時(shí)候通常不會(huì)理會(huì)別人的建議。如果他們認(rèn)真聽(tīng)取所有反饋意見(jiàn),那么他們就辦不成公司。”
謝家華創(chuàng)辦Zappos就是如此,林君叡也多次見(jiàn)證過(guò)這一點(diǎn)。
林君叡稱:“在謝家華帶領(lǐng)紅杉資本投資LinkExchange前,LinkExchange被投資人和機(jī)構(gòu)拒絕了太多次。我想可能不下十幾次?!?/p>
距離與徐訊的初次碰面又過(guò)去了幾年,在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家艾琳?李舉辦的晚宴上,林君叡碰巧與這位企業(yè)家比鄰而坐。這一次,徐訊成功說(shuō)服了他。在拒絕種子輪融資后,紅杉資本參與了DoorDash的A輪融資。(艾琳?李說(shuō):“天哪,那天的晚宴我也在場(chǎng)。我為什么沒(méi)有投資DoorDash?”)
最終,紅杉資本共計(jì)向DoorDash投資了4.15億美元,持有該公司的股份價(jià)值超過(guò)85億美元。
風(fēng)投公司Cowboy Ventures的創(chuàng)始人艾琳?李也是林君叡的朋友。在被問(wèn)及林君叡業(yè)績(jī)記錄的時(shí)候,艾琳?李開(kāi)玩笑說(shuō):“我的理想就是把工作做得足夠出色,從而有機(jī)會(huì)可以和林君叡一起投資?!?/p>
把握當(dāng)下
林君叡擅于挑選贏家,并以此而聞名。但與他共事過(guò)的企業(yè)家表示,他不僅僅是一位擅長(zhǎng)數(shù)據(jù)處理的成功人士,在他的身上還有更多閃光的特質(zhì)。
徐訊表示:“私底下,說(shuō)到真正關(guān)心企業(yè)家的人,我首先想到的就是林君叡。順便說(shuō)一句,我認(rèn)為他在某種程度上必須這么做,因?yàn)槟銌渭冎豢磾?shù)字,那么當(dāng)這些數(shù)字不存在、當(dāng)你不得不懷著某種程度的堅(jiān)信去相信一些東西的時(shí)候,你就會(huì)面臨太多棘手的時(shí)刻?!?/p>
林君叡還是Houzz的董事會(huì)成員,這是一家由聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人阿迪?塔塔科運(yùn)營(yíng)的家居設(shè)計(jì)網(wǎng)站。
塔塔科說(shuō):“從外表上看,他是一個(gè)強(qiáng)硬的人,他非常擅長(zhǎng)分析、絕頂聰明。但我相信在內(nèi)心深處他還是一個(gè)善良的人。他會(huì)與你并肩奮斗。他會(huì)大力幫助和支持他投資的創(chuàng)始人,并以我們希望的方式給我們提供支持。”
與林君叡密切合作的紅杉合伙人杰斯?李表示,林君叡之所以能夠吸引企業(yè)家,在很大程度上歸功于他對(duì)人和文化的關(guān)注。
杰斯?李說(shuō):“Zappos堪稱范本地展示了如何打造成功的公司文化。而且,我認(rèn)為就這一點(diǎn)而言,林君叡可以與謝家華平分秋色?!?/p>
在《黑天鵝備忘錄》發(fā)布大約一年后,紅杉資本又向包括塔塔科、徐訊和切斯基在內(nèi)的創(chuàng)始人發(fā)出了另一條信息。
這條信息被貼上了《新冠疫情讓未來(lái)提前到來(lái):現(xiàn)在抓住這個(gè)機(jī)遇》的標(biāo)簽。這一特殊信息采取了更為樂(lè)觀的語(yǔ)氣,預(yù)計(jì)美國(guó)將在2021年下半年迎來(lái)幾十年來(lái)“更為強(qiáng)勁的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)”。
也許是因?yàn)閴南⒖偙群孟鞑サ每?,這份特別的宣言并沒(méi)有像之前的《R.I.P. Good Times》和《黑天鵝備忘錄》那樣掀起太大的波瀾。還有一個(gè)不同之處在于,紅杉資本對(duì)初創(chuàng)公司創(chuàng)始人的建議還有另一個(gè)要素:關(guān)注其團(tuán)隊(duì)的福祉。
《備忘錄》中寫道:“我們看到,業(yè)務(wù)指標(biāo)的表現(xiàn)與這些公司中敏感人員的數(shù)量各有不同。開(kāi)誠(chéng)布公地討論員工面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。以人為本的有力領(lǐng)導(dǎo)將繼續(xù)發(fā)揮關(guān)鍵作用。”
這種論調(diào)不無(wú)道理,不僅僅是因?yàn)橐咔閷?duì)許多人的心理和身體健康造成了明顯的損害,同時(shí)也因?yàn)?,特別是對(duì)林君叡而言,這是喜憂參半的一年。史無(wú)前例的職業(yè)巔峰與前所未有的個(gè)人低谷并存。
紅杉資本的《黑天鵝備忘錄》簽署人一欄又是簡(jiǎn)簡(jiǎn)單單的“紅杉團(tuán)隊(duì)”。但就像愛(ài)彼迎和DoorDash,以及林君叡與已故合伙人謝家華運(yùn)營(yíng)的那些公司一樣,即使他的名字沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)在最醒目的位置,我們還是不難從中辨別出林君叡的風(fēng)格。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:胡萌琦、唐塵
Alfred Lin and I are seated—at an acceptable social distance—in Sequoia Capital’s San Francisco office. It’s empty. No one is here except for me, Lin, and the venture capital firm’s VP of communications. The quiet is even more pronounced because Lin, a partner at Sequoia since 2010, isn’t a big talker. He answers each of the questions I pose thoughtfully and economically. When he’s finished, he stops. He looks at me, waits for the next question. Unlike almost every other person I’ve interviewed in the past 15 years of my career as a business journalist, he feels no need to fill the silent gaps in conversation.
But Lin’s disarmingly low-key presence—and his vacant office—are misleading. Both the man and the firm, one of the oldest and most venerable venture capital shops in Silicon Valley, have had a hell of a year, generating plenty of noise in the tech world and beyond. “Reflecting on it, the words that come out of my head are ‘both exhilarating and exhausting at the same time,’” Lin says when asked how he would sum up his 2020. “There were a lot of highs and a lot of lows.”
The highs are easy enough to unpack. Seven of Sequoia’s portfolio companies IPOed in 2020 (an eighth, Clover Health, joined the public markets via a SPAC). Two of those, Airbnb and DoorDash, were the biggest IPOs of the year, earning the investment firm stakes currently worth more than $23 billion, collectively. These so-called exits helped make 2020 one of Sequoia’s strongest years ever in terms of returns, a notable achievement especially when you consider that the firm, founded in 1972 and named after California’s giant redwood trees, has invested in the likes of Google, LinkedIn, Oracle, and many other humongous tech successes over the decades. Lin was at the forefront of Sequoia’s monster year: Airbnb and DoorDash are his “babies,” and he sits on the boards of both. (Sequoia, for its part, prefers to present its investments as firm-led as opposed to affiliated with any one particular partner.)
The lows are more complicated. They are also harder to quantify—and much harder to talk about, particularly if you’re someone who is not prone to talking much.
Before becoming a venture capitalist at Sequoia, Lin had run several businesses with the entrepreneur Tony Hsieh—their most famous venture was the online footwear marketplace Zappos, which they sold to Amazon in 2009. Lin was the company’s CFO; Hsieh was its CEO. Hsieh, who had reportedly been struggling with drug and alcohol use in recent years, died last November, after suffering injuries in a house fire in New London, Conn. The two had been college classmates and spent 15 years working together as business partners—and close friends. “This is someone that, for a period of my life, I saw every single day,” says Lin. The fact that the personal tragedy struck in the midst of a pandemic made it that much harder to digest and heal. Lin, who tends to be very private, published a “final letter” to Hsieh in Forbes just days after his friend’s death, in which he highlighted some of the ways Hsieh had inspired him. He also used the opportunity to say a final goodbye. “It was a surprisingly authentic way of mourning and grieving and getting closure in the COVID world,” says Lin.
But while the pandemic may have pushed Lin to be more public than usual in his healing process, he remains very much out of the limelight—by design. Unlike a lot of other Silicon Valley venture capitalists, Lin doesn’t do a lot of public speaking. He doesn’t spend much time on social media. He’s never been been active on Clubhouse, the audio-based networking app that went viral in tech circles. (He set up an account just to “test” it out.) “He doesn’t have a million followers on Twitter, and I don’t think that’s a bad thing,” says Brian Chesky, cofounder and CEO of Airbnb.
Lin has never participated in an in-depth profile; this is his first. But he sat down with me twice, once in Sequoia’s office and once over Zoom, and was willing to talk openly about the wild ride he has been on in recent months, the record financial gains and deep personal loss. He agreed to talk about the impact Hsieh’s unexpected death had on him, and what he learned from his late partner and friend. And he was open, though definitely not boastful, about the part he played in Sequoia’s exceptionally fruitful 2020.
Lin’s relationship with Sequoia actually started back in the days when he was first working with Hsieh, after the VC firm invested in their first company, LinkExchange, in 1997. Sequoia also invested in Zappos, the duo’s second company. And then, after leaving Zappos in 2010, Lin joined Sequoia as a partner.
Both Hsieh and Sequoia have shaped Lin’s career in ways large and small. But that influence has been far from a one-way street. It’s easy to miss in the blinding spotlight that has shone on his former partner and his current firm. But Lin, in his characteristically quiet way, made an indelible mark on each of them as well.
“R.I.P. Good Times”
In the fall of 2008, Sequoia’s partners sent an email to the founders of all of their portfolio companies, asking them to come in for a mandatory, all-hands emergency meeting. More than 100 founders and founding team members gathered for the event, which took place in the Quadrus Conference Center on Sand Hill Road, close to the firm’s office in Menlo Park, Calif. But the message that was relayed at the meeting reverberated way beyond those four walls—prompting a sonic boom throughout Silicon Valley and the broader startup world.
The aim of the meeting was to issue a dire warning to Sequoia’s portfolio companies about just how far south the unfolding recession might send the global economy and, hopefully, provide some tips for how to survive. (In a nutshell: Hunker down.) To drive the message home, the firm’s partners had prepared an ominous, 56-slide presentation, titled “R.I.P Good Times,” which featured all sorts of economic charts sloping downward precipitously. The third slide was simply a knife plunged into a pig’s head—nothing else. Not surprisingly, the deck was effective.
It wasn’t just the visuals that got the industry’s attention. Sequoia was a kingmaker in Silicon Valley—if the firm invested in your company, you were taken seriously. After all, Sequoia was behind some of the biggest tech successes around, from Oracle to Google. So it was simple: When the firm spoke, the startup world listened. The foreboding slide deck was posted online, spreading faster than a beta invite for the latest mobile app. Silicon Valley news site TechCrunch called it a “presentation of doom.” Entrepreneurs freaked out. Layoffs ensued, not just at Sequoia portfolio companies but across the industry.
Lin, who was running Zappos with Hsieh at that time, was one of the entrepreneurs who had piled into the Sand Hill Road conference center. So was Hsieh—the two had flown out together from Las Vegas, where Zappos is headquartered.
But while the Sequoia presentation rattled them—it’s hard to ignore a pig head—its pessimistic message didn’t come as a surprise. The two had already seen sales at Zappos begin to soften in the second half of 2008. They knew it was a dire moment. “Sequoia doesn’t publish any of this stuff to founders unless it’s super important and serious,” says Lin.
Back in Las Vegas, they acted quickly, laying off around 100 employees, 8% of the Zappos workforce at that time. The downturn turned out to be as bad as Sequoia had predicted. “During that time, I noticed there was one day where our sales dropped 30% year over year,” Lin recalls. “I mean, we were growing 30% year over year. To see sales drop 30%, it was quite jarring. And to be able to be prepared for that was quite important. I think if we had not seen that presentation, we wouldn’t have taken it as seriously.”
In the end, Zappos was able to weather the storm. The company even managed to come out stronger, selling to Amazon for $1.2 billion in 2009. But it wasn’t just Sequoia’s guidance that had gotten Lin and Hsieh through the tough times. It was also each other.
A 15-year partnership
The two met as college students, at a dorm party at Harvard University. Lin was a senior, Hsieh was a junior. They had a lot in common. “We were both wearing big glasses and khakis, oversized button-down shirts that were hanging out,” says Lin. As he remembers it, the two of them stood toward the back of the room, observing the others as the crowd got more and more tipsy. While the other students partied, they discussed business ideas. “It was entertaining just to riff with him even if I thought [Hsieh’s ideas] were crazy,” says Lin. “And even if he thought I was thinking too conventionally.”
Lin had always had a nerdy, mathematical streak—okay, more than a streak. “We did a lot of card games that involved a lot of math,” Lin says when asked what he did for fun as a kid.
The 48-year-old moved from Taiwan to the United States when he was just 6, in first grade. His dad had been sent out to New York to open a branch for the international bank where he worked. Lin’s mom had a career in banking too, but she stopped working and became a stay-at-home mom when they moved to the U.S., in order to focus on her children’s education. Lin has a younger brother, and the two boys switched elementary schools three times. “It wasn’t for a better apartment, it was just for a better school district,” he recalls.
Hsieh and Lin bonded over their academically intense childhoods and their nerdy proclivities. But while Lin was methodical and analytical, Hsieh was creative and, sometimes, unrealistic. They both dreamed big, though. Starting with pizza.
There was a restaurant on the ground floor of their dormitory at Harvard, called the Quincy House Grille. It served burgers and fries. Hsieh believed that what college students really wanted, especially after a late night of partying, was pizza. He put in a bid to manage the restaurant; it was up for new management every year. But he did it his way. Instead of the usual one-year deal, he asked for two. For his offer price, meanwhile, he entered, “highest bid + $1.” It worked. And so did the pizza. Hsieh invested in a couple of pizza ovens for the restaurant; word spread, and soon the place had a line out the door.
Lin wasn’t Hsieh’s business partner—yet. But he found a way to get in on the pizza venture anyway. It’s a story Hsieh used to recall often. He even told it in the book he published in 2010, Delivering Happiness, which highlighted the culture the two had created at Zappos. But Lin has a slightly different version.
The two had grown close, and Lin had become Hsieh’s best customer at the Quincy House Grille. It wasn’t because he ate a lot himself. He would buy a full pie, then resell the individual pizza slices. The way Hsieh told the story, Lin charged more money for each slice in order to turn a profit. (And that’s how Hsieh knew he wanted his friend to someday become his CFO.) But as Lin tells it, he kind of fell into the profit part. He says he had negotiated a discount for the pizzas he bought from Hsieh, because he was purchasing such large quantities. So instead of the $2 per slice that the restaurant typically charged, he was getting his pies for about $1.25 or $1.50 per slice. Then he’d run the pizzas upstairs to sell by the slice. But the price hike wasn’t about profits. “I didn’t mark it up, but quarters were a prized commodity because they were needed for washing machines,” says Lin. So instead of $1.25 or $1.50, students gave him $2 per slice.
Whatever the real story is, the pizza connection helped solidify a long-standing friendship and business partnership between the two. They respected each other’s business acumen immensely. They complemented each other. And they would end up working together for 15 years.
Lin and Hsieh eventually ventured West. Hsieh took a job at Oracle, which didn’t last long, and Lin started a Ph.D. program at Stanford University, which also didn’t last long. They both caught the startup bug. Hsieh founded LinkExchange, an online ad marketplace, in 1996. Lin came on board to be his CFO shortly after. After selling LinkExchange to Microsoft in 1998, they started a venture fund. Then they discovered Zappos, which was one of their smaller investments, and decided to take it over; it had been struggling to figure out how to grow. Hsieh came in as CEO, and Lin as CFO. They wound down their venture fund and went all in on shoes.
Zappos wasn’t just a business endeavor. It also gave the two entrepreneurs an opportunity to define and create the kind of culture they wanted to immerse themselves in. (LinkExchange, meanwhile, had given them an opportunity to discover the kind of culture they didn't necessarily want to create.) Their idea? To make both customers and employees happy. It was revolutionary. At Zappos, call center workers weren’t rewarded for getting off the phone quickly with problem customers. It was the opposite—the more time they dedicated to talking through issues with customers, the more they were recognized (the longest customer service call logged in at 10 hours, 51 minutes, and is still celebrated by the company). And the broader mission at Zappos? It included unconventional values like “Create fun and a little weirdness” and “Be adventurous, creative, and open-minded.” The company became a case study for its unique culture and innovative approach to customer service. And in the process, Lin and Hsieh also built a multibillion-dollar online shoe store.
Lin left Zappos and joined Sequoia shortly after the Amazon acquisition, while Hsieh stayed on as CEO until August 2020, just months before his death. But Lin says the impact Hsieh had on him is lasting, and helps inform how he works with entrepreneurs to this day. “I think the reason I was good at working with Tony Hsieh, is the same reason I’m good at working with a lot of founders,” says Lin. “Because I try to parse their ideas and figure out how to make them better. I try to be a partner and a coach to them. And that started early on with Tony.”
The circumstances around Hsieh’s death are still murky—and Lin did not want to comment on the details. But articles that were published after Hsieh’s passing painted a picture of drug abuse and all sorts of erratic behavior, including a reported fascination with fire. (Hsieh’s fatal injuries were a result of smoke inhalation from the house fire in Connecticut, where he was staying at the time of his death.)
After Hsieh passed away, Lin was invited to join a memorial for friends and family, an attempt to commemorate the entrepreneur over Zoom. He says it didn’t provide him with the kind of forum he needed to grieve or get closure. That’s why, even though he’s usually very private, he published his letter to Hsieh online.
“I think what I wanted to get across for other people to read, is just the different facets of Tony that I saw,” says Lin. “I think there are certain people that saw certain pieces of Tony throughout different parts of his life. And I had the privilege of seeing him through many different phases, from a nerdy computer science person who was interested in business and wanted to create the best restaurant in a dorm building, to building a first Internet empire, to falling in love with Zappos.”
Lin had watched Hsieh take a crazy idea from concept to reality; he had watched him fundraise and deal with rejection, over and over again. And being exposed to that process, and very much a part of it, helped define him as an entrepreneur—and as an investor.
The Black Swan of 2020
The last time Sequoia’s partners all gathered in person, pre-COVID, was Monday, March 9, 2020. “I made a $20 bet that we wouldn’t be back in the office by July 1st,” says Doug Leone, a partner at Sequoia since 1988. “It was a bet I was hoping I would lose.”
Along with veteran investor Michael Moritz, Leone had been one of the lead instigators of the “R.I.P. Good Times” presentation back in 2008. Now, it was Lin and Roelof Botha, another of the firm’s younger generation of partners who would be the main drivers in Sequoia’s next message to go viral: the “Black Swan” memo. The email went out on March 5, just a few days before the firm’s last in-person gathering. Only this time, it wasn’t leaked. Sequoia published it on Medium.
“Coronavirus is the black swan of 2020,” were the ominous first words in the memo. “Some of you (and some of us) have already been personally impacted by the virus. We know the stress you are under and are here to help. With lives at risk, we hope that conditions improve as quickly as possible. In the interim, we should brace ourselves for turbulence and have a prepared mindset for the scenarios that may play out.”
The message was signed by “Team Sequoia.” But toward the bottom, just one of the firm’s partners was called out: Alfred Lin.
“I was serving as the COO/CFO of Zappos when I was summoned to Sequoia’s office for the infamous R.I.P. Good Times presentation in 2008, prior to the financial crisis,” Lin was quoted as saying in the Black Swan memo. “We didn’t know then, just like we don’t know now, how long or how sharp or shallow of a downturn we will face. What I can confirm is that the presentation made our team and our business stronger. Zappos emerged from the financial crisis ready to seize on opportunities after our competitors had been battered and bruised.”
Sequoia—and Lin—got their prognostications mostly right. But they definitely got dinged for the title (and a few other prophecies, which we’ll get into later).
“There are people who say [the pandemic] was completely foreseeable so therefore it’s not a black swan,” says Lin, adding that the fact that it caught so many people by surprise does merit the headline. Besides, says Lin, “it was catchy.”
Sequoia had no idea exactly how big or how long of a hit its portfolio companies would take as a direct result of the pandemic. But the firm thought the effect of the virus would last at least a few quarters, and that supply chains would be greatly impacted. Just as they had back in 2008, Sequoia again advised its portfolio companies to hunker down, to reevaluate headcount and other expenses.
Lin, who sits on more than 10 boards, including Airbnb and DoorDash, had already been through major crises with several of his entrepreneurs. Sequoia had initially invested in Airbnb in 2009, before Lin joined the firm. In 2012, the partner who had been on Airbnb’s board left Sequoia, leaving a position that needed to be filled. Chesky, Airbnb’s CEO and cofounder, asked Moritz to put Lin on his board. “I went to art school and had no operations experience,” says Chesky. “[Alfred] had operational discipline; he is highly analytical. We are a bit of yin and yang, a symbiotic relationship.”
Lin had also helped build a culture at Zappos that Airbnb’s founders admired. And he, along with Hsieh, had been through not just one but two downturns (in addition to the 2008 economic crisis, Zappos sales had taken a hit post-9/11). All of that experience and knowledge turned out to be very valuable for Chesky. Around 2013, Lin actually spent one day a week in the Airbnb office. It was a period of hypergrowth for the company, when Chesky was struggling to expand his executive leadership team at a clip to match. The CEO was also juggling regulatory lawsuits and instances of discrimination on the platform, and he didn’t have a chief operating officer to help him handle day-to-day management. Enter Lin, who, at least on a temporary basis, assisted Chesky with ramping up customer service and internal operations. “I went through a lot with him,” says Chesky. But the pandemic would test Airbnb in a whole new way.
In March 2020, the company’s business dropped by 80%.
“You learn a lot about people in a crisis,” says Chesky. “Alfred was everything I hoped he would be. He was optimistic and steady. He stood by us; he actually leaned in as a champion.”
Airbnb had to decide whether to raise debt or equity to get through the massive drop in sales. Debt was riskier but cheaper. Lin was a big proponent. He didn’t want Airbnb to take a “down round”—raising equity but lowering the company’s valuation. And he was confident in the company’s ability to rebound in the future. “It was a bit of a Rorschach test for which side you’re on,” Chesky says of the way his board, and Lin, handled the decision.
Airbnb eventually took on $2 billion in debt. It delayed its IPO, originally slated for earlier in 2020, and then finally went public at the end of the year, in December. Sequoia had invested a collective $375 million in Airbnb. Today, its stake in the vacation rental marketplace is worth a staggering $15 billion. After the IPO, Chesky asked Lin to remain on the Airbnb board. Lin agreed.
At the height of the pandemic, the two had talked multiple times a week, sometimes every single day, sometimes hours a day. “We have a very close relationship,” says Chesky. What began as a business relationship has also developed into a friendship.
“He has a poker-faced countenance,” says Chesky. “His voice doesn’t inflect very much when he talks. You don’t know how much he likes you when you first meet him. But he’s extremely passionate, and he’s actually emotional.”
It’s hard to see those characteristics in Lin, even when face-to-face, at least for those who don’t know him as well as Chesky does. But the Airbnb CEO has another proof point for Lin’s more emotive side: “Tony Hsieh would not have had a non-humanist as his partner.”
Saying no—then yes
It wasn’t just the title of the Black Swan memo that Sequoia got a little wrong. It also misjudged a financial aspect of the pandemic, predicting that private financing could “soften significantly,” as had happened in 2001 and 2008–09. In the end, while the virus wreaked havoc on many businesses and many lives, it provided a boon to others. And venture capital dollars, instead of drying up, flowed like never before. Amid the chaos, it wasn’t just Airbnb that bounced back. Another of Sequoia’s investments, and Lin’s board positions, actually ended up profiting immensely from the pandemic, resulting in the second-biggest IPO of the year: food delivery app DoorDash.
“They were really scared that restaurants wouldn’t survive,” Lin says of the takeout delivery app’s initial reaction to the virus. “It was a very uncertain time.”
But Lin never wavered. He and Tony Xu, CEO and founder of DoorDash, had already become close; Lin had been on Xu’s board since Sequoia invested in the company in 2014. Lin spent hours crunching the numbers with Xu, looking for trends and modeling financial projections. Instead of a doomsday scenario, another picture soon emerged: In the first nine months of 2020, DoorDash tripled its revenue, compared with the same time period a year before. The cause? Housebound Americans were ordering more food deliveries than ever before.
Like Airbnb, DoorDash ended up going public in December. In its first day of trading, shares of the company closed at $190, a full 86% above the IPO price of $102.
When Lin first met Xu, though, he wasn’t so sure that DoorDash would be a good investment. At the time, Xu was trying to raise a seed round of financing, and had pitched Lin on the deal. But Lin thought the food delivery space was already crowded and overly competitive, with a slew of well-established rivals like Postmates, Caviar, and Grubhub. He called Xu to tell him that he was passing on the opportunity. “I felt really bad because I didn’t realize he was at a wedding,” says Lin. It wasn’t Xu’s wedding—that came two weeks later. But he was one of the groomsmen at a friend’s ceremony when he got the call.
“It was like, ‘Okay, smile for the cameras,’” recalls Xu. “It was tough, tough to take that rejection, especially when your company doesn’t have much money.”
Though he’d passed on the investment, Lin says Xu made an impression on him: “There was something I just couldn’t get out of my head.”
Xu had been incredibly detailed in his analysis of his business, in the breakdown of how restaurant kitchens operate and how to optimize the process, from cooking lines to front-door delivery. That had impressed Lin. So had Xu’s tenacity. “Founders start companies by ignoring everybody’s advice,” says Lin. “If they listened carefully to all the feedback, they would just not start the companies.”
That certainly had been the case with Hsieh, as Lin had witnessed several times over. “With Tony [Hsieh], I don’t know how many people said no to LinkExchange before Sequoia invested,” says Lin. “I think it was probably a dozen.”
A few years after first meeting Xu, Lin happened to sit down next to the entrepreneur at a dinner put on by venture capitalist Aileen Lee. This time around, he was persuaded. Sequoia participated in DoorDash’s Series A funding round, after passing on the seed. (“God, I was at the same dinner,” says Lee. “Why didn’t I invest in DoorDash?”)
In the end, Sequoia invested a collective $415 million in DoorDash, and the firm’s stake is now worth over $8.5 billion. “I dream of being good enough at my job in order to invest with Alfred,” Lee, founder of investment firm Cowboy Ventures and a friend of Lin’s, jokes when asked about his track record.
Seize the day
Lin has made a name for himself by picking winners. But the entrepreneurs who have worked with him say there’s much more to him—that he’s more than a successful guy who knows how to crunch data.
“You know, behind the scenes, Alfred is a person who I think first and foremost genuinely cares about the entrepreneur,” says Xu. “I think he kind of has to, by the way, because there’s going to be too many tough moments if you’re just looking at the numbers when the numbers don’t exist, and when you have to believe in something with some level of conviction.”
Lin is also on the board of Houzz, a home design site run by cofounder Adi Tatarko. “From the outside he’s a tough person, he’s very analytical and supersmart,” says Tatarko. “But I believe inside he’s a soft person in a good way. He’s in it with you. He goes a very long way to support his founders and to support us the way we want him to support us.”
Jess Lee, a Sequoia partner who works closely with Lin, says his attention to people and culture is a huge part of his appeal to entrepreneurs. “Zappos literally wrote the book on how to build a great company culture,” says Lee. “And, you know, I think that was just as much Alfred as Tony [Hsieh].”
About a year after the Black Swan memo, Sequoia issued yet another message to its founders, including Tatarko, Xu, and Chesky. This one was labeled “COVID Accelerated the Future: Now Seize It.” This particular communication took a much more optimistic tone, projecting that the U.S. was poised for “stronger economic growth” in the second half of 2021 than we’ve seen in decades.
Perhaps because bad news travels faster than good news, this particular manifesto didn’t set off quite the same waves as the R.I.P. Good Times and Black Swan communications had in the past. And unlike those previous memos, there was another element to Sequoia’s advice to startup founders: a focus on the well-being of their teams.
“We’re seeing a difference between how business metrics are performing and how many people in those companies are feeling,” the memo read. “Keep an open dialogue about the challenges your employees face. Strong leadership that puts people first will continue to be critical.”
The tone made sense, not only because of the obvious toll the pandemic had taken on the mental and physical health of many. But also because, particularly for Lin, the year had been a mixed bag. Unprecedented professional highs had coexisted with unprecedented personal lows. Once again, the firm’s memo was simply signed by “Team Sequoia.” But just like Airbnb and DoorDash, and the companies he had run with his late partner, Hsieh, Lin’s touch was palpable, even if his name wasn’t front and center.