????核工業(yè)用半衰期來衡量放射性物質(zhì)保持放射性的時間。這個概念說明的是放射性物質(zhì)的放射性衰減一半所需的時間。比如，鈾235的半衰期是7億年。在工業(yè)時代，商業(yè)模式的半衰期通常按世代（約30年）來計(jì)算。一旦某個公司確定了如何創(chuàng)造價值，交付價值并獲取價值回報的基本規(guī)則，這些規(guī)則就會變得根深蒂固，由各職能部門予以強(qiáng)化，并通過鞏固公司文化加以維系。

????這樣的時代已經(jīng)終結(jié)。工業(yè)時代已經(jīng)一去不復(fù)返了。商業(yè)模式的半衰期正在縮短。今天的商界領(lǐng)袖要么得在運(yùn)營現(xiàn)行商業(yè)模式的同時，學(xué)習(xí)如何改變這一模式，要么就得做好被“網(wǎng)飛化”的準(zhǔn)備。

????網(wǎng)飛不是個動詞，但它應(yīng)該包含以下含義：

????1. 擾亂現(xiàn)有商業(yè)模式，或給它帶來混亂。

????2. 破壞曾大獲成功的商業(yè)模式。

????3. 顛覆現(xiàn)行的價值創(chuàng)造、交付及獲取模式。

????電影出租巨頭百視達(dá)公司（Blockbuster）以一套引人矚目的商業(yè)模式起家。其價值主張清晰明了，即讓消費(fèi)者在家中舒適地觀賞大片。依靠遍布各地的便捷店鋪，百視達(dá)建立了龐大的價值交付網(wǎng)絡(luò)。1985年，百視達(dá)第一家店開張，很快就發(fā)展到超過5,000家零售店，擁有60,000名員工。在獲取價值方面，該公司還擁有一套堪稱高明的融資模式。消費(fèi)者發(fā)現(xiàn)，與外出看電影的花費(fèi)相比，它的大片租賃價格頗具吸引力。與制片商合作的常規(guī)模式是向其支付大筆的預(yù)付費(fèi)（每部作品高達(dá)65美元），而百視達(dá)另辟蹊徑，采取了與制片方分享收入的合作模式，這樣每部大片就只需支付少許預(yù)付費(fèi)，甚至可以分文不付。這種模式給它帶來了巨大優(yōu)勢，讓它實(shí)現(xiàn)了飛速增長。百視達(dá)一路走來可謂順風(fēng)順?biāo)?002年，它達(dá)到了發(fā)展頂峰，市值高達(dá)50億美元。但到了2010年，它卻突然申請破產(chǎn)。原因何在？原來它被“網(wǎng)飛”了。

????百視達(dá)并不是對網(wǎng)飛公司的誕生視而不見。他們只是過于執(zhí)著于自己的實(shí)體商業(yè)模式，無法跳出這個框框。換言之，他們困在固有的商業(yè)模式中，不知變通。DVD技術(shù)出現(xiàn)后，該公司并未將其視為對自身商業(yè)模式的威脅，也沒有將它看成是一種破壞性的技術(shù)。相反，在他們眼中，DVD有利于其業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)展，可以改善其實(shí)體商業(yè)模式的業(yè)績。然而，1997年，里德?哈斯?。ňW(wǎng)飛公司首席執(zhí)行官——譯注）對百視達(dá)的服務(wù)大為光火，之后，局面就開始為之一變。那年，他因?yàn)闆]有按期歸還《阿波羅13號》（Apollo 13）這部影片而被百視達(dá)要求交滯納金。事實(shí)證明，他并不是唯一一個討厭支付滯納金的顧客。然而，百視達(dá)當(dāng)時一心一意拓展既有的商業(yè)模式，對自己即將被“網(wǎng)飛”掉幾乎毫無意識。

????網(wǎng)飛公司并沒有發(fā)明任何新技術(shù)。DVD光盤存儲技術(shù)早已問世了。它所發(fā)明的是一種全新的商業(yè)模式。

????1999年，網(wǎng)飛公司摒棄了百視達(dá)的“每片付租”（pay-per-rental）模式，轉(zhuǎn)而采用了一種訂閱模式：用戶只需要支付固定費(fèi)用，就能盡情租片觀賞，免去了到期還片日、滯納金、運(yùn)費(fèi)和手續(xù)費(fèi)等一系列麻煩。這一模式允許用戶每月只需支付固定費(fèi)用，就能在家中舒適地?zé)o限量觀賞大片。新模式一經(jīng)推出就引發(fā)市場熱捧：推出的第一年，公司銷售額從100萬美元猛增至500萬美元。創(chuàng)立5年后，網(wǎng)飛的銷售額就達(dá)到了5億美元，到了第8年，這個數(shù)字就變成了10億美元。2002年，網(wǎng)飛公司的訂閱用戶有100萬人；2006年，增至500萬；，2010年，就達(dá)到了1,400萬人。這還真不是個小眾買賣！

????百視達(dá)犯下了多數(shù)公司都會犯的錯誤，即低估了新技術(shù)和新商業(yè)模式的破壞性威脅，直至一切為時已晚。百視達(dá)固守自己的實(shí)體商業(yè)模式，天真地將網(wǎng)飛公司視為可以忽略不計(jì)的小眾市場開拓者。因?yàn)檩p視網(wǎng)飛公司，他們付出了慘重的代價。等到他們試圖有所反應(yīng)時，大勢已去。積重難返，他們既有的商業(yè)模式限制重重、壓力巨大，已難以逾越和克服。于是，百視達(dá)就這么遭遇了被“網(wǎng)飛”的命運(yùn)。

????The nuclear industry measures how long a radioactive material will retain its potency by its half-life -- the time it takes for the material to lose half of its radioactivity. The half-life of Uranium-235 is 700 million years, for example. During the industrial era the half-life of a business model was typically measured in generations. Once the basic rules for how a company creates, delivers, and captures value were established, they became etched in stone, fortified by functional silos and sustained by reinforcing company cultures.

????Those days are over. The industrial era is not coming back. The half-life of a business model is declining. Today's leaders are either going to learn how to change their business models while pedaling the bicycle of the current one or they are going to be "netflixed."

????If netflix isn't a verb it should be.

????net-flix

????1. to cause disruption or turmoil to an existing business model

????2. to destroy a previously successful business model

????3. to displace the way value is currently created, delivered, and captured

????Blockbuster started out with a compelling business model. Its value proposition was clear, enabling consumers to watch hit movies in the comfort of their homes. Blockbuster established an extensive value delivery network with stores conveniently located on every corner. Its first store opened in 1985 and it quickly grew to have over 5,000 retail outlets and 60,000 employees. It also had a smart financing model to capture value. It rented hit movies at a price consumers found attractive relative to the price of going out to the movies. Instead of paying a large upfront fee to buy videos from the studio (up to $65 per video) Blockbusters entered into a revenue sharing model with the movie studios including little to no upfront costs per video which gave them a huge advantage fueling explosive growth. Blockbuster started out on a roll. At its peak in 2002 Blockbuster's market cap rose to $5 billion. In 2010 in filed for bankruptcy. So what happened? Blockbuster was netflixed.

????It wasn't as if Blockbuster didn't see Netflix (NFLX) coming. They were just so committed to their bricks and mortar business model they couldn't see or act beyond it. They were stuck in their current business model. Blockbuster didn't see the emergence of DVD technology as a threat to their business model. They didn't see it as a disruptive technology. They saw DVDs as a sustaining technology to improve the performance of their current brick and mortar business model. That all changed in 1997 when Reed Hastings got pissed off because he was charged a late fee by Blockbuster after failing to return the movie, Apollo 13, by the due date. Turns out, Reed Hastings was not alone in hating paying late fees. Blockbuster was so focused on expanding its current business model it had no clue it was about to be netflixed.

????Netflix didn't invent any new technology. DVD optical disc storage technology had already been invented. What Netflix invented was a new business model.

????In 1999, Netflix moved away from Blockbuster's pay-per-rental model and introduced a subscription model where customers paid a flat-fee for unlimited rentals without due dates, late fees or shipping and handling fees. Netflix's business model story was to enable consumers to watch as many movies as they want in the comfort of their home for a fixed monthly price. The new business model caught fire with annual sales going from $1 million to $5 million in its first year. Within five years Netflix was a $500 million business and within eight years it had reached $1 billion in sales. In 2002, Netflix had one million subscribers growing to over 5 million in 2006 and over fourteen million in 2010. Hardly a niche business!

????Blockbuster made the mistake most companies make in underestimating the disruptive threat of new technologies and innovative business models until it is too late. Blockbuster remained stuck in their bricks and mortar business model, naively treating Netflix as a niche player that they could ignore. They underestimated Netflix at their own peril. They attempted to react but too late. The constraints and pressures of their existing business model proved too great to overcome. Blockbuster was netflixed.