????某種商業(yè)模式一度曾大獲成功，但有朝一日，顛覆性技術(shù)和新商業(yè)模式開(kāi)始崛起，取而代之，這就是百視達(dá)的遭遇。這種遭遇并非百視達(dá)的專利。所有的商業(yè)模式都有被“網(wǎng)飛”的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。甚至網(wǎng)飛公司自己需要警惕被“網(wǎng)飛”的威脅。

????毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，對(duì)網(wǎng)飛公司商業(yè)模式最大的毀滅性威脅來(lái)自電影現(xiàn)在可以在線下載和觀賞。總有一天，用錄像帶和DVD來(lái)觀賞數(shù)字化視頻將成為一種過(guò)時(shí)的做法?，F(xiàn)在，網(wǎng)飛已經(jīng)開(kāi)始試驗(yàn)在線提供電影，并運(yùn)用新的定價(jià)機(jī)制，以此大幅改進(jìn)其商業(yè)模式。然而，網(wǎng)飛公司能避免自己被“網(wǎng)飛”掉的命運(yùn)嗎？

????起初，網(wǎng)飛公司試著在現(xiàn)有的商業(yè)模式中捆綁流媒體，作為新產(chǎn)品推出。對(duì)希望通過(guò)郵件和在線流媒體兩種方式觀賞影片的用戶，公司推出了一個(gè)頗受歡迎的定價(jià)方案：每月只需花上9.99美元，就能享受無(wú)限量觀賞流媒體，以及每次郵寄一部DVD電影的服務(wù)。這個(gè)方案廣受歡迎，但對(duì)網(wǎng)飛公司來(lái)說(shuō)，隨著成本日益上漲，它并不是個(gè)可持續(xù)運(yùn)營(yíng)的計(jì)劃。流媒體版權(quán)費(fèi)用不斷上漲，提供流媒體服務(wù)所需的帶寬、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和服務(wù)支持等方面的成本也在增加，這些都使每月只需少許費(fèi)用就能暢享流媒體和DVD郵寄租賃的服務(wù)變得難以為繼。如果沒(méi)有足夠現(xiàn)金購(gòu)買熱門作品的流媒體版權(quán)，網(wǎng)飛公司就難以取悅喜歡流媒體的用戶。此外，顯而易見(jiàn)的是，對(duì)只愿意通過(guò)郵件低價(jià)觀影的人來(lái)說(shuō)，要他們付更多的錢觀看實(shí)時(shí)流媒體電影肯定也無(wú)從談起。因此，采取折中措施在所難免。

????2011年7月，網(wǎng)飛向所有用戶宣布了一項(xiàng)大幅提價(jià)計(jì)劃。公司決定，終止9.99美元的捆綁定價(jià)服務(wù)，轉(zhuǎn)而將這兩項(xiàng)服務(wù)分拆，每項(xiàng)定價(jià)7.99美元。這意味著高達(dá)60%的漲價(jià)幅度。用戶立刻做出了反應(yīng)，一時(shí)間滿是怒斥之聲，網(wǎng)絡(luò)上怨聲載道。同時(shí)超過(guò)100萬(wàn)用戶選擇用腳投票，退訂了網(wǎng)飛的服務(wù)。網(wǎng)飛DVD郵寄租賃服務(wù)的商業(yè)模式運(yùn)作大獲成功，但用到與郵寄服務(wù)捆綁的提供在線流媒體服務(wù)時(shí)卻不怎么管用了。

????結(jié)果，僅僅兩個(gè)月后，網(wǎng)飛公司就再次推出新舉措。2011年9月，公司決定分拆為兩個(gè)獨(dú)立的業(yè)務(wù)單元。其中運(yùn)營(yíng)在線流媒體業(yè)務(wù)的將繼續(xù)以Netflix為品牌開(kāi)展經(jīng)營(yíng)，而另一個(gè)獨(dú)立業(yè)務(wù)單元將重新命名為Qwikster，運(yùn)營(yíng)公司傳統(tǒng)的DVD郵寄租賃服務(wù)。顯然，網(wǎng)飛公司明白，要在以DVD郵寄租賃服務(wù)為核心的商業(yè)模式下發(fā)展流媒體業(yè)務(wù)是行不通的。

????對(duì)諸位商界領(lǐng)袖來(lái)說(shuō)，可從里德?哈斯汀經(jīng)營(yíng)網(wǎng)飛公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)中汲取的最重要的教訓(xùn)來(lái)自他簡(jiǎn)明扼要但意味深長(zhǎng)的肺腑之言：“回顧過(guò)去，我認(rèn)識(shí)到，因?yàn)樵?jīng)的成功，我在不知不覺(jué)中變得驕傲自滿起來(lái)?！痹谝黄┛椭校^續(xù)娓娓道來(lái)：“我對(duì)網(wǎng)飛最大的擔(dān)憂一直是，我們無(wú)法從DVD業(yè)務(wù)上的成功大步邁向流媒體業(yè)務(wù)上的成功。大多數(shù)在某種業(yè)務(wù)上成就不凡的企業(yè)——比如美國(guó)在線公司（AOL）的撥號(hào)上網(wǎng)服務(wù)，或者伯得思書店（Borders bookstores）——往往因?yàn)閾?dān)心開(kāi)拓新業(yè)務(wù)有損原有業(yè)務(wù)，在人們需要的新鮮事物上就變得無(wú)所作為了（對(duì)我們來(lái)說(shuō)新事物就是流媒體）。最終，這些企業(yè)意識(shí)到，在新事物上投入不足就會(huì)錯(cuò)失良機(jī)，隨后開(kāi)始拼命彌補(bǔ)，想要彌補(bǔ)錯(cuò)誤，然而此時(shí)已經(jīng)希望渺茫。企業(yè)很少會(huì)因發(fā)展太快而一敗涂地，它們倒是經(jīng)常會(huì)因?yàn)楣悴磺岸鴫劢K正寢?！?/p>

????然而，在流失了100多萬(wàn)用戶，并且流失速度變得難以遏制后不到一個(gè)月，里德?哈斯汀又宣布，網(wǎng)飛再次改變決策，不會(huì)繼續(xù)推進(jìn)獨(dú)立的Qwikster商業(yè)模式和業(yè)務(wù)。公司將繼續(xù)對(duì)在線業(yè)務(wù)和DVD郵寄租賃業(yè)務(wù)及兩者的定價(jià)實(shí)行打包經(jīng)營(yíng)。讓人驚訝的是，在他宣布該決定的講話中，他否定了自己所謂的“企業(yè)很少會(huì)因發(fā)展太快而一敗涂地”這一提法。他說(shuō)：“發(fā)展迅速和發(fā)展太快并不是一回事。”耳聞目睹網(wǎng)飛自己陷入被“網(wǎng)飛”的境地真讓人痛心。

????我不知道這部大片的結(jié)局將會(huì)如何，但有一點(diǎn)是毋庸置疑的。商業(yè)模式已不再像過(guò)去那樣經(jīng)得起時(shí)間考驗(yàn)了。它們變得容易被“網(wǎng)飛”。任何人，任何企業(yè)都無(wú)法幸免，網(wǎng)飛自身也不例外。

????索爾?卡普蘭@skap5是商業(yè)創(chuàng)新工場(chǎng)（Business Innovation Factory）的創(chuàng)始人和主要推動(dòng)者。

????譯者：清遠(yuǎn)

????The Blockbuster story is about a business model that was successful until a disruptive technology and a new business model displaced it. The story isn't unique to Blockbuster. All business models are vulnerable to being netflixed. Even Netflix has to worry about being netflixed.

????Of course, the biggest threat of disruption to Netflix's business model comes from the ability to download or watch movies directly online. It is only a matter of time until both videocassettes and DVDs seem like an antiquated way to access digital video content. Netflix has been aggressively evolving its business model experimenting with new online movie offerings and pricing models. But can Netflix avoid being netflixed itself?

????Netflix initially tried to bundle streaming as a new product offering within its current business model. For customers that wanted to access movies through both the mail and online streaming it offered a popular pricing plan of unlimited streaming and one movie out by mail at a time for $9.99 a month. Many liked the offer but with increasing costs it wasn't a sustainable proposition for Netflix. The growing cost of streaming rights and the increasing costs for bandwidth, infrastructure and support to make streaming available were making a one low price per month for unlimited streaming and DVD delivery untenable for Netflix. Without the cash to gain streaming rights for popular content Netflix would not be able to please customers interested in streaming. And of course customers who were only interested in a low price mail delivery model had no interest in paying higher prices for real time movie streaming. Something had to give.

????Netflix announced a whopper of a price increase to all of its customers in July of 2011. They decided to get rid of the $9.99 bundled price plan and to separate the two offerings each priced individually at $7.99. It was a 60% price increase and customer reaction was immediate and angry. Blog posts and comments piled up across the Web in reaction and over a million customers voted with their feet by unsubscribing to the Netflix service. The business model that had worked so well for the DVD-by-mail service did not work well to deliver online streaming bundled with the mail service.

????It only took two months for Netflix's next move. In September of 2011 it decided to split up into two discreet business units. One for online streaming continuing to operate under the name Netflix and another independent business unit established under the new name Qwikster to operate the company's legacy DVD-by-mail service. It became clear to Netflix that trying to grow the streaming business within the core DVD-by-mail business model wouldn't work.

????The most important lesson for all leaders to take away from Reed Hastings' experience at Netflix is from his simple but profound admission, "In hindsight, I slid into arrogance based upon past success". Hastings goes on to say in a blog post, "My greatest fear at Netflix has been that we wouldn't make the leap from success in DVDs to success in streaming. Most companies that are great at something -- like AOL (AOL) dialup or Borders bookstores – do not become great at new things people want (streaming for us) because they are afraid to hurt their initial business. Eventually these companies realize their error of not focusing enough on the new thing, and then the company fights desperately and hopelessly to recover. Companies rarely die from moving too fast, and they frequently die from moving too slowly".

????And then less than a month later after losing over 1 million customers and the bleeding continuing Reed Hastings announced Netflix had changed its mind again and would not be going forward with a separate Qwikster business model and unit. They would continue to blend the online and DVD-by-mail offerings and pricing. He amazingly contradicted his comment that companies rarely die from moving too fast in his announcement saying, "There is a difference between moving quickly and moving too fast." It was painful to hear and to watch Netflix in the throws of being netflixed.

????I don't know how the movie will turn out but one thing is clear. Business models just don't last as long as they used to. They are all vulnerable to being netflixed. No one and no organization are immune, not even Netflix.

????Saul Kaplan @skap5 is the Founder and Chief Catalyst of the Business Innovation Factory.