????今年夏天，竊聽丑聞被曝光，新聞集團（News Corp）遭遇重創(chuàng)，甚至動搖了公司的根基。時至今日，這個傳媒帝國仍未能走出陰影。與此同時，一個重大的問題也日益突出：公司深陷危機，新聞集團的股東們都到哪里去了？

????實際上，業(yè)內(nèi)對新聞集團竊聽丑聞的關(guān)注已有數(shù)年之久。然而，最近的詳細調(diào)查顯示，新聞集團9月2日收到的代理委托書中竟然沒有一份與此相關(guān)的股東提案。公司股東的集體沉默在管理界幾乎達到了登峰造極的地步。

????美國基督教兄弟投資服務(wù)公司（Christian Brothers Investment Services）領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的投資者聯(lián)盟計劃在該集團于10月21日召開的股東年度大會上提交議案，分離集團的CEO和董事會主席職位。竊聽丑聞令新聞集團舉步維艱，同時也暴露出這個傳媒巨頭獨立管理的缺失；相形之下，這份提案以及沒有出現(xiàn)其它相關(guān)提案這一事實表明，股東對事態(tài)的反應(yīng)相當無力。

????最近幾天，很多股東呼吁通過投票來反對某些董事會成員的連任。同時，代理顧問服務(wù)公司ISS建議新聞集團股東在今年的股東大會上改選幾名董事會成員，包括新聞集團董事長兼CEO魯伯特?默多克和他的兩個兒子。

????但奇怪的是，為什么新聞集團股東卻遲遲沒有回應(yīng)？

????難道目睹竊聽丑聞曝光以及董事會獨立性的明顯缺失，股東依然選擇袖手旁觀？ 又或者在過去幾年中，新聞集團的一錯再錯早已耗盡了他們的精力？我倒希望真的是這樣！

????據(jù)悉，2010年，新聞集團收到的代理委托書中只包括兩份股東提案。一項提案源于對中國新聞自由的關(guān)注，建議在新聞集團建立人權(quán)委員會；另一項提議是建立“薪酬話語權(quán)”制度，美國國會同年通過的《多德-弗蘭克法案》（Dodd-Frank Act）強制要求執(zhí)行這項制度。但不幸的是，兩項提案無一例外均被否決。

????另外，2010年，英國 F&C資產(chǎn)管理公司以及內(nèi)森?卡明斯基金會（Nathan Cummings Foundation)曾提議投票反對董事會審計委員會主席羅德?埃丁頓繼續(xù)連任，因為新聞集團曾分別向共和黨州長協(xié)會（Republican Governors' Association）和主要為共和黨選舉服務(wù)的美國商會（Chamber of Commerce）捐贈了100萬美元。

????盡管董事會疏于對該公司政治獻金的監(jiān)督讓集團投資者極為不滿，但是埃丁頓并沒有因此出局，反而以53,900萬支持票對4，100萬反對票的絕對優(yōu)勢再次當選。

????2009年的情況又如何呢？股東們沒有任何提案。2008年呢？也沒有。

????2007年呢？當年共有兩項股東提案。一項提案建議董事會成員選舉每年舉辦一次。而這項提案在2008年又被作為新聞集團公司的提案出現(xiàn)。

????另一項提案建議取消雙重股權(quán)機構(gòu)，采取單一股權(quán)制。雖然該提案對公司有利，但仍然被眾多股東否決，慘遭擱置。

????毋庸置疑，要改變魯伯特?默多克領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的傳媒帝國實非易事。目前，魯伯特?默多克掌握著約四成甚至更多有投票權(quán)的股份，與2007年約30%相比有所增長。

????然而，股東們甚至鮮有嘗試，這才是問題的癥結(jié)所在。而新聞集團的法人股東通常只關(guān)心管理方面的問題。

????如今，一切都已塵埃落定，股東們終于按捺不住了，紛紛向法院提起訴訟，矛頭直指董事會辦事不力。然而我們依然要問：他們早干嘛去了？為什么沒有盡早采取行動？

????事實上，新聞集團所呈現(xiàn)出的這種現(xiàn)象并非特例：例如，一些董事會不懂受托監(jiān)督公司的業(yè)務(wù)，甚至有些久經(jīng)世故的大股東們連他們投資的基礎(chǔ)何在都不甚了解——知道一切難以挽回。

????實際情況是，法人股東的力量一般較為分散，顯得過于薄弱，導(dǎo)致他們最終無法有效工作。撥亂反正需要集中法人股東的集體力量，就像在一家企業(yè)中眾多證券分析師所做的那樣。公司的股東們必須團結(jié)起來，共同決定如何劃分各投資者分管公司的“勢力范圍”；之后，職責(zé)分明的股東們必須統(tǒng)帥各自分管的公司及其業(yè)務(wù)，有效行使股東會賦予的權(quán)力。

????現(xiàn)在，雖然一些股東們確實對資源進行了小規(guī)模的整合，但是投資（當然還包括管理活動）本身就存在競爭性，而這種競爭性必然會阻礙有效合作的形成。一些公司治理評級機構(gòu)試圖以咨詢代理的身份建議投資者采取有效的行動，但最終都以失敗告終。

????試想，如果投資者自己不關(guān)注，不采取行動，出現(xiàn)公司治理不善的局面又何足為奇？即便導(dǎo)致金融危機也在意料之中，因為金融危機就是眾多公司管理者管理不善的產(chǎn)物。投資者必須提高意識，采取更加積極的態(tài)度，才能真正有效地促進資本市場體系的繁榮，并充分發(fā)揮資本市場體系的作用，而不是在事后依靠法律訴訟解決問題。

????本文作者愛麗諾?布洛斯罕現(xiàn)任董事會咨詢機構(gòu)價值聯(lián)盟和公司治理聯(lián)盟（The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance）（http://thevaluealliance.com）的首席執(zhí)行官。

????譯者：李淑玉/汪皓

????As News Corp continues to endure the after effects of a hacking scandal that shook the company to its core this past summer, one question in particular still looms large: Where have the company's shareholders been all this time?

????Concerns related to the hacking scandal at News Corp (NWS) have spanned several years, but amid all the recent scrutiny, the company's latest proxy, filed on September 2, did not include a single proposal from shareholders. In the governance world, that's about as silent as shareholders can be.

????One shareholder group, Christian Brothers Investment Services, plans to bring a proposal to the annual meeting on October 21 calling for the separation of the CEO and chair positions. But that single proposal -- and the lack of others -- is a very tepid response to the scandals roiling the company and the lack of independent governance at the media giant.

????Some shareholders in recent days are now calling for votes against the reelection of certain members of the board. And proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services recently recommended that News Corp shareholders not reelect several board members, including chairman and CEO Rupert Murdoch, and his sons.

????But why has any response from shareholders been so long in coming?

????Have shareholders of News Corp just stood by as the hacking issues were revealed and the lack of board independence was evident? Or is their current silence just weariness from repeated failed activism in prior years? If only.

????In 2010, there were only two shareholder proposals on News Corp's proxy filing. One proposal was to establish a human rights committee at News Corp, arising out of concerns related to freedom of the press in China. The second related to establishing a vote on "say on pay," which had already been mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act for the following year. Both shareholder proposals were voted down, in any case.

????In addition, in 2010, there were also calls by British asset manager F&C and by the Nathan Cummings Foundation to vote against the reelection of the board's audit committee chair, Sir Rod Eddington based on concerns related to the $1 million donation News Corp. made to the Republican Governors' Association and another $1 million to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

????The investors were displeased with the lack of board oversight of political spending. But Eddington sailed through his reelection, with 539 million votes in his favor and 41 million against.

????What about 2009? No shareholder proposals. 2008? No shareholder proposals.

????2007? There were two shareholder proposals that year. One was to elect directors annually. News Corp itself put forth this proposal in 2008.

????Another shareholder proposal to eliminate the dual class of shares and create a single class of stock was also on the docket that year, which might have been helpful but was defeated by shareholders.

????Yes, the bar is set high when it comes to making changes at News Corp. Rupert Murdoch holds around 40% or more of the company's voting class shares now, up from around 30% in 2007.

????But the lack of trying is the conundrum in this case. Institutional shareholders of News Corp are those who often concern themselves with governance matters.

????Now, after all that has transpired, shareholder lawsuits are under way. While these suits take aim at the passive board, the question remains: where were the shareholders before and why did they not take action sooner?

????While the News Corp case is one example, it is not unique: like some boards of directors who do not understand the business of the companies they have been entrusted to oversee, often even large, sophisticated shareholders remain unaware of the underpinnings of their investments -- until it's too late.

????The fact is that, as a general matter, institutional shareholders are spread too thin – and fail to do their jobs effectively. To right the ship would require large institutional shareholders to organize much like securities analysts do within a single firm. They would have to come together to agree which investor would "cover" a certain set of companies and then stay on top of governance and other business practices for those particular companies.

????While some funds do pool their resources on a small scale, investing (and governance activism, for that matter) is competitive by nature – and that presents an obstacle to effective cooperation. Governance rating services, some of which have attempted to act as information agents, have also failed to effectively rouse investors to action.

????But If investors do not pay attention or take action, who can be surprised at poor governance -- or financial crises which are the product of governance issues at multiple companies? To truly be effective in influencing the prosperity and accountability of the capital markets system, investors must be aware and active -- rather than rely on lawsuits after the fact.

????Eleanor Bloxham is CEO of The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (http://thevaluealliance.com), a board advisory firm.