????高盛的這項(xiàng)新協(xié)議令人質(zhì)疑首席獨(dú)立董事真正的獨(dú)立性?！蔼?dú)立董事們當(dāng)前決定，應(yīng)由公司治理與任命委員會的主席出任首席獨(dú)立董事。”但勞埃德?布蘭克費(fèi)恩稱，董事會選擇委員會主席“會參考董事長的意見”。

????根據(jù)新的指引，首席獨(dú)立董事將向“董事長和首席執(zhí)行官匯報獨(dú)立董事們的所有想法、顧慮和事宜?！?不加區(qū)分、凡事一律匯報的要求并不符合董事會的獨(dú)立宗旨，不僅不能促進(jìn)、反而可能會扼殺獨(dú)立董事間良好的溝通。首席獨(dú)立董事只有在征得獨(dú)立董事允許的情況下，才能進(jìn)行這樣的匯報。因?yàn)楹芸赡軙幸恍┟舾惺乱?，?dú)立董事們希望先形成自己的觀點(diǎn)，然后再與首席執(zhí)行官討論。獨(dú)立董事至少應(yīng)該有機(jī)會權(quán)衡各種各種選擇。

????根據(jù)高盛新的方案，首席獨(dú)立董事也會負(fù)責(zé)一年一度的首席執(zhí)行官評估。但是，還是那個問題，這位董事能有多獨(dú)立呢？

????高盛的這項(xiàng)幕后協(xié)議也反映了當(dāng)前的一股趨勢。今年以來，美國股東們與公司的對話比以往任何時候都要活躍。這在某種程度上是因?yàn)椤靶匠晖镀睓?quán)”以及代理投票權(quán)措施為新的對話提供了可能——而且如今美國股東們也越來越習(xí)慣這個流程了。隨著股東參與度的增加，必然會有一些失敗的實(shí)驗(yàn)。林德斯萊稱，在“提交美國州縣市雇員聯(lián)盟提案前”沒有和高盛進(jìn)行過“高級別”對話，甚至根本就“沒有進(jìn)行過這樣的嘗試”。

????美國股東們應(yīng)仔細(xì)考慮他們愿意和誰談判以及什么時候是合適的談判時機(jī)。美國州縣市雇員聯(lián)盟關(guān)于這一提案的討論是與高盛高管成員約翰?羅杰斯進(jìn)行的，林德斯萊稱羅杰斯“通情達(dá)理”。根據(jù)結(jié)果判斷，如果當(dāng)初股東和獨(dú)立董事都能坐下來參與協(xié)商，可能會取得更好的成果。

????美國股東們還必須警惕小勝即安，事態(tài)往往容易被大人物所左右。

????美國很多公司都已拆分了首席執(zhí)行官和董事長的職務(wù)，因此，美國州縣市雇員聯(lián)盟的建議絕對談不上牽強(qiáng)。高盛的企業(yè)治理現(xiàn)狀也早該有人管管了?？丛谒腥说姆萆?，我們希望高盛達(dá)成的下一宗交易不會只對其首席執(zhí)行官有好處。

????本文作者埃莉諾?布洛斯罕是董事會咨詢機(jī)構(gòu)——價值聯(lián)盟及公司治理聯(lián)盟（The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance）的首席執(zhí)行官。

????譯者：早稻米

??? Goldman's new scheme calls into question the true independence of the lead director. "The independent directors have currently determined that the chairperson of the corporate governance and nominating committee shall be the lead director." But the board chooses committee chairs "taking into account the views of the Chairman," Lloyd Blankfein

????And the lead director, under the new guidelines, will be "reporting to the Chairman and CEO any views, concerns and issues of the independent directors." A blanket requirement to report is not in the best interest of the board's independence and may, in fact, stifle rather than foster good communication among the independent members. The lead director should not be making such a report unless the independent directors agree. There could very well be sensitive matters that the independent directors may wish to form an opinion on before they discuss them with the CEO -- and the independent members at least should have the opportunity to weigh those options.

????Under Goldman's new plan, the lead director is also now responsible for leading the annual CEO evaluation. But again, it's unclear how independent this person will be.

????The behind-the-scenes agreement with Goldman is part of a trend. U.S. shareholders have been more active than ever in conversations with companies this year. In part, this is because "say on pay" votes and proxy access measures have created openings for new dialogue -- and in part, because U.S. shareholders are just more comfortable with the process now. As engagement increases, there are bound to be experiments that fail. Lindsley says there had been no "high level" dialogue with Goldman "prior to the filing of [AFSCME's] proposal" and "none had been attempted."

????U.S. shareholders should consider carefully who they are willing to negotiate with and when negotiations are appropriate. In discussions about this particular proposal, AFSCME negotiated with John Rogers, a member of Goldman's management, whom Lindsley says was "reasonable". Based on the outcome, both shareholders and independent directors might have achieved a better deal if they had been the ones at the table.

????U.S. shareholders must also be careful to weigh the serious downsides of appeasement with the joy of minor victories. It is easy to be swayed by personalities.

????Given the large number of companies that have split the CEO and chair roles, the AFSCME proposal was not far-fetched. Given the state of Goldman's governance, it should have been a lay-up. Let's hope, for everyone's sake, the next deal Goldman cuts will benefit someone other than its CEO.

????Eleanor Bloxham is CEO of The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance , a board advisory firm.