????杰米?戴蒙于2006年1月1日出任摩根大通首席執(zhí)行官。根據(jù)最近的摩根大通投票委托書(shū)，杰米?戴蒙所持股票（和等價(jià)物）若按摩根大通6月8日收盤(pán)價(jià)，價(jià)值逾2億美元。如果股價(jià)漲至5年前水平，戴蒙所持股票凈值將再增加7500萬(wàn)美元。

????同樣的股價(jià)上漲將令前摩根大通首席投資官伊娜?德魯所持股票凈值增值超過(guò)2300萬(wàn)美元，包括她的延付薪酬和未行權(quán)股票。根據(jù)戴蒙的證詞，德魯負(fù)責(zé)的正是造成此次交易巨虧的部門(mén)，她直接向戴蒙報(bào)告。和近年來(lái)一樣，董事會(huì)給戴蒙和德魯?shù)牡男匠曛饕枪善焙推跈?quán)。僅這兩項(xiàng)2011年就分別合計(jì)1700萬(wàn)美元和850萬(wàn)美元。

????那么，他們的行為驅(qū)動(dòng)力是什么？當(dāng)董事會(huì)以這種方式支付高管薪酬時(shí)，傳遞出的時(shí)什么信息？

????紐約聯(lián)儲(chǔ)銀行去年12月份的一份工作人員報(bào)告警告稱(chēng)，這類(lèi)高薪可能鼓勵(lì)首席執(zhí)行官的冒險(xiǎn)行為，造成公司財(cái)務(wù)壓力（諷刺的是，戴蒙是紐約聯(lián)儲(chǔ)銀行的董事會(huì)成員，但要求其離任的一份請(qǐng)?jiān)笗?shū)獲得超過(guò)3.6萬(wàn)個(gè)簽名)。

????與之形成對(duì)比的是，監(jiān)管部門(mén)制定的《穩(wěn)健薪酬指南》建議采用基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的指標(biāo)，即將一家公司和員工的績(jī)效與所承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的數(shù)量和質(zhì)量相掛鉤。雖然銀行業(yè)宣稱(chēng)采用基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的指標(biāo)，但股價(jià)仍是決定銀行高管實(shí)際薪酬的最大決定因素。但推高一家公司的股價(jià)和理性承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，往往背道而馳。前雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）首席執(zhí)行官迪克?富爾德就是一個(gè)例子。

????不過(guò)，即便是投票委托書(shū)列出的考量戴蒙、德魯薪酬的指標(biāo)，也不是基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。今年高管薪酬方案被股東否決的花旗銀行（Citi）通過(guò)發(fā)言人回復(fù)電子郵件，聲稱(chēng)“花旗通過(guò)薪酬計(jì)劃，持續(xù)強(qiáng)化公司降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的能力”，摩根大通、高盛（Goldman）、美國(guó)銀行（Bank of America）和摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）拒絕在本文中討論他們的薪酬做法。毫不奇怪。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)（Federal Reserve）2011年10月的一份報(bào)告證實(shí)大銀行應(yīng)用基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的指標(biāo)存在“不均衡”現(xiàn)象，每家銀行都有更多工作要做。報(bào)告稱(chēng)“要推廣基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的指標(biāo)，實(shí)現(xiàn)一致性和有效性，還有大量的工作要做?！焙?jiǎn)言之，銀行董事會(huì)需要踹上一腳。

誰(shuí)會(huì)加大監(jiān)督力度？

????兩年前，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司（FDIC）發(fā)出了一則征求意見(jiàn)的預(yù)先通知，計(jì)劃如果銀行的薪酬方案風(fēng)險(xiǎn)高，它將向銀行收取更高的存款保險(xiǎn)費(fèi)。這樣一項(xiàng)舉措本應(yīng)起到敦促銀行盡快調(diào)整高管薪酬的作用。但“迄今為止，這一擬議條例尚無(wú)進(jìn)展，”FDIC的一位發(fā)言人最近在電子郵件中表示。近日，F(xiàn)DIC的代理主席馬丁?格魯伯格在參議院發(fā)表預(yù)先準(zhǔn)備好的講話(huà)時(shí)，也沒(méi)有談到薪酬或這樣一項(xiàng)擬議條例。

????Jamie Dimon became CEO of J.P. Morgan on January 1, 2006. The latest J.P. Morgan proxy shows that Jamie Dimon holds shares (and equivalents) worth over $200 million based on the company's closing price June 8. If the stock price rose to where it was just five years ago, his net worth would jump by $75 million.

????A similar pop would net Ina Drew, former chief investment officer at the bank, over $23 million, if you include her deferred compensation and unvested shares. Drew oversaw the unit responsible for the large losses and reported directly to Dimon according to the testimony this morning. As in years past, the board gave Dimon and Drew's pay primarily in stock and options-based awards. Those items alone totaled $17 million and $8.5 million in 2011, respectively.

????So what really drives their behavior? And what message is the board sending when they pay their executives this way?

????This kind of high pay is exactly what a December New York Fed staff report warned could encourage risky CEO behavior and create economic distress. (Ironically, Dimon sits on the NY Fed's board, although a petition for his removal has garnered over 36,000 signatures.)

????In contrast, sound compensation guidance from the regulators recommends risk-based measures, which put a company's and its employees' performance in the context of the quantity and quality of the risk that's taken on. Though banks claim to use risk-based measures, stock price is still the biggest determining factor in top bank executives' actual rewards. But goosing a company's stock price and taking rational risks are not exactly close companions. Former CEO Dick Fuld at Lehman Brothers was the poster child for this issue.

????Even the measures cited in the proxy for rewarding Dimon and Drew are not risk-based. While a spokesperson for Citi (C) (which received a no vote on pay this year) wrote in an email that "Citi has continued to enhance the ability of the firm to reduce risks through its compensation programs," J. P. Morgan, Goldman (GS), Bank of America (BAC), and Morgan Stanley (MS) declined to discuss their pay practices for this article. No wonder. An October 2011 report by the Federal Reserve confirms that the use of risk-based measures at the large banks is "uneven" and every bank has more work to do. "Substantial work remains to be done to achieve consistency and effectiveness … in providing balanced risk-taking incentives," the report states. Put simply, bank boards need a kick in the pants.

Who will step up?

????The FDIC put out an advanced notice over two years ago asking for comments on proposing a rule that would charge banks more for depository insurance if their pay programs were risky. Such a measure could have been a real impetus to fix pay. But, "to date, there has been no follow-up to the advance notice of proposed rulemaking," an FDIC spokesperson recently emailed me. And Martin Gruenberg, acting chair of the FDIC, did not address pay or such a proposed rule in his prepared testimony before the Senate last week.