????美國貨幣監(jiān)理署（The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency，OCC）這些天來頻頻發(fā)聲。他們在倫敦有員工，而造成摩根大通巨虧的交易員正是常住倫敦。OCC的一位發(fā)言人通過電子郵件向我解釋，他們的職員會對交易數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行每日或每周的例行檢查，但“即便是強(qiáng)大的風(fēng)險管理文化，也可能出現(xiàn)意外或失誤，但相比銀行業(yè)務(wù)，影響不應(yīng)很大?！敝劣谛匠?，“檢查人員采用[穩(wěn)健薪酬]指南對銀行進(jìn)行監(jiān)管?！?/p>

????OCC負(fù)責(zé)人托馬斯?柯瑞日前在美國參議院銀行委員會講話時，提到了“需要確保薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)能平衡風(fēng)險回報，并與有效的控制和風(fēng)險管理相適應(yīng)?！?/p>

????丹尼爾?塔魯洛代表美國聯(lián)儲銀行行長理事會（Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve）作證。但他事先準(zhǔn)備好的演講稿沒有提到薪酬，雖然美聯(lián)儲對高管薪酬有監(jiān)督職責(zé)。美聯(lián)儲2011年10月的報告列出了，銀行薪酬“到2011年底，應(yīng)該基本遵守銀行間指南（影響2011績效年激勵薪酬的授予），此后完全執(zhí)行?！钡珶o論是OCC，還是美聯(lián)儲都不愿就檢查評估情況發(fā)表評論。

????這種沉默，特別是美聯(lián)儲的沉默，令人心驚。尤其是在這些銀行的薪酬調(diào)整迄今似乎只涉及一些中層管理人員，而非高管。

????但高管薪酬方案非常重要，因?yàn)楦吖艿膭訖C(jī)會影響到他們的指示和其他經(jīng)理的行為（反之則不一定成立。）

????美聯(lián)儲2011年10月的報告指出，激勵機(jī)制“是造成這場金融危機(jī)（始于2007年）的原因之一?！辈蛔鳛榈睦碛芍皇?，損失幾十億美元對于像摩根大通這樣規(guī)模的銀行可能只是毛毛雨。我不同意這樣的觀點(diǎn)。不能因?yàn)檫@不是百年一遇的洪水，就不用查漏堵缺。要鑄下多少次大錯，我們才會著手糾正？

????本文作者埃莉諾?布洛克斯?jié)h姆是董事會咨詢機(jī)構(gòu)價值聯(lián)盟和企業(yè)管理管理聯(lián)盟（The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance）的CEO。

????譯者：早稻米

????The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is getting beat up these days. They had staff in London where the J.P. Morgan traders were located. An OCC spokesperson explained to me by email that while their staffers review trading data daily or weekly, "even a strong risk management culture could have surprises or breaks, but they should not be of significant magnitude relative to the banks business." Regarding pay, "the [sound compensation] guidance stands as what the examiners are using to supervise banks."

????Last week, in his remarks before the banking committee, OCC head Thomas Curry mentioned"the need to ensure that incentive compensation structures balance risk and financial rewards and are compatible with effective controls and risk management."

????Daniel Tarullo testified on behalf of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. But his prepared remarks did not mention compensation. This, despite the fact that the Fed has oversight responsibility for top executives' pay. The Fed's October 2011 report outlines that bank pay "should achieve substantial conformance with the interagency guidance by the end of 2011 (affecting the award of incentive compensation awards for the 2011 performance year), and should fully conform thereafter." Neither the OCC nor Federal Reserve would comment, however, on their examinations and assessments.

????The silence, especially from the Fed, is deafening, particularly since the banks' compensation fixes seem to have been done for only some managers rather than the top executives.

????But pay programs for top executives matter most because their motives will influence their instructions and other managers' actions. (While the reverse is not necessarily true.)

????The October 2011 report by the Federal Reserve states that incentives "were a contributing factor to the financial crisis that began in 2007." The M.O. among do-nothings is that losing billions isn't necessarily concerning for a bank the size of J.P. Morgan. I don't agree. Just because this isn't the 100-year flood doesn't mean we shouldn't repair the levy. How many breaks will we tolerate until we fix it?

????Eleanor Bloxham is CEO of The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (http://thevaluealliance.com), a board advisory firm.