????做一個(gè)小測(cè)試：不論你現(xiàn)在用的是哪種品牌的智能手機(jī)或數(shù)碼相機(jī)，你知道數(shù)碼相機(jī)的絕大多數(shù)技術(shù)都是由哪家公司發(fā)明的嗎？早在1975年，這家公司的科學(xué)家就發(fā)明了數(shù)碼相機(jī)，而且還相繼生產(chǎn)出超過(guò)1,000種數(shù)字創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)品，包括第一款超過(guò)140萬(wàn)像素的百萬(wàn)像素傳感器、第一個(gè)彩色濾鏡座，以及第一種將圖像按JPEG標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行壓縮的方法。它是哪家公司？

????索尼（Sony）、三星（Samsung）、蘋(píng)果（Apple）、諾基亞（Nokia）、動(dòng)態(tài)研究公司（Research in Motion，也就是如今的黑莓），還是當(dāng)今的其他科技巨頭？如果這是你的答案，再猜一猜。猜不到了吧？答案是柯達(dá)公司（Kodak）?？逻_(dá)一度占有美國(guó)膠片市場(chǎng)90%的份額，但由于不愿意侵蝕自己的傳統(tǒng)產(chǎn)品，結(jié)果其它規(guī)模更小的數(shù)字?jǐn)z影創(chuàng)新公司在日益壯大和搶占份額的時(shí)候，柯達(dá)卻依然置之不理。結(jié)果，僅僅十年時(shí)間，柯達(dá)的價(jià)值便損失了87%，并于去年宣布破產(chǎn)。

????南加州大學(xué)馬歇爾商學(xué)院（University of Southern California's Marshall School of Business ）的管理學(xué)教授及全球創(chuàng)新中心（Center for Global Innovation）負(fù)責(zé)人杰勒德?J?泰利斯發(fā)現(xiàn)：“公司處于成功巔峰的時(shí)候，往往也是最危險(xiǎn)的時(shí)候，極有可能由此由盛轉(zhuǎn)衰。市場(chǎng)支配地位就像一個(gè)魔咒，會(huì)讓公司迷失方向，看不到即將到來(lái)的重大創(chuàng)新?！?/p>

????泰利斯的新書(shū)《創(chuàng)新無(wú)止境》（Unrelenting Innovation）對(duì)造成這種情況的原因進(jìn)行了研究。他與同事研究了15個(gè)國(guó)家的770家公司，其中許多公司的艱難歷程經(jīng)常登上媒體頭條，比如惠普（Hewlett-Packard）、索尼（Sony）和通用汽車(chē)（General Motors）等。研究人員發(fā)現(xiàn)，從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，成功與規(guī)模、擁有專(zhuān)利的數(shù)量或者用于研發(fā)的資金多少無(wú)關(guān)。要想始終保持領(lǐng)先，需要建立一種“創(chuàng)新的文化”，包括對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的偏好，對(duì)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)新思路的熱忱，以及對(duì)未來(lái)、而非過(guò)往的專(zhuān)注。

????當(dāng)然，說(shuō)起來(lái)容易做起來(lái)難。泰利斯詳細(xì)研究了所有障礙。最終書(shū)中解釋了一個(gè)道理，為什么創(chuàng)建一種文化、最終侵蝕掉目前成功的產(chǎn)品才是唯一的道路。想要通過(guò)收購(gòu)來(lái)引入這種文化的任何嘗試通常都不會(huì)成功，因?yàn)楫?dāng)一家公司決定進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)略收購(gòu)時(shí)，收購(gòu)目標(biāo)“要么已經(jīng)估值過(guò)高，要么已經(jīng)過(guò)了巔峰期，或者與公司的差異太過(guò)巨大，無(wú)法進(jìn)行有益地整合，”泰利斯解釋說(shuō)。

????泰利斯和他的研究團(tuán)隊(duì)仔細(xì)研究了收購(gòu)方的股價(jià)。以eBay為例。2005年，eBay以26億美元收購(gòu)了Skype。結(jié)果很不幸，兩年后，Skype貶值14億美元。而且，研究人員發(fā)現(xiàn)，“為了獲得創(chuàng)新技術(shù)而（收購(gòu)）公司，會(huì)導(dǎo)致收購(gòu)方的股價(jià)持續(xù)下跌?！倍切┰趦?nèi)部培養(yǎng)創(chuàng)新的公司，股價(jià)情況則恰恰相反：“市場(chǎng)對(duì)內(nèi)部的有機(jī)創(chuàng)新會(huì)給予回報(bào)，而對(duì)于外部收購(gòu)則會(huì)施加懲罰。”

????《創(chuàng)新無(wú)止境》一書(shū)吸引人的地方在于泰利斯在書(shū)中穿插的數(shù)十個(gè)短小、生動(dòng)的案例。以其中一則為例：在柯達(dá)全盛時(shí)期，“‘停滯文化’為可怕的官僚主義的滋生提供了土壤，官僚主義在柯達(dá)已經(jīng)根深蒂固，就像一個(gè)政府部門(mén)……公司強(qiáng)調(diào)任何事情都必須遵照公司的規(guī)則……開(kāi)會(huì)之前，總要事先召開(kāi)會(huì)議討論問(wèn)題，以避免沖突，因?yàn)樗麄冋J(rèn)為沖突不符合柯達(dá)的形象?！?/p>

????根據(jù)泰利斯所說(shuō)，如果你也在經(jīng)歷著同樣的事情，說(shuō)明你的公司已經(jīng)有麻煩了——尤其是在一切都非常順利的時(shí)候。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

????譯者：劉進(jìn)龍/汪皓

????Here's a quick quiz: No matter whose brand name is on the smartphone or digital camera you're using now, do you know who invented almost all of the technology in it? This outfit's scientists came up with digital cameras way back in 1975, and then went on to produce more than 1,000 digital innovations, including the first megapixel sensor of more than 1.4 million pixels, the first color filter tray, and the first method of image compression up to JPEG standards. What company was it?

????If you said Sony (SNE), Samsung, Apple (AAPL), Nokia (NOK), Research in Motion (now known as BlackBerry), or any other present-day tech giant, guess again. Give up? It was Kodak. Reluctant to cannibalize its traditional products (at one point, Kodak had a lock on 90% of the U.S. film market), the company sat on its hands while smaller digital-photography innovators zoomed in and ate its lunch. As a result, Kodak lost 87% of its value in just over a decade and declared bankruptcy last year.

????"Organizations are in greatest danger of failing when they're at the peak of their success," observes Gerard J. Tellis, who teaches management at the University of Southern California's Marshall School of Business and directs the Center for Global Innovation there. "Market dominance can be a curse that blinds companies to the next big innovation on the horizon."

????His new book, Unrelenting Innovation, looks at exactly how that happens. Tellis and his colleagues studied 770 companies across 15 countries, including many -- like Hewlett-Packard (HPQ), Sony, and General Motors (GM) -- whose struggles have made headlines. The researchers found that success over the long haul isn't a matter of size, number of patents, or the dollar amount of R&D investments. Instead, staying on top requires a "culture of innovation," including an appetite for risk, an eagerness to reward fresh thinking, and a focus on the future, not the past.

????That's easier said than done, of course, and Tellis examines all the obstacles in detail. But the book makes clear why creating a culture designed to cannibalize currently successful products is the only way to go. Trying to buy that kind of culture usually doesn't work because by the time a company decides on a strategic acquisition, the target is "either overpriced, past its peak, or too different to integrate profitably," Tellis notes.

????Tellis and his team of researchers scrutinized the share prices of acquirers -- like eBay (EBAY), for example, whose ill-fated $2.6 billion acquisition of Skype in 2005 led to a $1.4 billion write-down two years later -- and discovered that "[buying] firms for their innovations leads to a consistently negative spike in the stock price of the acquiring firm," while the opposite was true for shares of companies that grew their own innovations in-house: "The market rewards internal organic innovation and punishes external acquisitions."

????What makes Unrelenting Innovation a fascinating read is the dozens of short, vivid case studies Tellis has woven into his book. To take just one example among many: The "culture of stagnation" at Kodak in its heyday "fueled the growth of a nightmarish bureaucracy so entrenched it could have passed for a government agency…. There was an emphasis on doing everything by the company rulebooks…. Meetings were held prior to meetings to discuss issues and avoid confrontations, which were considered un-Kodaklike."

????By Tellis' lights, if that sounds at all familiar, your company is already in trouble -- even, or especially, if everything's going great right now.