????上周，美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)（Securities and Exchange Commission）出臺(tái)了一項(xiàng)規(guī)定，強(qiáng)制要求美國(guó)公司披露高管與普通員工的薪酬對(duì)比情況。許多大型上市公司高管薪酬失控，普通員工工資停滯不前，以及公司董事會(huì)無(wú)法將CEO薪酬與公司長(zhǎng)期績(jī)效有效掛鉤等問(wèn)題引發(fā)了越來(lái)越多的不滿，這些都是推動(dòng)證監(jiān)會(huì)出臺(tái)相關(guān)規(guī)定的主要原因。

????按照有效的資本主義模式，公司應(yīng)該根據(jù)多重因素提供CEO的薪酬，包括季度收益、長(zhǎng)期績(jī)效、股價(jià)增值、創(chuàng)新、資本回報(bào)率、員工滿意度、客戶維系等。但實(shí)際上，CEO的薪酬通常僅根據(jù)短期內(nèi)能讓分析師和投資者目眩神迷的幾個(gè)指標(biāo)，但實(shí)際上這些指標(biāo)卻根本無(wú)法反映公司基本面或未來(lái)的績(jī)效潛力。

????因此，對(duì)于股東活動(dòng)家、工人權(quán)益倡導(dǎo)者和工會(huì)來(lái)說(shuō)，美國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)的舉措看起來(lái)是利好消息，可實(shí)際上，這對(duì)于薪酬的現(xiàn)狀不會(huì)有太大作用。

????原因有很多。首先，大股東憑借強(qiáng)勢(shì)的地位早已知曉高管的薪酬信息，所以，既然他們沒(méi)有反對(duì)CEO的薪酬，也就不可能改變自己的立場(chǎng)；至于小股東，只要他們的股票在近期能夠增值，他們才不關(guān)心高管薪酬。此外，《多德-弗蘭克法案》（Dodd-Frank）的“薪酬發(fā)言權(quán)規(guī)定”雖然使股東有權(quán)反對(duì)過(guò)高的薪酬，但對(duì)公司董事會(huì)沒(méi)有任何約束力，所以根本沒(méi)有效果。此外，評(píng)估商業(yè)決策的長(zhǎng)期意義，把它與高管短期薪酬掛鉤，是一個(gè)非常復(fù)雜的過(guò)程，而且“追回利益”也很難操作。還有一個(gè)非常重要的理由，許多CEO對(duì)公司董事會(huì)及其個(gè)人的薪酬都有著不正當(dāng)?shù)挠绊懥Γ袝r(shí)候CEO往往還兼任公司董事會(huì)主席的職位。

????最近，美國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)一直在針對(duì)企業(yè)和公司積極出臺(tái)有關(guān)政策，但新規(guī)定無(wú)法解決上述挑戰(zhàn)，所以也很難產(chǎn)生什么影響。更有效的做法是，由政府對(duì)公司提供激勵(lì)，使CEO薪酬合理化，比如稅收抵免，以CEO與員工的薪酬比為基礎(chǔ)確定稅收抵免額。

????假如公司的薪酬比為25:1，且公司共有300名員工，則公司可獲得的稅收抵免額為：1,000美元（每位工人未調(diào)整稅收抵免額） x 1/25 （反向薪酬比） x 300 （員工人數(shù)） = 12,000美元

????在上面這個(gè)示例中，薪酬比越低（或CEO與普通員工薪酬差距越?。?，稅收抵免額越高，進(jìn)而鼓勵(lì)公司在制定CEO薪酬與初級(jí)員工工資時(shí)會(huì)更加謹(jǐn)慎。這個(gè)公式的一個(gè)附帶作用是，公司也可能通過(guò)擴(kuò)大招聘來(lái)獲得稅收減免，而在當(dāng)前高失業(yè)率時(shí)期，這恰好也是政府亟待實(shí)現(xiàn)的一個(gè)目標(biāo)。

????Last week, the Securities and Exchange Commission unveiled a rule that will compel U.S. companies to disclose how their top executive's pay compares to that of the average worker. The new rule is in response to growing criticism of runaway compensation at many large public companies, wage stagnation for rank-and-file workers, and the seeming inability of corporate boards to tie CEO paychecks to long-term company performance in an effective way.

????In an efficient capitalist model, companies would pay CEOs based on a variety of factors, including quarterly earnings, long-term performance, stock price appreciation, innovation, ROC (Return on Capital), employee satisfaction, and customer retention, among many other things. But in practice, CEO pay is often based on only a few metrics that may dazzle analysts and investors in the short run but may not reflect true business fundamentals or likely future performance.

????Given that, the SEC's move might seem like welcome news for shareholder activists, workers rights advocates, and labor unions, but it will do little to alter the status quo on pay.

????The reasons for this are many. For one, large shareholders already have access to this information due to their powerful position, and if they have not objected to a CEO's pay yet, they are unlikely to change their stance; plus smaller shareholders do not necessarily care about executive pay as long as their shares go up in value in the near term. Also, Dodd-Frank's say-on-pay rule, which enables shareholders to challenge oversize paychecks, is non-binding on corporate boards and therefore ineffective. On top of all of this, assessing the long- term implications of business decisions and tying them appropriately to short-term executive pay is complicated, and clawbacks can be tricky to execute. And if that weren't enough, many CEOs have undue influence over their boards -- and their own compensation -- sometimes by serving as chairman as well as CEO.

????The SEC has been especially active lately in policing the corporate sector, but the new rule cannot address any of the challenges mentioned above and so is unlikely to make a difference on its own. A more effective idea would be for the government to offer companies an incentive to rationalize CEO compensation, such as a tax credit, and to base that tax credit on the CEO-employee pay ratio.

????If a company had a pay ratio of 25:1 and 300 workers total, it would receive (for the sake of argument) the following tax credit: $1,000 (unadjusted tax credit per worker) X 1/25 (inverse pay ratio) X 300 (number of workers) = a total of $12,000

????In this example, the lower the pay ratio (or the narrower the gap between the pay of the CEO and average workers), the bigger the tax credit, motivating businesses to be more thoughtful in setting compensation for CEOs as well as junior employees. A side benefit of this formula is that a company would also receive credit for hiring more workers, which is an equally worthwhile goal for our government to pursue at a time of high unemployment.