????企業(yè)在并購之后出現(xiàn)經(jīng)營狀況急轉(zhuǎn)直下的案例比比皆是。在最終慘淡收場前，人們經(jīng)常會把一些明明是商業(yè)災(zāi)難的并購吹得天花亂墜。今年是美國在線和時代華納合并15周年。此次并購就屬于這種慘劇，它常被視為有史以來最糟糕的合并案。但歷史總會重演，而且具有諷刺意味的是，原因也非常相似。

????當(dāng)時，許多人都認(rèn)為美國在線和時代華納合并極為明智，而且擔(dān)心自己的公司會因此被甩在后面。在那個時候，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司的一舉一動都是對的，而美國在線正是這一領(lǐng)域的龍頭企業(yè)。該公司市值極高，在盼望大賺一筆的投資者的追捧之下，甚至超過了許多藍(lán)籌股。在時代華納合并的機會出現(xiàn)之前，時任美國在線首席執(zhí)行官的史蒂夫?凱斯已經(jīng)在四處尋找并購目標(biāo)。

????另一方面，時代華納在這次合并前曾急切嘗試開展網(wǎng)絡(luò)業(yè)務(wù)，但以失敗告終。此時，一條出路從天而降，而且聽起來很有吸引力。通過美國在線，時代華納將獲得一千萬新用戶；作為回報，美國在線可以使用時代華納的有線電視網(wǎng)絡(luò)以及內(nèi)容，并為后者的業(yè)務(wù)提供所謂的“用戶友好”界面。這項并購是“革命性的”（閱讀這個時期的文獻(xiàn)時會發(fā)現(xiàn)，這個詞確實已經(jīng)落伍，而且落伍速度非常之快）。如果這些初步設(shè)想真的變?yōu)榱爽F(xiàn)實，如今人們的措辭就會變?yōu)椤岸嗝淳哂羞h(yuǎn)見卓識的交易”。

????兩家公司在文化整合方面從一開始就存在問題。當(dāng)然，參與合并的律師和其他專業(yè)人士在數(shù)據(jù)方面按部就班地做了盡職調(diào)查。而同樣需要做盡職調(diào)查的還有文化，但他們顯然沒有進行這項工作。美國在線的人員雄心勃勃，而且在許多人看來都很自大，他們讓較為保守且更有組織性的時代華納同事“嚇了一跳”。雙方的互不尊重導(dǎo)致了不和，因此，合作與預(yù)期的協(xié)同效應(yīng)都未能實現(xiàn)。

????完成合并沒幾個月，網(wǎng)絡(luò)泡沫即告破裂，經(jīng)濟陷入衰退。廣告收入化為泡影。2002年，美國在線被迫注銷了近990億美元的商譽減值損失，這個數(shù)字令人瞠目結(jié)舌，就連見慣世面的《華爾街日報》記者也不禁大吃一驚。美國在線出現(xiàn)了訂閱用戶流失，訂閱收入不斷下降。該公司的市值隨即從2260億美元降至200億美元。

????我把美國在線遭遇的現(xiàn)象稱為短暫優(yōu)勢。它是指公司能夠依靠部分綜合能力在某一時段處于領(lǐng)先位置，但當(dāng)新形式的競爭優(yōu)勢出現(xiàn)后，原有的競爭優(yōu)勢就會受到侵蝕并被取代。在撥號上網(wǎng)領(lǐng)域，美國在線的確是一位王者，但撥號上網(wǎng)很快就被寬帶取代，后者可以一直保持在線狀態(tài)，而且速度要快得多。兩公司合并時，美國有一半人都可以接入網(wǎng)絡(luò)，但使用寬帶的僅占3%。美國在線最初的業(yè)務(wù)模式是按使用收費，隨后變成了按月收費，當(dāng)時這種模式已經(jīng)處于崩潰邊緣。二者最終分手在所難免。

????有鑒于此，我對如今的這批科技寵兒心存戒慮。它們中有許多估值都高達(dá)數(shù)十億美元?！度A爾街日報》提供的信息顯示，目前獲得風(fēng)投資金支持且估值超過10億美元的公司至少有48家。而在本世紀(jì)初網(wǎng)絡(luò)熱潮的頂峰時期，這樣的公司最多也不過10家。此外，這些公司尚未盈利，也不夠穩(wěn)定，而且沒有經(jīng)過常規(guī)市場標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的檢驗——它們目前所做的只是每個月大把地?zé)X。

????正如加州大學(xué)伯克利分校法學(xué)院教授史蒂芬?戴維?所羅門觀察到的，就連一些老概念（比如生鮮快遞）也出現(xiàn)了回爐另造的情況，成為所羅門所說的一股“熱潮”，即身在其中的投資者似乎在不惜代價地追捧這些初創(chuàng)型企業(yè)。舉例來說，租車服務(wù)商Uber估值410億美元，而美國整個出租車行業(yè)的年收入也不過110億美元左右。

????在諸多因素的推動下，例如斥資數(shù)十億美元收購初創(chuàng)公司和風(fēng)投資本家的鋌而走險，類似于收購Whatsapp或者Facebook以及Twitter首發(fā)上市的情況還會出現(xiàn)。正是這些因素帶來的壓力讓他們再三翻倍押注這些初創(chuàng)企業(yè)，同時，他們也盼望著自己的投資對象能成為該領(lǐng)域的龍頭企業(yè)，并將競爭對手都排除在市場之外。在這些新出現(xiàn)的熱門初創(chuàng)公司中，可能會有一、兩家順利實現(xiàn)這樣的目標(biāo)；但其他大多數(shù)都做不到這一點，這就是現(xiàn)實。

????因此，如果大家作為投資者對某些潛在新業(yè)務(wù)的前景感到興奮時，請花幾分鐘時間來核對一下它是否具有下列極其普通，但會導(dǎo)致失敗的特征：

????? 把未經(jīng)檢驗的假設(shè)當(dāng)做事實。

????? 幾乎沒有什么機會進行成本低、投入少的檢驗。

????? 負(fù)責(zé)人相信自己掌握著答案，不愿改弦易轍。

????? 前期投資巨大，而不是分階段或者按順序使用一系列資源。

????? 不確定性非常高，而且有時限上的壓力。

????這些因素合在一起經(jīng)常會產(chǎn)生不利結(jié)果。我的建議是，在拿著支票簿大筆一揮之前，最好是斟酌一下這些“革命性”初創(chuàng)公司背后的假設(shè)。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

????里塔?甘瑟?麥克格萊斯是哥倫比亞商學(xué)院商業(yè)策略教授，著有《競爭優(yōu)勢的終結(jié)：怎樣讓策略和業(yè)務(wù)同步發(fā)展》一書。

????譯者：Charlie

????審稿：李翔

????The landscape of mergers and acquisitions is littered with business flops, some catastrophic, highly visible disasters that were often hugely hyped before their eventual doom. Today marks the 15th anniversary of one such calamity when media giants AOL and Time Warner combined their businesses in what is usually described as the worst merger of all time. But what happened then will happen again, and ironically for the exact same reasons.

????A lot of people thought that the merger was a brilliant move and worried that their own companies would be left behind. At the time, the dot-coms could do no wrong, and AOL AOL -1.27% was at the head of the pack as the ‘dominant’ player. Its sky-high stock market valuation, bid up by investors looking for a windfall, made the young company more valuable in market cap terms than many blue chips. Then CEO Steve Case was already shopping around before the Time Warner opportunity came up.

????On the other side, Time Warner anxiously tried, and failed, to establish an online presence before the merger. And here, in one fell swoop, was a solution. The strategy sounded compelling. Time Warner TWC -0.93% , via AOL, would now have a footprint of tens of millions of new subscribers. AOL, in turn, would benefit from access to Time Warner’s cable network as well as to the content, adding its layer of so-called ‘user friendly’ interfaces on top of the pipes. The whole thing was “transformative” (a word that gets really old really fast when reading about this period). Had these initial assumptions been borne out, we might be talking today about what a visionary deal it was.

????Merging the cultures of the combined companies was problematic from the get go. Certainly the lawyers and professionals involved with the merger did the conventional due diligence on the numbers. What also needed to happen, and evidently didn’t, was due diligence on the culture. The aggressive and, many said, arrogant AOL people “horrified” the more staid and corporate Time Warner side. Cooperation and promised synergies failed to materialize as mutual disrespect came to color their relationships.

????A few scant months after the deal closed, the dot com bubble burst and the economy went into recession. Advertising dollars evaporated, and AOL was forced to take a goodwill write-off of nearly $99 billion in 2002, an astonishing sum that shook even the business-hardened writers of the Wall Street Journal. AOL was also losing subscribers and subscription revenue. The total value of AOL stock subsequently went from $226 billion to about $20 billion.

????The business was up against a phenomenon I refer to as transient advantage; namely when a combination of capabilities that at one point made a firm a leader, erodes and is replaced by the next form of competitive advantage. AOL was indeed the king of the dial-up Internet world, but that world was rapidly being supplanted by always-on, much faster broadband. At the time of the merger, half the country had Internet access, yes, but only 3% had broadband. AOL’s business model – originally based on payment for usage and subsequently for a monthly subscription – was about to implode. The eventual divorce of the two businesses was inevitable.

????This leads me to a cautionary note about today’s crop of digital darlings, many valued in the billions. According to the Wall Street Journal, there are at least 48 venture-capital backed companies with an implied value of over $1 billion, while the number of such companies peaked at 10 during the height of the 2000 dot-com boom. Moreover, these firms – not yet profitable, not yet stable and not yet assessed by normal market metrics – are burning through vast amounts of cash each month.

????As Berkeley University’s Steven David Solomon observed, even old ideas (think grocery delivery!) are being recycled in what he describes as a “frenzy” of investors pursuing startups seemingly at any price. Uber, for instance, has a valuation of $41 billion, even though total taxi revenue in the United States is about $11 billion a year.

????Billion dollar acquisitions of these young firms and the desperation of venture capitalists to be part of the next Whatsapp acquisition or Facebook or Twitter IPO have created exactly the kind of pressures that can cause them to redouble their investments, hoping that the beneficiaries will be “the” category leader and shut everyone else out. One or two of the new crop of hot startups may well accomplish this, but the reality is that most of them won’t.

????So if you’re an investor excited about the prospect of potential new business combinations, take a few minutes to check out this all-too common recipe for failure:

????? Untested assumptions are taken as facts.

????? Few opportunities exist for inexpensive, low-commitment testing.

????? Leaders are convinced they have the answer and not willing to change

????? Huge up-front investment, rather than a staged or sequenced flow of resources.

????? Massive uncertainty and a sense of time pressure.

????Put these ingredients together and the result is often toxic. My advice: It’s much better to take a look at the assumptions behind that “transformative” startup before diving in head first with your checkbook.

????Rita Gunther McGrath is a professor of business strategy at Columbia Business School and author of The End of Competitive Advantage: How to Keep Your Strategy Moving as Fast as Your Business.