????過去兩年，我一直就職于美國在線（AOL）旗下的風(fēng)投公司AOL Ventures。這家公司一直在努力從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)角度重新思考企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資（CVC）模式以及與初創(chuàng)企業(yè)的互動(dòng)方式。

????雖然不知道我們是否已經(jīng)掌握了要領(lǐng)（不妨去問問我們投資的企業(yè)家吧），但我有幸綜合了大量的信息，它們來自這個(gè)領(lǐng)域內(nèi)最睿智的一群人，從中，我也得出了一個(gè)相當(dāng)獨(dú)特的觀點(diǎn)。隨著企業(yè)風(fēng)投活動(dòng)升溫，越來越多的企業(yè)希望能夠得到相關(guān)的建議，因此我將把個(gè)人觀點(diǎn)付諸筆端，希望能為他們提供一些幫助。

????本文主要的基礎(chǔ)源自我們的成敗得失，闡述了企業(yè)應(yīng)如何看待CVC。首先要聲明一點(diǎn)，以下并不是什么全新的觀點(diǎn)，主要側(cè)重于互聯(lián)網(wǎng)/傳媒投資者，而且肯定是掛一漏萬。

????1. 你的產(chǎn)品有什么特色？說到底，企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資是一個(gè)相對(duì)封閉、高度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)且沒有多少差異化的市場(chǎng)。大多數(shù)公司提供的都是完全相同的產(chǎn)品。努力剖析客戶（企業(yè)家）體驗(yàn)，思考可能的差異化途徑。它可以是徹底改造客戶的痛點(diǎn)，可以是一個(gè)帶來更大價(jià)值的平臺(tái)，也可以是史無前例的奇思妙想。我們當(dāng)初創(chuàng)辦AOL Ventures的時(shí)候，推動(dòng)我們起步的最重要因素是“我們能在CVC市場(chǎng)上提供什么樣的特色產(chǎn)品，為什么企業(yè)家要接受我們的投資？”必須要進(jìn)行這樣的思考，否則就等著“泯然于眾人吧”。

????2. 士官和將軍。軍隊(duì)的日?；顒?dòng)要靠士官們來打理，而不是將軍。了解所在公司的中層士官們（排在高管之下的前100名員工），這一點(diǎn)非常重要。因?yàn)樗麄兪钦嬲苿?dòng)決策的人，他們可以成為你最好的朋友，也可以成為你的心腹大患。一家初創(chuàng)公司與你合作，顯然有一部分原因取決于你和這些人的關(guān)系。歸根結(jié)底，初創(chuàng)公司可能很樂意接受一家公司首席執(zhí)行官給出的建議，但他們可能更喜能夠歡快速達(dá)成的業(yè)務(wù)總監(jiān)式的交易（舉個(gè)例子）。因?yàn)槟闩c相關(guān)中層人員關(guān)系良好，可以推動(dòng)協(xié)商和交易，萬一出現(xiàn)法律問題，你也能輕松搞定（沒錯(cuò)，你甚至需要認(rèn)識(shí)所有的律師）。

????3.不一定要成為領(lǐng)投方。我一直不是很推崇CVC領(lǐng)投，特別是在早期融資階段。從風(fēng)險(xiǎn)回報(bào)角度看，CVC領(lǐng)投毫無意義，而且我也不認(rèn)為CVC真的有能力和一線風(fēng)投機(jī)構(gòu)角逐領(lǐng)投方的位置。如果你能增加可觀的價(jià)值，則應(yīng)當(dāng)成為積極的出資人，就像其他早期非領(lǐng)投投資者一樣，在自己擅長(zhǎng)的領(lǐng)域內(nèi)提供與眾不同的價(jià)值。（這又回到了我們提供的產(chǎn)品上）。不必一定要擁有大量的董事會(huì)席位才能接近你投資的企業(yè)家，沒有的話，一樣可以擁有優(yōu)秀公司的可觀股份，通過支持所投資公司發(fā)展，成為出色的企業(yè)生命周期投資者，為母公司賺取回報(bào)。

????4. 熱情擁抱首席財(cái)務(wù)官。如果你認(rèn)為CVC是你自己的獨(dú)立王國，不需要為母公司贏得利益，據(jù)我所見所聞，歷史將證明你是錯(cuò)的。想一想，除了顯而易見的資金事宜，你還能母公司做些什么。一定要和公司首席財(cái)務(wù)官保持緊密聯(lián)系，把他們至少當(dāng)作有限合伙人一樣隨時(shí)通報(bào)進(jìn)展，因?yàn)檎f到底他們掌握著調(diào)撥投資資金的大權(quán)，決定著你的命運(yùn)。

????Mike Brown Jr.是美國在線風(fēng)投基金AOL Ventures駐紐約的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資人。這篇文章最初發(fā)布于他的個(gè)人博客。

????These past two years I've been part of AOL Ventures, a group that has tried to think long and hard about re-envisioning the corporate venture capital model and how corporations should interact with startups.

????Who knows if we have the right recipe (talk to our entrepreneurs) but I've had the benefit of synthesizing a ton of information from some of the best minds in the space and developed a pretty distinct viewpoint. The interest in corporate venture activity is at fever pitch, and with more and more corporations looking for perspective, I thought it might be thoughtful to put pen to paper.

????What follows is how corporations might want to think about CVC, largely based upon our successes and failures. I'd note in advance that none of this is terribly novel, it focuses on Internet/media investors and there obviously is a lot more here that isn't written.

????1. What Is Your Distinct Product? At the end of the day you are attempting to enter a largely insular, highly competitive market with not a lot of differentiation. Most people offer the same product. Try hard to map the customer (entrepreneur) experience and think about ways that you can differentiate. That could be a re-invention of certain pain points that the customer has or it could be a better platform that drives more value or it could be something totally amazing that no one has thought about. The most important thing that drove us from the outset when starting AOLV was 'what is the distinct product we are offering in the corporate venture market and why should an entrepreneur take our money?' You will need to think about this or join the sea of sameness.

????2. Staff Sergeants vs Generals. The military is run day-to-day by staff sergeants, not generals. It is of paramount importance to know mid-level staff sergeants (top 100 right-under execs) in your company as they are the ones who really drive decisions and can be your best friend or worst enemy. A start-up is obviously working with you partly because of your relationship with these folks. End of the day start-ups will happily take advice from your CEO, but they probably like a BD deal (por ejemplo) better that happens quickly because you know the right mid-level people and can drive the discussion, the deal, and help when it gets mucked up in legal (yes you even should know all the lawyers).

????3.You Don't Have to Lead. I've never been a big fan of corporations leading rounds of financing, especially at the early stages. Just doesn't make any sense on a risk/reward basis to take a corporate as a lead and I don't believe corporates can even really compete to lead rounds over Tier-1 investors. If your fund proves you can add measurable value you should be an active participant in a cap table and adding distinct value where you can like any other early stage non-lead investor (again it goes back to the product you offer). You do not have to have a ton of Board seats to be close to your entrepreneurs and can still own sizable pieces of good companies to earn a return for your parent by being a good life cycle investor that supports a company through it's growth.

????4. Bear Hug Your CFO. If you think you can play the totally autonomous game that gives no benefit back to your parent company, history will prove you wrong as far as I've seen and been told. Think about what you can do for your parent company beyond the obvious treasury play and make sure you have great inroads to the CFO function of your company, keep them updated like a normal LP (sometimes more) because at the end of the day they are the folks who meet your capital calls and determine your fate.

????Mike Brown Jr. is a venture capitalist with AOL Ventures in New York City. This post first appeared on his blog.