新冠疫情在中國(guó)趨緩之際,西方國(guó)家和全球的疫情正處于失控爆發(fā)階段。如今,醫(yī)療和科技水平全球第一的美國(guó)卻在確診人數(shù)和死亡人數(shù)上排名第一,其社交隔離措施帶來的經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯和衰退,也需要一代人的時(shí)間去修復(fù)。如此巨大、不可承受的生命和社會(huì)代價(jià),特朗普政府有著直接不可推脫的責(zé)任。
流行病學(xué)是一門建立在推測(cè)基礎(chǔ)上的學(xué)科。研究人員將數(shù)據(jù)點(diǎn)放在一個(gè)地圖上,推測(cè)它們之間的關(guān)聯(lián),繼而神奇地發(fā)現(xiàn)可能的感染點(diǎn)和傳播載體。這些推測(cè),會(huì)形成假設(shè)理論的基礎(chǔ),這之后,艱苦的工作才正式開始:科學(xué)家煞費(fèi)苦心地,全面地搜集證據(jù),直到他們可以證實(shí)或否定這些理論。
在1854年,歷史上最有名的流行病學(xué)專家約翰?斯諾就是這么做的。當(dāng)時(shí),他在倫敦地圖上標(biāo)出霍亂致死的病例,最終鎖定了此次爆發(fā)的源頭:一口受污染的井和水泵?,F(xiàn)在,流行病專家也在做同樣的事情,只是對(duì)象換成了新型冠狀病毒和它引發(fā)的呼吸道疾病“新型冠狀病毒病肺炎”。
這場(chǎng)全球性危機(jī)已進(jìn)入第五個(gè)月了,根據(jù)約翰霍普金斯大學(xué)的數(shù)據(jù),新冠病毒感染確診病例激增至近200萬人,遍布185個(gè)國(guó)家和地區(qū),導(dǎo)致12.5萬人死亡。然而,依然有眾多的謎團(tuán)有待解決:有多少人在不自知的情況下染上了病毒,而且還在繼續(xù)傳播?疫情到底要持續(xù)多久?什么時(shí)候才能安全地去上班?然而,沒有人知道答案。
至于新冠病毒會(huì)如何重塑全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的一系列問題,例如,它會(huì)對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)造成多大的破壞?哪些行業(yè)損失最慘重,哪些會(huì)回彈,哪些會(huì)重塑?我們將用一整期的文章,以及大部分的每日網(wǎng)絡(luò)報(bào)道來調(diào)查這些問題?;旧?,我們整個(gè)編輯團(tuán)隊(duì)在過去幾個(gè)月中,一直在未完成的地圖上繪制數(shù)據(jù)點(diǎn),盡力在這些點(diǎn)中尋找有意義的規(guī)律。這些當(dāng)然都是推測(cè),不過,你也可以把它看做是金融流行病學(xué)。
然而,在這個(gè)充滿了“看似”,“可能”,和各種未知的領(lǐng)域中,還是有一些事情我們是掌握的,將這些教訓(xùn)分門別類地列出,可能有助于我們避免重蹈覆轍。
應(yīng)對(duì)準(zhǔn)備完全不足
“對(duì)于疫情的應(yīng)對(duì)準(zhǔn)備,我們過于滿足了。”身為醫(yī)生和紐約-長(zhǎng)老會(huì)醫(yī)院主席的史蒂芬?柯文說,“當(dāng)然,無論是單個(gè)醫(yī)院,還是一個(gè)國(guó)家,最終都能夠挺過去?!边^去幾十年中,有好幾次傳染病威脅到美國(guó),例如SARS、 中東呼吸癥候群冠狀病毒、H1N1禽流感,甚至是埃博拉,其中有幾種在其他地區(qū)局地肆虐,比如SARS在亞洲的爆發(fā),但是,沒有哪一個(gè)像新冠病毒那樣對(duì)美國(guó)造成如此之大的沖擊??挛恼f,在錯(cuò)誤的安全感下,一些重要的問題被忽視了:“國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備需要放什么?供應(yīng)鏈有多脆弱?我們有多依賴快速物流?快速物流平時(shí)可以很快把防護(hù)用品送到醫(yī)院,但出現(xiàn)疫情時(shí),卻變得效率很低?!?/p>
隨著疫情的蔓延,這些問題得到了回答。4月初,紐約的疫情已經(jīng)達(dá)到高峰,每周消耗70萬個(gè)口罩,紐約州的口罩用量則達(dá)到了350萬個(gè),柯文說,按照這個(gè)速度,美國(guó)國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備用不了多久就會(huì)耗盡。2月時(shí),衛(wèi)生與公共服務(wù)部部長(zhǎng)亞歷克斯?阿扎向一個(gè)參議院委員會(huì)表示,美國(guó)國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備僅有3000萬個(gè)N95口罩和1200萬臺(tái)呼吸機(jī)的儲(chǔ)備量,此外,還有幾百萬個(gè)可能已過了保質(zhì)期的口罩。
美國(guó)的醫(yī)療和制藥供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)执嗳酢?谡值葌€(gè)人防護(hù)裝備大部分來自中國(guó),此外,中國(guó)還是全球最大的活性藥物成分、現(xiàn)代醫(yī)藥化學(xué)原料生產(chǎn)商和出口商,中國(guó)還生產(chǎn)了眾多疾病診斷用化學(xué)試劑,例如分辨病毒株的聚合酶鏈反應(yīng)測(cè)試。因此,如果出現(xiàn)了全球疫情,而供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)菑闹袊?guó)開始的,那么在到達(dá)美國(guó)之前可能就會(huì)中斷。
測(cè)試診斷成瓶頸
當(dāng)遇到可能具有大規(guī)模傳染性的病毒,也就是病毒毒性高,又可以輕易地人傳人時(shí),任何診斷測(cè)試上的滯后都可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致災(zāi)難性的后果。新冠病毒便是這樣一個(gè)案例,因?yàn)槊绹?guó)疾控中心最初開發(fā)的診斷測(cè)試存在缺陷,使得大規(guī)模測(cè)試很遲才開始,但更大的問題并不僅僅是政府所說的一個(gè)故障,而是一開始,所有的測(cè)試都必須經(jīng)由聯(lián)邦實(shí)驗(yàn)室進(jìn)行,集中往往意味著瓶頸,一旦出現(xiàn)故障,則完全無法進(jìn)行下去。
“即便一切進(jìn)展順利,哪怕疾控中心的測(cè)試也完全沒有問題,美國(guó)的篩查測(cè)試能力也根本不足以應(yīng)對(duì)這樣的疫情局面?!必?fù)責(zé)此類診斷規(guī)范的美國(guó)食藥局前專員斯科特?戈特列布說,“大學(xué)實(shí)驗(yàn)室和診所實(shí)驗(yàn)室也都必須參與檢測(cè),但這需要時(shí)間,因此,你得從1月份就開始和他們合作,這樣,到了2月和3月,才會(huì)準(zhǔn)備好?!?/p>
“如果我們?cè)?月中旬時(shí),就有能力每周測(cè)試10萬個(gè)樣本,那么結(jié)果會(huì)大不一樣?!备晏亓胁颊f??挛膶?duì)此也表示同意:“只有建立在早期測(cè)試和診斷基礎(chǔ)上,我們才能對(duì)這類病毒防控進(jìn)行情景規(guī)劃?!?/p>
沒有防控規(guī)劃
現(xiàn)在的美國(guó)政府并沒有一個(gè)防控規(guī)劃。當(dāng)我采訪薩賓疫苗研究所全球免疫業(yè)務(wù)主席布魯斯?杰林時(shí),他像幾乎所有美國(guó)人一樣,正在居家隔離。隔離期間,他有了時(shí)間整理自己的車庫(kù),在一堆上世紀(jì)90年代的玩偶底下,他發(fā)現(xiàn)了之前的聯(lián)邦政府制定的諸多防御病毒侵襲的規(guī)劃?!耙咔橐?guī)劃,我們是曾經(jīng)是有的?!苯芰种S刺說道,他也曾經(jīng)是前衛(wèi)生部助理副秘書長(zhǎng)、國(guó)家疫苗項(xiàng)目負(fù)責(zé)人。2005年布什政府時(shí)代,他主導(dǎo)制定了美國(guó)首個(gè)流感防控和應(yīng)急規(guī)劃。
當(dāng)時(shí)出現(xiàn)的“禽流感”也一度讓社會(huì)緊張無比,決策者們做了很多推測(cè),一旦真的變成大流行病,要對(duì)大量人口進(jìn)行隔離的話,那經(jīng)濟(jì)與社會(huì)成本會(huì)是多少?!捌渲幸粋€(gè)原則就是要列出,萬一人們不能外出的話,有哪些后勤準(zhǔn)備要做到位。”杰林回憶說,“例如,如果護(hù)士的學(xué)齡兒童呆在家,她怎么去上班?如果人們本來就是勉強(qiáng)度日的,一旦無法工作,怎么交得起房租?怎么按時(shí)繳納抵押貸款?如果你強(qiáng)迫人們呆在家中,大量的問題就會(huì)接踵而至。”這些為減少社區(qū)傳播的做法只是這個(gè)規(guī)劃中的一部分。在新冠疫情期間,我們都意識(shí)到這類問題有多重要。
最后,這一切最發(fā)人深省的教訓(xùn)可能還在于,在這個(gè)前所未有的挑戰(zhàn)面前,在疫情造成社會(huì)幾近癱瘓的局面下,現(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府竟然完全無所作為。
2004年12月,小布什總統(tǒng)啟用邁克?李維特任衛(wèi)生與公共服務(wù)部的秘書長(zhǎng),李維特要求該機(jī)構(gòu)的所有部門負(fù)責(zé)人向其匯報(bào)各自職責(zé)。
“他在決定應(yīng)該保留誰,剔除誰?!鼻肮残l(wèi)生應(yīng)急響應(yīng)部門助理秘書長(zhǎng)、現(xiàn)任世衛(wèi)組織助理總干事斯圖爾特?西蒙森說,“我于是向他匯報(bào)應(yīng)急響應(yīng)方面的情況,會(huì)議結(jié)束時(shí),我給了他兩本書:約翰?巴里關(guān)于1918年西班牙流感的《大流感》和《911委員會(huì)報(bào)告》?!?/p>
“我當(dāng)時(shí)說的大概意思是,我們認(rèn)為我們將迎來另一場(chǎng)1918大流感。這是不可避免的,或早或晚都會(huì)發(fā)生。如果它發(fā)生時(shí)你還在任,而且沒能意識(shí)到它的威脅,那么這本書的下一卷,你將成為主角。”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:MS
責(zé)編:雨晨
新冠疫情在中國(guó)趨緩之際,西方國(guó)家和全球的疫情正處于失控爆發(fā)階段。如今,醫(yī)療和科技水平全球第一的美國(guó)卻在確診人數(shù)和死亡人數(shù)上排名第一,其社交隔離措施帶來的經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯和衰退,也需要一代人的時(shí)間去修復(fù)。如此巨大、不可承受的生命和社會(huì)代價(jià),特朗普政府有著直接不可推脫的責(zé)任。
流行病學(xué)是一門建立在推測(cè)基礎(chǔ)上的學(xué)科。研究人員將數(shù)據(jù)點(diǎn)放在一個(gè)地圖上,推測(cè)它們之間的關(guān)聯(lián),繼而神奇地發(fā)現(xiàn)可能的感染點(diǎn)和傳播載體。這些推測(cè),會(huì)形成假設(shè)理論的基礎(chǔ),這之后,艱苦的工作才正式開始:科學(xué)家煞費(fèi)苦心地,全面地搜集證據(jù),直到他們可以證實(shí)或否定這些理論。
在1854年,歷史上最有名的流行病學(xué)專家約翰?斯諾就是這么做的。當(dāng)時(shí),他在倫敦地圖上標(biāo)出霍亂致死的病例,最終鎖定了此次爆發(fā)的源頭:一口受污染的井和水泵?,F(xiàn)在,流行病專家也在做同樣的事情,只是對(duì)象換成了新型冠狀病毒和它引發(fā)的呼吸道疾病“新型冠狀病毒病肺炎”。
這場(chǎng)全球性危機(jī)已進(jìn)入第五個(gè)月了,根據(jù)約翰霍普金斯大學(xué)的數(shù)據(jù),新冠病毒感染確診病例激增至近200萬人,遍布185個(gè)國(guó)家和地區(qū),導(dǎo)致12.5萬人死亡。然而,依然有眾多的謎團(tuán)有待解決:有多少人在不自知的情況下染上了病毒,而且還在繼續(xù)傳播?疫情到底要持續(xù)多久?什么時(shí)候才能安全地去上班?然而,沒有人知道答案。
至于新冠病毒會(huì)如何重塑全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的一系列問題,例如,它會(huì)對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)造成多大的破壞?哪些行業(yè)損失最慘重,哪些會(huì)回彈,哪些會(huì)重塑?我們將用一整期的文章,以及大部分的每日網(wǎng)絡(luò)報(bào)道來調(diào)查這些問題?;旧希覀冋麄€(gè)編輯團(tuán)隊(duì)在過去幾個(gè)月中,一直在未完成的地圖上繪制數(shù)據(jù)點(diǎn),盡力在這些點(diǎn)中尋找有意義的規(guī)律。這些當(dāng)然都是推測(cè),不過,你也可以把它看做是金融流行病學(xué)。
然而,在這個(gè)充滿了“看似”,“可能”,和各種未知的領(lǐng)域中,還是有一些事情我們是掌握的,將這些教訓(xùn)分門別類地列出,可能有助于我們避免重蹈覆轍。
應(yīng)對(duì)準(zhǔn)備完全不足
“對(duì)于疫情的應(yīng)對(duì)準(zhǔn)備,我們過于滿足了。”身為醫(yī)生和紐約-長(zhǎng)老會(huì)醫(yī)院主席的史蒂芬?柯文說,“當(dāng)然,無論是單個(gè)醫(yī)院,還是一個(gè)國(guó)家,最終都能夠挺過去?!边^去幾十年中,有好幾次傳染病威脅到美國(guó),例如SARS、 中東呼吸癥候群冠狀病毒、H1N1禽流感,甚至是埃博拉,其中有幾種在其他地區(qū)局地肆虐,比如SARS在亞洲的爆發(fā),但是,沒有哪一個(gè)像新冠病毒那樣對(duì)美國(guó)造成如此之大的沖擊。柯文說,在錯(cuò)誤的安全感下,一些重要的問題被忽視了:“國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備需要放什么?供應(yīng)鏈有多脆弱?我們有多依賴快速物流?快速物流平時(shí)可以很快把防護(hù)用品送到醫(yī)院,但出現(xiàn)疫情時(shí),卻變得效率很低?!?/p>
隨著疫情的蔓延,這些問題得到了回答。4月初,紐約的疫情已經(jīng)達(dá)到高峰,每周消耗70萬個(gè)口罩,紐約州的口罩用量則達(dá)到了350萬個(gè),柯文說,按照這個(gè)速度,美國(guó)國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備用不了多久就會(huì)耗盡。2月時(shí),衛(wèi)生與公共服務(wù)部部長(zhǎng)亞歷克斯?阿扎向一個(gè)參議院委員會(huì)表示,美國(guó)國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備僅有3000萬個(gè)N95口罩和1200萬臺(tái)呼吸機(jī)的儲(chǔ)備量,此外,還有幾百萬個(gè)可能已過了保質(zhì)期的口罩。
美國(guó)的醫(yī)療和制藥供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)执嗳?。口罩等個(gè)人防護(hù)裝備大部分來自中國(guó),此外,中國(guó)還是全球最大的活性藥物成分、現(xiàn)代醫(yī)藥化學(xué)原料生產(chǎn)商和出口商,中國(guó)還生產(chǎn)了眾多疾病診斷用化學(xué)試劑,例如分辨病毒株的聚合酶鏈反應(yīng)測(cè)試。因此,如果出現(xiàn)了全球疫情,而供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)菑闹袊?guó)開始的,那么在到達(dá)美國(guó)之前可能就會(huì)中斷。
測(cè)試診斷成瓶頸
當(dāng)遇到可能具有大規(guī)模傳染性的病毒,也就是病毒毒性高,又可以輕易地人傳人時(shí),任何診斷測(cè)試上的滯后都可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致災(zāi)難性的后果。新冠病毒便是這樣一個(gè)案例,因?yàn)槊绹?guó)疾控中心最初開發(fā)的診斷測(cè)試存在缺陷,使得大規(guī)模測(cè)試很遲才開始,但更大的問題并不僅僅是政府所說的一個(gè)故障,而是一開始,所有的測(cè)試都必須經(jīng)由聯(lián)邦實(shí)驗(yàn)室進(jìn)行,集中往往意味著瓶頸,一旦出現(xiàn)故障,則完全無法進(jìn)行下去。
“即便一切進(jìn)展順利,哪怕疾控中心的測(cè)試也完全沒有問題,美國(guó)的篩查測(cè)試能力也根本不足以應(yīng)對(duì)這樣的疫情局面?!必?fù)責(zé)此類診斷規(guī)范的美國(guó)食藥局前專員斯科特?戈特列布說,“大學(xué)實(shí)驗(yàn)室和診所實(shí)驗(yàn)室也都必須參與檢測(cè),但這需要時(shí)間,因此,你得從1月份就開始和他們合作,這樣,到了2月和3月,才會(huì)準(zhǔn)備好?!?/p>
“如果我們?cè)?月中旬時(shí),就有能力每周測(cè)試10萬個(gè)樣本,那么結(jié)果會(huì)大不一樣?!备晏亓胁颊f。柯文對(duì)此也表示同意:“只有建立在早期測(cè)試和診斷基礎(chǔ)上,我們才能對(duì)這類病毒防控進(jìn)行情景規(guī)劃。”
沒有防控規(guī)劃
現(xiàn)在的美國(guó)政府并沒有一個(gè)防控規(guī)劃。當(dāng)我采訪薩賓疫苗研究所全球免疫業(yè)務(wù)主席布魯斯?杰林時(shí),他像幾乎所有美國(guó)人一樣,正在居家隔離。隔離期間,他有了時(shí)間整理自己的車庫(kù),在一堆上世紀(jì)90年代的玩偶底下,他發(fā)現(xiàn)了之前的聯(lián)邦政府制定的諸多防御病毒侵襲的規(guī)劃?!耙咔橐?guī)劃,我們是曾經(jīng)是有的?!苯芰种S刺說道,他也曾經(jīng)是前衛(wèi)生部助理副秘書長(zhǎng)、國(guó)家疫苗項(xiàng)目負(fù)責(zé)人。2005年布什政府時(shí)代,他主導(dǎo)制定了美國(guó)首個(gè)流感防控和應(yīng)急規(guī)劃。
當(dāng)時(shí)出現(xiàn)的“禽流感”也一度讓社會(huì)緊張無比,決策者們做了很多推測(cè),一旦真的變成大流行病,要對(duì)大量人口進(jìn)行隔離的話,那經(jīng)濟(jì)與社會(huì)成本會(huì)是多少?!捌渲幸粋€(gè)原則就是要列出,萬一人們不能外出的話,有哪些后勤準(zhǔn)備要做到位。”杰林回憶說,“例如,如果護(hù)士的學(xué)齡兒童呆在家,她怎么去上班?如果人們本來就是勉強(qiáng)度日的,一旦無法工作,怎么交得起房租?怎么按時(shí)繳納抵押貸款?如果你強(qiáng)迫人們呆在家中,大量的問題就會(huì)接踵而至?!边@些為減少社區(qū)傳播的做法只是這個(gè)規(guī)劃中的一部分。在新冠疫情期間,我們都意識(shí)到這類問題有多重要。
最后,這一切最發(fā)人深省的教訓(xùn)可能還在于,在這個(gè)前所未有的挑戰(zhàn)面前,在疫情造成社會(huì)幾近癱瘓的局面下,現(xiàn)任美國(guó)政府竟然完全無所作為。
2004年12月,小布什總統(tǒng)啟用邁克?李維特任衛(wèi)生與公共服務(wù)部的秘書長(zhǎng),李維特要求該機(jī)構(gòu)的所有部門負(fù)責(zé)人向其匯報(bào)各自職責(zé)。
“他在決定應(yīng)該保留誰,剔除誰?!鼻肮残l(wèi)生應(yīng)急響應(yīng)部門助理秘書長(zhǎng)、現(xiàn)任世衛(wèi)組織助理總干事斯圖爾特?西蒙森說,“我于是向他匯報(bào)應(yīng)急響應(yīng)方面的情況,會(huì)議結(jié)束時(shí),我給了他兩本書:約翰?巴里關(guān)于1918年西班牙流感的《大流感》和《911委員會(huì)報(bào)告》?!?/p>
“我當(dāng)時(shí)說的大概意思是,我們認(rèn)為我們將迎來另一場(chǎng)1918大流感。這是不可避免的,或早或晚都會(huì)發(fā)生。如果它發(fā)生時(shí)你還在任,而且沒能意識(shí)到它的威脅,那么這本書的下一卷,你將成為主角?!保ㄘ?cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:MS
責(zé)編:雨晨
Epidemiology is a science of “seems to be” steps. Researchers plot data points on a map and speculate connections between them, conjuring up likely nodes of infection and possible vectors of transmission. Such guessing, if you will, forms the basis for hypotheses, and then the truly hard work begins: Scientists gather evidence—systematically, painstakingly—until they can prove or disprove those theories.
That’s what John Snow, history’s most famous epidemiologist, did in 1854, when he plotted deadly cases of cholera on a map of London, eventually tracing the outbreak to a single contaminated well and water pump. And that’s what’s happening now, with the novel coronavirus and respiratory disease it causes, COVID-19.
As we enter the fifth month of this worldwide crisis—a viral pandemic that has grown feverishly to nearly 2 million confirmed cases in 185 countries or regions, and more than 125,000 deaths, according to researchers at Johns Hopkins University—there are still plenty of mysteries to solve. How many people are unknowingly infected with (and possibly spreading) the virus? How long will the pandemic last? When is it safe to go back to work? Well, no one quite knows.
As to the question of how the coronavirus will reshape the global economy—How much damage will it do? Which industries will suffer the most, bounce back, be reinvented?—we have devoted this entire issue and most of our daily online coverage to investigating. Virtually our entire editorial team has spent the past few months plotting data points on unfinished maps and doing our best to draw meaningful patterns among them. It’s guesswork, to be sure—though you might think of it as financial epidemiology as well.
But in the sea of seems-to-bes, maybes, and outright unknowns, there are also things that we do know—and cataloging those lessons will perhaps keep us from repeating our mistakes again.
“Let’s start with the premise that we’ve been complacent about our preparation for such a pandemic,” says Steven Corwin, who is both a physician and the president and CEO of New York–Presbyterian hospital. “And I don’t think there’s any question—whether it’s an individual hospital, whether it’s as a country, we’ve been able to skate by.” For all the would-be plagues that have threatened American shores in the past couple of decades—SARS, MERS-CoV, H1N1 influenza, even Ebola—none delivered the knockout blow to the U.S. that COVID-19 has, even if a few were devastating elsewhere. Our false sense of security has led us to put off tackling important questions, Corwin says: “What do you need in the Strategic National Stockpile? How fragile is the supply chain? How much are we dependent upon just-in-time delivery—which, though it makes us more efficient in terms of health care, doesn’t necessarily provide resiliency?”
As it happens, the pandemic answered those questions for us. “We’re now at the peak of this in New York,” says Corwin, in early April. “We’re using 700,000 masks a week, and we’re 20% of the New York system—which works out to 3.5 million masks this week for the downstate New York area. At that rate, the Strategic National Stockpile doesn’t go a long way.” Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar told a Senate committee in February that the Strategic National Stockpile had a mere 30 million surgical masks and 12 million respirators (the N95 masks that filter out most smaller viral particles) in reserve, plus a few million more that were likely past their expiration date.
We know that our medical and pharmaceutical supply chains are vulnerable. It’s not only masks and other personal protective equipment (PPE) that largely come from China. That nation, for example, is also the world’s largest producer and exporter of active pharmaceutical ingredients, the chemical feedstock of modern medicine. China also produces many of the chemical reagents that are used in disease diagnostics, such as polymerase chain reaction (or PCR) tests that identify viral strains. So, if in the midst of a pandemic, the supply starts there, the chain may break before it gets here.
On that front, we know that, when it comes to a potentially pandemic strain—a virus that is both virulent and easily transmissible from human to human—any lag in diagnostic testing can be catastrophic. That has been the case with the novel coronavirus, for which widespread testing was badly delayed due to the development of a flawed diagnostic test at the CDC. But the bigger problem wasn’t the glitch in the government’s assay; rather, it was the policy of centralizing testing at one federal lab. Centralizing, in short, just meant bottlenecking.
“Even if everything went perfectly, even if the CDC tests had rolled out perfectly, there was no way that the screening capacity in the U.S. was going to be robust enough to deal with a pandemic strain here in the U.S.,” says Scott Gottlieb, a physician and former commissioner of the FDA, which regulates such diagnostics. “You always had to get the academic labs [at universities] and the clinical labs in the game. And that takes time. So you needed to be working with them in January to get them ready for February and March.
“If we had the capacity in place in mid-February to test 100,000 samples a week,” says Gottlieb, “it could have made a very big difference.” Corwin agrees: “All the scenario planning around this type of virus was predicated on early testing and diagnosis.”
Which brings up something else we know: A plan is not a process. When I reach Bruce Gellin, the president of global immunization at the Sabin Vaccine Institute, he—like most everyone else in America—is under home quarantine, which has afforded him time to clean out his garage. There, under piles of Beanie Babies and other 1990s detritus, Gellin has found volumes of several of the federal government’s plans to fight a viral scourge. “We had a plandemic,” quips Gellin, a former deputy assistant secretary for Health and leader of HHS’s National Vaccine Program Office. In 2005, under the Bush administration, he led the creation of America’s first pandemic influenza preparedness and response plan.
This was the “bird flu” era, and federal policy makers were imagining the economic and social costs of quarantining huge swaths of the population, if it came to that. “One of the principles was outlining the backstops that needed to be in place to allow people to stay in place,” Gellin recalls. “How would a nurse be able to work if her school-age kids were home, for example? How would someone living hand-to-mouth not get kicked out of her house if she can’t work—or a homeowner not default on a mortgage? There is a huge cascade of stuff that has to happen if you’re going to force people to stay at home.” Such “community mitigation,” as they called it, was just part of the planning within the plan. In the era of COVID-19, we are all learning how essential such questions are.
Finally, the most powerful lesson of all? may come from witnessing government inaction in the face of a once-in-a-generation challenge—and knowing the cost of that paralysis.
After President George W. Bush tapped Michael Leavitt to succeed former Wisconsin Gov. Tommy Thompson as secretary of Health and Human Services in December 2004, Leavitt asked all of the agency’s operating and staff division heads to come over and brief him on their respective portfolios.
“He was trying to decide who to keep, maybe, and who not to keep,” says Stewart Simonson, then a former assistant secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness and now assistant director-general for the World Health Organization’s office at the United Nations. “And so I went over to brief on the preparedness and response portfolio, and then at the end of the meeting, I gave him two books: The Great Influenza—John Barry’s book on the 1918 flu epidemic—and the 9/11 Commission Report.
“And what I said is—something to the effect of that we know we will have another 1918. It’s inevitable. It’s just a matter of time. And if it happens while you’re secretary, and you’re not aware of the threat, this other book’s next volume will be about you.”