抗擊新冠疫情的戰(zhàn)役與其他戰(zhàn)爭不同,因為敵人是無形的,沒有人性可言,也沒有軍隊、將軍或致命的武器,而且因為其微小的形態(tài)更具隱蔽性。然而就其經(jīng)濟(jì)影響而言,全球在抗擊新冠疫情期間所面臨的痛楚在某些方面與此前的戰(zhàn)爭有些相似,盡管并非完全一樣。隨著各國開始重啟其經(jīng)濟(jì),歷史可以為今后可能會遇到哪些問題提供有用的線索,包括恢復(fù)速度、潛在的贏家和輸家,以及政府角色的變化。
當(dāng)前的經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢類似于兩場世界大戰(zhàn)的全民動員,只不過這一次是逆向動員,也就是動員大家待在家中,頂著失業(yè)的風(fēng)險放棄薪酬,而不是入伍上前線。
政府也加大了支出,用于資助這一逆向動員,例如直接或通過雇主給工人發(fā)錢,就像給戰(zhàn)爭中的戰(zhàn)士開餉一樣。在歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)五強(qiáng)中,有3000多萬名暫時休假的員工依然能拿到部分或全部薪酬,而這部分資金來自于政府給公司的補(bǔ)貼。在美國,《新冠病毒援助、救濟(jì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)安全法案》中有近半的方案都包括直接給家庭發(fā)的資金、提升失業(yè)補(bǔ)助以及保護(hù)在崗員工的薪資。這場居家動員的總成本達(dá)到了約1.23萬億美元,占美國GDP的6%,與1941年美國軍費占GDP的比重相當(dāng)。
在兩次世界大戰(zhàn)中,政府成為了經(jīng)濟(jì)的主要參與方和購買者,盡管此次危機(jī)還沒有發(fā)展到這個地步,但毋庸置疑的是,政府發(fā)揮的作用已經(jīng)有了大幅提升。對英格蘭銀行千年數(shù)據(jù)集的分析顯示,在一戰(zhàn)伊始,英國政府的消費額從1913年占GDP的8%躍升至1917年的近40%。在二戰(zhàn)中,美國政府的消費水平從1940年占GDP的15%躍升至1943年的占GDP的48%。
首先,如今的公共債要高得多,各大央行大幅提升了其資產(chǎn)額。美國聯(lián)邦資產(chǎn)負(fù)債從2019年的約4萬億美元躍升至7.1萬億美元。在歐洲,央行資產(chǎn)亦出現(xiàn)了急劇增長,在近幾個月中從約8000億歐元(約合8870億美元)升至5.5萬億歐元(約合6.1萬億美元)。眾多國家政府錢袋的膨脹程度已經(jīng)達(dá)到了二戰(zhàn)末的水平。然而,如果這樣的戰(zhàn)時經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)一個季度以上或兩個季度,那么GDP的增值將依賴于政府消費的增長,因為家庭會削減消費開支,企業(yè)會削減投資,同時出口也將下滑。
與此前戰(zhàn)爭類似的是,各大領(lǐng)域都有可能出現(xiàn)明顯的贏家和輸家。資源在戰(zhàn)時會迅速地從一個領(lǐng)域流入另一個領(lǐng)域。各國政府會努力發(fā)展任何戰(zhàn)略性產(chǎn)業(yè),從坦克一直到食品。與此同時,依賴于家庭可自由支配開支的各大領(lǐng)域?qū)⒔档推洚a(chǎn)能。例如,美國勞工部的數(shù)據(jù)分析顯示,在1941年至1944年期間,美國城市家庭在家庭裝飾、電器、休閑和娛樂方面的開支減少了25%。同樣在疫情期間,一些受封鎖令影響的領(lǐng)域遭受的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失要大得多,例如交通、娛樂和休閑,以及酒店行業(yè)。
但這種戰(zhàn)爭類比并不總是能夠站得住腳。在兩次世界大戰(zhàn)期間,各國均通過加大動員力度來驅(qū)除經(jīng)濟(jì)中的各種蕭條因素,結(jié)果造成了勞動力市場的緊張以及通脹的攀升。失業(yè)基本上消失了。如今我們很難想象,自疫情爆發(fā)以來大多數(shù)申請失業(yè)救助的3300萬美國工人以及法國、德國、意大利、西班牙和英國3000萬暫時休假的工人,能夠通過這種方式來解決就業(yè)問題。反而,各國可能會迎來半常態(tài)化的局面,其中,差旅和酒店行業(yè)將處于超低負(fù)荷運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)狀態(tài),破產(chǎn)和財務(wù)困境依然會持續(xù),而且有關(guān)新一波感染的擔(dān)憂依然會存在。
這場戰(zhàn)爭是否會以經(jīng)濟(jì)蕭條告終?這正是美國在兩次世界大戰(zhàn)、美國內(nèi)戰(zhàn)以及朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束后遇到的情況。在政府消費迅速萎縮的同時,家庭收入的增長還不足以支撐經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。這一次,疫情后經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩的某些誘因種子已經(jīng)種下。政府會收回其超常的財政手段,而提升公共債務(wù)可能會引發(fā)擔(dān)憂、裁員和緊縮。如果失業(yè)率依然居高不下,家庭開支的恢復(fù)可能需要很長的時間。
這場疫情給數(shù)千萬民眾帶來了經(jīng)濟(jì)不安感。不過,如果我們能夠以歷史為鑒,那么隨之而來的就會是社會改革。英國、法國和其他一些歐洲國家在二戰(zhàn)期間或結(jié)束后開展了重大的福利制度改革。在美國,《退伍軍人法》為告老還鄉(xiāng)的士兵提供了提升其技能和教育程度的機(jī)會。因此,疫情后的恢復(fù)可能會加速這些變化,例如基本收入、遠(yuǎn)程工作以及家庭、員工和公司在供應(yīng)鏈中彈性的增加。如果這類變化發(fā)生了,我們的社會契約可能將得到更新,它將改善收入保障,提供更多接觸科技的機(jī)會,并將生產(chǎn)力和經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮不斷推向新高度。(財富中文網(wǎng))
加里·平庫斯是麥肯錫北美的董事長。
斯里·拉瑪斯瓦米是麥肯錫全球研究所的合伙人。
譯者:Feb
抗擊新冠疫情的戰(zhàn)役與其他戰(zhàn)爭不同,因為敵人是無形的,沒有人性可言,也沒有軍隊、將軍或致命的武器,而且因為其微小的形態(tài)更具隱蔽性。然而就其經(jīng)濟(jì)影響而言,全球在抗擊新冠疫情期間所面臨的痛楚在某些方面與此前的戰(zhàn)爭有些相似,盡管并非完全一樣。隨著各國開始重啟其經(jīng)濟(jì),歷史可以為今后可能會遇到哪些問題提供有用的線索,包括恢復(fù)速度、潛在的贏家和輸家,以及政府角色的變化。
當(dāng)前的經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢類似于兩場世界大戰(zhàn)的全民動員,只不過這一次是逆向動員,也就是動員大家待在家中,頂著失業(yè)的風(fēng)險放棄薪酬,而不是入伍上前線。
政府也加大了支出,用于資助這一逆向動員,例如直接或通過雇主給工人發(fā)錢,就像給戰(zhàn)爭中的戰(zhàn)士開餉一樣。在歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)五強(qiáng)中,有3000多萬名暫時休假的員工依然能拿到部分或全部薪酬,而這部分資金來自于政府給公司的補(bǔ)貼。在美國,《新冠病毒援助、救濟(jì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)安全法案》中有近半的方案都包括直接給家庭發(fā)的資金、提升失業(yè)補(bǔ)助以及保護(hù)在崗員工的薪資。這場居家動員的總成本達(dá)到了約1.23萬億美元,占美國GDP的6%,與1941年美國軍費占GDP的比重相當(dāng)。
在兩次世界大戰(zhàn)中,政府成為了經(jīng)濟(jì)的主要參與方和購買者,盡管此次危機(jī)還沒有發(fā)展到這個地步,但毋庸置疑的是,政府發(fā)揮的作用已經(jīng)有了大幅提升。對英格蘭銀行千年數(shù)據(jù)集的分析顯示,在一戰(zhàn)伊始,英國政府的消費額從1913年占GDP的8%躍升至1917年的近40%。在二戰(zhàn)中,美國政府的消費水平從1940年占GDP的15%躍升至1943年的占GDP的48%。
首先,如今的公共債要高得多,各大央行大幅提升了其資產(chǎn)額。美國聯(lián)邦資產(chǎn)負(fù)債從2019年的約4萬億美元躍升至7.1萬億美元。在歐洲,央行資產(chǎn)亦出現(xiàn)了急劇增長,在近幾個月中從約8000億歐元(約合8870億美元)升至5.5萬億歐元(約合6.1萬億美元)。眾多國家政府錢袋的膨脹程度已經(jīng)達(dá)到了二戰(zhàn)末的水平。然而,如果這樣的戰(zhàn)時經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)一個季度以上或兩個季度,那么GDP的增值將依賴于政府消費的增長,因為家庭會削減消費開支,企業(yè)會削減投資,同時出口也將下滑。
與此前戰(zhàn)爭類似的是,各大領(lǐng)域都有可能出現(xiàn)明顯的贏家和輸家。資源在戰(zhàn)時會迅速地從一個領(lǐng)域流入另一個領(lǐng)域。各國政府會努力發(fā)展任何戰(zhàn)略性產(chǎn)業(yè),從坦克一直到食品。與此同時,依賴于家庭可自由支配開支的各大領(lǐng)域?qū)⒔档推洚a(chǎn)能。例如,美國勞工部的數(shù)據(jù)分析顯示,在1941年至1944年期間,美國城市家庭在家庭裝飾、電器、休閑和娛樂方面的開支減少了25%。同樣在疫情期間,一些受封鎖令影響的領(lǐng)域遭受的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失要大得多,例如交通、娛樂和休閑,以及酒店行業(yè)。
但這種戰(zhàn)爭類比并不總是能夠站得住腳。在兩次世界大戰(zhàn)期間,各國均通過加大動員力度來驅(qū)除經(jīng)濟(jì)中的各種蕭條因素,結(jié)果造成了勞動力市場的緊張以及通脹的攀升。失業(yè)基本上消失了。如今我們很難想象,自疫情爆發(fā)以來大多數(shù)申請失業(yè)救助的3300萬美國工人以及法國、德國、意大利、西班牙和英國3000萬暫時休假的工人,能夠通過這種方式來解決就業(yè)問題。反而,各國可能會迎來半常態(tài)化的局面,其中,差旅和酒店行業(yè)將處于超低負(fù)荷運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)狀態(tài),破產(chǎn)和財務(wù)困境依然會持續(xù),而且有關(guān)新一波感染的擔(dān)憂依然會存在。
這場戰(zhàn)爭是否會以經(jīng)濟(jì)蕭條告終?這正是美國在兩次世界大戰(zhàn)、美國內(nèi)戰(zhàn)以及朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束后遇到的情況。在政府消費迅速萎縮的同時,家庭收入的增長還不足以支撐經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。這一次,疫情后經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩的某些誘因種子已經(jīng)種下。政府會收回其超常的財政手段,而提升公共債務(wù)可能會引發(fā)擔(dān)憂、裁員和緊縮。如果失業(yè)率依然居高不下,家庭開支的恢復(fù)可能需要很長的時間。
這場疫情給數(shù)千萬民眾帶來了經(jīng)濟(jì)不安感。不過,如果我們能夠以歷史為鑒,那么隨之而來的就會是社會改革。英國、法國和其他一些歐洲國家在二戰(zhàn)期間或結(jié)束后開展了重大的福利制度改革。在美國,《退伍軍人法》為告老還鄉(xiāng)的士兵提供了提升其技能和教育程度的機(jī)會。因此,疫情后的恢復(fù)可能會加速這些變化,例如基本收入、遠(yuǎn)程工作以及家庭、員工和公司在供應(yīng)鏈中彈性的增加。如果這類變化發(fā)生了,我們的社會契約可能將得到更新,它將改善收入保障,提供更多接觸科技的機(jī)會,并將生產(chǎn)力和經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮不斷推向新高度。(財富中文網(wǎng))
加里·平庫斯是麥肯錫北美的董事長。
斯里·拉瑪斯瓦米是麥肯錫全球研究所的合伙人。
譯者:Feb
The war against COVID-19 is unlike other wars in that the enemy is invisible and inhuman, without armies, generals, or deadly hardware, and all the more insidious for being microscopic. Yet in terms of its economic consequences, the global struggle against the coronavirus does resemble previous wars in some—but not all—respects. As countries tackle reopening, history can provide helpful clues about what to expect next, in terms of the speed of recovery, potential winners and losers, and the changed role of government.
The current economic cycle is similar to the mass mobilization of the two world wars. This time, though, the mobilization is happening in reverse, an at-home mobilization of residents being asked to stay home, forgo paychecks, and risk unemployment rather than enlist to fight.
Government spending has ramped up to finance this reverse mobilization, paying workers directly or through their employers, just as it did soldiers in war. Across Europe’s five largest economies, more than 30 million furloughed workers continue to receive much or all of their pay via government subsidies to companies. In the United States, roughly half the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act package includes direct payments to households, expanded unemployment benefits, and paycheck protection for employed workers. This at-home mobilization, which totals to about $1.23 trillion, amounts to nearly 6% of U.S. GDP—roughly the U.S. military budget’s share of GDP in 1941.
Government during the two world wars became the primary actor and purchaser in the economy—and while that isn’t yet the case in this crisis, its role has certainly grown substantially. At the start of the First World War, government consumption in Britain jumped from 8% of GDP in 1913 to nearly 40% in 1917, according to analysis of the Bank of England’s millennium data set. During the Second World War, America’s government consumption rose from 15% of GDP in 1940 to 48% by 1943.
Public debt today is much higher to begin with, and central banks have massively increased their assets. The U.S. federal balance sheet jumped from about $4 trillion in 2019 to $7.1 trillion, and in Europe, central bank assets have also risen sharply, increasing in recent months by around 800 billion euros ($887 billion) to 5.5 trillion euros ($6.1 trillion). The public purse is thus already as stretched in many countries as it was at the end of the Second World War. Yet, if this wartime economy continues for more than one or two quarters, growth in government consumption is what will keep GDP growth going as households cut back on consumption, businesses cut back on investment, and exports fall.
As in previous wars, there are likely to be clear winners and losers among sectors. Resources move quickly from one area to another in wartime. Governments call the shots for anything deemed strategic, from tanks to food. Meanwhile sectors that depend on households’ discretionary spending could see a fall in output; between 1941 and 1944, for instance, urban American households reduced their spending on household furnishings, appliances, recreation, and entertainment by 25%, according to analysis of data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Likewise, during this pandemic, economic loss has been disproportionately in sectors affected by the lockdowns, like the transportation, entertainment and recreation, and hospitality industries.
The war analogy does not always hold up. During the two world wars, mobilization ramped up to absorb all the slack in the economy, tightening the labor market, and raising inflation. Unemployment essentially disappeared. Today, it is hard to imagine that most of the 33 million U.S. workers that filed for unemployment since the pandemic spread or the 30 million furloughed workers in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K. will be absorbed by mobilization. Instead, countries may settle for a half-normal situation, one in which travel and hospitality operate well below capacity, bankruptcies and financial hardships continue at a steady pace, and persistent worries remain about a new wave of infections.
Could this war end with a recession? That is what happened in the U.S. after both world wars, the American Civil War, and the Korean War. While government consumption shrank quickly, households did not have the income growth to step up as economic engines. This time, some of the conditions for a post-pandemic slowdown have already been seeded. Governments will pull back their extraordinary fiscal measures, and rising public debt could trigger concerns and calls for cutbacks and austerity. Household spending may take time to recover if unemployment continues to be high.
This pandemic has highlighted the economic insecurity of millions. But if the past is a guide, social reforms could follow. In Britain, France, and some other European countries, major welfare reforms were enacted during or at the end of the Second World War. In the U.S., the GI Bill gave returning soldiers an opportunity to upgrade their skills and education. Thus, the post-pandemic recovery could potentially accelerate changes such as universal incomes, remote work, and greater resilience for households, workers, and companies in supply chains. If such changes are enacted, we could end up with a renewed social contract that improves income security, expands access to technology, and creates a rising tide of productivity and economic prosperity.
Gary Pinkus is chairman of North America for McKinsey.
Sree Ramaswamy is a partner at the McKinsey Global Institute.