成人小说亚洲一区二区三区,亚洲国产精品一区二区三区,国产精品成人精品久久久,久久综合一区二区三区,精品无码av一区二区,国产一级a毛一级a看免费视频,欧洲uv免费在线区一二区,亚洲国产欧美中日韩成人综合视频,国产熟女一区二区三区五月婷小说,亚洲一区波多野结衣在线

首頁(yè) 500強(qiáng) 活動(dòng) 榜單 商業(yè) 科技 領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力 專題 品牌中心
雜志訂閱

對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)公司來說,限制大企業(yè)并購(gòu)是好事嗎?

Patricia Nakache
2020-08-06

如果政府對(duì)并購(gòu)活動(dòng)實(shí)施限制,進(jìn)而影響了企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)回報(bào),那么科技界的生態(tài)就會(huì)受到影響,吸引到的創(chuàng)業(yè)者和資本就會(huì)減少。

文本設(shè)置
小號(hào)
默認(rèn)
大號(hào)
Plus(0條)

2020年7月29日,亞馬遜公司創(chuàng)始人、首席執(zhí)行官杰夫·貝索斯出席美國(guó)眾議院司法委員會(huì)的視頻聽證會(huì)。圖片來源:GRAEME JENNINGS/WASHINGTON EXAMINER/BLOOMBERG VIA GETTY IMAGES

上周四美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)召開的反壟斷聽證會(huì),標(biāo)志著美國(guó)政府在是否應(yīng)該監(jiān)管以及應(yīng)該如何監(jiān)管大型科技企業(yè)的問題上邁出了重要一步。不過從聽證會(huì)上提出的問題來看,議員們很可能將注意力放在了一些錯(cuò)誤的問題上。

受疫情影響,美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退愈演愈烈,失業(yè)率持續(xù)飆升,然而蘋果、谷歌、臉書和亞馬遜等大型科技公司的業(yè)績(jī)卻比以往任何時(shí)候都要好。蘋果的市值已經(jīng)超過了1.9萬(wàn)億美元,而光是2020年以來,亞馬遜的股票就增長(zhǎng)了63%,市值也達(dá)到了驚人的1.6萬(wàn)億美元。目前,美國(guó)四大科技公司的市值總計(jì)已達(dá)5萬(wàn)億美元,占標(biāo)普500企業(yè)的近五分之一。而且更重要的是,它們對(duì)社會(huì)的方方面面都產(chǎn)生了前所未有的影響。

在周四的聽證會(huì)上,有些議員質(zhì)疑,四大科技公司是否在利用收并購(gòu)手段消滅競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手,或者是否在用收并購(gòu)活動(dòng)鞏固其市場(chǎng)力量,以達(dá)到對(duì)市場(chǎng)的壟斷性控制地位。Stratechery網(wǎng)站的本·湯普森稱,臉書收購(gòu)Instagram是“過去十年監(jiān)管領(lǐng)域的最大失敗”。收并購(gòu)問題成為聽證會(huì)上的核心議題也是很自然的,因?yàn)槊绹?guó)司法部、聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)等監(jiān)管部門都有通過監(jiān)管收并購(gòu)活動(dòng)來反壟斷的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。

雖然如此,但過度關(guān)注收并購(gòu)問題仍然是一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤——尤其是美國(guó)就業(yè)市場(chǎng)正處于“大蕭條”以來最疲軟的時(shí)期,如果制訂過于激進(jìn)的反收并購(gòu)政策,對(duì)市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行過度修正,由此帶來的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)將遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過Instagram這個(gè)孤例的負(fù)面影響。

科技界的收并購(gòu)活動(dòng)包含了很多種交易。有些收并購(gòu)活動(dòng)的規(guī)模比較?。ū热缫恍l臨倒閉的公司,收購(gòu)這些公司主要是為了它的員工,通常是工程師)。雖然能夠獲得媒體關(guān)注的,只有那些交易額達(dá)幾十億美元的收購(gòu)案,但這些小規(guī)模的收購(gòu)活動(dòng)才是市場(chǎng)的主流。此外還有很多中等規(guī)模的收購(gòu),它們有時(shí)甚至可以給初創(chuàng)公司及其員工創(chuàng)造堅(jiān)實(shí)的甚至出色的業(yè)績(jī)。2018年,美國(guó)一共有779起由風(fēng)投支持的收并購(gòu)交易,其交易額的中位數(shù)為1.05億美元。

可以肯定的說,所有風(fēng)投資本家和想方設(shè)法拉風(fēng)投的創(chuàng)業(yè)者,他們的目標(biāo)都是IPO。IPO可以給所有人(員工、創(chuàng)始人和投資人)帶來最理想的回報(bào),也能創(chuàng)造最多的工作機(jī)會(huì)。但大多數(shù)企業(yè)永遠(yuǎn)也無法達(dá)到上市公司的規(guī)模,去年幾家科技公司的IPO遇冷就是例子。另外,從美國(guó)當(dāng)前的監(jiān)管環(huán)境來看,上市對(duì)企業(yè)規(guī)模的要求也越來越高。這就是為什么在過去幾年里,美國(guó)每年IPO的公司數(shù)量平均只有2000年以前的一半。毫不奇怪,如今美國(guó)上市公司的總數(shù)大概也只有20年前的一半。

企業(yè)上市的難度越大,收并購(gòu)就越容易成為創(chuàng)業(yè)者承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的動(dòng)力,以及風(fēng)投家給創(chuàng)業(yè)者注資的動(dòng)力。如果政府對(duì)收并購(gòu)活動(dòng)實(shí)施限制,進(jìn)而影響了企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)回報(bào),那么科技界的生態(tài)就會(huì)受到影響,吸引到的創(chuàng)業(yè)者和資本就會(huì)減少。企業(yè)界的很多收并購(gòu)活動(dòng),恰恰是由監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)想要限制的那些大公司發(fā)起的,哪怕這些公司最終沒有完成收購(gòu),他們通常也參與了競(jìng)標(biāo),從而為創(chuàng)業(yè)者和風(fēng)投家?guī)砹朔e極的結(jié)果。由于創(chuàng)業(yè)的失敗率是很高的,創(chuàng)業(yè)者和他們的創(chuàng)業(yè)團(tuán)隊(duì)必須有潛在的巨大利益,才能激勵(lì)他們承擔(dān)如此巨大的創(chuàng)業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。換言之,如果靠限制大公司的收并購(gòu)活動(dòng)來鼓勵(lì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng),則反而可能不利于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。

因此,我建議采取以下措施,既有益于創(chuàng)造公平的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境,又不會(huì)剝奪創(chuàng)業(yè)者靠被收購(gòu)而退出的權(quán)利。

開放數(shù)據(jù)遷移

大型科技公司的權(quán)力,很大程度上來自他們積累的大量用戶數(shù)據(jù),這些數(shù)據(jù)使他們能夠提供更有針對(duì)性的服務(wù)和結(jié)果,最終實(shí)現(xiàn)用戶“鎖定”。聯(lián)合廣場(chǎng)風(fēng)投(Union Square Ventures)的尼克?格羅斯曼表示,應(yīng)該賦予用戶對(duì)自己的社交數(shù)據(jù)、財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)和健康數(shù)據(jù)的控制權(quán),使用戶可以自由地將他們的數(shù)據(jù)遷移到其他服務(wù),這樣將有助于促進(jìn)市場(chǎng)公平,鼓勵(lì)創(chuàng)業(yè)者的創(chuàng)新和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。換句話說,就是“打破數(shù)據(jù),而不是打破公司。”

鼓勵(lì)跨平臺(tái)交互

如今,無數(shù)創(chuàng)業(yè)公司賴以生存的平臺(tái)和受眾,基本上都掌控在幾家大型科技公司手里。比如,iPhone用戶只能通過蘋果的應(yīng)用商店下載軟件,應(yīng)用開發(fā)者如果想在蘋果應(yīng)用商店賣軟件,無一例外地都要向蘋果支付高額分成。在控制這些平臺(tái)的同時(shí),大型科技公司也在監(jiān)控著這些平臺(tái)上的數(shù)據(jù),他們能夠發(fā)現(xiàn)哪些產(chǎn)品有吸引力,并且復(fù)制它們。因此,我們應(yīng)該鼓勵(lì)跨平臺(tái)交互,并且在必要時(shí)建立“長(zhǎng)城”,防止大型科技公司利用數(shù)據(jù)和平臺(tái)上的優(yōu)勢(shì)開展不公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng),以此削弱這些大型數(shù)據(jù)公司的“數(shù)據(jù)守門人”地位。

降低企業(yè)上市難度

美國(guó)的《薩班斯-奧克斯利法案》和《多德-弗蘭克法案》給企業(yè)上市設(shè)置了很多阻礙,美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)可以放松其中一些財(cái)務(wù)、會(huì)計(jì)和法律等方面的限制。上市公司數(shù)量的增多,也必然會(huì)給這些占市場(chǎng)主導(dǎo)地位的公司帶來更多的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。

這些復(fù)雜的問題是沒有簡(jiǎn)單的答案的。監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)很有可能增設(shè)重重壁壘,使創(chuàng)業(yè)公司幾乎無法參與競(jìng)爭(zhēng),從而進(jìn)一步鞏固這些大型科技公司的壟斷地位。不得不說,這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)始終都是存在的。好在監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)已經(jīng)表態(tài)稱,他們有興趣聽取風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和創(chuàng)業(yè)公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的意見,不管是通過直接對(duì)話,還是通過與全美風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資協(xié)會(huì)(National Venture Capital Association)等組織的對(duì)話。

美國(guó)良好的創(chuàng)新生態(tài)并不是天上掉下來的。在上世紀(jì)90年代中期,美國(guó)吸引了全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的95%以上,現(xiàn)在這個(gè)比例只有一半多一點(diǎn)。如果我們認(rèn)真思考如何推進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇的問題,那么,我們可能就在無形中為那些沒有受到收并購(gòu)限制的外國(guó)企業(yè)提供了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。所謂美國(guó)夢(mèng),強(qiáng)調(diào)的就是任何人通過努力工作和創(chuàng)新,都可以擁有自己的事業(yè),改善自己的生活。在過去的幾十年里,通過一代代創(chuàng)業(yè)人的努力,我們一次又一次地看到了美國(guó)夢(mèng)的實(shí)現(xiàn)。現(xiàn)在,我們比以往任何時(shí)候都更需要這些杰出的創(chuàng)業(yè)者來幫助我們度過疫情危機(jī),重振經(jīng)濟(jì),創(chuàng)造新的就業(yè)。

本文作者Patricia Nakache是Trinity Ventures公司的普通合伙人,斯坦福大學(xué)商學(xué)院管理學(xué)講師,也是美國(guó)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資協(xié)會(huì)的理事會(huì)成員。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:Min

上周四美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)召開的反壟斷聽證會(huì),標(biāo)志著美國(guó)政府在是否應(yīng)該監(jiān)管以及應(yīng)該如何監(jiān)管大型科技企業(yè)的問題上邁出了重要一步。不過從聽證會(huì)上提出的問題來看,議員們很可能將注意力放在了一些錯(cuò)誤的問題上。

受疫情影響,美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退愈演愈烈,失業(yè)率持續(xù)飆升,然而蘋果、谷歌、臉書和亞馬遜等大型科技公司的業(yè)績(jī)卻比以往任何時(shí)候都要好。蘋果的市值已經(jīng)超過了1.9萬(wàn)億美元,而光是2020年以來,亞馬遜的股票就增長(zhǎng)了63%,市值也達(dá)到了驚人的1.6萬(wàn)億美元。目前,美國(guó)四大科技公司的市值總計(jì)已達(dá)5萬(wàn)億美元,占標(biāo)普500企業(yè)的近五分之一。而且更重要的是,它們對(duì)社會(huì)的方方面面都產(chǎn)生了前所未有的影響。

在周四的聽證會(huì)上,有些議員質(zhì)疑,四大科技公司是否在利用收并購(gòu)手段消滅競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手,或者是否在用收并購(gòu)活動(dòng)鞏固其市場(chǎng)力量,以達(dá)到對(duì)市場(chǎng)的壟斷性控制地位。Stratechery網(wǎng)站的本·湯普森稱,臉書收購(gòu)Instagram是“過去十年監(jiān)管領(lǐng)域的最大失敗”。收并購(gòu)問題成為聽證會(huì)上的核心議題也是很自然的,因?yàn)槊绹?guó)司法部、聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)等監(jiān)管部門都有通過監(jiān)管收并購(gòu)活動(dòng)來反壟斷的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。

雖然如此,但過度關(guān)注收并購(gòu)問題仍然是一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤——尤其是美國(guó)就業(yè)市場(chǎng)正處于“大蕭條”以來最疲軟的時(shí)期,如果制訂過于激進(jìn)的反收并購(gòu)政策,對(duì)市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行過度修正,由此帶來的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)將遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過Instagram這個(gè)孤例的負(fù)面影響。

科技界的收并購(gòu)活動(dòng)包含了很多種交易。有些收并購(gòu)活動(dòng)的規(guī)模比較?。ū热缫恍l臨倒閉的公司,收購(gòu)這些公司主要是為了它的員工,通常是工程師)。雖然能夠獲得媒體關(guān)注的,只有那些交易額達(dá)幾十億美元的收購(gòu)案,但這些小規(guī)模的收購(gòu)活動(dòng)才是市場(chǎng)的主流。此外還有很多中等規(guī)模的收購(gòu),它們有時(shí)甚至可以給初創(chuàng)公司及其員工創(chuàng)造堅(jiān)實(shí)的甚至出色的業(yè)績(jī)。2018年,美國(guó)一共有779起由風(fēng)投支持的收并購(gòu)交易,其交易額的中位數(shù)為1.05億美元。

可以肯定的說,所有風(fēng)投資本家和想方設(shè)法拉風(fēng)投的創(chuàng)業(yè)者,他們的目標(biāo)都是IPO。IPO可以給所有人(員工、創(chuàng)始人和投資人)帶來最理想的回報(bào),也能創(chuàng)造最多的工作機(jī)會(huì)。但大多數(shù)企業(yè)永遠(yuǎn)也無法達(dá)到上市公司的規(guī)模,去年幾家科技公司的IPO遇冷就是例子。另外,從美國(guó)當(dāng)前的監(jiān)管環(huán)境來看,上市對(duì)企業(yè)規(guī)模的要求也越來越高。這就是為什么在過去幾年里,美國(guó)每年IPO的公司數(shù)量平均只有2000年以前的一半。毫不奇怪,如今美國(guó)上市公司的總數(shù)大概也只有20年前的一半。

企業(yè)上市的難度越大,收并購(gòu)就越容易成為創(chuàng)業(yè)者承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的動(dòng)力,以及風(fēng)投家給創(chuàng)業(yè)者注資的動(dòng)力。如果政府對(duì)收并購(gòu)活動(dòng)實(shí)施限制,進(jìn)而影響了企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)回報(bào),那么科技界的生態(tài)就會(huì)受到影響,吸引到的創(chuàng)業(yè)者和資本就會(huì)減少。企業(yè)界的很多收并購(gòu)活動(dòng),恰恰是由監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)想要限制的那些大公司發(fā)起的,哪怕這些公司最終沒有完成收購(gòu),他們通常也參與了競(jìng)標(biāo),從而為創(chuàng)業(yè)者和風(fēng)投家?guī)砹朔e極的結(jié)果。由于創(chuàng)業(yè)的失敗率是很高的,創(chuàng)業(yè)者和他們的創(chuàng)業(yè)團(tuán)隊(duì)必須有潛在的巨大利益,才能激勵(lì)他們承擔(dān)如此巨大的創(chuàng)業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。換言之,如果靠限制大公司的收并購(gòu)活動(dòng)來鼓勵(lì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng),則反而可能不利于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。

因此,我建議采取以下措施,既有益于創(chuàng)造公平的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境,又不會(huì)剝奪創(chuàng)業(yè)者靠被收購(gòu)而退出的權(quán)利。

開放數(shù)據(jù)遷移

大型科技公司的權(quán)力,很大程度上來自他們積累的大量用戶數(shù)據(jù),這些數(shù)據(jù)使他們能夠提供更有針對(duì)性的服務(wù)和結(jié)果,最終實(shí)現(xiàn)用戶“鎖定”。聯(lián)合廣場(chǎng)風(fēng)投(Union Square Ventures)的尼克?格羅斯曼表示,應(yīng)該賦予用戶對(duì)自己的社交數(shù)據(jù)、財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)和健康數(shù)據(jù)的控制權(quán),使用戶可以自由地將他們的數(shù)據(jù)遷移到其他服務(wù),這樣將有助于促進(jìn)市場(chǎng)公平,鼓勵(lì)創(chuàng)業(yè)者的創(chuàng)新和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。換句話說,就是“打破數(shù)據(jù),而不是打破公司。”

鼓勵(lì)跨平臺(tái)交互

如今,無數(shù)創(chuàng)業(yè)公司賴以生存的平臺(tái)和受眾,基本上都掌控在幾家大型科技公司手里。比如,iPhone用戶只能通過蘋果的應(yīng)用商店下載軟件,應(yīng)用開發(fā)者如果想在蘋果應(yīng)用商店賣軟件,無一例外地都要向蘋果支付高額分成。在控制這些平臺(tái)的同時(shí),大型科技公司也在監(jiān)控著這些平臺(tái)上的數(shù)據(jù),他們能夠發(fā)現(xiàn)哪些產(chǎn)品有吸引力,并且復(fù)制它們。因此,我們應(yīng)該鼓勵(lì)跨平臺(tái)交互,并且在必要時(shí)建立“長(zhǎng)城”,防止大型科技公司利用數(shù)據(jù)和平臺(tái)上的優(yōu)勢(shì)開展不公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng),以此削弱這些大型數(shù)據(jù)公司的“數(shù)據(jù)守門人”地位。

降低企業(yè)上市難度

美國(guó)的《薩班斯-奧克斯利法案》和《多德-弗蘭克法案》給企業(yè)上市設(shè)置了很多阻礙,美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)可以放松其中一些財(cái)務(wù)、會(huì)計(jì)和法律等方面的限制。上市公司數(shù)量的增多,也必然會(huì)給這些占市場(chǎng)主導(dǎo)地位的公司帶來更多的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。

這些復(fù)雜的問題是沒有簡(jiǎn)單的答案的。監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)很有可能增設(shè)重重壁壘,使創(chuàng)業(yè)公司幾乎無法參與競(jìng)爭(zhēng),從而進(jìn)一步鞏固這些大型科技公司的壟斷地位。不得不說,這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)始終都是存在的。好在監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)已經(jīng)表態(tài)稱,他們有興趣聽取風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和創(chuàng)業(yè)公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的意見,不管是通過直接對(duì)話,還是通過與全美風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資協(xié)會(huì)(National Venture Capital Association)等組織的對(duì)話。

美國(guó)良好的創(chuàng)新生態(tài)并不是天上掉下來的。在上世紀(jì)90年代中期,美國(guó)吸引了全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的95%以上,現(xiàn)在這個(gè)比例只有一半多一點(diǎn)。如果我們認(rèn)真思考如何推進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇的問題,那么,我們可能就在無形中為那些沒有受到收并購(gòu)限制的外國(guó)企業(yè)提供了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。所謂美國(guó)夢(mèng),強(qiáng)調(diào)的就是任何人通過努力工作和創(chuàng)新,都可以擁有自己的事業(yè),改善自己的生活。在過去的幾十年里,通過一代代創(chuàng)業(yè)人的努力,我們一次又一次地看到了美國(guó)夢(mèng)的實(shí)現(xiàn)?,F(xiàn)在,我們比以往任何時(shí)候都更需要這些杰出的創(chuàng)業(yè)者來幫助我們度過疫情危機(jī),重振經(jīng)濟(jì),創(chuàng)造新的就業(yè)。

本文作者Patricia Nakache是Trinity Ventures公司的普通合伙人,斯坦福大學(xué)商學(xué)院管理學(xué)講師,也是美國(guó)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資協(xié)會(huì)的理事會(huì)成員。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:Min

Thursday’s Congressional antitrust hearing marked an important milestone in the government’s ongoing exploration into whether and, specifically, how to regulate Big Tech. But judging from the lines of questioning, lawmakers may be focusing on some of the wrong issues.

As the pandemic-induced downturn rages on, and unemployment rates continue to soar, Apple, Google, Facebook and Amazon are doing better than ever. Apple is now worth more than $1.9 trillion, and Amazon, whose stock price has grown 63% 2020 alone, enjoys an equally staggering $1.6 trillion market cap. Collectively, these four companies are worth $5 trillion, account for nearly a fifth of the S&P 500, and, more importantly, wield unprecedented power over nearly every segment of society.

Some of the questions on Thursday focused, appropriately so, on the topics of mergers and acquisitions aimed at either killing competitors or consolidating their market power to the point of monopolistic control. Stratechery’s Ben Thompson has called Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram “the greatest regulatory failure of the past decade.” M&A is also a natural area for regulator focus since regulatory bodies like the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have experience conducting oversight in this manner.

Even so, focusing tech regulation on M&A would be a mistake—especially now as we navigate what may become the weakest job market since the Great Depression. Now more than ever the risks of over-correcting through aggressive anti-M&A policymaking significantly outweigh the risks of missing the rare instance of an Instagram.

Tech M&A encompasses a broad range of transactions ranging from modest acquihires (where companies that were likely going to fail are bought for their employees, usually engineers) to billion-dollar megahits. While the big hits get most of the media attention, it’s the small buys that account for the vast majority of transactions. There are also many mid-size acquisitions which can create solid and even occasionally outstanding outcomes for startup founders and employees. In 2018 there were 779 M&A transactions of venture-backed companies with a median deal value of $105 million.

To be sure, IPOs are almost universally the goal for venture-backed founders and investors. IPOs consistently generate the best payouts for everyone involved (employees, founders and investors) and create the most jobs. But most companies will never be able to reach the scale required to thrive in the public markets, a lesson starkly demonstrated by several tech public offerings that took place last year. Moreover, the scale required for a company to go public has been increasing due to our current regulatory environment. That’s why over the past few years we’ve seen on average half the IPOs per year that we saw in either decade before 2000. As a result, there are roughly half the total number of public companies today that there were twenty years ago.

The more challenging it is for companies to go public, the more important M&A becomes as a motivation for founders to take risks and for venture investors to fund them. If restrictions on M&A reduce financial returns, the tech innovation ecosystem will attract fewer entrepreneurs and less capital. Many acquisitions in the tech sector are executed by the same tech companies that regulators seek to limit, and even when those companies do not ultimately complete these acquisitions, they’re often part of the bidding process that leads to positive outcomes for entrepreneurs and venture investors. Given high failure rates among startups, entrepreneurs and their teams need the lure of potential large outcomes to motivate them to take on such extraordinary risk. In other words, by limiting M&A to promote competition against Big Tech, we could end up with less.

Instead, I recommend the following steps to level the competitive playing field without depriving entrepreneurs of the option to exit via acquisitions:

Mandate data portability

The power of the big technology companies is derived at least in part from the user data they have amassed, allowing them to deliver ever more targeted services and results, and ultimately ensuring consumer “l(fā)ock in.” Giving users control over their own social, financial and health data and the freedom to move it to other services will help to level the playing field and encourage entrepreneurs to innovate and compete. In the words of Nick Grossman of Union Square Ventures, “Break up the data, not the companies.”

Encourage platform interoperability

Today large technology companies control access to platforms and audiences on which startups are dependent for survival. For example, iPhone users can only download apps through Apple’s App Store, and app developers who sell through the App Store, with few exceptions, are required to pay Apple a hefty toll. Moreover, in their roles controlling these platforms and monitoring the data that flows through them, the big companies are able to identify which products have traction and copy them. The powerful gatekeeper role of the large tech platforms should be moderated by encouraging interoperability and instituting, where appropriate, “Chinese Walls” to prevent them from using their data and platform dominance to unfairly guarantee the success of separate products and services that compete with customers or partners.

Make it easier for companies to go public

Congress can relax some of the financial, accounting and legal controls put in place through the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts that are creating so many hurdles for companies to go public. More public companies would generate more competition for these dominant firms.

These are complex issues without any easy answers. There’s always the risk that regulation can strengthen the incumbents by creating so many costly hurdles that it becomes impossible for startups to compete. Fortunately, regulators have demonstrated that they’re interested in receiving input from VCs and startup leaders, both directly and through dialogue with organizations like the National Venture Capital Association.

Let’s not take America’s incredible innovation ecosystem for granted: The share of worldwide VC dollars deployed in the U.S. has declined from more than 95% in the mid-1990’s to just over half today. If we’re not careful about how we address our economic recovery, we could inadvertently provide a competitive advantage to international companies unhindered by acquisition restrictions. The American dream has always epitomized what is best about our country: the idea that through hard work and innovation anyone here can build a business and improve their lives. For the past few decades, we’ve seen the American dream realized time and again through the amazing efforts of our entrepreneurs. Right now, we need these remarkable entrepreneurs more than ever to help us weather the pandemic storm, reignite our economy and generate new jobs.

Patricia Nakache is a general partner at Trinity Ventures, a lecturer in management at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and a board member of the National Venture Capital Association.

財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)所刊載內(nèi)容之知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)為財(cái)富媒體知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)有限公司及/或相關(guān)權(quán)利人專屬所有或持有。未經(jīng)許可,禁止進(jìn)行轉(zhuǎn)載、摘編、復(fù)制及建立鏡像等任何使用。
0條Plus
精彩評(píng)論
評(píng)論

撰寫或查看更多評(píng)論

請(qǐng)打開財(cái)富Plus APP

前往打開
熱讀文章
国产熟女亚洲精品麻豆| 亚洲精品国产AV现线| 产欧美日韩综合精品一区二区三区| 国产精品无码专区在线观看| 夜添久久精品亚洲精品第一国产综合高清| 人妻体内射精一区二区三区| 色久桃花影院在线观看| 亚洲伊人久久精品影院| 亚洲精品国产精品乱码视.| 国产精品三级av及在线观看| 国产成人v片视频在线观看| 亚洲人成在线观看网站无码| 国产av人人夜夜澡人人爽麻豆| 国产一级做a爰片久久毛片99| 国产成人精品久久二区二区| 国产精品无码素人福利免费| 国产美女高潮久久久久白浆| 色视频一区二区三区网网网网 | 肥老熟妇伦子伦456视频| 国产亚洲婷婷香蕉久久精品| 91精品国产亚洲综合色婷婷久久久99| 国产精品爆乳奶水无码视频| 欧美日韩免费一区二区三区播放| 午夜无码区在线观看亚洲| 久久久久人妻精品一区| 午夜精品A片一区二区 | 性欧美VIDEOFREE高清| 国产精品成人一区二区三区| 亚洲中文字幕无码亚洲人成影院| 一级a性色生活片久久| 一本色道久久综合狠狠躁| 久久精品aⅴ无码中文字字幕| 亚洲va成无码人在线观看天堂| 大地资源二在线观看免费高清| 无码heyzo天然素人在线观看| 日本精品啪啪一区二区三区| 青椒午夜影院在线日本视频| 自拍亚洲欧美在线成电影| 亚洲综合经典在线一区二区| 午夜A理论片在线播放| 久久精品一区二区白丝袜自慰|