有人認(rèn)為美國房價暴漲會持續(xù)下去,有人認(rèn)為股市盡管估值過高但將保持繁榮,還有人認(rèn)為美國人能夠負(fù)擔(dān)得起數(shù)萬億美元的新借款,這些觀點都有或者曾經(jīng)有一個相同的假設(shè):至少在未來幾年,美元利率將繼續(xù)維持在超低水平。現(xiàn)在,十年期基準(zhǔn)國債(長期債券)的收益率突然大幅上升,令支撐這些有利趨勢的情景遭到了嚴(yán)重質(zhì)疑。利率上行已經(jīng)讓過熱的房價降溫,縮小了樂觀投資者一直喜歡強(qiáng)調(diào)的股票對債券的優(yōu)勢,并且動搖了美國可以在利息支出下降的同時大規(guī)模發(fā)行新債的觀念。
債券收益率突然上升
10年期國債的收益率自2020年年初達(dá)到1.88%之后,受到經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢的影響持續(xù)低迷。從2020年4月中旬到10月中旬,10年期國債的收益率始終在0.5%至0.75%之間徘徊,進(jìn)入2021年只有0.93%。2月1日,10年期國債收益率大幅上漲。到3月18日,在短短七周內(nèi),長期債券收益率從略高于1.0%上漲到1.73%,創(chuàng)下自去年1月以來的新高。30年期國債收益率也隨之上漲,在2021年從1.66%上漲到2.5%。
導(dǎo)致收益率曲線上行的原因包括高于預(yù)期的通貨膨脹和“實際”(通脹調(diào)整)利率上行。實際利率上行的影響尤其嚴(yán)重。從長遠(yuǎn)來看,通脹調(diào)整后收益率往往會與GDP增長保持相同趨勢?,F(xiàn)在,它們的快速上漲可能體現(xiàn)了經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇的前景,以及從去年春天開始的大舉借債所帶來的壓力。從2020年年初以來,美國增加了5萬億美元負(fù)債,此外1.9萬億美元“美國救助計劃”(American Rescue Plan)、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)方案和大規(guī)模結(jié)構(gòu)性赤字還會帶來巨額借款,這很可能是實際利率上行的主要因素,而實際利率對房地產(chǎn)市場、股市和聯(lián)邦預(yù)算都至關(guān)重要。
通脹調(diào)整后的收益率即便恢復(fù)到歷史水平,也會令這三個市場面臨危機(jī)。超低利率讓房地產(chǎn)和股票市場有理由持續(xù)上漲,而聯(lián)邦利息支出依舊是可控的,盡管支出在大幅增加。利率恢復(fù)到正常水平將使房價和股價也恢復(fù)正常,這意味著它們會雙雙下跌,并讓美國的債務(wù)前景從“我們以后再處理”變成“洪水就在眼前”。
住房抵押貸款成本升高
對于房價而言,沒有什么比30年住房抵押貸款的月供更加重要。從2018年10月至2020年12月,這種美國常見抵押貸款的利率從4.86%下降到2.67%。這種歷史性的利率下行帶來了持續(xù)至今的房地產(chǎn)市場繁榮,但危險即將來臨。
30年住房抵押貸款利率的變化趨勢與長期債券保持一致。最近,10年期國債收益率上漲使抵押貸款利率截至3月18日上漲到3.45%,恢復(fù)到去年3月的水平。抵押貸款利率上行對于美國中產(chǎn)階級家庭的預(yù)算意義重大。自今年年初以來,固定月供從820美元增加到884美元。額外增加的60美元聽起來不多,而且也沒有太大的影響。但這次利率上行已經(jīng)令房價大幅上漲的趨勢放緩。利率下行會讓房價上漲,因此同樣的房子價格更高,而30年貸款利率恢復(fù)“正?!睂?dǎo)致史上漲幅最大的房價開始下跌。
美國企業(yè)研究所住房中心(American Enterprise Institute Housing Center)的主任埃德·平托預(yù)測,根據(jù)一兩個月前簽署的合同,今年三四月的房價將上漲約13%。這比2020年1月的發(fā)展速度加快了一倍,并且從去年夏天到3月底,房價一直在屢創(chuàng)新高。房價上漲的原因包括房源緊張,去年美國房屋庫存減少了約50%。另外一個原因是低利率在房價飛漲的同時限制了月供增加,因此吸引了購房人。
但平托認(rèn)為,到5月,房價同比漲幅將恢復(fù)到11%左右。他說:“如果30年住房抵押貸款利率達(dá)到4%,購房市場應(yīng)該依舊強(qiáng)勁。雖然房價增長率不會始終維持在11%,但依舊可能會達(dá)到8%。這仍然遠(yuǎn)高于可持續(xù)的房價水平。如果利率達(dá)到4.75%,房價可能以2%的幅度上漲。但利率達(dá)到5%將使房價停止上漲。然后你會看到房價下跌?!?/p>
之所以出現(xiàn)房價特別容易受到利率上行影響這種不同尋常的情況,是因為房價過高?,F(xiàn)在購買一座農(nóng)場的價格比兩年前上漲了35%,而且購房人還需要額外支付幾個百分點的住房抵押貸款,這導(dǎo)致月供增加,只有房價大幅下跌才能夠恢復(fù)住房的可負(fù)擔(dān)性。平托舉了一個例子。一對夫婦兩年前購買了一套價值25萬美元的房子,首付5萬美元,住房抵押貸款20萬美元,貸款利率為3.0%,每月月供約為820美元。街對面一棟類似的房子今天的房價可能高達(dá)34萬美元。如果貸款利率達(dá)到2018年11月的5%,他們要支付的月供將達(dá)到1,557美元,接近翻了一番。
現(xiàn)在,我們距離這個臨界點只有不足1.5個百分點,比去年晚些時候的水平上漲了1個百分點。雖然貸款利率達(dá)到5%似乎需要很長時間,但已經(jīng)近在眼前的高通脹、持續(xù)數(shù)年的大舉借債和強(qiáng)勁的經(jīng)濟(jì),很容易使住房抵押貸款利率達(dá)到這個臨界點,進(jìn)而引發(fā)房價暴跌。
股市也可能大幅下跌
從2021年年初以來,美國長期國債收益率增長一倍,這對于股市的影響有多嚴(yán)重?與房地產(chǎn)市場一樣,關(guān)鍵不在于已經(jīng)發(fā)生了什么,而是未來會發(fā)生什么。美國國債利率由兩部分組成:通脹率部分使投資者可以跟上通脹速度,而“實際”收益率則能夠帶來高于CPI的收益。對股市而言,問題并不在于利率會在什么時候上行,因為投資者預(yù)計未來通脹率將會提高。公司銷售額和利潤隨著整體物價的上漲而上漲;這些制造商正在推高SUV和智能手機(jī)的價格。對股市的真正威脅是“實際利率”的大幅上行正在醞釀當(dāng)中。
原因是:實際利率越低,股票的收益率看起來就會遠(yuǎn)高于其主要競爭對手固定收益證券,包括基準(zhǔn)10年期國債。今年年初,長期債券的收益率為0.93%。未來10年的預(yù)期通脹率約為2%,因此債券的通脹調(diào)整后收益率為負(fù)1.07%。這個可怕的數(shù)字令股票看起來比債券更適合投資。華爾街投資者認(rèn)為,即使股票定價過高,與過于昂貴的債券相比依舊價格便宜。
樂觀主義者喜歡引用標(biāo)普500指數(shù)收益率和10年期國債實際收益率之差,用于證明投資股票對投資債券的優(yōu)勢。在此假設(shè)標(biāo)普指數(shù)的正?;抗墒找鏋?40美元;這是2019年第四季度的歷史最高水平。根據(jù)這個數(shù)字,今年年初的標(biāo)普指數(shù)收益率為3.7%(其價格3756除以每股收益140美元)。
在大部分情況下,這個收益率可能毫無吸引力。但與債券相比,卻顯得非常誘人。1月4日,標(biāo)普指數(shù)收益率與美國國債的負(fù)收益率之差達(dá)到4.77%。股市持續(xù)堅挺在很大程度上并不是因為股價較低,而是因為投資股票的溢價遠(yuǎn)高于過于昂貴的債券。
截至3月18日收盤時,標(biāo)普指數(shù)上漲11%至3974點,收益率下降到3.5%。與此同時,基于未來十年2.3%的平均預(yù)測通脹率,長期債券的“實際收益率”從負(fù)1.07%提高到負(fù)0.5%。股票對債券的優(yōu)勢從4.77%縮小到4%。這聽起來并不嚴(yán)重,但如果這種趨勢持續(xù)下去,可能會造成災(zāi)難性的后果。事實上,實際收益率極有可能會持續(xù)上行進(jìn)入小幅上漲區(qū)間,因為與預(yù)測通脹率相反,目前的通脹率接近1.6%。未來10年2.3%的預(yù)估通脹率是一個高度不確定的數(shù)字。
更高實際利率對昂貴的科技股影響最大。實際收益率是未來收益貼現(xiàn)率的關(guān)鍵部分。亞馬遜(Amazon)、特斯拉(Tesla)、Netflix等科技巨頭在標(biāo)普指數(shù)的估值中占有很大權(quán)重,這些股票的市盈率倍數(shù)較高,這意味著投資者預(yù)計未來5年、10年和15年這些公司的利潤很大程度上會保持增長。相反,能源股和銀行股等價值股在未來幾年的總利潤中將占據(jù)更大比重。
實際利率上行之所以對昂貴的科技股影響最大,是因為科技公司有更多收益將按照更高的新利率進(jìn)行折現(xiàn),進(jìn)而會大幅降低這些股票的“現(xiàn)值”。這些實力雄厚的公司或許已經(jīng)開始估值回調(diào)。自2月中旬達(dá)到峰值以來,納斯達(dá)克指數(shù)(Nasdaq)的估值下跌了7%,其中在3月18日下跌了3%。
總體經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況
2月初,美國國會預(yù)算辦公室(Congressional Budget Office)發(fā)布了10年預(yù)算預(yù)測報告。報告中提出了一個令人震驚的預(yù)測:雖然其“基線”情景顯示,公眾持有的美國國家債務(wù)從2019財年的16.8萬億美元增加到2025年的26.6萬億美元,增加約60%,但利息支出只會增加8%至3,610億美元。國會預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)測,雖然美國正在以二戰(zhàn)以來前所未見的規(guī)模舉債,但從2000年至2025年利息支出將大幅減少。
債務(wù)增加和利息支出減少同時出現(xiàn)的原因非常簡單。國會預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)測未來將維持超低利率,尤其是實際收益率將深陷負(fù)區(qū)間。在2月發(fā)布的另外一份報告中,該部門預(yù)測2021年的10年期平均利率為1.1%,2022年為1.3%并維持到2024年。六周后,這些預(yù)測早已過時。目前,長期債券利率比國會預(yù)算辦公室今年的預(yù)估收益率高約0.65%,并且遠(yuǎn)高于其預(yù)測的2022年至2024年的利率1.3%。
自2020年年初以來,為了控制利息成本,美國財政部的5.2萬億美元新增借款中,超過60%的期限不超過一年。美國財政部的策略是盡可能將短期債務(wù)進(jìn)行更長期限的再融資。美國財政部的10年期國債交易已經(jīng)非常糟糕,需要支付的價格比年初時增加了80個基準(zhǔn)點。截至2月,美國有4.9萬億美元借款的期限不超過12個月,現(xiàn)在只能延期償還,并付出更高的成本。美國今年還需要舉債約4萬億美元。除非美國財政部重新發(fā)行短期債券,否則利息成本將遠(yuǎn)高于國會預(yù)算辦公室美好的預(yù)測。
美國政府和支持增加支出的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家預(yù)測未來幾年實際利率將維持在負(fù)區(qū)間,這種結(jié)論過于草率。事實上,他們也不知道利率會如何變化。2020年1月,國會預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)測,2021年10年期國債平均收益率為2.2%,2022年為2.6%,比2月的預(yù)測高出一倍。
更簡單、更合理的預(yù)測是:實際利率更接近GDP增長率,因此10年期國債的收益率將恢復(fù)到更高、更正常的水平。美國政府和呼吁大幅增加刺激支持的專家認(rèn)為,世界已經(jīng)發(fā)生了改變。有一段時間確實如此。但最近長期國債收益率上漲可能意味著,基本面再次成為市場主導(dǎo)。而這對于美國的房地產(chǎn)市場、股市和未來財政來說,并非是好消息。(財富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:劉進(jìn)龍
審校:汪皓
有人認(rèn)為美國房價暴漲會持續(xù)下去,有人認(rèn)為股市盡管估值過高但將保持繁榮,還有人認(rèn)為美國人能夠負(fù)擔(dān)得起數(shù)萬億美元的新借款,這些觀點都有或者曾經(jīng)有一個相同的假設(shè):至少在未來幾年,美元利率將繼續(xù)維持在超低水平?,F(xiàn)在,十年期基準(zhǔn)國債(長期債券)的收益率突然大幅上升,令支撐這些有利趨勢的情景遭到了嚴(yán)重質(zhì)疑。利率上行已經(jīng)讓過熱的房價降溫,縮小了樂觀投資者一直喜歡強(qiáng)調(diào)的股票對債券的優(yōu)勢,并且動搖了美國可以在利息支出下降的同時大規(guī)模發(fā)行新債的觀念。
債券收益率突然上升
10年期國債的收益率自2020年年初達(dá)到1.88%之后,受到經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢的影響持續(xù)低迷。從2020年4月中旬到10月中旬,10年期國債的收益率始終在0.5%至0.75%之間徘徊,進(jìn)入2021年只有0.93%。2月1日,10年期國債收益率大幅上漲。到3月18日,在短短七周內(nèi),長期債券收益率從略高于1.0%上漲到1.73%,創(chuàng)下自去年1月以來的新高。30年期國債收益率也隨之上漲,在2021年從1.66%上漲到2.5%。
導(dǎo)致收益率曲線上行的原因包括高于預(yù)期的通貨膨脹和“實際”(通脹調(diào)整)利率上行。實際利率上行的影響尤其嚴(yán)重。從長遠(yuǎn)來看,通脹調(diào)整后收益率往往會與GDP增長保持相同趨勢。現(xiàn)在,它們的快速上漲可能體現(xiàn)了經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇的前景,以及從去年春天開始的大舉借債所帶來的壓力。從2020年年初以來,美國增加了5萬億美元負(fù)債,此外1.9萬億美元“美國救助計劃”(American Rescue Plan)、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)方案和大規(guī)模結(jié)構(gòu)性赤字還會帶來巨額借款,這很可能是實際利率上行的主要因素,而實際利率對房地產(chǎn)市場、股市和聯(lián)邦預(yù)算都至關(guān)重要。
通脹調(diào)整后的收益率即便恢復(fù)到歷史水平,也會令這三個市場面臨危機(jī)。超低利率讓房地產(chǎn)和股票市場有理由持續(xù)上漲,而聯(lián)邦利息支出依舊是可控的,盡管支出在大幅增加。利率恢復(fù)到正常水平將使房價和股價也恢復(fù)正常,這意味著它們會雙雙下跌,并讓美國的債務(wù)前景從“我們以后再處理”變成“洪水就在眼前”。
住房抵押貸款成本升高
對于房價而言,沒有什么比30年住房抵押貸款的月供更加重要。從2018年10月至2020年12月,這種美國常見抵押貸款的利率從4.86%下降到2.67%。這種歷史性的利率下行帶來了持續(xù)至今的房地產(chǎn)市場繁榮,但危險即將來臨。
30年住房抵押貸款利率的變化趨勢與長期債券保持一致。最近,10年期國債收益率上漲使抵押貸款利率截至3月18日上漲到3.45%,恢復(fù)到去年3月的水平。抵押貸款利率上行對于美國中產(chǎn)階級家庭的預(yù)算意義重大。自今年年初以來,固定月供從820美元增加到884美元。額外增加的60美元聽起來不多,而且也沒有太大的影響。但這次利率上行已經(jīng)令房價大幅上漲的趨勢放緩。利率下行會讓房價上漲,因此同樣的房子價格更高,而30年貸款利率恢復(fù)“正?!睂?dǎo)致史上漲幅最大的房價開始下跌。
美國企業(yè)研究所住房中心(American Enterprise Institute Housing Center)的主任埃德·平托預(yù)測,根據(jù)一兩個月前簽署的合同,今年三四月的房價將上漲約13%。這比2020年1月的發(fā)展速度加快了一倍,并且從去年夏天到3月底,房價一直在屢創(chuàng)新高。房價上漲的原因包括房源緊張,去年美國房屋庫存減少了約50%。另外一個原因是低利率在房價飛漲的同時限制了月供增加,因此吸引了購房人。
但平托認(rèn)為,到5月,房價同比漲幅將恢復(fù)到11%左右。他說:“如果30年住房抵押貸款利率達(dá)到4%,購房市場應(yīng)該依舊強(qiáng)勁。雖然房價增長率不會始終維持在11%,但依舊可能會達(dá)到8%。這仍然遠(yuǎn)高于可持續(xù)的房價水平。如果利率達(dá)到4.75%,房價可能以2%的幅度上漲。但利率達(dá)到5%將使房價停止上漲。然后你會看到房價下跌。”
之所以出現(xiàn)房價特別容易受到利率上行影響這種不同尋常的情況,是因為房價過高?,F(xiàn)在購買一座農(nóng)場的價格比兩年前上漲了35%,而且購房人還需要額外支付幾個百分點的住房抵押貸款,這導(dǎo)致月供增加,只有房價大幅下跌才能夠恢復(fù)住房的可負(fù)擔(dān)性。平托舉了一個例子。一對夫婦兩年前購買了一套價值25萬美元的房子,首付5萬美元,住房抵押貸款20萬美元,貸款利率為3.0%,每月月供約為820美元。街對面一棟類似的房子今天的房價可能高達(dá)34萬美元。如果貸款利率達(dá)到2018年11月的5%,他們要支付的月供將達(dá)到1,557美元,接近翻了一番。
現(xiàn)在,我們距離這個臨界點只有不足1.5個百分點,比去年晚些時候的水平上漲了1個百分點。雖然貸款利率達(dá)到5%似乎需要很長時間,但已經(jīng)近在眼前的高通脹、持續(xù)數(shù)年的大舉借債和強(qiáng)勁的經(jīng)濟(jì),很容易使住房抵押貸款利率達(dá)到這個臨界點,進(jìn)而引發(fā)房價暴跌。
股市也可能大幅下跌
從2021年年初以來,美國長期國債收益率增長一倍,這對于股市的影響有多嚴(yán)重?與房地產(chǎn)市場一樣,關(guān)鍵不在于已經(jīng)發(fā)生了什么,而是未來會發(fā)生什么。美國國債利率由兩部分組成:通脹率部分使投資者可以跟上通脹速度,而“實際”收益率則能夠帶來高于CPI的收益。對股市而言,問題并不在于利率會在什么時候上行,因為投資者預(yù)計未來通脹率將會提高。公司銷售額和利潤隨著整體物價的上漲而上漲;這些制造商正在推高SUV和智能手機(jī)的價格。對股市的真正威脅是“實際利率”的大幅上行正在醞釀當(dāng)中。
原因是:實際利率越低,股票的收益率看起來就會遠(yuǎn)高于其主要競爭對手固定收益證券,包括基準(zhǔn)10年期國債。今年年初,長期債券的收益率為0.93%。未來10年的預(yù)期通脹率約為2%,因此債券的通脹調(diào)整后收益率為負(fù)1.07%。這個可怕的數(shù)字令股票看起來比債券更適合投資。華爾街投資者認(rèn)為,即使股票定價過高,與過于昂貴的債券相比依舊價格便宜。
樂觀主義者喜歡引用標(biāo)普500指數(shù)收益率和10年期國債實際收益率之差,用于證明投資股票對投資債券的優(yōu)勢。在此假設(shè)標(biāo)普指數(shù)的正?;抗墒找鏋?40美元;這是2019年第四季度的歷史最高水平。根據(jù)這個數(shù)字,今年年初的標(biāo)普指數(shù)收益率為3.7%(其價格3756除以每股收益140美元)。
在大部分情況下,這個收益率可能毫無吸引力。但與債券相比,卻顯得非常誘人。1月4日,標(biāo)普指數(shù)收益率與美國國債的負(fù)收益率之差達(dá)到4.77%。股市持續(xù)堅挺在很大程度上并不是因為股價較低,而是因為投資股票的溢價遠(yuǎn)高于過于昂貴的債券。
截至3月18日收盤時,標(biāo)普指數(shù)上漲11%至3974點,收益率下降到3.5%。與此同時,基于未來十年2.3%的平均預(yù)測通脹率,長期債券的“實際收益率”從負(fù)1.07%提高到負(fù)0.5%。股票對債券的優(yōu)勢從4.77%縮小到4%。這聽起來并不嚴(yán)重,但如果這種趨勢持續(xù)下去,可能會造成災(zāi)難性的后果。事實上,實際收益率極有可能會持續(xù)上行進(jìn)入小幅上漲區(qū)間,因為與預(yù)測通脹率相反,目前的通脹率接近1.6%。未來10年2.3%的預(yù)估通脹率是一個高度不確定的數(shù)字。
更高實際利率對昂貴的科技股影響最大。實際收益率是未來收益貼現(xiàn)率的關(guān)鍵部分。亞馬遜(Amazon)、特斯拉(Tesla)、Netflix等科技巨頭在標(biāo)普指數(shù)的估值中占有很大權(quán)重,這些股票的市盈率倍數(shù)較高,這意味著投資者預(yù)計未來5年、10年和15年這些公司的利潤很大程度上會保持增長。相反,能源股和銀行股等價值股在未來幾年的總利潤中將占據(jù)更大比重。
實際利率上行之所以對昂貴的科技股影響最大,是因為科技公司有更多收益將按照更高的新利率進(jìn)行折現(xiàn),進(jìn)而會大幅降低這些股票的“現(xiàn)值”。這些實力雄厚的公司或許已經(jīng)開始估值回調(diào)。自2月中旬達(dá)到峰值以來,納斯達(dá)克指數(shù)(Nasdaq)的估值下跌了7%,其中在3月18日下跌了3%。
總體經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況
2月初,美國國會預(yù)算辦公室(Congressional Budget Office)發(fā)布了10年預(yù)算預(yù)測報告。報告中提出了一個令人震驚的預(yù)測:雖然其“基線”情景顯示,公眾持有的美國國家債務(wù)從2019財年的16.8萬億美元增加到2025年的26.6萬億美元,增加約60%,但利息支出只會增加8%至3,610億美元。國會預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)測,雖然美國正在以二戰(zhàn)以來前所未見的規(guī)模舉債,但從2000年至2025年利息支出將大幅減少。
債務(wù)增加和利息支出減少同時出現(xiàn)的原因非常簡單。國會預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)測未來將維持超低利率,尤其是實際收益率將深陷負(fù)區(qū)間。在2月發(fā)布的另外一份報告中,該部門預(yù)測2021年的10年期平均利率為1.1%,2022年為1.3%并維持到2024年。六周后,這些預(yù)測早已過時。目前,長期債券利率比國會預(yù)算辦公室今年的預(yù)估收益率高約0.65%,并且遠(yuǎn)高于其預(yù)測的2022年至2024年的利率1.3%。
自2020年年初以來,為了控制利息成本,美國財政部的5.2萬億美元新增借款中,超過60%的期限不超過一年。美國財政部的策略是盡可能將短期債務(wù)進(jìn)行更長期限的再融資。美國財政部的10年期國債交易已經(jīng)非常糟糕,需要支付的價格比年初時增加了80個基準(zhǔn)點。截至2月,美國有4.9萬億美元借款的期限不超過12個月,現(xiàn)在只能延期償還,并付出更高的成本。美國今年還需要舉債約4萬億美元。除非美國財政部重新發(fā)行短期債券,否則利息成本將遠(yuǎn)高于國會預(yù)算辦公室美好的預(yù)測。
美國政府和支持增加支出的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家預(yù)測未來幾年實際利率將維持在負(fù)區(qū)間,這種結(jié)論過于草率。事實上,他們也不知道利率會如何變化。2020年1月,國會預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)測,2021年10年期國債平均收益率為2.2%,2022年為2.6%,比2月的預(yù)測高出一倍。
更簡單、更合理的預(yù)測是:實際利率更接近GDP增長率,因此10年期國債的收益率將恢復(fù)到更高、更正常的水平。美國政府和呼吁大幅增加刺激支持的專家認(rèn)為,世界已經(jīng)發(fā)生了改變。有一段時間確實如此。但最近長期國債收益率上漲可能意味著,基本面再次成為市場主導(dǎo)。而這對于美國的房地產(chǎn)市場、股市和未來財政來說,并非是好消息。(財富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:劉進(jìn)龍
審校:汪皓
The view that the historic surge in housing prices has legs, that stocks will keep booming despite steep valuations, and that America can afford trillions in new borrowings all share, or used to share, the same assumption: that interest rates will remain super-low for at least a few more years. Now, the sudden, shocking jump in the yield on the benchmark 10-year Treasury note (long bond) has brought the scenario that’s underpinning so many favorable trends into serious doubt. Rising rates are already cooling the hot run in home prices, shrinking the edge equities held over bonds that the bulls love to spotlight, and upending the conviction that the U.S. can amass gigantic new debt while its interest outlays fall.
An unexpected spike in yields
After starting 2020 at 1.88%, the 10-year cratered with the economy. From mid-April to mid-October, its yield hovered between 0.5% and 0.75%, and entered 2021 at 0.93%. The big ramp started on Feb. 1. In just seven weeks to March 18, the long bond yield has leapt from just over 1.0% to 1.73%, its highest reading since January of last year. The 30-year yield has followed, rising from 1.66% at the beginning of 2021, to 2.5%.
A combination of higher than anticipated inflation and rising “real” (inflation-adjusted) rates are boosting the long end of curve. The jump in real rates is especially troubling. Over long periods, inflation-adjusted yields tend to track growth in GDP. Now, their quick rise may be reflecting both a resurgent economy, and pressure from the giant borrowing binge that began last spring. The $5 trillion in debt the U.S. has added since the start of 2020, plus the flood of borrowing to come from the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, the proposed infrastructure initiative, and big structural deficits, could well be a major force in swelling the real rate that’s so important to housing, stocks, and the federal budget.
A return in inflation-adjusted yields even to historic levels would endanger all three. Ultra-favorable real rates are supposed to justify how housing and stocks can keep soaring, and federal interest outlays remain manageable despite the explosion in spending. Getting back to normal would pull home and equity prices back to normal as well––meaning they’d drop—and radically alter the debt outlook from “we’ll deal with it later” to the “deluge is at hand.”
Costlier mortgages
Nothing is more important to housing prices than the monthly payment on the 30-year home loan. From October 2018 to December 2020, the rate on that American classic dropped from 4.86% to 2.67%. That historic drop triggered the boom that continues to this day, but may soon be in danger.
But the 30-year rate follows the trend in the long bond. The recent jump in 10-year yields lifted mortgage rates to 3.45% as of March 18, back to the levels of last March. That rise makes a big difference in the budgets of middle Americans. Since the start of the year, the fixed monthly payment has risen from $820 to $884. The extra $60-plus doesn’t sound like much, and it’s not making a huge difference yet. But the increase has already slowed the historic acceleration in prices. Given that the drop in rates inflated prices, making similar homes a lot more expensive, a return to a more “normal” rate on the 30-year could turn the strongest rise on record into a slide.
Ed Pinto, director of the American Enterprise Institute Housing Center, predicts that prices will rise around 13% in both March and April, based on contracts signed a month or two before. That’s double the pace in January 2020, and from last summer through the closings come in April, prices have been marching to higher and higher peaks. Driving the gains: the confluence of tight supply––inventories dropped almost 50% in the past year––and those bargain rates that lure buyers by restraining monthly payments even as prices sprint.
But by May, Pinto reckons that year-over-year gains will throttle back to around 11%. “The purchase market should be strong up to a 4% rate on 30-year home loans,” he says. “It wouldn’t keep advancing at 11%, but it could run at 8%. That’s still way higher than what’s sustainable. At 4.75%, prices might be rising at 2%. But it would take a 5% rate to put the brakes on. Then you’d see prices decline.”
The reason prices are unusually vulnerable to rising rates is precisely because houses have gotten so much pricier. Paying 35% more than what the same ranch was selling for two years ago, and also paying a couple of extra points on your home loan, would raise monthly costs to the point where only a steep drop in prices would restore affordability. Pinto offers an example. A couple who purchased a $250,000 home with a $50,000 down payment and a $200,000 mortgage at 3.0% a couple of years ago is paying around $820 a month. A similar house across the street could cost $340,000 today. And if rates indeed get to 5%, about where they stood in November 2018, they’d be paying $1,557, or almost double.
We’re now within 1.5 points of the number that’s the tipping point, about a point closer than late last year. Though 5% may seem a long way off, the convergence of higher inflation that is already expected, a borrowing blowout with years to run, and a strong economy could easily push mortgage rates to that threshold, and send prices tumbling.
Stocks could plummet too
How bad is the doubling of yields since the start of 2021 for stocks? As for housing, it’s not so much what’s happened yet, but what may lie ahead. Treasury rates have two components: the inflation portion that keeps investors even with prices, and the “real” number that provides a return over and above, say, the CPI. It isn’t such a problem when rates rise because investors are expecting an increase in future inflation. Companies’ sales and profits rise with overall prices; it’s those producers that are pushing the prices of SUVs and smartphones higher. The threat for stocks is a big rise in “real rates” that may well be underway.
The reason: The lower real rates go, the better stocks look versus their main rivals, fixed-income securities, including the benchmark 10-year Treasury. At the start of the year, the long bond was yielding 0.93%. Since expected inflation over the next decade stood at around 2%, it offered a negative, inflation adjusted return of minus 1.07%. That dreadful number made stocks look good by comparison. The Wall Street manifesto held that even though equities appeared pricey, they were a bargain compared with exorbitantly expensive bonds.
The metrics that illustrated equities’ edge over bonds, and that the optimists loved to cite, is the difference between the S&P 500 earnings yield and real yield on the 10-year Treasury. I’ll put normalized EPS for the S&P at $140; that’s its record level in Q4 of 2019. Using that number, the S&P’s earnings yield at the start of this year was 3.7% (that’s its price of 3756 divided by profits of $140 a share).
In most times, that would be an unattractive number. But compared with bonds it looked pretty good. On January 4, the S&P earnings yield beat the minus number on Treasuries by a big 4.77%. Stocks kept doing great, not because they were cheap––not by a long shot––but because they offered such a fat premium over ultra-expensive bonds.
As of the close on March 18, the S&P had gained 11% to 3974, shrinking the earnings yield to 3.5%. At the same time, the “real yield” on the long bond had risen from a negative 1.07% to minus 0.5%, based on projected average inflation of 2.3% over the next decade. The equities’ advantage went from 4.77% to 4%. That doesn’t sound catastrophic, but if the trend continues, the upshot would be disastrous. It’s indeed possible that the real yield has climbed all the way into slightly positive territory, since the current as opposed to projected rate of inflation is now around 1.6%. The estimated rate over the next 10 years, at 2.3%, is a highly uncertain number.
Higher real rates will inflict their biggest damage on pricey tech stocks. Real yields are a key part of the discount rate applied to future earnings. Titans such as Amazon, Tesla, and Netflix that account for a huge share of the S&P’s value are selling at big multiples, meaning investors expect the lion’s share of their profits to roll in five, 10, and 15 years from now. By contrast, value stocks such as energy and banking have a much bigger slice of total future profits arriving in the next few years.
A rise in real rates hits expensive tech much harder because much more of their profits must be discounted back, at the new, higher rates, making their “present value” a lot lower. A revaluation of those super-rich names may already be underway. Since its mid-February peak, the Nasdaq has shed 7% of its value, including a drop of 3% on March 18.
The overall economic picture
In early February, the Congressional Budget Office released its 10-Year Budget Projections report. It contains an astounding forecast: Although its “baseline” shows U.S. debt held by the public rising from $16.8 trillion in fiscal 2019 to $26.6 trillion in 2025, an increase of almost 60%, interest expense is expected to wax by just 8% to $361 billion. The CBO posits that the category will decline sharply from 2000 to 2025, despite borrowing on a scale not seen since World War II.
The reason for the crisscross between burgeoning debt and falling interest expense is basic. The CBO was forecasting a future of ultralow rates, and especially, deeply negative real yields. In another report, also from February, the agency forecast that the 10-year rate would average 1.1% in 2021, and 1.3% in 2022, and stay there through 2024. Six weeks later, those projections are already way out of date. The long bond is now paying around 0.65% more than the CBO’s estimate for this year, and hovers well above the 1.3% forecast for 2022 to 2024.
Since the start of 2020, the Treasury has financed over 60% of the $5.2 trillion in new borrowing at maturities of under a year to restrain interest costs. Its strategy involves refinancing as much of that short-term debt as possible at longer terms. The Treasury is already getting a much worse deal on the 10-year, by paying 80 basis points more than when the year started. As of February, the U.S. had $4.9 trillion maturing in under 12 months that it must now roll over at at least a much higher cost. And the U.S. will need to borrow another approximately $4 trillion this year. Unless the Treasury reverts to issuing short-term Treasury bills, interest costs will be much higher than the CBO’s rosy projection.
The administration and economists championing new spending were reckless in predicting that real rates would remain negative for years to come. In fact, they have no idea where rates are going. In January 2020, the CBO figured that the 10-year yield would average 2.2% in 2021 and 2.6% in 2022, double the numbers from it was forecasting in February.
The simpler, more reasonable projection: The real rate pulls much closer to GDP growth, so that the 10-year returns to a far higher, and more normal, number. The administration and experts advocating huge stimulus spending bet that the world had changed. It did for a while. But the recent spike could signal that the fundamentals are once again taking charge. And that’s bad news for housing, stocks, and America’s fiscal future.