筆者一直在密切關(guān)注標(biāo)普500指數(shù),眼看著它的估值日益接近一個(gè)危險(xiǎn)點(diǎn)位。按照我的非官方指標(biāo),標(biāo)普500指數(shù)以前只有一次達(dá)到過這個(gè)點(diǎn)位,那是2000年9月互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫的最高點(diǎn)。4月16日上午,該大盤指數(shù)突破了這個(gè)令人不安的里程碑。標(biāo)普指數(shù)在開盤后漲至4187點(diǎn),創(chuàng)歷史新高。根據(jù)我的“正常化”利潤(rùn)基準(zhǔn)值,這使標(biāo)普指數(shù)的市盈率倍數(shù)達(dá)到30倍(準(zhǔn)確的說(shuō)是30.02倍)。
乍一看,30倍的市盈率似乎并不可怕。去年6月,根據(jù)之前四個(gè)季度按美國(guó)公認(rèn)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則計(jì)算的凈收益這個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)指標(biāo),基本市盈率達(dá)到31,當(dāng)時(shí)的股價(jià)比今天低26%。2020年第4季度結(jié)束時(shí),市盈率倍數(shù)約為40倍。這并沒有影響樂觀投資者的心態(tài),因此在那之后標(biāo)普指數(shù)持續(xù)上漲。但這些疫情期間的經(jīng)濟(jì)比率,對(duì)于衡量股票估值過高、過低還是公允毫無(wú)意義。雖然股價(jià)持續(xù)上漲,但從2019年第4季度到2020年底,股票收益下跌了三分之一,導(dǎo)致最知名、最基本的估值指標(biāo)升高。
顯而易見,利潤(rùn)將從疫情導(dǎo)致的低點(diǎn)實(shí)現(xiàn)反彈,這會(huì)使分母變大,使40倍以上的市盈率倍數(shù)恢復(fù)到更現(xiàn)實(shí)的區(qū)間。為了準(zhǔn)確預(yù)測(cè)股票估值過高還是過低,以及股市所面臨的障礙,你需要使用“正?;麧?rùn)”。我將“正?;麧?rùn)”定義為經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇之后,所有標(biāo)普500公司最有可能達(dá)到的利潤(rùn)水平。我根據(jù)2019年全年的數(shù)據(jù),選擇了2019年第4季度的每股收益139.47美元。
這樣選擇有兩個(gè)原因。首先,2019年的利潤(rùn)不僅達(dá)到歷史新高,而且按照歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)看,與銷售額等指標(biāo)的比率也處在極高水平。這樣降低了正?;杏氏蛏吓で母怕剩?yàn)槲覀兊凸懒宋磥?lái)出現(xiàn)更高可持續(xù)收益的可能性。當(dāng)然,樂觀的投資者會(huì)認(rèn)為,30倍市盈率倍數(shù)并不正常,因?yàn)?021年的股票收益會(huì)令2019年表現(xiàn)出色的大盤股都相形見絀。
其次,即使在2019年經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮時(shí)期,仍有一個(gè)根本原因?qū)е旅總€(gè)季度的每股收益(EPS)基本保持平穩(wěn)。雖然利潤(rùn)達(dá)到較高水平,但從基本面來(lái)看,收益卻缺乏上行空間。即使到現(xiàn)在,通常超級(jí)樂觀的華爾街分析師仍預(yù)測(cè),到2021年第2季度,年化利潤(rùn)將與2019年年底的139美元持平。簡(jiǎn)而言之,2021年利潤(rùn)有望重新達(dá)到歷史高點(diǎn)。
歷史上,除了最近的一次以外,標(biāo)普指數(shù)的市盈率倍數(shù)只有在收益大幅下降或暴跌時(shí),才會(huì)超過30倍。在1999年第4季度,市盈率倍數(shù)達(dá)到30.5,接近互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫的最高點(diǎn)。這個(gè)數(shù)字令投資者不安,因?yàn)楫?dāng)時(shí)的每股收益達(dá)到歷史新高。換言之,投資者每獲得1美元利潤(rùn),都需要支付30美元,而且當(dāng)時(shí)的利潤(rùn)水平已經(jīng)高于歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn)水平。但每股收益繼續(xù)上漲,到2000年第3季度達(dá)到53.70美元,再創(chuàng)新高。
每股收益在隨后四年一直沒有超過這一水平。在每股利潤(rùn)創(chuàng)新高的同時(shí),基準(zhǔn)指數(shù)在2000年9月1日漲至1518點(diǎn)的史上最高點(diǎn)。當(dāng)時(shí),該指數(shù)在四年內(nèi)上漲了120%。所以,與今天的市場(chǎng)最相似的是2000年勞動(dòng)節(jié)前三天的行情。標(biāo)普500指數(shù)歷史上只出現(xiàn)過兩次利潤(rùn)和股價(jià)同時(shí)創(chuàng)下新高的情況。(當(dāng)然,這是因?yàn)槲疫x擇2019年的利潤(rùn)與今天的利潤(rùn)進(jìn)行對(duì)比。)
在二十多年前,標(biāo)普指數(shù)的傳統(tǒng)市盈率倍數(shù)為26.75。按照這個(gè)指標(biāo)計(jì)算,標(biāo)普指數(shù)的成本比今天按30倍市盈率計(jì)算的結(jié)果高出12%。但市盈率倍數(shù)并不全面。比如根據(jù)當(dāng)時(shí)的基本面信息,2000年的每股收益遠(yuǎn)高于2021年。所以當(dāng)時(shí)的市盈率倍數(shù)是可以理解的,因?yàn)槔麧?rùn)一定會(huì)下降,但今天的市盈率倍數(shù)過高是因?yàn)槊抗墒找娌⒉桓?,這預(yù)示著未來(lái)會(huì)有較大的增長(zhǎng)空間。
雖然相關(guān)證據(jù)有些復(fù)雜,但總體而言,截至2019年第4季度的利潤(rùn)似乎至少達(dá)到了互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫時(shí)期的最高點(diǎn)。例如,2019年全年的每股收益相當(dāng)于國(guó)民收入的5.4%,遠(yuǎn)高于截至2000年9月四個(gè)季度的4.4%。2019年,標(biāo)普指數(shù)營(yíng)業(yè)利潤(rùn)在銷售額中的占比或“營(yíng)運(yùn)利潤(rùn)率”為11.1%,比2000年高約4個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。相比之下,標(biāo)普指數(shù)在世紀(jì)之交的股權(quán)收益率為17.5%,高于2019年的15.5%。
由于大部分指標(biāo)都顯示2019年的相對(duì)利潤(rùn)高于2000年,因此我們將按保守估算,假設(shè)兩個(gè)周期的相對(duì)利潤(rùn)相當(dāng)。然后我們可以對(duì)僅有的兩個(gè)收益和估值均創(chuàng)歷史新高的時(shí)期進(jìn)行詳細(xì)對(duì)比。這對(duì)于今天的大盤股意味著什么?
繁榮背后的壞消息
如果你從未離場(chǎng),那么市盈率倍數(shù)達(dá)到30背后的繁榮當(dāng)然是好消息。但如果你計(jì)劃現(xiàn)在進(jìn)場(chǎng),或者想把你獲得的利潤(rùn)再投資到美國(guó)大盤股,這可能是最糟糕的消息。不妨看看2000年9月1日之后發(fā)生了什么。當(dāng)時(shí)標(biāo)普指數(shù)陷入長(zhǎng)期低迷,2003年3月11日跌至801點(diǎn),下跌47%。直到7年后的2007年9月,標(biāo)普指數(shù)才重回2000年9月的最高點(diǎn);當(dāng)然在金融危機(jī)期間,標(biāo)普指數(shù)再次暴跌,2013年3月突破1500點(diǎn)。這導(dǎo)致該指數(shù)長(zhǎng)達(dá)12年的收益為零,只有微薄的股息。
當(dāng)然,你無(wú)法預(yù)測(cè)我們是否會(huì)再經(jīng)歷一次互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫破滅之后的暴跌。樂觀的投資者預(yù)測(cè),兩個(gè)強(qiáng)大的利好消息將帶領(lǐng)美國(guó)股市繼續(xù)高歌猛進(jìn):快速上漲的利潤(rùn)將超過2019年的最高水平,以及未來(lái)幾年的超低利率。
這兩種情況出現(xiàn)的可能性不大。而且要從這兩件事中受益的機(jī)會(huì)更加渺茫。首先,我們來(lái)看一下利潤(rùn)的未來(lái)前景。目前,股票收益的GDP占比為5.4%,已經(jīng)超過了歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn)水平。如果按照華爾街的預(yù)測(cè),每股收益上漲速度將繼續(xù)超過GDP,利潤(rùn)占比只會(huì)持續(xù)擴(kuò)大。尤其令人擔(dān)憂的是,4月16日,標(biāo)普指數(shù)的估值在國(guó)民收入中的占比令人震驚地達(dá)到161%,比2000年的130%提高了四分之一,幾乎比二十年中位數(shù)翻了一番。
為了將這個(gè)比例維持在160%以上,股票收益需要吞噬掉更大一部分經(jīng)濟(jì),與此同時(shí),美國(guó)長(zhǎng)期低迷的工資最終將開始上漲,美國(guó)的長(zhǎng)期增長(zhǎng)率將低于2%,而且企業(yè)所得稅作為拜登政府雄心勃勃的支出計(jì)劃的主要收入來(lái)源,其稅率可能將大幅提高。
關(guān)于利率,樂觀投資者認(rèn)為,未來(lái)幾年10年期國(guó)債收益率將與GDP保持相同的增長(zhǎng)趨勢(shì),對(duì)于這種觀點(diǎn)最好的回應(yīng)非常簡(jiǎn)單:這種情況以前很少發(fā)生。正常情況下,“實(shí)際”利率或通脹調(diào)整后利率會(huì)與國(guó)民收入增長(zhǎng)保持相同趨勢(shì),最近幾十年利率陷入負(fù)區(qū)間的情況下從來(lái)不會(huì)持續(xù)太久。對(duì)于今天低于通貨膨脹的收益率,最合理的解釋是這是千年不遇的新冠疫情沖擊經(jīng)濟(jì)造成的罕見現(xiàn)象。
依舊有許多經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的投資者相信,低利率將維持較長(zhǎng)時(shí)間。路易斯·納維利爾為他的家族理財(cái)室管理價(jià)值18億美元的資產(chǎn)組合。他非常冷靜,對(duì)于股市有獨(dú)到的見解。他告訴《財(cái)富》雜志:“我們聽說(shuō)了各種有關(guān)通貨膨脹的說(shuō)法,我們看到了極好的零售銷售數(shù)據(jù)和GDP向上修正的趨勢(shì)。但債券收益率卻在下跌。我敢說(shuō)按照當(dāng)前的債券收益率,股票的價(jià)值依舊在被低估?!?/p>
納維利爾的觀點(diǎn)很有道理。但我會(huì)繼續(xù)對(duì)標(biāo)普指數(shù)史上僅有的市盈率達(dá)到30的兩個(gè)時(shí)期進(jìn)行對(duì)比,分析兩者的相似之處?;ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)泡沫釀成了上個(gè)世紀(jì)最慘烈的股災(zāi)之一。現(xiàn)在,我們?cè)俅慰吹搅水?dāng)時(shí)出現(xiàn)過的警告信號(hào)和瘋狂的繁榮。好日子或許還能持續(xù)一段時(shí)間。但如果持續(xù)太久將違背歷史規(guī)律。根據(jù)2000年年底出現(xiàn)的瘋狂和隨后的股災(zāi),我更愿意相信歷史。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:劉進(jìn)龍
審校:汪皓
筆者一直在密切關(guān)注標(biāo)普500指數(shù),眼看著它的估值日益接近一個(gè)危險(xiǎn)點(diǎn)位。按照我的非官方指標(biāo),標(biāo)普500指數(shù)以前只有一次達(dá)到過這個(gè)點(diǎn)位,那是2000年9月互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫的最高點(diǎn)。4月16日上午,該大盤指數(shù)突破了這個(gè)令人不安的里程碑。標(biāo)普指數(shù)在開盤后漲至4187點(diǎn),創(chuàng)歷史新高。根據(jù)我的“正?;崩麧?rùn)基準(zhǔn)值,這使標(biāo)普指數(shù)的市盈率倍數(shù)達(dá)到30倍(準(zhǔn)確的說(shuō)是30.02倍)。
乍一看,30倍的市盈率似乎并不可怕。去年6月,根據(jù)之前四個(gè)季度按美國(guó)公認(rèn)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則計(jì)算的凈收益這個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)指標(biāo),基本市盈率達(dá)到31,當(dāng)時(shí)的股價(jià)比今天低26%。2020年第4季度結(jié)束時(shí),市盈率倍數(shù)約為40倍。這并沒有影響樂觀投資者的心態(tài),因此在那之后標(biāo)普指數(shù)持續(xù)上漲。但這些疫情期間的經(jīng)濟(jì)比率,對(duì)于衡量股票估值過高、過低還是公允毫無(wú)意義。雖然股價(jià)持續(xù)上漲,但從2019年第4季度到2020年底,股票收益下跌了三分之一,導(dǎo)致最知名、最基本的估值指標(biāo)升高。
顯而易見,利潤(rùn)將從疫情導(dǎo)致的低點(diǎn)實(shí)現(xiàn)反彈,這會(huì)使分母變大,使40倍以上的市盈率倍數(shù)恢復(fù)到更現(xiàn)實(shí)的區(qū)間。為了準(zhǔn)確預(yù)測(cè)股票估值過高還是過低,以及股市所面臨的障礙,你需要使用“正?;麧?rùn)”。我將“正?;麧?rùn)”定義為經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇之后,所有標(biāo)普500公司最有可能達(dá)到的利潤(rùn)水平。我根據(jù)2019年全年的數(shù)據(jù),選擇了2019年第4季度的每股收益139.47美元。
這樣選擇有兩個(gè)原因。首先,2019年的利潤(rùn)不僅達(dá)到歷史新高,而且按照歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)看,與銷售額等指標(biāo)的比率也處在極高水平。這樣降低了正?;杏氏蛏吓で母怕剩?yàn)槲覀兊凸懒宋磥?lái)出現(xiàn)更高可持續(xù)收益的可能性。當(dāng)然,樂觀的投資者會(huì)認(rèn)為,30倍市盈率倍數(shù)并不正常,因?yàn)?021年的股票收益會(huì)令2019年表現(xiàn)出色的大盤股都相形見絀。
其次,即使在2019年經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮時(shí)期,仍有一個(gè)根本原因?qū)е旅總€(gè)季度的每股收益(EPS)基本保持平穩(wěn)。雖然利潤(rùn)達(dá)到較高水平,但從基本面來(lái)看,收益卻缺乏上行空間。即使到現(xiàn)在,通常超級(jí)樂觀的華爾街分析師仍預(yù)測(cè),到2021年第2季度,年化利潤(rùn)將與2019年年底的139美元持平。簡(jiǎn)而言之,2021年利潤(rùn)有望重新達(dá)到歷史高點(diǎn)。
歷史上,除了最近的一次以外,標(biāo)普指數(shù)的市盈率倍數(shù)只有在收益大幅下降或暴跌時(shí),才會(huì)超過30倍。在1999年第4季度,市盈率倍數(shù)達(dá)到30.5,接近互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫的最高點(diǎn)。這個(gè)數(shù)字令投資者不安,因?yàn)楫?dāng)時(shí)的每股收益達(dá)到歷史新高。換言之,投資者每獲得1美元利潤(rùn),都需要支付30美元,而且當(dāng)時(shí)的利潤(rùn)水平已經(jīng)高于歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn)水平。但每股收益繼續(xù)上漲,到2000年第3季度達(dá)到53.70美元,再創(chuàng)新高。
每股收益在隨后四年一直沒有超過這一水平。在每股利潤(rùn)創(chuàng)新高的同時(shí),基準(zhǔn)指數(shù)在2000年9月1日漲至1518點(diǎn)的史上最高點(diǎn)。當(dāng)時(shí),該指數(shù)在四年內(nèi)上漲了120%。所以,與今天的市場(chǎng)最相似的是2000年勞動(dòng)節(jié)前三天的行情。標(biāo)普500指數(shù)歷史上只出現(xiàn)過兩次利潤(rùn)和股價(jià)同時(shí)創(chuàng)下新高的情況。(當(dāng)然,這是因?yàn)槲疫x擇2019年的利潤(rùn)與今天的利潤(rùn)進(jìn)行對(duì)比。)
在二十多年前,標(biāo)普指數(shù)的傳統(tǒng)市盈率倍數(shù)為26.75。按照這個(gè)指標(biāo)計(jì)算,標(biāo)普指數(shù)的成本比今天按30倍市盈率計(jì)算的結(jié)果高出12%。但市盈率倍數(shù)并不全面。比如根據(jù)當(dāng)時(shí)的基本面信息,2000年的每股收益遠(yuǎn)高于2021年。所以當(dāng)時(shí)的市盈率倍數(shù)是可以理解的,因?yàn)槔麧?rùn)一定會(huì)下降,但今天的市盈率倍數(shù)過高是因?yàn)槊抗墒找娌⒉桓?,這預(yù)示著未來(lái)會(huì)有較大的增長(zhǎng)空間。
雖然相關(guān)證據(jù)有些復(fù)雜,但總體而言,截至2019年第4季度的利潤(rùn)似乎至少達(dá)到了互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫時(shí)期的最高點(diǎn)。例如,2019年全年的每股收益相當(dāng)于國(guó)民收入的5.4%,遠(yuǎn)高于截至2000年9月四個(gè)季度的4.4%。2019年,標(biāo)普指數(shù)營(yíng)業(yè)利潤(rùn)在銷售額中的占比或“營(yíng)運(yùn)利潤(rùn)率”為11.1%,比2000年高約4個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。相比之下,標(biāo)普指數(shù)在世紀(jì)之交的股權(quán)收益率為17.5%,高于2019年的15.5%。
由于大部分指標(biāo)都顯示2019年的相對(duì)利潤(rùn)高于2000年,因此我們將按保守估算,假設(shè)兩個(gè)周期的相對(duì)利潤(rùn)相當(dāng)。然后我們可以對(duì)僅有的兩個(gè)收益和估值均創(chuàng)歷史新高的時(shí)期進(jìn)行詳細(xì)對(duì)比。這對(duì)于今天的大盤股意味著什么?
繁榮背后的壞消息
如果你從未離場(chǎng),那么市盈率倍數(shù)達(dá)到30背后的繁榮當(dāng)然是好消息。但如果你計(jì)劃現(xiàn)在進(jìn)場(chǎng),或者想把你獲得的利潤(rùn)再投資到美國(guó)大盤股,這可能是最糟糕的消息。不妨看看2000年9月1日之后發(fā)生了什么。當(dāng)時(shí)標(biāo)普指數(shù)陷入長(zhǎng)期低迷,2003年3月11日跌至801點(diǎn),下跌47%。直到7年后的2007年9月,標(biāo)普指數(shù)才重回2000年9月的最高點(diǎn);當(dāng)然在金融危機(jī)期間,標(biāo)普指數(shù)再次暴跌,2013年3月突破1500點(diǎn)。這導(dǎo)致該指數(shù)長(zhǎng)達(dá)12年的收益為零,只有微薄的股息。
當(dāng)然,你無(wú)法預(yù)測(cè)我們是否會(huì)再經(jīng)歷一次互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫破滅之后的暴跌。樂觀的投資者預(yù)測(cè),兩個(gè)強(qiáng)大的利好消息將帶領(lǐng)美國(guó)股市繼續(xù)高歌猛進(jìn):快速上漲的利潤(rùn)將超過2019年的最高水平,以及未來(lái)幾年的超低利率。
這兩種情況出現(xiàn)的可能性不大。而且要從這兩件事中受益的機(jī)會(huì)更加渺茫。首先,我們來(lái)看一下利潤(rùn)的未來(lái)前景。目前,股票收益的GDP占比為5.4%,已經(jīng)超過了歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn)水平。如果按照華爾街的預(yù)測(cè),每股收益上漲速度將繼續(xù)超過GDP,利潤(rùn)占比只會(huì)持續(xù)擴(kuò)大。尤其令人擔(dān)憂的是,4月16日,標(biāo)普指數(shù)的估值在國(guó)民收入中的占比令人震驚地達(dá)到161%,比2000年的130%提高了四分之一,幾乎比二十年中位數(shù)翻了一番。
為了將這個(gè)比例維持在160%以上,股票收益需要吞噬掉更大一部分經(jīng)濟(jì),與此同時(shí),美國(guó)長(zhǎng)期低迷的工資最終將開始上漲,美國(guó)的長(zhǎng)期增長(zhǎng)率將低于2%,而且企業(yè)所得稅作為拜登政府雄心勃勃的支出計(jì)劃的主要收入來(lái)源,其稅率可能將大幅提高。
關(guān)于利率,樂觀投資者認(rèn)為,未來(lái)幾年10年期國(guó)債收益率將與GDP保持相同的增長(zhǎng)趨勢(shì),對(duì)于這種觀點(diǎn)最好的回應(yīng)非常簡(jiǎn)單:這種情況以前很少發(fā)生。正常情況下,“實(shí)際”利率或通脹調(diào)整后利率會(huì)與國(guó)民收入增長(zhǎng)保持相同趨勢(shì),最近幾十年利率陷入負(fù)區(qū)間的情況下從來(lái)不會(huì)持續(xù)太久。對(duì)于今天低于通貨膨脹的收益率,最合理的解釋是這是千年不遇的新冠疫情沖擊經(jīng)濟(jì)造成的罕見現(xiàn)象。
依舊有許多經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的投資者相信,低利率將維持較長(zhǎng)時(shí)間。路易斯·納維利爾為他的家族理財(cái)室管理價(jià)值18億美元的資產(chǎn)組合。他非常冷靜,對(duì)于股市有獨(dú)到的見解。他告訴《財(cái)富》雜志:“我們聽說(shuō)了各種有關(guān)通貨膨脹的說(shuō)法,我們看到了極好的零售銷售數(shù)據(jù)和GDP向上修正的趨勢(shì)。但債券收益率卻在下跌。我敢說(shuō)按照當(dāng)前的債券收益率,股票的價(jià)值依舊在被低估?!?/p>
納維利爾的觀點(diǎn)很有道理。但我會(huì)繼續(xù)對(duì)標(biāo)普指數(shù)史上僅有的市盈率達(dá)到30的兩個(gè)時(shí)期進(jìn)行對(duì)比,分析兩者的相似之處。互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫釀成了上個(gè)世紀(jì)最慘烈的股災(zāi)之一?,F(xiàn)在,我們?cè)俅慰吹搅水?dāng)時(shí)出現(xiàn)過的警告信號(hào)和瘋狂的繁榮。好日子或許還能持續(xù)一段時(shí)間。但如果持續(xù)太久將違背歷史規(guī)律。根據(jù)2000年年底出現(xiàn)的瘋狂和隨后的股災(zāi),我更愿意相信歷史。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:劉進(jìn)龍
審校:汪皓
This writer has been watching carefully as the S&P 500 climbed closer and closer to matching a perilous valuation mark that, by my unofficial metrics, has been reached only once before—at the height of the dotcom bubble in September 2000. The morning of April 16, the big-cap index reached that troubling milestone. Just after the open, the S&P hit a fresh record at 4187. That lifted its multiple, based on my benchmark for "normalized" profits, to a towering 30 times earnings (or 30.02, to be precise).
At first glance, a price/earnings ratio of 30 might not seem alarming. In June of last year, the basic earnings multiple—using the standard measure of trailing four quarters of GAAP net earnings—soared to 31, when shares were 26% cheaper than today. And at the end of the fourth quarter of 2020, the P/E stood at almost 40. That number hasn't bothered the bulls at all, since the S&P has partied since then. But those pandemic-economy ratios are pretty meaningless in gauging whether stocks are expensive, cheap, or fairly valued. Although prices romped, it was the one-third earnings collapse from the fourth quarter of 2019 to the end of 2020 that most inflated the most famous and fundamental of valuation measures.
It was always clear that profits would rebound from COVID-stricken lows, increasing the denominator and putting that 40-plus PE in a more realistic range. To get an accurate reading on where stocks stand on the spectrum of super-pricey to bargains, and hence handicap where they're headed, you need a yardstick for "normalized profits." I define that level as the number the S&P companies collectively are most likely to post once the recovery takes hold. My choice is the Q4 2019 earnings of $139.47 per share, based on the total for the year.
I made that pick for two reasons. First, 2019 profits not only set a record, but also stood extremely high by historical standards when compared to sales and other measures. That reduces the chance that our normalized P/E is distorted upwards because we're underestimating much higher sustainable earnings in the pipeline. Of course, the bulls will argue that our 30 multiple is way out of whack, because 2021 profits will dwarf even big-caps’ super performance in 2019.
Second, even in the strong economy of 2019, earnings per share (EPS) from quarter to quarter were essentially flat, for a basic reason. Profits had reached such high levels versus fundamentals that earnings lacked room to run. Even now, Wall Street analysts, who are typically ultra-optimistic, project annualized profits through the second quarter of 2021 that match the $139 registered at year-end 2019. Put simply, rescaling that summit is a likely scenario for profits in 2021.
Historically, the S&P multiple has exceeded 30 only at times when earnings dropped sharply or collapsed, with one exception prior to today. In the December quarter of 1999, the P/E reached 30.5 near the peak of the Internet stock craze. That number flashed red, because it came on top of the highest EPS ever recorded. In other words, investors were paying a gigantic $30 for every $1 in profits, and those profits were already elevated by historical standards. But EPS marched on, striking a new high of $53.70 in the September quarter of 2000.
As it turned out, EPS wouldn't beat that mark again for four years. Those record profits coincided with an all-time peak for the benchmark index, which reached the summit of 1518 on Sept. 1, 2000. At that point, the index had surged 120% in four years. So the best single parallel to where the market stands today is its status three days before Labor Day in 2000. Once again, those are the only two times the S&P 500 achieved never-before-witnessed profits and prices at the same time. (Of course, that's using our choice of 2019 profits for the comparison to today.)
On that date more than two decades ago, the S&P’s traditional multiple hovered at 26.75. By that yardstick, the index is 12% more expensive today at a P/E of 30. But the multiple doesn't provide the full picture. Say that according to fundamentals at the time, EPS was a lot higher in 2000 than in 2021. In that case, the multiple could be understated because profits were bound to fall, and today's P/E is overstated because EPS is still modest, presaging big increases to come.
The evidence is somewhat mixed, but on the whole, profits as of Q4 2019 appear at least as high, relative to the period, as at the apex of the tech bubble. For example, earnings for the full year of 2019 were equivalent to 5.4% of national income, far above the 4.4% for the four quarters ending in September 2000. As for operating profits as a share of sales, or "operating margins," the S&P recorded 11.1% in 2019, beating the number in 2000 by around four percentage points. By comparison, the turn-of-the-century index did better in return on equity, garnering 17.5% to 2019's 15.5%.
Since most but not all of the metrics point to higher relative profits in 2019 than 2000, we'll take a conservative stance and rate them about equal for both periods. We're left with a side-by-side look at the only two periods of all-time high earnings coincided with record valuations. What does this mean for today's big-caps?
Bad news behind the boom
The boom that brought the P/E of 30 is great news if you've been riding the train. But it's the worst possible tidings if you're planning to jump in now, or want to leave your winnings in U.S. big-caps. The evidence: Look what happened in the period following Sept. 1, 2000. The S&P entered a long swoon, bottoming at 801 on March 11, 2003, for a loss of 47%. The index didn't regain the September 2000 mountaintop for seven years, until September 2007; prices plunged again, of course, during the financial crisis, before climbing back above 1500 in March 2013. That adds up to over 12 long years of booking zero gains except for paltry dividends.
Of course, it's impossible to predict whether we'll experience a drop of anything like the aftermath of the dotcom catastrophe. The bulls forecast that two powerful tailwinds will converge for a full-rigged voyage to glory: fast-rising profits that will surmount the feats of 2019, and the support of super-low interest rates for years to come.
Both are possibilities, but unlikely. And benefiting from the confluence of both is an even longer shot. Let's look first at the outlook for profits. At 5.4% of GDP, earnings are already outsize by historical standards. For EPS to keep outpacing GDP, as Wall Street predicts, profits would have to get even more outsize. It's especially worrying that on April 16, the S&P's valuation as a share of national income hit an astounding 161%, one-quarter above the 130% it reached in the 2000 rampage, and almost double the two-decade median.
To stay at 160%-plus, earnings would have to devour an even bigger share of the economy at a time when wages, depressed for years, are finally on the rise, the U.S. is facing long-term growth rates at below 2%, and corporate income taxes are likely to rise significantly as a prime source of revenue for President Biden's ambitious spending agenda.
As for interest rates, the best response to the bull case that the 10-year Treasury yield will trail the trajectory of GDP in the years ahead is basic: It has seldom happened before. "Real" or inflation-adjusted rates normally track national income, and cases in which they’re in negative territory have never lasted long in recent decades. The most logical explanation for today's sub-inflation yields is that they're a rare phenomenon caused by COVID's once-in-a-millennium blow to the economy.
Still, many seasoned investors believe rates will remain low for a long time. Louis Navellier, who runs a $1.8 billion portfolio for his family office, is a sober, insightful student of the markets. "We were hearing all this talk of inflation, and we saw stunning retail sales figures, and upward GDP revisions," he told Fortune. "And yet bond yields fell. I can make the argument that where bond yields are now, stocks are still undervalued."
Navellier makes a good case. I'll stick with the takeaway from setting the only two times the S&P reached 30 on peak earnings cheek by jowl, and judging the resemblance. The aftermath of the dotcom fever ranked among the worst deluges of the past century. We're reliving the warning signals and wild exuberance we saw then. The great times may keep rolling for a while. But for the roll to last would be a departure from history. And I'm betting on history, as chronicled by the craziness of late 2000 and the wreckage that followed.