毫無疑問,四大審計(jì)公司正在艱難地應(yīng)對(duì)美國(guó)投資者對(duì)透明度的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性需求,并根據(jù)中國(guó)隱私和證券法履行其義務(wù)。美中經(jīng)濟(jì)與安全評(píng)估委員會(huì)(U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission)稱,長(zhǎng)期以來,美國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)(Public Company Accounting Oversight Board)無法獲取在美上市中國(guó)企業(yè)的審計(jì)工作底稿,因此有理由對(duì)此表示擔(dān)心,而且目前此類中國(guó)企業(yè)達(dá)到了217家,總市值超過了2萬億美元。
然而,審計(jì)透明度是一個(gè)波及全球的大問題。
數(shù)百家海外審計(jì)公司都已經(jīng)在美國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)的網(wǎng)站上注冊(cè)。其中英國(guó)的審計(jì)公司最多,達(dá)到了45家,中國(guó)39家,加拿大36家,新加坡25家,墨西哥20家,馬來西亞18家。盡管美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission)開始按照最近通過的2020《外國(guó)公司擔(dān)責(zé)法案》(Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act of 2020)采取行動(dòng),來解決美國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)注冊(cè)新興市場(chǎng)公司的審計(jì)操作問題,但我們認(rèn)為從戰(zhàn)略角度來講,它將把更多的精力放在履行美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的強(qiáng)制令方面,以保護(hù)投資者,維持井然有序的市場(chǎng),并促進(jìn)資本形成。
當(dāng)美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)于1934年成立時(shí),資本市場(chǎng)的全球化水平并沒有如今這么高。因此,我們有必要秉承適用于21世紀(jì)的全球化思維方式。
我們建議在華盛頓特區(qū)之外運(yùn)營(yíng)的美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的國(guó)際事務(wù)辦公室(Office of International Affairs)擴(kuò)大其活動(dòng)范圍。具體來說,美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)(以及美國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì))應(yīng)該設(shè)立海外分支,并派遣員工前往全球不同的市場(chǎng),以發(fā)現(xiàn)和回應(yīng)影響美國(guó)投資者在海外公司利益的問題。
此舉也是在效仿美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院(State Department)的模式,成為美國(guó)了解整個(gè)世界的“眼睛和耳朵”。處于海外的美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)員工應(yīng)該努力向國(guó)務(wù)院學(xué)習(xí),掌握有關(guān)各國(guó)及其對(duì)美歷史關(guān)系的特有知識(shí)和專長(zhǎng)。美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)在一開始可以考慮設(shè)立三家海外分支機(jī)構(gòu):美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)亞太辦事處,常駐新加坡或香港;美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)歐洲辦事處,常駐英國(guó);美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)拉美辦事處,常駐墨西哥城或圣保羅。
美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)能夠賦予這些海外機(jī)構(gòu)外交職能,以加強(qiáng)與該區(qū)域金融監(jiān)管方的關(guān)系。我們的建議或?qū)椭绹?guó)獲得一些至關(guān)重要的軟實(shí)力,從而讓美國(guó)更加有效地與其他國(guó)家進(jìn)行協(xié)商,并最終為美國(guó)投資者帶來更好的成果。軟實(shí)力的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵特征在于,它是非強(qiáng)制性的,而且軟實(shí)力的內(nèi)容包括文化、政治價(jià)值和外交政策。
軟實(shí)力需要與硬實(shí)力進(jìn)行搭配。因此,我們還建議讓身處海外的美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)和美國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)分支機(jī)構(gòu)承擔(dān)對(duì)審計(jì)公司以及位于該區(qū)域且在美國(guó)交叉上市的公司進(jìn)行審核的職責(zé)。
此舉是否會(huì)挑戰(zhàn)這些國(guó)家的主權(quán)地位?的確會(huì)。然而,美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的外交職能有望緩和幕后的一些緊張關(guān)系。
當(dāng)然,終極手段是切斷與敵對(duì)外國(guó)政府的金融外交聯(lián)系,實(shí)際上就是要求此類外國(guó)公司從美國(guó)交易所退市。美國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)是外國(guó)公司可以利用的最豐厚、最具流動(dòng)性的融資場(chǎng)所,因此,在可預(yù)見的未來,人們對(duì)于接觸這一市場(chǎng)的興趣仍然會(huì)延續(xù)。
如果美國(guó)證券委員會(huì)和美國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)希望有效地保障其美國(guó)投資者在海外公司的利益,那么就應(yīng)該立即行動(dòng)起來,投資擴(kuò)張其國(guó)際印跡。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
希瓦·拉吉戈帕爾是哥倫比亞商學(xué)院(Columbia Business School)的冠名教授,亦是杰羅米查山全球商業(yè)研究所(Jerome A. Chazen Institute for Global Business)的高級(jí)學(xué)者。
斯里·拉馬莫迪是商業(yè)管理學(xué)院(School of Business Administration)的副教授,亦是戴頓大學(xué)漢利可持續(xù)發(fā)展研究所(Hanley Sustainability Institute at the University of Dayton)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展學(xué)者。
譯者:馮豐
審校:夏林
毫無疑問,四大審計(jì)公司正在艱難地應(yīng)對(duì)美國(guó)投資者對(duì)透明度的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性需求,并根據(jù)中國(guó)隱私和證券法履行其義務(wù)。美中經(jīng)濟(jì)與安全評(píng)估委員會(huì)(U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission)稱,長(zhǎng)期以來,美國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)(Public Company Accounting Oversight Board)無法獲取在美上市中國(guó)企業(yè)的審計(jì)工作底稿,因此有理由對(duì)此表示擔(dān)心,而且目前此類中國(guó)企業(yè)達(dá)到了217家,總市值超過了2萬億美元。
然而,審計(jì)透明度是一個(gè)波及全球的大問題。
數(shù)百家海外審計(jì)公司都已經(jīng)在美國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)的網(wǎng)站上注冊(cè)。其中英國(guó)的審計(jì)公司最多,達(dá)到了45家,中國(guó)39家,加拿大36家,新加坡25家,墨西哥20家,馬來西亞18家。盡管美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission)開始按照最近通過的2020《外國(guó)公司擔(dān)責(zé)法案》(Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act of 2020)采取行動(dòng),來解決美國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)注冊(cè)新興市場(chǎng)公司的審計(jì)操作問題,但我們認(rèn)為從戰(zhàn)略角度來講,它將把更多的精力放在履行美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的強(qiáng)制令方面,以保護(hù)投資者,維持井然有序的市場(chǎng),并促進(jìn)資本形成。
當(dāng)美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)于1934年成立時(shí),資本市場(chǎng)的全球化水平并沒有如今這么高。因此,我們有必要秉承適用于21世紀(jì)的全球化思維方式。
我們建議在華盛頓特區(qū)之外運(yùn)營(yíng)的美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的國(guó)際事務(wù)辦公室(Office of International Affairs)擴(kuò)大其活動(dòng)范圍。具體來說,美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)(以及美國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì))應(yīng)該設(shè)立海外分支,并派遣員工前往全球不同的市場(chǎng),以發(fā)現(xiàn)和回應(yīng)影響美國(guó)投資者在海外公司利益的問題。
此舉也是在效仿美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院(State Department)的模式,成為美國(guó)了解整個(gè)世界的“眼睛和耳朵”。處于海外的美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)員工應(yīng)該努力向國(guó)務(wù)院學(xué)習(xí),掌握有關(guān)各國(guó)及其對(duì)美歷史關(guān)系的特有知識(shí)和專長(zhǎng)。美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)在一開始可以考慮設(shè)立三家海外分支機(jī)構(gòu):美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)亞太辦事處,常駐新加坡或香港;美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)歐洲辦事處,常駐英國(guó);美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)拉美辦事處,常駐墨西哥城或圣保羅。
美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)能夠賦予這些海外機(jī)構(gòu)外交職能,以加強(qiáng)與該區(qū)域金融監(jiān)管方的關(guān)系。我們的建議或?qū)椭绹?guó)獲得一些至關(guān)重要的軟實(shí)力,從而讓美國(guó)更加有效地與其他國(guó)家進(jìn)行協(xié)商,并最終為美國(guó)投資者帶來更好的成果。軟實(shí)力的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵特征在于,它是非強(qiáng)制性的,而且軟實(shí)力的內(nèi)容包括文化、政治價(jià)值和外交政策。
軟實(shí)力需要與硬實(shí)力進(jìn)行搭配。因此,我們還建議讓身處海外的美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)和美國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)分支機(jī)構(gòu)承擔(dān)對(duì)審計(jì)公司以及位于該區(qū)域且在美國(guó)交叉上市的公司進(jìn)行審核的職責(zé)。
此舉是否會(huì)挑戰(zhàn)這些國(guó)家的主權(quán)地位?的確會(huì)。然而,美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的外交職能有望緩和幕后的一些緊張關(guān)系。
當(dāng)然,終極手段是切斷與敵對(duì)外國(guó)政府的金融外交聯(lián)系,實(shí)際上就是要求此類外國(guó)公司從美國(guó)交易所退市。美國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)是外國(guó)公司可以利用的最豐厚、最具流動(dòng)性的融資場(chǎng)所,因此,在可預(yù)見的未來,人們對(duì)于接觸這一市場(chǎng)的興趣仍然會(huì)延續(xù)。
如果美國(guó)證券委員會(huì)和美國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)希望有效地保障其美國(guó)投資者在海外公司的利益,那么就應(yīng)該立即行動(dòng)起來,投資擴(kuò)張其國(guó)際印跡。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
希瓦·拉吉戈帕爾是哥倫比亞商學(xué)院(Columbia Business School)的冠名教授,亦是杰羅米查山全球商業(yè)研究所(Jerome A. Chazen Institute for Global Business)的高級(jí)學(xué)者。
斯里·拉馬莫迪是商業(yè)管理學(xué)院(School of Business Administration)的副教授,亦是戴頓大學(xué)漢利可持續(xù)發(fā)展研究所(Hanley Sustainability Institute at the University of Dayton)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展學(xué)者。
譯者:馮豐
審校:夏林
It’s no secret that the Big Four audit firms are struggling to deal with competing demands for transparency from U.S. investors and to meet their obligations under Chinese privacy and securities laws. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is rightly concerned about its long-standing inability to access the working papers of audits of Chinese companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges, with 217 such companies exceeding $2 trillion of combined market cap, according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
But the issue of auditing transparency is a larger concern that extends across the globe.
Hundreds of overseas audit firms are registered on the PCAOB’s website. The United Kingdom has the most audit firms with 45, followed by 39 in China, 36 in Canada, 25 in Singapore, 20 in Mexico, and 18 in Malaysia. While the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is beginning to take action, under the recently passed Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act of 2020, to address issues with the auditing practices of PCAOB-registered firms in emerging markets, including China, we think a more strategic focus is warranted to fulfill the SEC’s mandate to protect investors, maintain orderly markets, and facilitate capital formation.
Capital markets were not as globalized as they are today when the SEC was established in 1934. A global approach, suitable for the 21st century, is necessary.
We propose an expansion of the activities of the SEC’s Office of International Affairs (OIA) that operates out of Washington, D.C. Specifically, the SEC (and the PCAOB) should set up foreign missions with staff deployed in different markets around the world to identify and respond to issues impacting the interests of American investors in overseas companies.
This would follow the State Department’s model of being America’s “eyes and ears” to the world at large. Overseas SEC staff should strive to achieve the State Department’s unique knowledge and expertise about different countries and their historical relationship with the U.S. The SEC could consider three overseas missions as a start: SEC–Asia Pacific, based in Singapore or Hong Kong; SEC-Europe, based in the United Kingdom; and SEC–Latin America, based in Mexico City or S?o Paulo.
The SEC could charge these overseas missions with diplomatic objectives to foster and nurture better relations with financial regulators in the region. Our proposal would help the U.S. gain some soft power that could be crucial in making negotiations with other countries more effective and ultimately lead to better outcomes for American investors. A defining feature of soft power is that it is noncoercive, and the currency of soft power includes culture, political values, and foreign policies.
Soft power needs to be complemented with hard power. Therefore, we would also recommend tasking the overseas SEC and PCAOB missions with local inspections of audit firms and of companies based in the region and cross-listed in the U.S.
Will this pose sovereignty challenges from these countries? For sure. But the SEC’s diplomacy wing would hopefully smooth some of these tensions behind the scenes.
The nuclear option, of course, is to sever financial diplomatic connections with hostile foreign governments, effectively asking such foreign companies to delist from U.S. stock exchanges. U.S. capital markets represent the deepest, most liquid avenues for foreign companies to tap into, so there will remain continued interest in accessing them for the foreseeable future.
It is time for the SEC and the PCAOB to invest in expanding their international footprint if they want to effectively safeguard the interests of American investors in overseas companies.
Shiva Rajgopal is the Kester and Byrnes professor at Columbia Business School and a senior scholar at the Jerome A. Chazen Institute for Global Business.
Sri Ramamoorti is an associate professor in the School of Business Administration and a sustainability scholar affiliated with the Hanley Sustainability Institute at the University of Dayton.