工商界和投資界最擔心的就是通脹魔咒,這遠比它們存在的其他顧慮大得多。消費和生產(chǎn)價格目前的增速處于十多年來的最高水平。通脹陡增可能讓當前的極低利率開始上升的時間大幅提前,且利率漲幅也可能遠超之前預期。
大家都害怕這樣的局面,原因是超低利率是推動美國股市一再刷新歷史紀錄的主要動力,是美國維持巨額債務和赤字的保障,也確保美國能夠對道路、橋梁、機場、寬帶、幼兒園和學校等領域投入數(shù)萬億美元。人們認為低成本借款對保持快速復蘇勢頭來說至關重要。的確,幾十年來最有吸引力的抵押貸款利率讓住宅建設領域一片繁榮,而住宅建設是經(jīng)濟增長的一股關鍵動力。
但由此也能夠看出美聯(lián)儲的政策是如何推升通脹的,這些政策打造的低成本信貸則可能因此化為烏有。在此我們將從各個方面粗淺地探討一下通脹上升對個人收入乃至整體經(jīng)濟的潛在影響。
何為通脹?如何進行度量?
首先讓我們回顧一下基本經(jīng)濟概念。通脹的定義是既定貨幣的購買力逐步下降的現(xiàn)象。對價格的跟蹤通過定期考察的一籃子普通商品來進行。由此得出的居民消費價格指數(shù)的上升或下降則以百分數(shù)表達。
如果這一籃子商品的價格上漲了2%,那就意味著通脹率是2%。同時,2%是美聯(lián)儲的目標通脹率,該機構認為這樣的年通脹率既不過熱,也不過冷。
通脹上升了多少?
專家們對通脹觀點迥異,從而把美國人徹底搞糊涂了,這可以理解。但有一點很清楚,那就是新的CPI數(shù)據(jù)很嚇人。
美國商務部稱,今年5月的美國CPI環(huán)比上升0.6%,同比上升5%,是2008年8月以來的最高點。去年5月以來,餐飲價格上漲了4%,服裝價格上升5.6%,電價漲了6.2%,包括機票在內的交通運輸服務價格上揚11.2%。二手車價格飆升56%,汽油價格也漲了一半。
農(nóng)產(chǎn)品方面,玉米和大豆價格分別比2019年年底上漲70%和40%,均創(chuàng)多年新高。
伊利諾伊大學的農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟學家布魯斯?謝里克認為農(nóng)產(chǎn)品價格將保持較高水平。他說:“新冠疫情期間,人們在家做飯的次數(shù)比以前多了很多。他們花錢在食雜店買的東西遠遠超過在餐廳點的菜?!?/p>
謝里克預測在自家廚房享用自制佳肴的趨勢將延續(xù)下去。他指出,由此產(chǎn)生的結果就是“人們在食雜店的花費將繼續(xù)增加。出現(xiàn)疫情以后,人們更有興趣了解自己在家消費的食品的屬性。他們在農(nóng)產(chǎn)品上的開支占比將大幅上升。這對農(nóng)民和食品價格來說是有利因素?!?/p>
通脹為什么現(xiàn)在突然上升?
簡單來說,解封釋放了需求,而部分行業(yè)的供應鏈仍然受到影響,進而造成價格上漲。某幾類商品的價格漲幅遠超其他商品。
彭博社報道稱,5月通脹上升“部分原因是半導體產(chǎn)品短缺使汽車生產(chǎn)放緩,進而造成二手車價格大漲。租車、機票以及酒店房間價格急劇上升也是主要因素,這表明需求異常旺盛,原因是許多消費者從居家隔離時的大件商品消費,轉向服務消費。”
通脹躥升是暫時現(xiàn)象嗎?
美聯(lián)儲認為是這樣,它表示預料之外的通脹激增很快就會過去。
6月21日在美國國會聽證會上,美聯(lián)儲的主席杰羅姆?鮑威爾稱,新一輪的通脹大幅上升是“短暫現(xiàn)象”。
在鮑威爾看來,通脹躥升是經(jīng)濟回暖帶動需求增長與熱門產(chǎn)品暫時短缺共同作用的結果。他表示,庫存驟降的同時出現(xiàn)大量訂單推動計算機芯片以及二手車價格飆升。但他預測這些短缺商品的產(chǎn)量將迅速擴大,從而扭轉價格上漲的局面。
鮑威爾還認為,眾所周知的勞動力不足問題也將很快緩解,從而對目前工資的大幅上升形成限制。他在作證時說:“如果可以越過新聞,把目光投向那些價格真正上漲的領域,你們就會發(fā)現(xiàn),它們往往都受到了解封的直接影響?!?/p>
不過,鮑威爾沒有說明這次的通脹上行將持續(xù)多久,而且他甚至承認這也許不會像他預測的那么“短暫”。
鮑威爾對議員們說:“這種情況要持續(xù)一段時間,然后才會結束?!彼€認為通脹率最終將回落到2%,也就是美聯(lián)儲的長期目標上下。但他也謹慎地表示“非常難預測具體時間”,而且“實際情況可能表明通脹要比我們的預期的更高、更持久?!?/p>
但如果不是“短暫”通脹呢?
許多專家都認為美國本輪通脹延續(xù)的時間可能要長得多?;蛘咚麄冎辽僬J為這種可能性很高。
早在去年12月,摩根大通的首席執(zhí)行官杰米?戴蒙就曾經(jīng)預測2021年美國通脹率將達到3%至4%。最近在美國國會作證時,戴蒙提出了他的最新觀點:“我認為通脹并非短暫現(xiàn)象的可能性非常高。”
美國銀行的首席執(zhí)行官布萊恩?莫伊尼漢也變得更為擔心。6月中旬,莫伊尼漢在接受美國消費者新聞與商業(yè)頻道的采訪時稱:“主要爭議在于通脹是不是暫時的。我覺得現(xiàn)在我們必須更加謹慎,因為我們看到工資正在上升,粘性價格也在上升。這是短暫現(xiàn)象嗎?可能吧,但看到實際情況之前沒有人知道。”
美聯(lián)儲會被迫加息嗎?
盡管鮑威爾說了些讓人舒心的話,但數(shù)據(jù)顯示價格上漲速度遠超預期已經(jīng)讓美聯(lián)儲的策略發(fā)生了重大轉變。
6月16日,美聯(lián)儲表示,聯(lián)邦公開市場委員會的18名成員中有多數(shù)人認為2023年年底前美聯(lián)儲將加息兩次——3月美聯(lián)儲還在經(jīng)濟展望報告中預測最早將在2024年提高利率。
上述策略調整還將改變美聯(lián)儲對購買巨額債券的時間安排,這是它調控利率的第二大法寶。
目前美聯(lián)儲每月購買1200億美元債券,其中主要是支持美國政府大量借款的美國國債。(一般來說,美聯(lián)儲希望保持低利率時會購買債券,由此產(chǎn)生的需求有提高債券價格并降低其利率的作用。反過來,如果美國政府想提高利率,美聯(lián)儲就會賣出債券,從而通過增加供應來降低債券價格,最終帶動利率上升。)
加息時間比原計劃早了差不多一年,為了做準備,美聯(lián)儲“縮表”,或者說放慢債券購買步伐的時間也需要提前。今年晚些時候,美聯(lián)儲就有可能開始縮表。部分華爾街人士認為美聯(lián)儲采取行動的速度甚至要更快一些。
摩根士丹利的首席執(zhí)行官詹姆斯?戈爾曼預測,2022年年初,美聯(lián)儲就有可能提高基準利率。他在5月底的一次會議上說:“越來越多的人開始說通脹可能是較為結構性的,而且是長期的?!?/p>
這對聯(lián)邦基金利率有何影響?
目前,美聯(lián)儲仍然將聯(lián)邦基金利率(即銀行超額存款準備金隔夜拆借利率)保持在基本為零的水平。超寬松貨幣政策給美國國債短期收益率帶來了下行壓力,大量購買則壓低了長期美國國債收益率。
隨著美聯(lián)儲逐步后撤,利率決定權將回到市場手里。出現(xiàn)這種情況后,收益率將一直接近目前水平的觀點就很難說是正確的了。而高股價以及美國聯(lián)邦債務出現(xiàn)創(chuàng)紀錄增長的依據(jù)正是我們一直聽到的這些預期。
美國財政部的部長珍妮特?耶倫以及拉里?薩默斯、賈森?福曼等知名經(jīng)濟學家均表示,當前的低利率帶來了將借貸規(guī)模擴大數(shù)萬億美元的絕佳時機。
收益率曲線有哪些預示?
我認為,有一項極少有人關注的通脹指標,那就是收益率曲線。其實,預測利率前景的最佳途徑不是華爾街或美聯(lián)儲的展望,而是為客戶或自己掙錢的無數(shù)基金和個人確立的一系列曲線中蘊含的東西。
謝里克說:“收益率曲線總結了市場的最佳預期?!?/p>
大多數(shù)人都忽略了一年期、三年期、五年期和十年期美國國債當前收益率中包含的預期。
舉例來說,如果今年大家買入收益率0.90%的五年期美國國債,那么到2026年年中你們獲得的復合收益率就是4.6%。簡而言之,五年期國債帶來的總收益必須等于大家在2021年中期到2026年連續(xù)購買五次一年期國債獲得的收益,而且你們每次都會把之前得到的利息用于再次購買一年期國債。
因此,如果今年大家開始購買時一年期國債的收益率只有0.009%,還不到1%的一成,那么今后幾年其收益率必須迅速上升,這樣才能夠使2021年至2026年的累計收益率達到4.6%。
目前,收益率曲線預示今后幾年的利率會高得多正是基于這樣的理由。比如說,盡管三年期和五年期國債的收益率和歷史數(shù)據(jù)相比處于極低水平,但由于美聯(lián)儲的刺激性貨幣政策將一年期國債收益率壓到了不可思議的低點,今后一年期國債的收益率需要大幅而且是連續(xù)大幅上升,才可以達到三年期或五年期國債到期時的收益水平。
斯坦福大學胡佛研究所的經(jīng)濟學家約翰?科克倫說:“收益率曲線的變化是非常重要的信號。”他認為,一個合理的解釋是今后幾年的通脹率將超過之前預測的水平。
謝里克也指出:“目前的通脹預期已經(jīng)高于幾周之前。”
其他通脹指標發(fā)出了什么樣的信號?
美國財政部的通脹保值債券(簡稱TIPS)可以保護投資者不受價格快速上漲影響。其收益率隨通脹而動,因此CPI飆升時,TIPS持有者的購買力絲毫不會減弱。TIPS對今后通脹的預期則包含在所謂的盈虧平衡通脹率數(shù)據(jù)中,它預測的是今后5至10年的價格漲幅。
2020年年初經(jīng)濟形勢良好時,十年期美國國債的盈虧平衡通脹率為1.65%,也就是說市場預測今后十年價格的平均年漲幅為1.65%。
但在解封期間,這個數(shù)字刷新了多年來的最高點,5月中旬曾經(jīng)達到2.54%,6月22日回落至2.31%。由此能夠看出,目前投資者對今后十年通脹率的預期比新冠疫情前高得多。而最近這個數(shù)字突破2.54%則表明價格上升速度有可能遠遠超過2%的美聯(lián)儲目標。
五年期國債的盈虧平衡通脹率情況如何呢?它表明中期內價格將上升,兩年期、三年期和五年期國債收益率最近上升恰恰說明了這一點。
5月中旬,五年期國債盈虧平衡通脹率觸及2.72%的高點,目前則滑落至2.5%。但這仍然是2008年以來的最高點,而且?guī)缀醣纫咔橹醯乃礁哒粋€百分點。
可以說,投資者運用“集體智慧”做出的預測是今后幾年的通脹率將明顯高于美聯(lián)儲2%的目標值。
今后利率將如何發(fā)展?
大家可能注意到了,五年期和十年期美國國債的存續(xù)期收益率低于對同期平均通脹的預期。因此,如果現(xiàn)在買入這些債券,大家獲得的利息并不足以彌補日常生活成本的上升。
這些債券的收益率和預期通脹率之間的差異就是人們所說的“實際利率”。目前實際利率為負值,這很極端而且很少見。而關鍵問題在于這種情況怎樣才可以延續(xù)下去。
在以往的大多數(shù)時間段內,實際利率一直跟隨著經(jīng)濟增長率。
科克倫說:“如果經(jīng)濟處于增長狀態(tài),貸款進行投資的公司增多,那么美國國債收益率就得超過通脹率。人們說:‘現(xiàn)在我們要存錢,因為利率有吸引力?!@樣他們就不會出門去吃飯了?!?/p>
經(jīng)濟有活力時,公司和投資者競相購買國債,從而將他們不斷增長的利潤和儲蓄放到安全之處。在大多數(shù)時期,這種動力將三年期、五年期和十年期國債收益率維持在價格增速以上,這樣投資者就能夠保持其投資資金的購買力,并在通脹率隨經(jīng)濟實體增長的情況下實現(xiàn)少量“真正”收益。
但現(xiàn)在的情況并非如此?!皩嶋H”利率鮮有低于零的時候,更不用說低得如此之多。
正如科克倫解釋的那樣,這在一定程度上是因為美國經(jīng)濟的大幅下滑。他指出:“從2000年開始,美國的經(jīng)濟年增速一直是2%。低增長與低利率相伴。因此在低增長環(huán)境下出現(xiàn)超低利率并不意外?!?/p>
但也像科克倫承認的那樣,與通脹率相比,實際利率處于如此之低的負值出乎意料。他說:“美國利率一直低于零是個新現(xiàn)象。”
全球金融危機過后,五年期美國國債實際收益率在2011年中期至2013年中期跌入負區(qū)間。隨后,十年期美國國債也曾經(jīng)短暫出現(xiàn)過負的實際收益率。但這些都發(fā)生在經(jīng)濟狀況慘淡之際。
解封后,在美國GDP預計將增長7%的情況下,五年期國債實際收益率約為0.8%,比目前到2026年5月的通脹預期低1.6個百分點。十年期國債方面,目前其收益率為1.48%,預計將比年通脹率低0.8個百分點左右。
換句話說,如果現(xiàn)在買進五年期或十年期美國國債,大家獲得的收益將只有租金、醫(yī)療和食雜費用增幅的一半或三分之一。
通脹走勢如何?
我覺得盈虧平衡通脹率是判斷通脹走勢的絕佳依據(jù)。今后幾年這個數(shù)字將在2.5%上下。盡管收益率曲線釋放出的信號顯示同期利率將大幅上揚,但它們的實際增幅可能要大得多。
原因就是,最終投資者會希望國債收益率超過通脹率,就像以前幾乎所有情況下那樣。2018年年底,美聯(lián)儲開始“正?;焙蟮木置骖A示著今后實際利率的走勢。經(jīng)通脹調整后,十年期美國國債收益率達到1%并呈上升態(tài)勢。
當然,美聯(lián)儲隨后調整了策略,再次向市場投放大量低成本信貸,原因是他們擔心前總統(tǒng)唐納德?特朗普針對中國的關稅可能讓美國經(jīng)濟每況愈下。
讓實際利率一直處于負區(qū)間的是美聯(lián)儲的特別操作。但現(xiàn)在美聯(lián)儲卻宣稱將提前減小壓縮收益率的力度。
隨著情況的變化,我們可以假設實際收益率將至少回到1%的水平,而且筆者預測更有可能至少升至1.5%,仍然低于美國國會預算辦公室預測的GDP年增速。以此為基礎,將1%和2.5%和預期通脹率相加,就能夠推算出五年期美國國債收益率為3.5%,十年期國債收益率則在4%上下。
如果投資者對收益率的要求是比價格漲幅高1.5個百分點,五年期國債的收益率就要達到4%,十年期國債收益率要達到4.5%。
我們可以把這些數(shù)字和美國國會預算辦公室在2月發(fā)布的最新預算預測比較一下。
美國國會預算辦公室預計2021至2031年十年期美國國債的平均收益率為24%。這個極為溫和的數(shù)字是為美國政府赤字開支的增長做宣傳用的,是為了說明今后十年聯(lián)邦債務利率支出上升絕不會帶來問題。
但如果美國國會預算辦公室是對的,那么美國長期債券收益率就基本不會上行,甚至有可能落后于通脹率。今后十年平均實際利率有可能等于或者低于零。
更為謹慎的預測認為,情況將恢復正常,十年期美國國債收益率將比通脹率高1至2個百分點。但這種情況會立即帶來一種真正的危險,那就是激增的利息支出可能吞沒美國政府的預算。
通脹對股票和債券投資者來說意味著什么?
對任何類似于未來利率回到傳統(tǒng)水平的情況,預算政策以及債券和股票投資者的預期都沒有做好準備。
科克倫說:“美國財政部目前用于填補赤字的借款利率和2006年購房者使用的短期優(yōu)惠利率處于同一水平,那些人覺得他們的房子只可能升值?!彼麚睦始眲∩仙?,財政部被迫每年都滾轉的巨額債務可能使利息支出升至難以為繼的高點,進而引發(fā)危機。
科克倫指出:“你會看到將利率保持在低水平的強大壓力。如果利率漲幅過大,就會出現(xiàn)大而不能倒的銀行,預算崩潰,而且很多股票投資者都會蒙受巨大損失?!?/p>
盡管美聯(lián)儲正在淡化這樣的消息,但影響鮑威爾行動的是通脹的急劇上揚。而且要大幅上調利率,CPI數(shù)據(jù)并不需要像上個月那樣飆升。
要出現(xiàn)這樣的局面,美聯(lián)儲只需后退一步即可。利率最終要符合通脹水平,屆時一些美國人就會逐步從美聯(lián)儲構建的夢幻樂園中走出來。這將帶來另一次解封,“大師”將收手,市場力量將成為主宰。
而這樣的機制更迭不會是一個賞心悅目的過程。(財富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:Charlie
工商界和投資界最擔心的就是通脹魔咒,這遠比它們存在的其他顧慮大得多。消費和生產(chǎn)價格目前的增速處于十多年來的最高水平。通脹陡增可能讓當前的極低利率開始上升的時間大幅提前,且利率漲幅也可能遠超之前預期。
大家都害怕這樣的局面,原因是超低利率是推動美國股市一再刷新歷史紀錄的主要動力,是美國維持巨額債務和赤字的保障,也確保美國能夠對道路、橋梁、機場、寬帶、幼兒園和學校等領域投入數(shù)萬億美元。人們認為低成本借款對保持快速復蘇勢頭來說至關重要。的確,幾十年來最有吸引力的抵押貸款利率讓住宅建設領域一片繁榮,而住宅建設是經(jīng)濟增長的一股關鍵動力。
但由此也能夠看出美聯(lián)儲的政策是如何推升通脹的,這些政策打造的低成本信貸則可能因此化為烏有。在此我們將從各個方面粗淺地探討一下通脹上升對個人收入乃至整體經(jīng)濟的潛在影響。
何為通脹?如何進行度量?
首先讓我們回顧一下基本經(jīng)濟概念。通脹的定義是既定貨幣的購買力逐步下降的現(xiàn)象。對價格的跟蹤通過定期考察的一籃子普通商品來進行。由此得出的居民消費價格指數(shù)的上升或下降則以百分數(shù)表達。
如果這一籃子商品的價格上漲了2%,那就意味著通脹率是2%。同時,2%是美聯(lián)儲的目標通脹率,該機構認為這樣的年通脹率既不過熱,也不過冷。
通脹上升了多少?
專家們對通脹觀點迥異,從而把美國人徹底搞糊涂了,這可以理解。但有一點很清楚,那就是新的CPI數(shù)據(jù)很嚇人。
美國商務部稱,今年5月的美國CPI環(huán)比上升0.6%,同比上升5%,是2008年8月以來的最高點。去年5月以來,餐飲價格上漲了4%,服裝價格上升5.6%,電價漲了6.2%,包括機票在內的交通運輸服務價格上揚11.2%。二手車價格飆升56%,汽油價格也漲了一半。
農(nóng)產(chǎn)品方面,玉米和大豆價格分別比2019年年底上漲70%和40%,均創(chuàng)多年新高。
伊利諾伊大學的農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟學家布魯斯?謝里克認為農(nóng)產(chǎn)品價格將保持較高水平。他說:“新冠疫情期間,人們在家做飯的次數(shù)比以前多了很多。他們花錢在食雜店買的東西遠遠超過在餐廳點的菜?!?/p>
謝里克預測在自家廚房享用自制佳肴的趨勢將延續(xù)下去。他指出,由此產(chǎn)生的結果就是“人們在食雜店的花費將繼續(xù)增加。出現(xiàn)疫情以后,人們更有興趣了解自己在家消費的食品的屬性。他們在農(nóng)產(chǎn)品上的開支占比將大幅上升。這對農(nóng)民和食品價格來說是有利因素?!?/p>
通脹為什么現(xiàn)在突然上升?
簡單來說,解封釋放了需求,而部分行業(yè)的供應鏈仍然受到影響,進而造成價格上漲。某幾類商品的價格漲幅遠超其他商品。
彭博社報道稱,5月通脹上升“部分原因是半導體產(chǎn)品短缺使汽車生產(chǎn)放緩,進而造成二手車價格大漲。租車、機票以及酒店房間價格急劇上升也是主要因素,這表明需求異常旺盛,原因是許多消費者從居家隔離時的大件商品消費,轉向服務消費?!?/p>
通脹躥升是暫時現(xiàn)象嗎?
美聯(lián)儲認為是這樣,它表示預料之外的通脹激增很快就會過去。
6月21日在美國國會聽證會上,美聯(lián)儲的主席杰羅姆?鮑威爾稱,新一輪的通脹大幅上升是“短暫現(xiàn)象”。
在鮑威爾看來,通脹躥升是經(jīng)濟回暖帶動需求增長與熱門產(chǎn)品暫時短缺共同作用的結果。他表示,庫存驟降的同時出現(xiàn)大量訂單推動計算機芯片以及二手車價格飆升。但他預測這些短缺商品的產(chǎn)量將迅速擴大,從而扭轉價格上漲的局面。
鮑威爾還認為,眾所周知的勞動力不足問題也將很快緩解,從而對目前工資的大幅上升形成限制。他在作證時說:“如果可以越過新聞,把目光投向那些價格真正上漲的領域,你們就會發(fā)現(xiàn),它們往往都受到了解封的直接影響?!?/p>
不過,鮑威爾沒有說明這次的通脹上行將持續(xù)多久,而且他甚至承認這也許不會像他預測的那么“短暫”。
鮑威爾對議員們說:“這種情況要持續(xù)一段時間,然后才會結束?!彼€認為通脹率最終將回落到2%,也就是美聯(lián)儲的長期目標上下。但他也謹慎地表示“非常難預測具體時間”,而且“實際情況可能表明通脹要比我們的預期的更高、更持久?!?/p>
但如果不是“短暫”通脹呢?
許多專家都認為美國本輪通脹延續(xù)的時間可能要長得多?;蛘咚麄冎辽僬J為這種可能性很高。
早在去年12月,摩根大通的首席執(zhí)行官杰米?戴蒙就曾經(jīng)預測2021年美國通脹率將達到3%至4%。最近在美國國會作證時,戴蒙提出了他的最新觀點:“我認為通脹并非短暫現(xiàn)象的可能性非常高。”
美國銀行的首席執(zhí)行官布萊恩?莫伊尼漢也變得更為擔心。6月中旬,莫伊尼漢在接受美國消費者新聞與商業(yè)頻道的采訪時稱:“主要爭議在于通脹是不是暫時的。我覺得現(xiàn)在我們必須更加謹慎,因為我們看到工資正在上升,粘性價格也在上升。這是短暫現(xiàn)象嗎?可能吧,但看到實際情況之前沒有人知道?!?/p>
美聯(lián)儲會被迫加息嗎?
盡管鮑威爾說了些讓人舒心的話,但數(shù)據(jù)顯示價格上漲速度遠超預期已經(jīng)讓美聯(lián)儲的策略發(fā)生了重大轉變。
6月16日,美聯(lián)儲表示,聯(lián)邦公開市場委員會的18名成員中有多數(shù)人認為2023年年底前美聯(lián)儲將加息兩次——3月美聯(lián)儲還在經(jīng)濟展望報告中預測最早將在2024年提高利率。
上述策略調整還將改變美聯(lián)儲對購買巨額債券的時間安排,這是它調控利率的第二大法寶。
目前美聯(lián)儲每月購買1200億美元債券,其中主要是支持美國政府大量借款的美國國債。(一般來說,美聯(lián)儲希望保持低利率時會購買債券,由此產(chǎn)生的需求有提高債券價格并降低其利率的作用。反過來,如果美國政府想提高利率,美聯(lián)儲就會賣出債券,從而通過增加供應來降低債券價格,最終帶動利率上升。)
加息時間比原計劃早了差不多一年,為了做準備,美聯(lián)儲“縮表”,或者說放慢債券購買步伐的時間也需要提前。今年晚些時候,美聯(lián)儲就有可能開始縮表。部分華爾街人士認為美聯(lián)儲采取行動的速度甚至要更快一些。
摩根士丹利的首席執(zhí)行官詹姆斯?戈爾曼預測,2022年年初,美聯(lián)儲就有可能提高基準利率。他在5月底的一次會議上說:“越來越多的人開始說通脹可能是較為結構性的,而且是長期的?!?/p>
這對聯(lián)邦基金利率有何影響?
目前,美聯(lián)儲仍然將聯(lián)邦基金利率(即銀行超額存款準備金隔夜拆借利率)保持在基本為零的水平。超寬松貨幣政策給美國國債短期收益率帶來了下行壓力,大量購買則壓低了長期美國國債收益率。
隨著美聯(lián)儲逐步后撤,利率決定權將回到市場手里。出現(xiàn)這種情況后,收益率將一直接近目前水平的觀點就很難說是正確的了。而高股價以及美國聯(lián)邦債務出現(xiàn)創(chuàng)紀錄增長的依據(jù)正是我們一直聽到的這些預期。
美國財政部的部長珍妮特?耶倫以及拉里?薩默斯、賈森?福曼等知名經(jīng)濟學家均表示,當前的低利率帶來了將借貸規(guī)模擴大數(shù)萬億美元的絕佳時機。
收益率曲線有哪些預示?
我認為,有一項極少有人關注的通脹指標,那就是收益率曲線。其實,預測利率前景的最佳途徑不是華爾街或美聯(lián)儲的展望,而是為客戶或自己掙錢的無數(shù)基金和個人確立的一系列曲線中蘊含的東西。
謝里克說:“收益率曲線總結了市場的最佳預期。”
大多數(shù)人都忽略了一年期、三年期、五年期和十年期美國國債當前收益率中包含的預期。
舉例來說,如果今年大家買入收益率0.90%的五年期美國國債,那么到2026年年中你們獲得的復合收益率就是4.6%。簡而言之,五年期國債帶來的總收益必須等于大家在2021年中期到2026年連續(xù)購買五次一年期國債獲得的收益,而且你們每次都會把之前得到的利息用于再次購買一年期國債。
因此,如果今年大家開始購買時一年期國債的收益率只有0.009%,還不到1%的一成,那么今后幾年其收益率必須迅速上升,這樣才能夠使2021年至2026年的累計收益率達到4.6%。
目前,收益率曲線預示今后幾年的利率會高得多正是基于這樣的理由。比如說,盡管三年期和五年期國債的收益率和歷史數(shù)據(jù)相比處于極低水平,但由于美聯(lián)儲的刺激性貨幣政策將一年期國債收益率壓到了不可思議的低點,今后一年期國債的收益率需要大幅而且是連續(xù)大幅上升,才可以達到三年期或五年期國債到期時的收益水平。
斯坦福大學胡佛研究所的經(jīng)濟學家約翰?科克倫說:“收益率曲線的變化是非常重要的信號?!彼J為,一個合理的解釋是今后幾年的通脹率將超過之前預測的水平。
謝里克也指出:“目前的通脹預期已經(jīng)高于幾周之前?!?/p>
其他通脹指標發(fā)出了什么樣的信號?
美國財政部的通脹保值債券(簡稱TIPS)可以保護投資者不受價格快速上漲影響。其收益率隨通脹而動,因此CPI飆升時,TIPS持有者的購買力絲毫不會減弱。TIPS對今后通脹的預期則包含在所謂的盈虧平衡通脹率數(shù)據(jù)中,它預測的是今后5至10年的價格漲幅。
2020年年初經(jīng)濟形勢良好時,十年期美國國債的盈虧平衡通脹率為1.65%,也就是說市場預測今后十年價格的平均年漲幅為1.65%。
但在解封期間,這個數(shù)字刷新了多年來的最高點,5月中旬曾經(jīng)達到2.54%,6月22日回落至2.31%。由此能夠看出,目前投資者對今后十年通脹率的預期比新冠疫情前高得多。而最近這個數(shù)字突破2.54%則表明價格上升速度有可能遠遠超過2%的美聯(lián)儲目標。
五年期國債的盈虧平衡通脹率情況如何呢?它表明中期內價格將上升,兩年期、三年期和五年期國債收益率最近上升恰恰說明了這一點。
5月中旬,五年期國債盈虧平衡通脹率觸及2.72%的高點,目前則滑落至2.5%。但這仍然是2008年以來的最高點,而且?guī)缀醣纫咔橹醯乃礁哒粋€百分點。
可以說,投資者運用“集體智慧”做出的預測是今后幾年的通脹率將明顯高于美聯(lián)儲2%的目標值。
今后利率將如何發(fā)展?
大家可能注意到了,五年期和十年期美國國債的存續(xù)期收益率低于對同期平均通脹的預期。因此,如果現(xiàn)在買入這些債券,大家獲得的利息并不足以彌補日常生活成本的上升。
這些債券的收益率和預期通脹率之間的差異就是人們所說的“實際利率”。目前實際利率為負值,這很極端而且很少見。而關鍵問題在于這種情況怎樣才可以延續(xù)下去。
在以往的大多數(shù)時間段內,實際利率一直跟隨著經(jīng)濟增長率。
科克倫說:“如果經(jīng)濟處于增長狀態(tài),貸款進行投資的公司增多,那么美國國債收益率就得超過通脹率。人們說:‘現(xiàn)在我們要存錢,因為利率有吸引力?!@樣他們就不會出門去吃飯了?!?/p>
經(jīng)濟有活力時,公司和投資者競相購買國債,從而將他們不斷增長的利潤和儲蓄放到安全之處。在大多數(shù)時期,這種動力將三年期、五年期和十年期國債收益率維持在價格增速以上,這樣投資者就能夠保持其投資資金的購買力,并在通脹率隨經(jīng)濟實體增長的情況下實現(xiàn)少量“真正”收益。
但現(xiàn)在的情況并非如此?!皩嶋H”利率鮮有低于零的時候,更不用說低得如此之多。
正如科克倫解釋的那樣,這在一定程度上是因為美國經(jīng)濟的大幅下滑。他指出:“從2000年開始,美國的經(jīng)濟年增速一直是2%。低增長與低利率相伴。因此在低增長環(huán)境下出現(xiàn)超低利率并不意外。”
但也像科克倫承認的那樣,與通脹率相比,實際利率處于如此之低的負值出乎意料。他說:“美國利率一直低于零是個新現(xiàn)象?!?/p>
全球金融危機過后,五年期美國國債實際收益率在2011年中期至2013年中期跌入負區(qū)間。隨后,十年期美國國債也曾經(jīng)短暫出現(xiàn)過負的實際收益率。但這些都發(fā)生在經(jīng)濟狀況慘淡之際。
解封后,在美國GDP預計將增長7%的情況下,五年期國債實際收益率約為0.8%,比目前到2026年5月的通脹預期低1.6個百分點。十年期國債方面,目前其收益率為1.48%,預計將比年通脹率低0.8個百分點左右。
換句話說,如果現(xiàn)在買進五年期或十年期美國國債,大家獲得的收益將只有租金、醫(yī)療和食雜費用增幅的一半或三分之一。
通脹走勢如何?
我覺得盈虧平衡通脹率是判斷通脹走勢的絕佳依據(jù)。今后幾年這個數(shù)字將在2.5%上下。盡管收益率曲線釋放出的信號顯示同期利率將大幅上揚,但它們的實際增幅可能要大得多。
原因就是,最終投資者會希望國債收益率超過通脹率,就像以前幾乎所有情況下那樣。2018年年底,美聯(lián)儲開始“正?;焙蟮木置骖A示著今后實際利率的走勢。經(jīng)通脹調整后,十年期美國國債收益率達到1%并呈上升態(tài)勢。
當然,美聯(lián)儲隨后調整了策略,再次向市場投放大量低成本信貸,原因是他們擔心前總統(tǒng)唐納德?特朗普針對中國的關稅可能讓美國經(jīng)濟每況愈下。
讓實際利率一直處于負區(qū)間的是美聯(lián)儲的特別操作。但現(xiàn)在美聯(lián)儲卻宣稱將提前減小壓縮收益率的力度。
隨著情況的變化,我們可以假設實際收益率將至少回到1%的水平,而且筆者預測更有可能至少升至1.5%,仍然低于美國國會預算辦公室預測的GDP年增速。以此為基礎,將1%和2.5%和預期通脹率相加,就能夠推算出五年期美國國債收益率為3.5%,十年期國債收益率則在4%上下。
如果投資者對收益率的要求是比價格漲幅高1.5個百分點,五年期國債的收益率就要達到4%,十年期國債收益率要達到4.5%。
我們可以把這些數(shù)字和美國國會預算辦公室在2月發(fā)布的最新預算預測比較一下。
美國國會預算辦公室預計2021至2031年十年期美國國債的平均收益率為24%。這個極為溫和的數(shù)字是為美國政府赤字開支的增長做宣傳用的,是為了說明今后十年聯(lián)邦債務利率支出上升絕不會帶來問題。
但如果美國國會預算辦公室是對的,那么美國長期債券收益率就基本不會上行,甚至有可能落后于通脹率。今后十年平均實際利率有可能等于或者低于零。
更為謹慎的預測認為,情況將恢復正常,十年期美國國債收益率將比通脹率高1至2個百分點。但這種情況會立即帶來一種真正的危險,那就是激增的利息支出可能吞沒美國政府的預算。
通脹對股票和債券投資者來說意味著什么?
對任何類似于未來利率回到傳統(tǒng)水平的情況,預算政策以及債券和股票投資者的預期都沒有做好準備。
科克倫說:“美國財政部目前用于填補赤字的借款利率和2006年購房者使用的短期優(yōu)惠利率處于同一水平,那些人覺得他們的房子只可能升值?!彼麚睦始眲∩仙?,財政部被迫每年都滾轉的巨額債務可能使利息支出升至難以為繼的高點,進而引發(fā)危機。
科克倫指出:“你會看到將利率保持在低水平的強大壓力。如果利率漲幅過大,就會出現(xiàn)大而不能倒的銀行,預算崩潰,而且很多股票投資者都會蒙受巨大損失?!?/p>
盡管美聯(lián)儲正在淡化這樣的消息,但影響鮑威爾行動的是通脹的急劇上揚。而且要大幅上調利率,CPI數(shù)據(jù)并不需要像上個月那樣飆升。
要出現(xiàn)這樣的局面,美聯(lián)儲只需后退一步即可。利率最終要符合通脹水平,屆時一些美國人就會逐步從美聯(lián)儲構建的夢幻樂園中走出來。這將帶來另一次解封,“大師”將收手,市場力量將成為主宰。
而這樣的機制更迭不會是一個賞心悅目的過程。(財富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:Charlie
The biggest fear by far haunting the worlds of business and investing is the I-word, short for the curse of looming inflation. Consumer and producer prices are now waxing at their fastest pace in well over a decade. That sudden surge raises the threat that today's extra-low interest rates will start escalating much sooner—and spike far higher—than previously believed. That prospect spreads terror because super-slim yields are the main force propelling stocks to record after record, and enabling the U.S. to support our gigantic debt and deficits, as well as what could be trillions in proposed new spending for the likes of roads, bridges, airports, broadband, and child care and education.
Bargain borrowing is deemed essential to keeping the burgeoning recovery on track. Indeed, the most attractive mortgages rates in decades are fueling a boom in homebuilding, a key engine of economic growth. But it's an example of how Fed policy is stoking inflation that may undo the cheap credit it has engineered. We put together a primer about all the ways the rise in inflation may start to affect your wallet—and the economy at large.
What is inflation and how is it measured?
First, a trip back to Econ 101. Inflation is defined as a decline in the purchasing power of a given currency over time. Prices are tracked via a “basket” of common goods that are periodically measured. The resulting move up or down in the consumer price index (CPI) is expressed as a percentage. If prices for the basket go up 2%, that means inflation is running at 2%. And 2% is the Fed's target for where it would like to see inflation on an annual basis—not too hot, not too cold.
How much has inflation jumped?
Americans can be excused for getting thoroughly confused by the experts' wildly divergent views on inflation. But one element is clear: The new CPI numbers are scary. In May, the U.S. Department of Commerce reported that consumer prices jumped by 0.6% in May—or at a 7.2% annualized rate—and have risen 5% in the past 12 months, the highest reading since August 2008. Since May of last year, the cost of dining out has swelled by 4%, apparel by 5.6%, electricity by 6.2%, and "transportation services," a category including airline tickets, by 11.2%. Used cars and trucks got 56% pricier, and at the gas station, you're paying half again as much to fill your tank as a year ago.
As for agricultural commodities, corn and soybean prices have vaulted 70% and 40% respectively since the close of 2019 to reach multiyear highs. Bruce Sherrick, an agricultural economist at the University of Illinois, believes higher farm produce prices are here to stay. "People dined at home a lot more during the pandemic," he says. "The dollars they spent shopping at grocery stores buy a lot more food than in a restaurant." He predicts that the trend to enjoying family meals around kitchen and dining room tables will persist. The upshot, he says, is that "people will continue to spend more in grocery stores. Since the pandemic, they have an elevated interest in learning about the attributes of the food they consume at home. The fraction of the dollars spent on food going to farmers will be much higher. That's good for farmers and food prices."
Why is inflation spiking now?
Put simply, reopening has unleashed demand, and supply chains are still disrupted in some sectors, leading to higher prices. Some categories are seeing much higher spikes than others. May's increase "was driven partly by a huge rise in used car prices, which have soared as shortages of semiconductors have slowed vehicle production. Sharply higher prices for car rentals, airline tickets, and hotel rooms were also major factors, reflecting pent-up demand as consumers shift away from the large-goods purchases many of them had made while stuck at home to spending on services," according to Bloomberg.
Is the spike in inflation temporary?
According to the Federal Reserve, yes. The central bank claims that the unforeseen rampage is a passing phase. In testimony before Congress the week of June 21, Chairman Jerome Powell characterized the big new wave as "transitory." For Powell, what's causing the jump is the confluence of rising demand as the economy roars back and popular products temporarily in short supply. Powell noted that depleted stocks and heavy orders for computer chips and used cars and trucks have sent their prices soaring. But he predicted that production of such scarce goods will ramp up quickly, reversing the spikes. He also posits that the famous worker shortage will also soon ease, restraining today's big wage increases. "If you look behind the headlines and look at the categories where these prices are really going up," Powell testified, "you'll see that it tends to be in areas that are directly affected by the reopening."
The chairman, however, isn't predicting how long the inflation onslaught will last, and he even admits it may not be nearly as "transitory" as his best forecast. "That's something we'll go through over a period," he told lawmakers. "It will then be over." Powell added that inflation should eventually subside to around the Fed's long-term target of 2%, while cautioning that "it's very hard to say what the timing of that will be," and that "inflation could turn out to be higher and more persistent than we anticipate."
But what if it’s not “transitory”?
Many experts believe that the U.S. is facing a hot streak that could last much longer. Or at least they think it's a strong possibility. As early as last December, JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon was predicting price increases of 3% to 4% for 2021, and in recent testimony before Congress he updated his view, saying, "I think you have a very good chance that inflation will be more than transitory." Bank of America's Brian Moynihan is also getting wary. "The great debate is whether inflation is transitory or not transitory," he declared on CNBC in mid-June. "I think we have to be much more careful now because we're seeing wages grow, we're seeing sticky prices grow. Are they transitory? Probably, but we won't know until we get there."
Will the Fed have to raise interest rates?
Despite Powell's soothing words, the data showing prices rising far faster than the Fed's forecasts triggered a major shift in its strategy. On June 16, the central bank announced that the majority of the 18-member Open Market Committee believe that the Fed will raise rates twice by the end of 2023. That view advances the March outlook that called for increases in 2024 at the earliest.
The reset will also alter the timing on the Fed's second big offensive for restraining rates, its gigantic bond-buying program. The central bank is now amassing $120 billion a month in fixed-income securities; the bulk of those purchases are Treasuries issued to fund the nation's voracious borrowing. (Generally speaking, when the Fed wants to keep interest rates low it buys bonds; the demand has the effect of raising the price and lowering the interest rates of those bonds. On the flip side, when the government wants to nudge interest rates higher, it will sell bonds, raising supply, lowering the price and causing rates to go up.)
To prepare for the rate hikes that are now coming around a year earlier than previously planned, the Fed will also need to start "tapering" or reducing its bond-buying pace sooner than expected. We'll probably see the tapering begin later this year. Some Wall Street bankers believe that the Fed will need to move even faster. James Gorman, CEO of Morgan Stanley, believes the Fed could raise its benchmark rate in early 2022. "Increasingly people are starting to say it [inflation] may be more structural, long term," said Gorman at a conference in late May.
What does this mean for the Fed funds rate?
For now, the Fed is continuing to hold the Fed funds rate (at which banks lend one another excess reserves overnight) at virtually zero. That ultra-easy-money stance exerts a gravitational pull on short-term Treasury yields, while its prodigious buying depresses those on longer-dated bonds. As the Fed gradually retreats, the power to set interest rates will shift back to the markets. As that happens, it's difficult to see how the bluebird view that yields will remain anywhere near today's levels can be correct. Yet it's those forecasts that we keep hearing to justify lofty equity prices and the already historic run-up in federal debt. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, along with such distinguished economists as Larry Summers and Jason Furman, contends that today's slender rates make it a great time to borrow trillions more.
What is the yield curve predicting?
As I wrote recently for Fortune, there's an inflation indicator very few people are paying attention to: the yield curve. Indeed, the best road map to where rates are headed isn't the outlook from Wall Street or the Fed. It's what's baked into the array of yields set by the galaxy of funds and individuals wagering money for their clients and themselves. "The yield curve is the summary of the market's best estimates," says Sherrick.
What's mostly ignored is that there's a forecast embedded in current yields for one-, three-, five-, and 10-year Treasuries. If, for example, you buy a five-year today, at 0.90%, you'll be getting a compound return of 4.6% total by mid-2026. Put simply, the math says that the total gain on the five-year has to equal the sum of what you'd get from buying five one-year bonds in each 12-month period from mid-2021 to June 2026, reinvesting the interest each time. So if you're starting this year at just 0.009%, less than one-tenth of one percent, one-year yields in future years must ramp fast to get a total, cumulative return from 2021 to 2016 of 4.6%.
Today, the curve is predicting much higher rates in a few years for exactly that reason: Even though yields on, say, the three- and the five-year are extremely low versus history, the one-year is so incredibly depressed by the Fed's stimulative stance that future one-years need to jump and keep jumping to reach what you'd get holding the three- or five-year to maturity.
"The yield curve shift is signaling something that is really important," says John Cochrane, an economist at the Hoover Institution. A plausible explanation, he says, is that inflation will be higher in the next several years than previously thought. Adds Sherrick, "We're seeing higher expectations for inflation than a few weeks ago."
What are other inflation indicators predicting?
Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, or TIPS, shield investors from the ravages of fast-rising prices. Their returns track inflation, so that bondholders keep all of their purchasing power when the CPI sprints. The TIPS forecast for future inflation is embodied in what's called the Inflation Breakeven data, which forecast the rate of price increases for future five- and 10-year periods.
In the thriving economy of early 2020, the 10-year breakeven stood at 1.65%, meaning the markets expected prices to rise by an average of 1.65% a year over the next decade. But in the reopening, it has hit the highest levels in years, rising to 2.54% in mid-May, before easing to 2.31% on June 22. So investors foresee much higher inflation over the next decade than they predicted before the pandemic. And the spike to over 2.54% recently suggests that prices are in danger of rising much faster than the Fed's 2% target.
How about the five-year breakeven? It points to higher price increases in the middle years, just what the recent pop in the two-, three-, and five-year yields-to-come are showing. In mid-May, the five-year breakeven hit 2.72% before drifting to the current 2.5%. Still, that's the highest reading since 2008, and it's almost a full point above the level at the start of the pandemic. So over the next few years, the investors in their collective wisdom forecast that inflation will run well above the Fed's 2% goal.
What will happen to interest rates going forward?
You probably noticed that the yields on five- and 10-year Treasuries are lower than the estimates of average inflation over the life of those bonds. So if you buy them today, the interest payments won't keep you even with the rising costs of everyday living. The difference between their yields, and expected inflation, is what's called the "real rate." Today, real rates are extremely and unusually negative. The big question is how that can possibly continue.
In most past periods, the real rate has tracked growth in the economy. "If the economy is growing, more companies borrow to invest, and you need to have Treasury rates that exceed inflation," says Cochrane. "People say, 'We'll save money now because rates are attractive,' and put off going out to dinner." In a buoyant economy, companies and investors compete to purchase Treasuries as a safe place to park their growing profits and savings. It's the dynamic that in most periods keeps yields on the three-, five-, and 10-year above the growth in prices, so that investors maintain the purchasing power of the dollars they invest and also pocket a small "real" gain over inflation that follows the "real" rise in GDP.
But that's not the case today. "Real" rates have seldom been negative, let alone this deeply negative. As Cochrane explains, part of the reason is the big downshift in the U.S. economy's performance. "Starting in 2000, America got stuck with 2% a year growth," he says. "Low growth goes together with low rates. That we have super-low rates in a low-growth regime is not surprising."
But as Cochrane acknowledges, that rates are actually negative and this far underwater versus inflation is surprising. "Persistently negative rates in the U.S. are a new thing," he says. The real rate on the five-year Treasury sank into minus territory in the aftermath of the Great Financial crisis from mid-2011 to mid-2013, and the 10-year followed suit for a much briefer interval. But that happened in a horrible economy. In today's reopening, with GDP projected to grow by 7%, the five-year at around 0.8% is languishing 1.6% below the estimate for inflation from now until May 2026. As for the 10-year, its current yield of 1.48% is projected to lag the price level yearly by about 0.80%. In other words, if you buy five- or 10-year Treasuries today, you'll be getting paid one-half to one-third as much as your rent, medical expenses, and grocery bills are likely to rise.
Where is inflation heading now?
My bet is that the Inflation Breakeven numbers are a great guide to where inflation is heading. And it's pointing to around 2.5% in the years ahead. But although the yield curve is flashing that rates for the same maturities will rise a lot, they'll probably have to increase much more. The reason: Eventually, investors will want returns on Treasuries that exceed inflation, as they almost always have in the past. What happened when the Fed began to "normalize" in late 2018 provides a guide to where real rates are going. The inflation-adjusted yield on the 10-year hit 1% and looked to be heading higher. Of course, the Fed then changed course and once again flooded the markets with cheap credit over fears that the Trump tariffs targeting China would send the economy into a tailspin.
What's kept real rates negative is the Fed's extraordinary acrobatics. But now the central bank is pledging to start easing its yield-crunching campaign sooner than expected. As the shift happens, we can assume that real yields will return to at least 1% and, in this writer's estimation, more likely rise to at least 1.5%, which is still below the CBO's forecast for annual growth in GDP. So add 1% to projected inflation of 2.5%, and you get 3.5% on the five-year, and probably around 4% on the 10-year. If investors demand returns that outpace prices by 1.5%, the five-year yield would hit 4%, and the long bond would reach 4.5%.
Compare those numbers to the CBO's latest budget forecast, issued in February. The agency predicts that the 10-year will average 2.4% from 2021 to 2031. That extremely modest number is being used by the advocates of increased deficit spending to argue that over the next decade, federal interest expense won't rise enough to cause a problem. But if the CBO's right, the long-bond yield will barely match and could even trail inflation. Real rates would average zero or stay negative for the next decade.
A more prudent estimate would foresee a return to the regular world where the 10-year yield equals inflation plus a point or two. But that scenario would expose the real and present danger that exploding interest expense will swamp the budget.
What does inflation mean for stock and bond investors?
The budget policies and the expectations of both bond and stock investors are ill-prepared for anything remotely resembling a future in which interest rates return to traditional levels. "The Treasury is borrowing to finance the deficits at what amounts to the kind of short-term teaser rates that folks who bought houses in 2006 took out, thinking their homes' values could only increase," says Cochrane. He fears that a jump in rates on the huge amounts of debt the Treasury's forced to roll over each year could push interest expense to unsustainable heights, unleashing a crisis. "You will see intense pressure to keep rates low," he says. "If they go up too much, you'll have too-big-to-fail banks, a budget meltdown, and a lot of equity investors who will lose a lot of money."
Though the Fed is underplaying the news, it's the inflation flare-up that's forcing Powell's hand. But we don't have to see a continuation of last month's dizzying CPI numbers for rates to go far higher. All that has to happen is for the Fed to back off. Rates will eventually have to match inflation, and then some. America will gradually emerge from a fantasyland orchestrated by the Fed. That will be another reopening where the maestro withdraws and market forces take charge. The regime change won't be pretty.