今年1月以來,汽車制造商、電子產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)商一直在設(shè)法應(yīng)對半導(dǎo)體(控制機(jī)載計算功能的關(guān)鍵元件)供應(yīng)短缺問題。出于對芯片供應(yīng)明顯不足的擔(dān)憂,制造商紛紛增加了芯片訂單。而芯片制造商為滿足激增的需求,又隨之加大投入、擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能。但現(xiàn)在,供需失調(diào)已出現(xiàn)逆轉(zhuǎn)風(fēng)險,分析師警告稱,芯片供應(yīng)或由短缺轉(zhuǎn)為過剩。
“包括美國、歐盟、韓國和中國在內(nèi),全球各大發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體均制定了擴(kuò)大國內(nèi)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)能的計劃,”穆迪(Moody's)副總裁兼高級信貸官莉莉安·李(Lillian Li)表示。
美國拜登政府計劃通過國會正在討論的一項法案為美國半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)提供520億美元的資金支持。歐盟則承諾提供1600億美元的新冠復(fù)興資金,用于發(fā)展本地區(qū)的科技能力,以期到2030年將歐盟在全球半導(dǎo)體制造業(yè)的份額提升至20%。與此同時,在政府減稅政策的刺激下,韓國芯片制造商也承諾將在未來10年投入4500億美元用于芯片產(chǎn)能建設(shè)。
莉莉安表示:“如此巨額的投資或?qū)?dǎo)致產(chǎn)能過剩及投資配置低效等問題”,她的說法與其他分析師的警告不謀而合。今年6月,貝恩公司(Bain & Company)的分析師就曾表示,擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能將“損害供應(yīng)商的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益”,因為當(dāng)需求減弱時,所有供應(yīng)商都將無法充分利用自己生產(chǎn)線的產(chǎn)能。
今年4月,行業(yè)分析師丹尼爾·尼尼(Daniel Nenni)在接受《財富》采訪時表示,除非在當(dāng)前的恐慌性購買之外出現(xiàn)“半導(dǎo)體需求的大幅增長”,否則市場必將出現(xiàn)供過于求的局面。芯片供應(yīng)短缺問題始于汽車行業(yè)。疫情期間,消費(fèi)者對新車的需求大幅增加,汽車制造商紛紛增加了自己的芯片組訂單,導(dǎo)致出現(xiàn)芯片供不應(yīng)求、交貨延期等現(xiàn)象,進(jìn)而引發(fā)了采購經(jīng)理的搶購潮,為保障庫存,采購代理訂購的芯片數(shù)量早已超過自己的實際需要。待到恐慌平息之后,芯片過剩幾成定局。莉莉安警告稱,作為最急于實現(xiàn)芯片國產(chǎn)化的國家,中國可能比其他國家更容易出現(xiàn)供過于求的局面。
穆迪8月2日發(fā)布的報告顯示,中國去年在半導(dǎo)體研發(fā)方面的投入達(dá)350億美元,較2019年增長407%。2020年,中國半導(dǎo)體進(jìn)口額超過3500億美元。為打破對進(jìn)口半導(dǎo)體的依賴,中國政府投入巨資,規(guī)模數(shù)以10億美元計。美國曾利用其在半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)的主導(dǎo)地位對中國的芯片進(jìn)口進(jìn)行限制。
去年5月,美國切斷了中國智能手機(jī)制造商華為的先進(jìn)芯片供應(yīng)渠道,迫使這家總部位于深圳的企業(yè)將自己的業(yè)務(wù)重心從智能手機(jī)銷售轉(zhuǎn)向其他業(yè)務(wù)。
但莉莉安表示,中國為推動半導(dǎo)體國產(chǎn)化所付出的努力可能導(dǎo)致某些芯片(如存儲芯片)產(chǎn)能過剩,在總體需求低于總體產(chǎn)能時,那些“信貸渠道較少、政府支持不足”的企業(yè)將會失去獲利空間。
但即便是得到政府大力支持的芯片制造商,也面臨著擴(kuò)張過快的風(fēng)險。
清華紫光是中國最知名的內(nèi)存芯片制造商之一,卻也面臨著破產(chǎn)危機(jī)。在中國擴(kuò)大芯片產(chǎn)能的推動下,清華紫光大幅擴(kuò)建芯片廠,并在此過程中欠下了約300億美元的債務(wù)。但這些建設(shè)成本高達(dá)100億美元的芯片工廠需要數(shù)年時間才能建成,投資回報周期較長。去年11月,清華紫光暫停了兩家新建工廠的開發(fā)項目,并因公司資金緊張無法按時歸還欠款。一債權(quán)人已將這家違約公司告上法庭,并在推動這家芯片制造商申請破產(chǎn)重組。
莉莉安說:“對中國來說,推動國內(nèi)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展有利也有弊。好處顯而易見,比如可以規(guī)避掉地緣政治方面的不確定因素。但產(chǎn)能過剩的風(fēng)險依然存在?!保ㄘ敻恢形木W(wǎng))
譯者:梁宇
審校:夏林
今年1月以來,汽車制造商、電子產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)商一直在設(shè)法應(yīng)對半導(dǎo)體(控制機(jī)載計算功能的關(guān)鍵元件)供應(yīng)短缺問題。出于對芯片供應(yīng)明顯不足的擔(dān)憂,制造商紛紛增加了芯片訂單。而芯片制造商為滿足激增的需求,又隨之加大投入、擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能。但現(xiàn)在,供需失調(diào)已出現(xiàn)逆轉(zhuǎn)風(fēng)險,分析師警告稱,芯片供應(yīng)或由短缺轉(zhuǎn)為過剩。
“包括美國、歐盟、韓國和中國在內(nèi),全球各大發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體均制定了擴(kuò)大國內(nèi)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)能的計劃,”穆迪(Moody's)副總裁兼高級信貸官莉莉安·李(Lillian Li)表示。
美國拜登政府計劃通過國會正在討論的一項法案為美國半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)提供520億美元的資金支持。歐盟則承諾提供1600億美元的新冠復(fù)興資金,用于發(fā)展本地區(qū)的科技能力,以期到2030年將歐盟在全球半導(dǎo)體制造業(yè)的份額提升至20%。與此同時,在政府減稅政策的刺激下,韓國芯片制造商也承諾將在未來10年投入4500億美元用于芯片產(chǎn)能建設(shè)。
莉莉安表示:“如此巨額的投資或?qū)?dǎo)致產(chǎn)能過剩及投資配置低效等問題”,她的說法與其他分析師的警告不謀而合。今年6月,貝恩公司(Bain & Company)的分析師就曾表示,擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能將“損害供應(yīng)商的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益”,因為當(dāng)需求減弱時,所有供應(yīng)商都將無法充分利用自己生產(chǎn)線的產(chǎn)能。
今年4月,行業(yè)分析師丹尼爾·尼尼(Daniel Nenni)在接受《財富》采訪時表示,除非在當(dāng)前的恐慌性購買之外出現(xiàn)“半導(dǎo)體需求的大幅增長”,否則市場必將出現(xiàn)供過于求的局面。芯片供應(yīng)短缺問題始于汽車行業(yè)。疫情期間,消費(fèi)者對新車的需求大幅增加,汽車制造商紛紛增加了自己的芯片組訂單,導(dǎo)致出現(xiàn)芯片供不應(yīng)求、交貨延期等現(xiàn)象,進(jìn)而引發(fā)了采購經(jīng)理的搶購潮,為保障庫存,采購代理訂購的芯片數(shù)量早已超過自己的實際需要。待到恐慌平息之后,芯片過剩幾成定局。莉莉安警告稱,作為最急于實現(xiàn)芯片國產(chǎn)化的國家,中國可能比其他國家更容易出現(xiàn)供過于求的局面。
穆迪8月2日發(fā)布的報告顯示,中國去年在半導(dǎo)體研發(fā)方面的投入達(dá)350億美元,較2019年增長407%。2020年,中國半導(dǎo)體進(jìn)口額超過3500億美元。為打破對進(jìn)口半導(dǎo)體的依賴,中國政府投入巨資,規(guī)模數(shù)以10億美元計。美國曾利用其在半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)的主導(dǎo)地位對中國的芯片進(jìn)口進(jìn)行限制。
去年5月,美國切斷了中國智能手機(jī)制造商華為的先進(jìn)芯片供應(yīng)渠道,迫使這家總部位于深圳的企業(yè)將自己的業(yè)務(wù)重心從智能手機(jī)銷售轉(zhuǎn)向其他業(yè)務(wù)。
但莉莉安表示,中國為推動半導(dǎo)體國產(chǎn)化所付出的努力可能導(dǎo)致某些芯片(如存儲芯片)產(chǎn)能過剩,在總體需求低于總體產(chǎn)能時,那些“信貸渠道較少、政府支持不足”的企業(yè)將會失去獲利空間。
但即便是得到政府大力支持的芯片制造商,也面臨著擴(kuò)張過快的風(fēng)險。
清華紫光是中國最知名的內(nèi)存芯片制造商之一,卻也面臨著破產(chǎn)危機(jī)。在中國擴(kuò)大芯片產(chǎn)能的推動下,清華紫光大幅擴(kuò)建芯片廠,并在此過程中欠下了約300億美元的債務(wù)。但這些建設(shè)成本高達(dá)100億美元的芯片工廠需要數(shù)年時間才能建成,投資回報周期較長。去年11月,清華紫光暫停了兩家新建工廠的開發(fā)項目,并因公司資金緊張無法按時歸還欠款。一債權(quán)人已將這家違約公司告上法庭,并在推動這家芯片制造商申請破產(chǎn)重組。
莉莉安說:“對中國來說,推動國內(nèi)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展有利也有弊。好處顯而易見,比如可以規(guī)避掉地緣政治方面的不確定因素。但產(chǎn)能過剩的風(fēng)險依然存在?!保ㄘ敻恢形木W(wǎng))
譯者:梁宇
審校:夏林
Since January, automakers and electronics producers have contended with a shortage in semiconductors—the components vital to controlling onboard computing functions. Panicked by an apparent chip drought, manufacturers increased orders to secure future supplies, and chipmakers responded by investing in new capacity. But now the imbalance between demand and supply risks swinging the other way, as analysts warn a chip drought could become a chip glut.
“All the world’s advanced economies, including the U.S., the EU, South Korea, and China have set out plans to advance capacity in the domestic semiconductor industry,” says Lillian Li, vice president and senior credit officer at Moody’s.
In the U.S., the Biden administration plans to allocate $52 billion in incentives for the domestic semiconductor industry via a bill Congress is currently debating. The EU has committed $160 billion of COVID recovery funds to developing regional tech capabilities as it aims to boost the bloc’s share of semiconductor manufacturing to 20% of the global total by 2030. Meanwhile, chipmakers in South Korea, buoyed by government tax breaks, have committed $450 billion over the next 10 years to building chip capacity.
“These major investments could lead to overcapacity and inefficient investment allocation,” Li says, echoing warnings made by other analysts. In June, analysts at consultancy Bain & Company said building capacity would “hurt the economics” of suppliers, since each will likely run production lines below capacity once demand abates.
In April, industry analyst Daniel Nenni told Fortune there would be a glut unless “there is some big boom in semiconductor demand” beyond the current panic buying. The chip shortage began when automakers, surprised by consumer appetite for new cars in the pandemic, increased their orders for chipsets, pushing demand beyond supply and increasing lead times for deliveries. The squeeze on supply sparked panic buying as purchasing agents ordered more chips than they need in an attempt to secure stock. Once the panic subsides, the world could find itself with too many chips. But Li warns that China—the country most desperate to secure a domestic chip supply—could suffer a glut more easily than its peers.
According to a Moody's report published Monday, China spent $35 billion on semiconductor development last year, up 407% from 2019. Beijing is spending billions to break China’s reliance on semiconductor imports, which were worth over $350 billion in 2020. The U.S. has used its dominance in the semiconductor industry to throttle China’s access to chips.
In May last year, the U.S. severed Chinese smartphone maker Huawei Technologies’ access to advanced chips, forcing the Shenzhen-based firm to pivot its business model away from smartphone sales.
But, Li says, Beijing’s push for semiconductor independence could lead to overcapacity in particular chipmaking sectors—such as memory chips—and leave companies with “l(fā)ess access to credit and government support” unprofitable, as total demand falls short of capacity.
But even chipmakers with strong government support are at risk of expanding too aggressively.
One of China’s most prominent memory chipmakers, Tsinghua Unigroup, is facing bankruptcy despite its close ties to the state. Motivated by Beijing’s directive to build chip capacity, Tsinghua Unigroup has racked up some $30 billion in debts as it raced to build chip factories. But chip factories, which cost up to $10 billion to build, take years to complete. The return on investment is slow. In November last year, Tsinghua Unigroup paused two new factory developments and defaulted on credit repayments as the company entered a cash crunch. One of the group’s creditors has taken the defaulting company to court and is pushing the chipmaker to file for bankruptcy and restructure.
“For China, developing domestic semiconductors has pros and cons,” Li says. “The advantages, such as avoiding geopolitical insecurities, are very apparent. But the risk of spurring overcapacity remains.”