隨著俄烏沖突爆發(fā)和由此導(dǎo)致的汽油價(jià)格上漲以及對全球供應(yīng)鏈的進(jìn)一步破壞,美國家庭面臨著通脹上漲的壓力。而在此之前,由新冠疫情導(dǎo)致的季節(jié)調(diào)整后通貨膨脹率已經(jīng)達(dá)到7.09%。
為了解俄烏沖突對通貨膨脹的影響,我們可以回顧自1800年以來的戰(zhàn)爭史和通貨膨脹歷史,尤其是伴隨大型戰(zhàn)爭出現(xiàn)的通脹大幅度波動。每次戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā),通脹率都會大幅攀升,但戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束后會突然下降。
與戰(zhàn)爭相關(guān)聯(lián)的通貨膨脹之所以發(fā)生,是因?yàn)樾枨笤鲩L,而供給卻大幅下降。士兵們要到戰(zhàn)場作戰(zhàn),無法在農(nóng)場和工廠工作。農(nóng)田變成了戰(zhàn)場,無法種植莊稼,工廠被用于其他用途或被戰(zhàn)火摧毀,物價(jià)飆升。這就是“供應(yīng)耗竭”通貨膨脹。在美國,隨著戰(zhàn)爭支出減少,士兵回到工作崗位,戰(zhàn)場又變回了農(nóng)田,工廠得以重建,這種通貨膨脹通常會突然結(jié)束。
1812年戰(zhàn)爭、美國內(nèi)戰(zhàn)、第一次世界大戰(zhàn)和第二次世界大戰(zhàn)期間,年通脹率最高達(dá)到15%左右甚至更高,但隨著戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束通脹率大幅下降。通貨膨脹會降到負(fù)區(qū)間,之后是長達(dá)數(shù)年的良性通脹甚至通貨緊縮。
20世紀(jì)60年代末的通脹率為5.9%。部分原因是越戰(zhàn),但更主要的原因是美國利用高利率來維護(hù)正在崩潰的金本位制。值得注意的是,美國參與的其他戰(zhàn)爭基本沒有影響通脹,盡管有些戰(zhàn)爭,尤其是海灣戰(zhàn)爭和伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭直接影響了全球石油供應(yīng)。
美國經(jīng)歷上一輪通脹大幅波動時(shí),油價(jià)暴漲了超過10倍,從3.50美元上漲到39美元,原因是分別于1973年和1979年爆發(fā)的贖罪日戰(zhàn)爭和伊朗伊斯蘭革命所引發(fā)的沖突和政治局勢。
隨著卡特總統(tǒng)和里根總統(tǒng)放松對美國國內(nèi)油價(jià)的管制,從1982年到1986年期間油價(jià)驟降,通脹結(jié)束。
本輪通脹受到三個因素的影響,分別是歷史上曾經(jīng)出現(xiàn)過的戰(zhàn)爭、石油供應(yīng)中斷和新冠疫情。首先,新冠疫情減少了全球勞動力,導(dǎo)致供應(yīng)大量減少,破壞了供應(yīng)鏈。而俄烏沖突的爆發(fā)導(dǎo)致形勢進(jìn)一步惡化,因?yàn)槎砹_斯和烏克蘭供應(yīng)了全球26%的小麥,目前,俄羅斯每天約500萬桶石油出口遭到抵制。
通脹率會升到多高?這種情況將持續(xù)多久?
在俄烏沖突爆發(fā)之前,我認(rèn)為在新冠疫情的影響下,通貨膨脹將至少持續(xù)一兩年甚至更長的時(shí)間,通脹率可能維持在高個位數(shù)或低兩位數(shù)的水平,之后會恢復(fù)到新冠疫情之前的中低水平。
供應(yīng)鏈恢復(fù)時(shí)間往往超出預(yù)期。再加上戰(zhàn)爭的影響,最初受到新冠疫情破壞的供應(yīng)鏈可能需要更長的時(shí)間才能夠恢復(fù)。但即使俄烏沖突像波斯尼亞、科索沃、阿富汗或伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭一樣,最終演變成一場曠日持久的戰(zhàn)爭甚至越陷越深,世界最終將會適應(yīng)這種情況。
關(guān)鍵是根本原因解決之后,通貨膨脹通常會快速結(jié)束。戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束,工廠和工人復(fù)工,通脹結(jié)束。與1920年一樣,疫情結(jié)束后通脹也隨之結(jié)束。20世紀(jì)80年代,油價(jià)從每桶近40美元下降到11美元,通脹結(jié)束。
有人可能會不認(rèn)同這種觀點(diǎn)。有分析師認(rèn)為通貨膨脹是結(jié)構(gòu)性貨幣問題,根本原因在于貨幣供應(yīng)量增加。
這種誕生于20世紀(jì)七八十年代的觀點(diǎn),已經(jīng)被40年的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和數(shù)據(jù)證明并不可信。日本的通脹率25年來一直接近零,但日本政府的支出和貨幣量增長卻高于美國。
2008年金融危機(jī)之后,美國政府的刺激政策和支持導(dǎo)致貨幣供應(yīng)量超額增長,卻并沒有引發(fā)通貨膨脹。事實(shí)上,仔細(xì)分析五十個大國的通脹數(shù)據(jù)可以發(fā)現(xiàn),高通脹并非發(fā)生在高貨幣量增長之后,反之亦然。
美國已經(jīng)承諾不會派兵參戰(zhàn),也不會冒險(xiǎn)引發(fā)世界大戰(zhàn)。與此同時(shí),美國正在加快對烏克蘭的經(jīng)濟(jì)支持,并實(shí)施嚴(yán)厲的經(jīng)濟(jì)制裁,這必定會給石油、天然氣和其他大宗商品帶來價(jià)格上行壓力。
我們至少將面臨一年或兩年的通貨膨脹,但我們之前經(jīng)受住了通貨膨脹的考驗(yàn),必定也能夠順利結(jié)束本輪通脹。
俄烏沖突讓我們突然意識到,危機(jī)隨時(shí)可能爆發(fā),我們應(yīng)該始終做好準(zhǔn)備。我們還應(yīng)該記住,能源供應(yīng)多元化應(yīng)該是一項(xiàng)重要的準(zhǔn)備措施。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
本文作者理查德·韋格(Richard Vague)是《債務(wù)大赦免的理由》(The Case for a Debt Jubilee)、《美國商業(yè)史》(An Illustrated Business History of the United States)、《金融危機(jī)簡史》(A Brief History of Doom)和《下一次經(jīng)濟(jì)災(zāi)難》(The Next Economic Disaster)等書的作者。他此前曾經(jīng)擔(dān)任一家風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金的主理合伙人、一家電力和天然氣公司的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人及首席執(zhí)行官,以及兩家全國性消費(fèi)者銀行的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人及首席執(zhí)行官。他是經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)服務(wù)公司Tychos的創(chuàng)始人。
譯者:劉進(jìn)龍
審校:汪皓
隨著俄烏沖突爆發(fā)和由此導(dǎo)致的汽油價(jià)格上漲以及對全球供應(yīng)鏈的進(jìn)一步破壞,美國家庭面臨著通脹上漲的壓力。而在此之前,由新冠疫情導(dǎo)致的季節(jié)調(diào)整后通貨膨脹率已經(jīng)達(dá)到7.09%。
為了解俄烏沖突對通貨膨脹的影響,我們可以回顧自1800年以來的戰(zhàn)爭史和通貨膨脹歷史,尤其是伴隨大型戰(zhàn)爭出現(xiàn)的通脹大幅度波動。每次戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā),通脹率都會大幅攀升,但戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束后會突然下降。
與戰(zhàn)爭相關(guān)聯(lián)的通貨膨脹之所以發(fā)生,是因?yàn)樾枨笤鲩L,而供給卻大幅下降。士兵們要到戰(zhàn)場作戰(zhàn),無法在農(nóng)場和工廠工作。農(nóng)田變成了戰(zhàn)場,無法種植莊稼,工廠被用于其他用途或被戰(zhàn)火摧毀,物價(jià)飆升。這就是“供應(yīng)耗竭”通貨膨脹。在美國,隨著戰(zhàn)爭支出減少,士兵回到工作崗位,戰(zhàn)場又變回了農(nóng)田,工廠得以重建,這種通貨膨脹通常會突然結(jié)束。
1812年戰(zhàn)爭、美國內(nèi)戰(zhàn)、第一次世界大戰(zhàn)和第二次世界大戰(zhàn)期間,年通脹率最高達(dá)到15%左右甚至更高,但隨著戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束通脹率大幅下降。通貨膨脹會降到負(fù)區(qū)間,之后是長達(dá)數(shù)年的良性通脹甚至通貨緊縮。
20世紀(jì)60年代末的通脹率為5.9%。部分原因是越戰(zhàn),但更主要的原因是美國利用高利率來維護(hù)正在崩潰的金本位制。值得注意的是,美國參與的其他戰(zhàn)爭基本沒有影響通脹,盡管有些戰(zhàn)爭,尤其是海灣戰(zhàn)爭和伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭直接影響了全球石油供應(yīng)。
美國經(jīng)歷上一輪通脹大幅波動時(shí),油價(jià)暴漲了超過10倍,從3.50美元上漲到39美元,原因是分別于1973年和1979年爆發(fā)的贖罪日戰(zhàn)爭和伊朗伊斯蘭革命所引發(fā)的沖突和政治局勢。
隨著卡特總統(tǒng)和里根總統(tǒng)放松對美國國內(nèi)油價(jià)的管制,從1982年到1986年期間油價(jià)驟降,通脹結(jié)束。
本輪通脹受到三個因素的影響,分別是歷史上曾經(jīng)出現(xiàn)過的戰(zhàn)爭、石油供應(yīng)中斷和新冠疫情。首先,新冠疫情減少了全球勞動力,導(dǎo)致供應(yīng)大量減少,破壞了供應(yīng)鏈。而俄烏沖突的爆發(fā)導(dǎo)致形勢進(jìn)一步惡化,因?yàn)槎砹_斯和烏克蘭供應(yīng)了全球26%的小麥,目前,俄羅斯每天約500萬桶石油出口遭到抵制。
通脹率會升到多高?這種情況將持續(xù)多久?
在俄烏沖突爆發(fā)之前,我認(rèn)為在新冠疫情的影響下,通貨膨脹將至少持續(xù)一兩年甚至更長的時(shí)間,通脹率可能維持在高個位數(shù)或低兩位數(shù)的水平,之后會恢復(fù)到新冠疫情之前的中低水平。
供應(yīng)鏈恢復(fù)時(shí)間往往超出預(yù)期。再加上戰(zhàn)爭的影響,最初受到新冠疫情破壞的供應(yīng)鏈可能需要更長的時(shí)間才能夠恢復(fù)。但即使俄烏沖突像波斯尼亞、科索沃、阿富汗或伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭一樣,最終演變成一場曠日持久的戰(zhàn)爭甚至越陷越深,世界最終將會適應(yīng)這種情況。
關(guān)鍵是根本原因解決之后,通貨膨脹通常會快速結(jié)束。戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束,工廠和工人復(fù)工,通脹結(jié)束。與1920年一樣,疫情結(jié)束后通脹也隨之結(jié)束。20世紀(jì)80年代,油價(jià)從每桶近40美元下降到11美元,通脹結(jié)束。
有人可能會不認(rèn)同這種觀點(diǎn)。有分析師認(rèn)為通貨膨脹是結(jié)構(gòu)性貨幣問題,根本原因在于貨幣供應(yīng)量增加。
這種誕生于20世紀(jì)七八十年代的觀點(diǎn),已經(jīng)被40年的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和數(shù)據(jù)證明并不可信。日本的通脹率25年來一直接近零,但日本政府的支出和貨幣量增長卻高于美國。
2008年金融危機(jī)之后,美國政府的刺激政策和支持導(dǎo)致貨幣供應(yīng)量超額增長,卻并沒有引發(fā)通貨膨脹。事實(shí)上,仔細(xì)分析五十個大國的通脹數(shù)據(jù)可以發(fā)現(xiàn),高通脹并非發(fā)生在高貨幣量增長之后,反之亦然。
美國已經(jīng)承諾不會派兵參戰(zhàn),也不會冒險(xiǎn)引發(fā)世界大戰(zhàn)。與此同時(shí),美國正在加快對烏克蘭的經(jīng)濟(jì)支持,并實(shí)施嚴(yán)厲的經(jīng)濟(jì)制裁,這必定會給石油、天然氣和其他大宗商品帶來價(jià)格上行壓力。
我們至少將面臨一年或兩年的通貨膨脹,但我們之前經(jīng)受住了通貨膨脹的考驗(yàn),必定也能夠順利結(jié)束本輪通脹。
俄烏沖突讓我們突然意識到,危機(jī)隨時(shí)可能爆發(fā),我們應(yīng)該始終做好準(zhǔn)備。我們還應(yīng)該記住,能源供應(yīng)多元化應(yīng)該是一項(xiàng)重要的準(zhǔn)備措施。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
本文作者理查德·韋格(Richard Vague)是《債務(wù)大赦免的理由》(The Case for a Debt Jubilee)、《美國商業(yè)史》(An Illustrated Business History of the United States)、《金融危機(jī)簡史》(A Brief History of Doom)和《下一次經(jīng)濟(jì)災(zāi)難》(The Next Economic Disaster)等書的作者。他此前曾經(jīng)擔(dān)任一家風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金的主理合伙人、一家電力和天然氣公司的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人及首席執(zhí)行官,以及兩家全國性消費(fèi)者銀行的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人及首席執(zhí)行官。他是經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)服務(wù)公司Tychos的創(chuàng)始人。
譯者:劉進(jìn)龍
審校:汪皓
With the invasion of Ukraine and the consequent steep increase in gasoline prices and further disruption in global supply chains, U.S. households are facing a rise in inflation. This follows directly on the heels of COVID-linked inflation, which had already reached a seasonally adjusted 7.09%.
To understand the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on inflation, we can look to our own history of war and inflation since 1800, especially the major bouts of inflation that often accompanied major wars. In each case, inflation raged but reversed abruptly after the war ended.
War-related inflation happens because demand grows, yet supplies are decimated. Soldiers are fighting and cannot work in farms and factories. Farms become battlefields without crops, factories are repurposed or destroyed, and prices skyrocket. Call it “supply-depletion” inflation. In the U.S. this inflation has always ended abruptly as war spending abates, soldiers return to work, battlefields revert back to farms, and factories are rebuilt.
In the War of 1812, the Civil War, World War I, and World War II, annual inflation peaked at the mid-teens or higher, but ended sharply when these wars ended. That inflation plunged into negative numbers and then years of very benign inflation or even deflation followed.
Inflation in the late 1960s reached 5.9%. Some attribute that to the Vietnam War, but it had more to do with the use of high interest rates to defend the failing gold standard. Notably, there was essentially no inflation of consequence in our other wars, even though some, especially the Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War, directly impacted the global oil supply.
Our last major bout of inflation came when the price of oil increased over tenfold, from $3.50 to $39, due to conflicts and politics surrounding the Yom Kippur War and the Iranian Revolution in 1973 and 1979, respectively.
That inflation ended when the deregulation of domestic oil prices under presidents Carter and Reagan sent prices plunging in the years from 1982 to 1986.
Our current bout of inflation has come from the three factors that we’ve seen historically: war, oil-supply disruption, and a pandemic. It started when COVID depleted the global workforce, decimated supplies, and impaired supply chains. It has now been exacerbated since warring Russia and Ukraine supply 26% of the world’s wheat, and there are boycotts on the estimated five million barrels a day of Russian oil exports.
How high will inflation get, and how long will it last?
With COVID, before the Russia-Ukraine war, my view was that inflation would last at least a year or two, maybe more–and could reach high single-digit or low double-digit levels before returning to moderate or low pre-pandemic levels.
Supply chains always take longer to recover than predicted. With the addition of this war, that recovery, initially from COVID disruptions, could yet be longer. But even if this becomes a protracted war or quagmire, along the lines of Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq—the world eventually adjusts.
The key is that inflation has always ended fairly quickly once its root cause is resolved. A war ends, factories and workers return, and inflation ends. A pandemic ends, as happened in 1920, and inflation ends. Oil prices drop from nearly $40 a barrel to $11 a barrel in the 1980s, and inflation ends.
Some disagree. For these analysts, inflation is a structural monetary issue that stems from money supply growth.
This view, which took root in the 1970s and 1980s, has been discredited by 40 years of experience and data. Japan’s inflation has been close to zero for twenty-five years, and yet its government spending and monetary growth dwarf our own.
After the 2008 crisis, U.S. government stimulus and support brought extraordinary money supply growth—without bringing inflation. In fact, a careful analysis of inflation across the fifty largest countries shows that high inflation occurs in periods not preceded by high monetary growth, and vice versa.
We have pledged not to commit our military and risk world war. Meanwhile, we are accelerating our financial support for Ukraine, and are imposing vigorous economic sanctions that promise to put upward pressure on oil, gas, and other commodities.
We will face inflation for at least a year or two–but we have weathered the threat of inflation before and will do so again.
If anything, the Russia-Ukraine war is an abrupt reminder that a crisis can come at any time, and we should always be prepared. We should be reminded, too, that further diversification of our sources of energy should be a major part of that readiness.
Richard Vague is the author of The Case for a Debt Jubilee, An Illustrated Business History of the United States, A Brief History of Doom, and The Next Economic Disaster. Previously, he was managing partner of a venture capital investment firm, co-founder and CEO of an electricity and natural gas company, and co-founder and CEO of two national consumer banks. He is the founder of the economic data service Tychos.