公司破產(chǎn)通常是相當枯燥的事情。但FTX的情況并非如此,直到兩周前,它還被視為加密貨幣界的金童,但現(xiàn)在似乎已成為一個巨大的龐氏騙局。
這一切使得FTX的新任首席執(zhí)行官約翰·雷三世(John Ray III)宣稱,這是他見過的最糟糕的事故。這確實傳達了一些信息,因為雷是一位重組專家,他曾主持過歷史上最臭名昭著的破產(chǎn)案——包括2001年能源巨頭安然公司(Enron)的破產(chǎn)案,一些旁觀者將安然公司破產(chǎn)案與FTX破產(chǎn)案相提并論,尤其是前財政部長拉里·薩默斯(Larry Summers)。
這些強烈譴責來自雷所謂的首日宣言。(根據(jù)破產(chǎn)程序,通常需要在第一天提交破產(chǎn)申請,而FTX的破產(chǎn)申請在第六天才提交,這表明該破產(chǎn)案有多么混亂。)
雷在向美國特拉華州破產(chǎn)法院提交的文件中表示:“在我的職業(yè)生涯中,我從未見過公司控制落得一敗涂地的下場,而且財務信息更是完全缺乏可信度?!比缓螅l(fā)表了對前管理團隊的意見,其中包括聲名狼藉的創(chuàng)始人兼前首席執(zhí)行官薩姆·班克曼-弗里德。“從系統(tǒng)完整性受損、海外監(jiān)管失誤,到控制權集中在極少數(shù)經(jīng)驗不足、涉世不深和難以抵御誘惑的個人手中,這種情況是前所未有的?!?/p>
考慮到近日傳出的有關FTX的一些細節(jié),上述描述并不令人意外,包括有報道稱,班克曼-弗里德在不召開董事會的情況下在他的頂層公寓管理整個公司,高層管理人員深陷吸毒和多角戀泥潭。
盡管如此,資產(chǎn)負債表中的一些細節(jié)還是令人震驚。雷會保留收據(jù),因此,他毫不留情地批評FTX不留收據(jù)。正如雷所言:“FTX.com業(yè)務一塌糊涂,尤其是沒有做到一以貫之地記錄決策過程。”
雷指出,F(xiàn)TX沒有會計部門,它“無法提供一份完整的截止到申請破產(chǎn)日為FTX集團工作的人員名單,或他們的雇傭條款?!?/p>
正如特許會計師吉納維芙·羅奇-德克托(Genevieve Roch-Dector)所指出的那樣,F(xiàn)TX向其高管提供了大量個人貸款,并通過聊天室聊天做出重大公司決策,而許多信息在聊天后不久就被刪除了。雷的懷疑躍然紙上:“FTX集團員工通過在線‘聊天’平臺提交付款請求,在這個平臺上,一群負責不同業(yè)務的主管通過回復個性化表情包來批準付款?!?/p>
關于使用公司資金為FTX員工購買物品,同樣的情況是,雷手頭拿到的收據(jù)少之又少,不能用來展開偵查工作。“據(jù)我了解,F(xiàn)TX的公司資金被用于為員工和顧問購買住房和其他私人物品。我了解到,似乎沒有文件記載其中某些交易是給員工和顧問提供的個人貸款,而且在巴哈馬群島的記錄中,某些房地產(chǎn)是以這些員工和顧問的個人名義登記的?!?/p>
盡管書面記錄少之又少,雷認為這不值得信賴,比如FTX臭名昭著的資產(chǎn)負債表。他寫道:“由于這樣的資產(chǎn)負債表是在債務人被班克曼-弗里德先生控制時編制的,我對它沒有信心,其中的信息就載明之日而言不一定符合實際。”
所有這些對雷來說都是一個非常頭疼的問題,他的任務是清理這個爛攤子,必須確定可以分配給投資者和債權人的資產(chǎn)——鑒于Semafor的一份報告顯示,可能是按巴哈馬群島政府的要求,班克曼-弗里德上周將大量資金或加密貨幣轉移出了交易所,雷的這一任務將變得更加困難。與此同時,與典型的破產(chǎn)案不同的是,F(xiàn)TX的破產(chǎn)申請不包括主要債權人名單,這可能是因為該公司對自己的債務一無所知。
在其他涉及欺詐的備受矚目的破產(chǎn)案中,如安然公司,像雷這樣的律師不得不從一連串旨在誤導監(jiān)管機構和審計人員的文件中找出蛛絲馬跡。但在FTX破產(chǎn)案中,根本就沒有任何書面記錄,這使得雷的任務和班克曼-弗里德面臨的犯罪風險都嚴峻得多。
甚至可能連表情包的蹤跡都沒有。(財富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:中慧言-王芳
FTX聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人兼首席執(zhí)行官薩姆·班克曼-弗里德(Sam Bankman-Fried),攝于2021年5月11日(星期二),中國香港。
公司破產(chǎn)通常是相當枯燥的事情。但FTX的情況并非如此,直到兩周前,它還被視為加密貨幣界的金童,但現(xiàn)在似乎已成為一個巨大的龐氏騙局。
這一切使得FTX的新任首席執(zhí)行官約翰·雷三世(John Ray III)宣稱,這是他見過的最糟糕的事故。這確實傳達了一些信息,因為雷是一位重組專家,他曾主持過歷史上最臭名昭著的破產(chǎn)案——包括2001年能源巨頭安然公司(Enron)的破產(chǎn)案,一些旁觀者將安然公司破產(chǎn)案與FTX破產(chǎn)案相提并論,尤其是前財政部長拉里·薩默斯(Larry Summers)。
這些強烈譴責來自雷所謂的首日宣言。(根據(jù)破產(chǎn)程序,通常需要在第一天提交破產(chǎn)申請,而FTX的破產(chǎn)申請在第六天才提交,這表明該破產(chǎn)案有多么混亂。)
雷在向美國特拉華州破產(chǎn)法院提交的文件中表示:“在我的職業(yè)生涯中,我從未見過公司控制落得一敗涂地的下場,而且財務信息更是完全缺乏可信度?!比缓?,他發(fā)表了對前管理團隊的意見,其中包括聲名狼藉的創(chuàng)始人兼前首席執(zhí)行官薩姆·班克曼-弗里德。“從系統(tǒng)完整性受損、海外監(jiān)管失誤,到控制權集中在極少數(shù)經(jīng)驗不足、涉世不深和難以抵御誘惑的個人手中,這種情況是前所未有的。”
考慮到近日傳出的有關FTX的一些細節(jié),上述描述并不令人意外,包括有報道稱,班克曼-弗里德在不召開董事會的情況下在他的頂層公寓管理整個公司,高層管理人員深陷吸毒和多角戀泥潭。
盡管如此,資產(chǎn)負債表中的一些細節(jié)還是令人震驚。雷會保留收據(jù),因此,他毫不留情地批評FTX不留收據(jù)。正如雷所言:“FTX.com業(yè)務一塌糊涂,尤其是沒有做到一以貫之地記錄決策過程?!?/p>
雷指出,F(xiàn)TX沒有會計部門,它“無法提供一份完整的截止到申請破產(chǎn)日為FTX集團工作的人員名單,或他們的雇傭條款?!?/p>
正如特許會計師吉納維芙·羅奇-德克托(Genevieve Roch-Dector)所指出的那樣,F(xiàn)TX向其高管提供了大量個人貸款,并通過聊天室聊天做出重大公司決策,而許多信息在聊天后不久就被刪除了。雷的懷疑躍然紙上:“FTX集團員工通過在線‘聊天’平臺提交付款請求,在這個平臺上,一群負責不同業(yè)務的主管通過回復個性化表情包來批準付款?!?/p>
關于使用公司資金為FTX員工購買物品,同樣的情況是,雷手頭拿到的收據(jù)少之又少,不能用來展開偵查工作?!皳?jù)我了解,F(xiàn)TX的公司資金被用于為員工和顧問購買住房和其他私人物品。我了解到,似乎沒有文件記載其中某些交易是給員工和顧問提供的個人貸款,而且在巴哈馬群島的記錄中,某些房地產(chǎn)是以這些員工和顧問的個人名義登記的?!?/p>
盡管書面記錄少之又少,雷認為這不值得信賴,比如FTX臭名昭著的資產(chǎn)負債表。他寫道:“由于這樣的資產(chǎn)負債表是在債務人被班克曼-弗里德先生控制時編制的,我對它沒有信心,其中的信息就載明之日而言不一定符合實際?!?/p>
所有這些對雷來說都是一個非常頭疼的問題,他的任務是清理這個爛攤子,必須確定可以分配給投資者和債權人的資產(chǎn)——鑒于Semafor的一份報告顯示,可能是按巴哈馬群島政府的要求,班克曼-弗里德上周將大量資金或加密貨幣轉移出了交易所,雷的這一任務將變得更加困難。與此同時,與典型的破產(chǎn)案不同的是,F(xiàn)TX的破產(chǎn)申請不包括主要債權人名單,這可能是因為該公司對自己的債務一無所知。
在其他涉及欺詐的備受矚目的破產(chǎn)案中,如安然公司,像雷這樣的律師不得不從一連串旨在誤導監(jiān)管機構和審計人員的文件中找出蛛絲馬跡。但在FTX破產(chǎn)案中,根本就沒有任何書面記錄,這使得雷的任務和班克曼-弗里德面臨的犯罪風險都嚴峻得多。
甚至可能連表情包的蹤跡都沒有。(財富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:中慧言-王芳
Sam Bankman-Fried, co-founder and chief executive officer of FTX, in Hong Kong, China, on Tuesday, May 11, 2021.
LAM YIK/BLOOMBERG VIA GETTY IMAGES
Corporate bankruptcies are usually pretty dull affairs. That’s not the case with FTX, which until two weeks ago was seen as the golden child of cryptocurrency, but now appears to have been a giant Ponzi scheme.
All this has led FTX’s new caretaker CEO, John Ray III, to declare this the worst trainwreck he has ever seen. And that’s really saying something, since Ray is a restructuring expert who has presided over some of the most infamous bankruptcies in history—including energy giant Enron in 2001, a comparison that some onlookers have made, notably including former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers.
The damning words came from Ray’s so-called first day declaration. (It is a sign of how chaotic this bankruptcy has been that the filing usually filed on the first day is being filed on the sixth day of the process.)
“Never in my career have I seen such a complete failure of corporate controls and such a complete absence of trustworthy financial information as occurred here,” wrote Ray in the Delaware court filing. Then he offered his verdict on the previous management team, including disgraced founder and former CEO Sam Bankman-Fried. “From compromised systems integrity and faulty regulatory oversight abroad, to the concentration of control in the hands of a very small group of inexperienced, unsophisticated and potentially compromised individuals, this situation is unprecedented.”
This description is not a surprise given details that have trickled out about FTX in recent days, including reports that Bankman-Fried ran the whole operation from his penthouse without a board, and that top executives were engaged in drug use and polyamory.
Nonetheless, some of the details set out in the balance sheet are shocking. Ray has the receipts and he’s unsparing about FTX’s lack of, well, receipts. As Ray puts it: “One of the most pervasive failures of the FTX.com business in particular is the absence of lasting records of decision-making.”
Ray notes that FTX does not have an accounting department and that it has “been unable to prepare a complete list of who worked for the FTX Group as of the Petition Date, or the terms of their employment.”
As chartered accountant Genevieve Roch-Dector has noted, FTX made large personal loans to its executive and made major corporate decisions by chat with many messages deleted soon after. Ray’s disbelief screams from the page: “employees of the FTX Group submitted payment requests through an on-line ‘chat’ platform where a disparate group of supervisors approved disbursements by responding with personalized emojis.”
Regarding the use of company funds to buy things for FTX employees, Ray likewise has few receipts to aid his detective work. “I understand that corporate funds of the FTX Group were used to purchase homes and other personal items for employees and advisors. I understand that there does not appear to be documentation for certain of these transactions as loans, and that certain real estate was recorded in the personal name of these employees and advisors on the records of the Bahamas.”
What little paper trail there is, Ray finds untrustworthy, for instance FTX’s infamous balance sheet. “Because such balance sheet was produced while the Debtors were controlled by Mr. Bankman-Fried,” he writes, “I do not have confidence in it, and the information therein may not be correct as of the date stated.”
All of this amounts to a massive headache for Ray, who is tasked with sorting out this mess and must identify assets that can be allocated to investors and creditors—a task that will become even harder given a report by Semafor that Bankman-Fried transferred large sums of money or crypto out of the exchange last week, possibly at the bequest of the Bahamian government. Meanwhile, unlike in typical bankruptcy cases, the FTX filing didn’t include a list of major creditors, likely because the company has no ideas of its own liabilities.
In other high-profile bankruptcies involving fraud, like Enron, attorneys like Ray have had to decipher paper trails intended to mislead regulators and auditors. But in the case of FTX, there will often be no paper trail at all—making both Ray’s task, and the criminal risk posed to Bankman-Fried, that much steeper.
There may not even be an emoji trail.