大概一年多以前,我就預(yù)測了經(jīng)濟衰退將在2023年下半年開始。這是顯而易見的。美國連續(xù)多年的零利率政策引發(fā)了股市、債市和房市泡沫。2022年6月,為了應(yīng)對飆升至9%的通脹率,美聯(lián)儲開始提高聯(lián)邦基金利率——即銀行間隔夜拆借利率,以冷卻商品和服務(wù)需求,目標(biāo)是將通脹率壓至2%。
目前,美國通貨膨脹的增長速度達到40年之最。由于工資增長顯然趕不上物價上漲的速度,美聯(lián)儲必須采取必要手段緩解老百姓的痛苦。簡而言之,工資-物價螺旋上升是一個美麗的神話。更確切地說,它要在幾輪通脹周期中才會顯現(xiàn)。
為了給經(jīng)濟降溫,并且將通脹至到目標(biāo)水平,美聯(lián)儲去年一整年都在快速提高聯(lián)邦基金利率。利率也從去年3月的近零利零,迅速上調(diào)至今年3月的4.75-5.00的區(qū)間。
最近的CPI數(shù)據(jù)顯示,2023年2月,美國的物價同比上漲6%,遠高于最新的5%的聯(lián)邦基金目標(biāo)利率。從歷史上看,美聯(lián)儲一般都將聯(lián)邦基金利率加息至通脹率以上,以遏制惡性通脹。但杰羅姆·鮑威爾畢竟不是保羅·沃爾克。后者曾在40多年前一口氣加息至接近18%,遠超12%的通脹率水平。至于接下來的幾個月,美聯(lián)儲是否會繼續(xù)加息控通脹,我們還將拭目以待。
不過就在美聯(lián)儲宣布新的加息目標(biāo)后,美聯(lián)儲主席鮑威爾在3月23日的新聞發(fā)布會上表示,除了控制惡性通脹之外,還有一件事值得擔(dān)憂——那就是硅谷銀行和簽名銀行的倒閉,讓美聯(lián)儲的宏觀經(jīng)濟管理目標(biāo)變得復(fù)雜了。美聯(lián)儲一般是通過調(diào)控利率來抑制通脹(包括通脹預(yù)期)的,而當(dāng)美國經(jīng)濟滑向衰退時,為了提振經(jīng)濟行為,美聯(lián)儲最有效的武器仍然是調(diào)控利率。另外,當(dāng)有銀行倒閉時,美聯(lián)儲還要負責(zé)確保金融穩(wěn)定,防止全國各地出現(xiàn)更多的銀行擠兌。雖然鮑威爾堅稱美國的銀行體系是“堅挺”的,但這話究竟有幾分可信,只有時間能告訴我們答案。
問題的真相是,美國彼此割裂的準(zhǔn)備金制度、寬松貨幣政策和聯(lián)邦存款保險雜糅在一起,釀成了一種道德風(fēng)險,導(dǎo)致了高風(fēng)險的銀行借貸行為。因此,當(dāng)一家銀行財務(wù)狀況不穩(wěn)的傳言傳開時,擠兌就會發(fā)生,這充分體現(xiàn)了美國銀行系統(tǒng)脆弱的流動性和資債情況。
美聯(lián)儲面臨的困局完全是它自己一手造成的。一旦物價上漲加速,通脹預(yù)期就會占主導(dǎo)地位——而一般情況下,美聯(lián)儲就會通過大幅調(diào)控利率,來抑制公眾的債務(wù)需求,從而降低市場需求,進而促進物價上漲放緩甚至是下降。
另外,預(yù)示衰退即將到來的最好的指標(biāo)之一,就是收益率曲線的倒轉(zhuǎn),尤其是10年期美國國債和3月期美國國債之間的收益率差。這條曲線在2022年10月底曾出現(xiàn)倒轉(zhuǎn)。從歷史上看,當(dāng)短期利率高于長期利率時,經(jīng)濟衰退大約會在一年后開始。有趣的是,當(dāng)收益率曲線在1998年出現(xiàn)倒轉(zhuǎn)時,經(jīng)濟衰退并未隨之而來,直至2000年該曲線再次倒轉(zhuǎn)——當(dāng)時美聯(lián)儲正在收緊信貸以應(yīng)對互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫。換句話說,每個“規(guī)則”也都是有例外的。
此外,這條收益率曲線還在2019年3月出現(xiàn)過倒轉(zhuǎn),當(dāng)時美聯(lián)儲開始提高聯(lián)邦基金利率,以應(yīng)對“過熱”的經(jīng)濟和強勁的金融市場。
不過美聯(lián)儲隨后就“轉(zhuǎn)向”了。就在2020年大選前,時任總統(tǒng)特朗普批評了美聯(lián)儲的加息行為,收益率曲線也隨即“轉(zhuǎn)正”。在美國歷史上,歷屆總統(tǒng)曾多次向“獨立履職”的美聯(lián)儲表達對其金融政策的看法,而每逢大選年,美聯(lián)儲也會很“講政治”地對總統(tǒng)的意愿做出回應(yīng)。所有總統(tǒng)都希望美聯(lián)儲在他尋求連任時,能夠幫忙保持流動性的暢通和低利率,以確保經(jīng)濟運轉(zhuǎn)良好。
2020年,為了應(yīng)對疫情防控而導(dǎo)致的經(jīng)濟衰退,美國出臺了大規(guī)模的貨幣刺激政策,但這也讓美國在2022年吃到了惡果。美聯(lián)儲史無前例地從2020年初的3.8萬億美元擴表至2022年末的7.1萬億美元,這也為物價的全面上漲提供了動力。隨著近幾個月廣義貨幣M2的下降,美聯(lián)儲仍在繼續(xù)縮表,基本上是在有效地從經(jīng)濟中回收流動性,而這又將對價格、失業(yè)率和GDP產(chǎn)生什么影響呢?
首先,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)金融和高科技行業(yè)的失業(yè)率開始上升,這些行業(yè)自2008年的全球金融危機以來,一直受益于美聯(lián)儲的寬松貨幣政策。
高盛一直是華爾街盈利和就業(yè)情況的風(fēng)向標(biāo),最近,高盛宣布裁員4000人左右,并將削減獎金。如果說高盛打響了2023年華爾街裁員的第一槍,那么緊接著華爾街還將迎來槍林彈雨,而且這種狀況還將蔓延至全美。臉書的母公司Meta和亞馬遜最近都宣布將再次大規(guī)模裁員。如果未來幾個月裁員加速,那么一場衰退就將開始,而這也將是對過去幾年的寬松政策的調(diào)整 。
目前,美國的就業(yè)市場總體上看似乎還很強勁,但從長期失業(yè)率來看,裁員往往在商業(yè)周期衰退階段的早期就開始了,然后企業(yè)意識到,他們必須削減支出,應(yīng)對貨幣緊縮和需求放緩的“新常態(tài)”,到了這時,裁員的速度就會明顯加快。
當(dāng)經(jīng)濟處于周期的頂峰時,失業(yè)率往往也是最低的,這時它一般會“穩(wěn)定”在周期的最低水平,然后就會開始重新上升。
而當(dāng)失業(yè)率達到政治上無法容忍的水平時,美聯(lián)儲就會“轉(zhuǎn)向”,開始降低聯(lián)邦基金利率。又一輪的貨幣寬松熱潮被點燃了。
那么,美聯(lián)儲何時才會轉(zhuǎn)向呢?是2023年,還是2024年,或者更晚?現(xiàn)在下結(jié)論還為時過早,但是觀察失業(yè)率的升高水平,則是預(yù)言下一波寬松貨幣政策和下一輪經(jīng)濟增長的最佳指標(biāo)。
本文作者Murray Sabrin博士是新澤西州拉馬波學(xué)院金融學(xué)名譽教授。
《財富》網(wǎng)站評論文章僅代表作者個人觀點,并不代表《財富》雜志的觀點和立場。(財富中文網(wǎng)
譯者:樸成奎
大概一年多以前,我就預(yù)測了經(jīng)濟衰退將在2023年下半年開始。這是顯而易見的。美國連續(xù)多年的零利率政策引發(fā)了股市、債市和房市泡沫。2022年6月,為了應(yīng)對飆升至9%的通脹率,美聯(lián)儲開始提高聯(lián)邦基金利率——即銀行間隔夜拆借利率,以冷卻商品和服務(wù)需求,目標(biāo)是將通脹率壓至2%。
目前,美國通貨膨脹的增長速度達到40年之最。由于工資增長顯然趕不上物價上漲的速度,美聯(lián)儲必須采取必要手段緩解老百姓的痛苦。簡而言之,工資-物價螺旋上升是一個美麗的神話。更確切地說,它要在幾輪通脹周期中才會顯現(xiàn)。
為了給經(jīng)濟降溫,并且將通脹至到目標(biāo)水平,美聯(lián)儲去年一整年都在快速提高聯(lián)邦基金利率。利率也從去年3月的近零利零,迅速上調(diào)至今年3月的4.75-5.00的區(qū)間。
最近的CPI數(shù)據(jù)顯示,2023年2月,美國的物價同比上漲6%,遠高于最新的5%的聯(lián)邦基金目標(biāo)利率。從歷史上看,美聯(lián)儲一般都將聯(lián)邦基金利率加息至通脹率以上,以遏制惡性通脹。但杰羅姆·鮑威爾畢竟不是保羅·沃爾克。后者曾在40多年前一口氣加息至接近18%,遠超12%的通脹率水平。至于接下來的幾個月,美聯(lián)儲是否會繼續(xù)加息控通脹,我們還將拭目以待。
不過就在美聯(lián)儲宣布新的加息目標(biāo)后,美聯(lián)儲主席鮑威爾在3月23日的新聞發(fā)布會上表示,除了控制惡性通脹之外,還有一件事值得擔(dān)憂——那就是硅谷銀行和簽名銀行的倒閉,讓美聯(lián)儲的宏觀經(jīng)濟管理目標(biāo)變得復(fù)雜了。美聯(lián)儲一般是通過調(diào)控利率來抑制通脹(包括通脹預(yù)期)的,而當(dāng)美國經(jīng)濟滑向衰退時,為了提振經(jīng)濟行為,美聯(lián)儲最有效的武器仍然是調(diào)控利率。另外,當(dāng)有銀行倒閉時,美聯(lián)儲還要負責(zé)確保金融穩(wěn)定,防止全國各地出現(xiàn)更多的銀行擠兌。雖然鮑威爾堅稱美國的銀行體系是“堅挺”的,但這話究竟有幾分可信,只有時間能告訴我們答案。
問題的真相是,美國彼此割裂的準(zhǔn)備金制度、寬松貨幣政策和聯(lián)邦存款保險雜糅在一起,釀成了一種道德風(fēng)險,導(dǎo)致了高風(fēng)險的銀行借貸行為。因此,當(dāng)一家銀行財務(wù)狀況不穩(wěn)的傳言傳開時,擠兌就會發(fā)生,這充分體現(xiàn)了美國銀行系統(tǒng)脆弱的流動性和資債情況。
美聯(lián)儲面臨的困局完全是它自己一手造成的。一旦物價上漲加速,通脹預(yù)期就會占主導(dǎo)地位——而一般情況下,美聯(lián)儲就會通過大幅調(diào)控利率,來抑制公眾的債務(wù)需求,從而降低市場需求,進而促進物價上漲放緩甚至是下降。
另外,預(yù)示衰退即將到來的最好的指標(biāo)之一,就是收益率曲線的倒轉(zhuǎn),尤其是10年期美國國債和3月期美國國債之間的收益率差。這條曲線在2022年10月底曾出現(xiàn)倒轉(zhuǎn)。從歷史上看,當(dāng)短期利率高于長期利率時,經(jīng)濟衰退大約會在一年后開始。有趣的是,當(dāng)收益率曲線在1998年出現(xiàn)倒轉(zhuǎn)時,經(jīng)濟衰退并未隨之而來,直至2000年該曲線再次倒轉(zhuǎn)——當(dāng)時美聯(lián)儲正在收緊信貸以應(yīng)對互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫。換句話說,每個“規(guī)則”也都是有例外的。
此外,這條收益率曲線還在2019年3月出現(xiàn)過倒轉(zhuǎn),當(dāng)時美聯(lián)儲開始提高聯(lián)邦基金利率,以應(yīng)對“過熱”的經(jīng)濟和強勁的金融市場。
不過美聯(lián)儲隨后就“轉(zhuǎn)向”了。就在2020年大選前,時任總統(tǒng)特朗普批評了美聯(lián)儲的加息行為,收益率曲線也隨即“轉(zhuǎn)正”。在美國歷史上,歷屆總統(tǒng)曾多次向“獨立履職”的美聯(lián)儲表達對其金融政策的看法,而每逢大選年,美聯(lián)儲也會很“講政治”地對總統(tǒng)的意愿做出回應(yīng)。所有總統(tǒng)都希望美聯(lián)儲在他尋求連任時,能夠幫忙保持流動性的暢通和低利率,以確保經(jīng)濟運轉(zhuǎn)良好。
2020年,為了應(yīng)對疫情防控而導(dǎo)致的經(jīng)濟衰退,美國出臺了大規(guī)模的貨幣刺激政策,但這也讓美國在2022年吃到了惡果。美聯(lián)儲史無前例地從2020年初的3.8萬億美元擴表至2022年末的7.1萬億美元,這也為物價的全面上漲提供了動力。隨著近幾個月廣義貨幣M2的下降,美聯(lián)儲仍在繼續(xù)縮表,基本上是在有效地從經(jīng)濟中回收流動性,而這又將對價格、失業(yè)率和GDP產(chǎn)生什么影響呢?
首先,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)金融和高科技行業(yè)的失業(yè)率開始上升,這些行業(yè)自2008年的全球金融危機以來,一直受益于美聯(lián)儲的寬松貨幣政策。
高盛一直是華爾街盈利和就業(yè)情況的風(fēng)向標(biāo),最近,高盛宣布裁員4000人左右,并將削減獎金。如果說高盛打響了2023年華爾街裁員的第一槍,那么緊接著華爾街還將迎來槍林彈雨,而且這種狀況還將蔓延至全美。臉書的母公司Meta和亞馬遜最近都宣布將再次大規(guī)模裁員。如果未來幾個月裁員加速,那么一場衰退就將開始,而這也將是對過去幾年的寬松政策的調(diào)整 。
目前,美國的就業(yè)市場總體上看似乎還很強勁,但從長期失業(yè)率來看,裁員往往在商業(yè)周期衰退階段的早期就開始了,然后企業(yè)意識到,他們必須削減支出,應(yīng)對貨幣緊縮和需求放緩的“新常態(tài)”,到了這時,裁員的速度就會明顯加快。
當(dāng)經(jīng)濟處于周期的頂峰時,失業(yè)率往往也是最低的,這時它一般會“穩(wěn)定”在周期的最低水平,然后就會開始重新上升。
而當(dāng)失業(yè)率達到政治上無法容忍的水平時,美聯(lián)儲就會“轉(zhuǎn)向”,開始降低聯(lián)邦基金利率。又一輪的貨幣寬松熱潮被點燃了。
那么,美聯(lián)儲何時才會轉(zhuǎn)向呢?是2023年,還是2024年,或者更晚?現(xiàn)在下結(jié)論還為時過早,但是觀察失業(yè)率的升高水平,則是預(yù)言下一波寬松貨幣政策和下一輪經(jīng)濟增長的最佳指標(biāo)。
本文作者Murray Sabrin博士是新澤西州拉馬波學(xué)院金融學(xué)名譽教授。
《財富》網(wǎng)站評論文章僅代表作者個人觀點,并不代表《財富》雜志的觀點和立場。(財富中文網(wǎng)
譯者:樸成奎
More than a year ago, I forecast a recession would begin in the second half of 2023. That was a no-brainer. Years of virtually zero interest rates ignited stock markets, bond markets, and housing bubbles. To deal with the spike in the inflation rate to 9% in June 2022, the Federal Reserve began to increase the Fed funds rate–the rate banks lend to each other overnight–expecting to cool demand for goods and services and thus bring the rate of inflation down to its target rate of 2%.
With inflation increasing at the fastest pace in more than 40 years, the Fed had to act to deal with the pain families were feeling as wage increases lagged the rise in the cost of living. In short, the wage-price spiral is a myth. More accurately, a price-wage spiral unfolds during inflationary cycles.
In an effort to cool off the economy and get inflation to its target rate, the Federal Reserve began to increase the Fed funds rate rapidly throughout 2022. Rates increased from virtually zero in March of that year to a target range of 4.75-5.00 for March 2023.
Nevertheless, the latest CPI data reveal prices rose 6% in February 2023 compared with the same month the previous year–well above the new Fed funds target rate of 5%. Historically, the Fed would raise its funds rate above the inflation rate to break the back of inflation. In short, Jerome Powell is no Paul Volcker, who raised the Fed funds rate more than four decades ago to nearly 18%–well above the 12% inflation rate (see above). We will have to wait and see if the Fed will raise the Fed funds rate in coming months to bring the inflation rate down.
However, Chairman Powell has another concern besides tweaking the Fed funds rate to slay the inflation dragon, which he addressed during his Mar. 23 press conference after the Fed announced the new funds rate target. The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank complicates the Fed’s task of “managing” the macroeconomy by moving the Fed funds rate up and down to dampen inflation (and inflation expectations) and boost economic activity when the economy eventually slides into a recession. Additionally, the Fed is responsible for ensuring financial stability when banks fail and preventing more bank runs throughout the country. Only time will tell if Chairman Powell’s assertion that the banking system is “sound” turns out to be true.
The truth of the matter is a combination of fractional reserve banking, easy money, and FDIC depositor insurance has created a moral hazard that promotes risky bank lending. Thus, when a rumor of a bank’s shaky financial condition gains traction, a run unfolds, revealing tenuous liquidity situations and weak balance sheets.
The conundrum the Fed faces is of its own making. Once price inflation accelerates, expectations take hold–and it typically takes a large move in interest rates to dampen the public’s appetite for debt, which would reduce demand and hence cause prices to decelerate, if not actually decline.
Meanwhile, one of the best indicators of an impending recession is the inverted yield curve, particularly the difference between the 10-year Treasury note and the three-month T-bill. The curve inverted at the end of October 2022. Historically, when short-term rates rise above the long-term rate a recession begins about a year later. Interestingly, when the yield curve inverted in 1998, a recession did not follow until the curve inverted again in 2000 when the Fed tightened credit to deal with the dot-com bubble. In other words, there are exceptions to every “rule.”
Furthermore, the yield curve inverted in March 2019, when the Fed began to raise the fed funds rate in response to what was perceived to be an “overheated” economy and robust financial markets.
The Federal Reserve then “pivoted”–and the yield curve went positive after then-president Trump criticized the Fed for raising interest rates before the 2020 election. This is one of many episodes in history of a president making his views known to the “independent” Federal Reserve, which usually responds to a president’s wishes going into an election year. All presidents want the Fed to keep the monetary spigot open and interest rates low to make sure the economy is humming when they seek another term.
The massive monetary stimulus of 2020 to deal with the economy’s implosion because of the COVID-19 lockdown came home to roost in 2022. The Fed’s unprecedented increase in its balance sheet from $3.8 trillion in early 2020 to $7.1 trillion by the end of 2022 provided the fuel to raise prices across the board. With M2 declining in recent months and the Fed continuing to shrink its balance sheet, effectively withdrawing liquidity from the economy, what effect will this have on prices, unemployment, and GDP?
We are witnessing the beginning of increasing unemployment in the financial sector and high-tech, which have benefitted from the Fed’s easy money policies since the Great Recession of 2008.
Recently, Goldman Sachs, a bellwether of Wall Street profitability and employment, announced layoffs of around 4,000 employees and cut bonuses. If Goldman’s announcement is a forerunner of 2023’s Wall Street’s downsizing, then higher unemployment is unfolding in the canyons of lower Manhattan–and soon in the rest of the country as 2023 unfolds.?Facebook parent Meta and Amazon recently announced another major downsizing of their workforces. If layoffs accelerate in the next few months, a recession–a readjustment to the end of the easy money policies of the past few years–will be underway.
The job market may seem strong overall–but according to a long-term chart of the unemployment rate (above), layoffs tend to begin early in the recession phase of the business cycle, and then accelerate markedly as companies realize they must cut expenses to deal with the new economic reality of tight money and slowing demand.
When the unemployment rate reaches a trough as the economy peaks, it tends to “stabilize” at the lowest level of the cycle–and then it is off to the races.
When unemployment reaches politically intolerable levels, that’s when the Fed “pivots” and begins to lower the fed funds rate. Another easy money boom is ignited.
When will the Fed pivot? 2023? 2024? Later? It is too early to tell–but watching the unemployment rate ratchet up is the best indicator for the next episode of easy money and the next upswing in the economy.
Murray Sabrin, Ph.D., is emeritus professor of finance, Ramapo College of New Jersey.
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